The end of the deal, hopes, delusions and treasons

[PAKISTANFOREVER]

Team Trump has adopted a new position under Biden administration based on three terms:

1. Mullah are desperate to have SOME sanction relief. They will come to the table.
2. They need two years to make one bomb, IF they decide to. We have time. No rush.
3. You need enough of major sanctions left for more bargain on other important stuff.
——————-
What they have no plan for:
- What to do when enrichment level increases.
- What to do when inspections are limited.
- How much time is a reasonable time to wait.
- What if a surprise nuke test happens. Who guarantees two years of time.

In May 2006, Netanyahu claimed that Iran need 18 months to make a nuclear bomb. Yet here in 2021, 15 years later, Iran needs another 2 years to make a nuke...........................

 

[Arian]

In May 2006, Netanyahu claimed that Iran need 18 months to make a nuclear bomb. Yet here in 2021, 15 years later, Iran needs another 2 years to make a nuke...........................

Well, the JCPOA set back Iran's nuclear stockpile by 12 years at least.

In 2013 before the Rouhani administration took the office from Ahmadinejad, we had 13,000 kilograms of 3.5% uranium (LEU) as well as 300 kilograms of 20% uranium (HALEU). Now we have less than 3,000 kilograms of LEU (mostly enriched to 4.5%) and about 17 kilograms of HALEU.

 

[PAKISTANFOREVER]

Well, the JCPOA set back Iran's nuclear stockpile by 12 years at least.

In 2013 before the Rouhani administration took the office from Ahmadinejad, we had 13,000 kilograms of 3.5% uranium (LEU) as well as 300 kilograms of 20% uranium (HALEU). Now we have less than 3,000 kilograms of LEU (mostly enriched to 4.5%) and about 17 kilograms of HALEU.

My point is that Iran is probably already nuclear capable. Which is why the americans and Israelis don't attack. Look at what the americans did to Iraq and Afghanistan because they had no nukes.

 

[Shawnee]

In May 2006, Netanyahu claimed that Iran need 18 months to make a nuclear bomb. Yet here in 2021, 15 years later, Iran needs another 2 years to make a nuke...........................

He was right back then. Open nuke test is a strategic decision not an engineering obstacle.

 

[Philosopher]

In my opinion, Iran achieves nothing by leaving the NPT if it doesn't intend to have a military nuclear program. Kicking the IAEA inspectors out completely is not really a rational step before we have made our decision to move towards nuclear bombs. We need to halt our adherence to the Additional Protocol, which can be justified as we were voluntarily executing it, but we should remain a member of the NPT unless we have reached a point where we can leave it and build nukes in a short matter of time (preferably in 3 months after notifying the agency of our decision to leave the NPT)

My only concern at this point is the damage done to the ICAC a few months ago. That can have an impact on our assembly of new advanced centrifuges. We cannot reach our target of 190,000 SWU without a fully operational assembly center like the ICAC.

Few point to note, tactically speaking, in my opinion leaving the NPT will serve as a potent pressure mechanism against the west. If we want to talk generally, then being part of NPT has done little/nothing for Iran. Matter of fact, NPT was used as an excuse to sanction Iran and to get the likes Russia and China on board in the UNSC sanctions. Iran can say, it will leave the NPT and not rejoin until the Zionists open up and join. As for the inspectors, removing their eyes will once again put a great pressure on the Americans. I do not think it is necessary for Iran to go nuclear with the above steps, but it will be enough of a hint it could go down that road.

The reason why I put forward the above moves is because Iran's retaliation against Americans and their deranged JCPOA tactics cannot be to simply go back to pre-JCPOA levels. Iran's response needs to be to go way beyond that. Morever, these will at first be threats of what Iran will do if they do not return to the deal, I believe they will come running back if Iran makes these threats. If they do not, well then Iran must go ahead with its expanded programs.

In terms what happened to the centrifuge machines, it is hard to comment exactly given we do not know if Iran has other such machines or the ability to produce/procure them. Nevertheless, even if there will be initial obstacles, we must go ahead fully speed. I am positive there is nothing about these machines that Iran could not produce if it really needed to.

I was in favour on going back into the JCPOA in order to get access to cash to given some breathing space to Iran's economy, but at this rate like I said earlier Iran's appetite for it is reducing by the day.

Team Trump has adopted a new position under Biden administration based on three terms:

1. Mullah are desperate to have SOME sanction relief. They will come to the table.
2. They need two years to make one bomb, IF they decide to. We have time. No rush.
3. You need enough of major sanctions left for more bargain on other important stuff.
——————-
What they have no plan for:
- What to do when enrichment level increases.
- What to do when inspections are limited.
- How much time is a reasonable time to wait.
- What if a surprise nuke test happens. Who guarantees two years of time.

They understand and have openly stated that these "x months/years before Iran gets a weapon" are just political time and not really technological, i.e If Iran made the political decision to produce a weapon openly (assuming it does not already have them) the real time will probably be a matter of weeks. I have little doubt post February, things will become much more aggressive from Iran's end. Iran will not sit around and watch them drag their feet for 3.5 years, then reduce some sanctions in their final months and then if a new president comes in power to play the Trump card again.

 

[Shawnee]

The time is running out for the Americans, these "no you first" conditions are in vain. Later on this month a good portion of the IAEA inspections will be cut. In my opinion once that is done Iran must go all out and give the Americans 2-4 weeks to completely remove all the sanctions or the following will happen:

1) Iran will completely leave the JCPOA and kick out all inspectors (i.e spies)
2) Declare it has left the NPT - leaving the NPT does not happen straight away, you need to give them few months notice.
3) It should also make it clear that its nuclear program will change in its posture i.e increase enrichment to beyond 20% and start working on developing new enrichment facilities deep underground with the aim of reaching the 1000,000 SWU target.
4) Start making more hints of Iran potentially going nuclear, like we recently saw from the the intelligence minister.

If these threats are made, then you will see how quickly these Americans will run back to the deal. The more these Americans drag their feet, the less appetite Iran will have for the JCPOA because as time goes by, Iran is adapting more and more to these sanctions. The Americans do not seem to realise they are the ones that is running out of time here.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1359919480319729673

When you watch the video, you see the confidence of Zarif and his power as an orator. His accent is better than half Iranians who have lived in the west for decades.

Jalili cannot do this!
Does Jalili know the difference between Bill OReilly and Bill Maher?

Let’s give him credit where he deserves.

 

[Arian]

Few point to note, tactically speaking, in my opinion leaving the NPT will serve as a potent pressure mechanism against the west. If we want to talk generally, then being part of NPT has done little/nothing for Iran. Matter of fact, NPT was used as an excuse to sanction Iran and to get the likes Russia and China on board in the UNSC sanctions. Iran can say, it will leave the NPT and not rejoin until the Zionists open up and join. As for the inspectors, removing their eyes will once again put a great pressure on the Americans. I do not think it is necessary for Iran to go nuclear with the above steps, but it will be enough of a hint it could go down that road.

The reason why I put forward the above moves is because Iran's retaliation against Americans and their deranged JCPOA tactics cannot be to simply go back to pre-JCPOA levels. Iran's response needs to be to go way beyond that. Morever, these will at first be threats of what Iran will do if they do not return to the deal, I believe they will come running back if Iran makes these threats. If they do not, well then Iran must go ahead with its expanded programs.

In terms what happened to the centrifuge machines, it is hard to comment exactly given we do not know if Iran has other such machines or the ability to produce/procure them. Nevertheless, even if there will be initial obstacles, we must go ahead fully speed. I am positive there is nothing about these machines that Iran could not produce if it really needed to.

I was in favour on going back into the JCPOA in order to get access to cash to given some breathing space to Iran's economy, but at this rate like I said earlier Iran's appetite for it is reducing by the day.


They understand and have openly stated that these "x months/years before Iran gets a weapon" are just political time and not really technological, i.e If Iran made the political decision to produce a weapon openly (assuming it does not already have them) the real time will probably be a matter of weeks. I have little doubt post February, things will become much more aggressive from Iran's end. Iran will not sit around and watch them drag their feet for 3.5 years, then reduce some sanctions in their final months and then if a new president comes in power to play the Trump card again.

Leaving the NPT prematurely can lead to a UNSC resolution under Chapter VII. We need to make sure that we're capable of defending ourselves against a potential international coalition that will target our nuclear facilities in limited strikes or declare a no-fly zone over Iran temporarily. Detonating a nuclear bomb before such a coalition forms will not only cancel their plans against Iran, but will force them to enter into negotiation with us from a much weaker position.

We can enrich uranium to more than 20%, but why should we do that? Enriching uranium to 20% means that we already have 83% of the job done. We won't gain much by increasing 20% to 60%. Unless we want to declare that we're aiming for 90% which is going to cause strong international reactions and we're back to my first point again.

We had disassembled thousands of IR-1 and IR-2 centrifuges after the JCPOA. We were keeping them in stock. I don't know whether they were among the damaged things at the ICAC or not. I hope they were stored at Kalaye Electric near Tehran and they weren't destroyed. Nevertheless, rebuilding the ICAC seems like a job that will take months or years, particularly now that we know it will be an underground facility. The satellite images showed that the damage was substantial.

I personally think that the most important thing here is the political will of the Iranian leaders. They should make up their minds and make a hard decision. If it were me, I would choose nuclear tests and ICBM tests without hesitation. But then again we don't have as much as information as they do.

 

[Philosopher]

Leaving the NPT prematurely can lead to a UNSC resolution under Chapter VII.

I am not 100% familiar with this particular resolution, but could the Russians and the Chinese not veto it?

We need to make sure that we're capable of defending ourselves against a potential international coalition that will target our nuclear facilities in limited strikes or declare a no-fly zone over Iran temporarily. Detonating a nuclear bomb before such a coalition forms will not only cancel their plans against Iran, but will force them to enter into negotiation with us from a much weaker position.

You are correct in your thinking, my assessment is based on the assumption that Iran has the necessary deterrence in play to prevent such a thing from occurring. From my point of view, there will be no attack on Iran pre-emptively regardless of Iran does internally.

We can enrich uranium to more than 20%, but why should we do that? Enriching uranium to 20% means that we already have 83% of the job done. We won't gain much by increasing 20% to 60%. Unless we want to declare that we're aiming for 90% which is going to cause strong international reactions and we're back to my first point again.

If you mean what excuse Iran can use then it has already put in play its card, i.e need for nuclear propulsion systems. I recall during last nuclear day, they talked about revealing their nuclear reactor for propulsion system but due to Covid the whole thing was not openly showed. You are correct in that 20% enrichment has already achieved most of the job, but here we are talking about moves to increase pressure on the other side. Even the recent uranium metal which Iran produced in theory has much more military uses (used for weapons core) than civilian but they went down that road. I see enrichmentincrease to also be part of the upcoming escalation ladder if the Americans do not play ball.

We had disassembled thousands of IR-1 and IR-2 centrifuges after the JCPOA. We were keeping them in stock. I don't know whether they were among the damaged things at the ICAC or not. I hope they were stored at Kalaye Electric near Tehran and they weren't destroyed. Nevertheless, rebuilding the ICAC seems like a job that will take months or years, particularly now that we know it will be an underground facility. The satellite images showed that the damage was substantial.

We need to wait and see what happens to the new facility they started to build after that incident. It will certainly delay the production of newer generation centrifuges, but Iran is no hurry right now to start the mass production. Bare in mind, Iran had stated it has the capability to produce 60 centrifuged per day, so if it focuses on expanding this capability, then once the new balancing machines are ready, it could produce 100's per day to make up for any lost time. That attack was important in the sense it will once again force Iran to self produce any bottle neck components. The attack certainly reduced the number of cards Iran has to play at this point, but it is nothing that Iran cannot make up for.

I personally think that the most important thing here is the political will of the Iranian leaders. They should make up their minds and make a hard decision. If it were me, I would choose nuclear tests and ICBM tests without hesitation. But then again we don't have as much as information as they do.

My personal belief is that Iran is already covertly nuclear. Iran has its own calculation in terms of when it will openly declare to go nuclear. We are getting a hint of that due to the recent comment by the intelligent minister.

 

[Arian]

I am not 100% familiar with this particular resolution, but could the Russians and the Chinese not veto it?

Chapter VII of the UN charter discusses taking action against countries that the UNSC deems them as threatening the world peace. It talks about non-compliance with the UNSC resolutions. The UNSC can declare a no-fly zone over such a country, impose a complete blockade on the country, and form an international coalition to attack the country. Any UN member that does not comply with the coalition or the UNSC decisions can be sanctioned herself.

Can we count on the Russians or the Chinese? I think no. They previously failed to veto UNSC resolutions against us, not only once, but 4 times. They didn't do anything to help Iraq fight the US invasion. Why would they help us?

You are correct in your thinking, my assessment is based on the assumption that Iran has the necessary deterrence in play to prevent such a thing from occurring. From my point of view, there will be no attack on Iran pre-emptively regardless of Iran does internally.

I think we have a good deterrence against a US unilateral strike with her regional allies. I don't think we can have any sort of deterrence against a UN coalition, unless we have nukes.

If you mean what excuse Iran can use then it has already put in play its card, i.e need for nuclear propulsion systems. I recall during last nuclear day, they talked about revealing their nuclear reactor for propulsion system but due to Covid the whole thing was not openly showed. You are correct in that 20% enrichment has already achieved most of the job, but here we are talking about moves to increase pressure on the other side. Even the recent uranium metal which Iran produced in theory has much more military uses (used for weapons core) than civilian but they went down that road. I see enrichmentincrease to also be part of the upcoming escalation ladder if the Americans do not play ball.

Honestly, I think the uranium metal production, when it's done in large industrial scale, will be much more useful to us. We can vaporize the uranium metal for laser isotope separation which can be done covertly without the fear of being detected easily by satellite imagery. You don't need huge enrichment facilities with thousands of centrifuges for that. Laser enrichment seems like the best choice for a clandestine program in my opinion.

That aside, we can always find excuses for increasing our enrichment level. But first we should ask ourselves this question: How much does this increase shorten our breakout time? If it's not a significant number, then it's not worth it. I think moving from 20% to 60% is not worth all the drama it will cause unless there's a well-thought strategy behind it.

We need to wait and see what happens to the new facility they started to build after that incident. It will certainly delay the production of newer generation centrifuges, but Iran is no hurry right now to start the mass production. Bare in mind, Iran had stated it has the capability to produce 60 centrifuged per day, so if it focuses on expanding this capability, then once the new balancing machines are ready, it could produce 100's per day to make up for any lost time. That attack was important in the sense it will once again force Iran to self produce any bottle neck components. The attack certainly reduced the number of cards Iran has to play at this point, but it is nothing that Iran cannot make up for.

Those balancing machines and clean rooms will take some time to rebuild. The figure that Iran can produce 60 centrifuges per day was based on reports before the explosion at the ICAC. It's certainly a setback, but at this point Iran has several options for uranium enrichment and developing nukes and we don't rely only on centrifuge technology for uranium enrichment.

Unfortunately, the JCPOA limits Iran's research on laser isotope separation. We did experiment with it in 1990s. I don't see why we shouldn't experiment with it again. If Iran wants to exert more pressure on the Europeans and the Americans, laser isotope separation is a very good choice in my opinion.

My personal belief is that Iran is already covertly nuclear. Iran has its own calculation in terms of when it will openly declare to go nuclear. We are getting a hint of that due to the recent comment by the intelligent minister.

Yes. Now after the recent reports on Iran's nuclear program in 1990s to 2003, it seems that Iran had already made huge progress in the military aspect of its nuclear program. We have mastered the nuclear fuel cycle, plutonium reprocessing, laser isotope separation, bridge wire detonators, neutron initiators, nanosecond imaging, hydrodynamic testing, implosions, etc.

 

[Shawnee]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1360721056034656259

یکی از دلایل این توییت عدم همراهی جمهوریخواهان در استیضاح دوم بود

اگر جمهوری خواهان با دموکرات ها همکاری نکنن در مسایل دیگر مثل برجام هم دخالت داده نمیشن​

 

[Stryker1982]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1360721056034656259

یکی از دلایل این توییت عدم همراهی جمهوریخواهان در استیضاح دوم بود

اگر جمهوری خواهان با دموکرات ها همکاری نکنن در مسایل دیگر مثل برجام هم دخالت داده نمیشن​

I like this new administration. Their poor understanding of Iran will cost them dearly.

 

[Sineva]

I like this new administration. Their poor understanding of Iran will cost them dearly.

Sadly,I think you could make that same statement about literally every single us regime since the beginning of the 1950s.
I think that in reality tho` that when it comes to the iri,that its less a case of poor understanding and more a case of simply refusing to accept the reality that confronts them.

 

[yavar]

وزیر خارجه قطر به تهران می‌آید

وزیر خارجه قطر به تهران می‌آید - تسنیم

منابع خبری از سفر «محمد بن عبدالرحمن آل‌ثانی» وزیر خارجه قطر به تهران خبر می‌دهند.

tn.ai

 

[yavar]

Iran tells IAEA voluntary implementation Additional Protocol ends next week

 

[yavar]

Iran Former Chief of the Nuclear Energy Organization Fereydoun Abbasi: Betrayal and waste of time and financial resources by China on its contract from 1981 to 1997 for 16 years, China violation of its contract