The defeat of the Afghan government sparks debates across Taiwan about if Taiwan will become the same

[Nan Yang]

We should do our best to prepare for the worst possible situation.
We will never be optimistic that the USA will not intervene to CCP liberate Taiwan. So we will do this patiently:
1. Build an economy twice that of the USA.
2. Build the PLN stronger than the USN.
3. Build a nuclear arsenal no worse than that of the USA.

Sounds like Sun Tzu. Attack only when you have already won.

 

[MH.Yang]

Sounds like Sun Tzu. Attack only when you have already won.

孙子曰:昔之善战者，先为不可胜，以待敌之可胜。不可胜在己，可胜在敌。
Sun Tzu:We should first create conditions that will not be defeated, and wait for the opportunity to defeat the enemy. Because if you can't be defeated, you have the initiative; Whether the enemy can be defeated depends on whether the enemy will give us a chance.


This is the foundation of Chinese strategic thought.
For example, we build the Great Wall, that is we create conditions that will not be defeated.
5000 years, Huns, Di, Qiang, Shatuo, Dangxiang, Khitans, Mongolia... Countless nomadic people have become corpses outside the Great Wall, but the owners inside the Great Wall have not changed.

 

[gambit]

And do you think a PRC invasion of Taiwan is going to be comparable to Saddam's invasion of Kuwait?

No, it is going to be much more difficult. See this...

China’s Xi Jinping is forecasting he will invade Taiwan and Biden Vows to respond to any Chinese attempts on Taiwan

China’s Xi Jinping is forecasting he will invade Taiwan, the US better listen: Robert O’Brien Former national security advisor tells 'Kudlow' China 'badly' wants Taiwan Former National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien warned the Biden administration Thursday to not underestimate Xi Jinping’s...

defence.pk

Because you have never served, you do not know what you are talking about.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Iraqi casualties were about 650 rounded figures. When Desert Storm ended, Allied casualties were about 1200 rounded figures.

Why do war planners desire the element of surprise so much?

On the surface, it seems intuitive that if you catch the enemy by surprise, defeat should be swift. That is true. But there is more to a swift defeat to the enemy. A major reason why the element of surprise is so desirable is that it reduces your casualties even if you grossly outnumber the enemy. Up until Desert Storm, PLA doctrine have been to overwhelm enemy defense by sheer numerical superiority, aka the 'human wave' tactic. But Desert Storm proved that flexibility and maneuverability are able to focus force to weak points faster than the enemy could react, in other words, exploit the element of surprise where least expected. The start of the air war was when Iraqi air defense radars were destroyed to create a just wide enough radar gap for the coalition's air forces to fly thru relatively undetected.

With an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, the PLA have no available avenue to exploit the element of surprise. The sea restrict to only one method of troop delivery: by ships. The favorable landing sites are known. The weather openings are predictable. In other words, Taiwanese defense can practically mirror PLA invasion plans.

Absent the element of surprise, the PLA attacking force needs at least a 2-1 numerical superiority ON LAND just to even the odds, let alone sway the odds over to victory. But now the PLA amphibious fleet would be vulnerable for at least 180 km in transit in the strait. Assuming a reasonable surface speed of 20 kts, the fleet would be 4 hrs in open water, and each vessel location would be known to Taiwanese defense IN REAL TIME.

The problem for the PLAN is that Taiwanese artillery can reach out to 40 km and they do not need to destroy the entire fleet. Taiwanese defense, which includes artillery, manned fighter-bombers, and missiles, just have to do enough damage to reduce PLA numerical superiority enough to induce doubt that the invasion will succeed, and if the doubt is there due to enough losses in transit, PLA generals will have no choice but to turn back, else losing the rest on Taiwanese beaches.

When I was active duty, the USAF standard formation was a four-ship flight.

F-15 Eagle Pilot Explains Exactly How He Downed Three Migs During Two Wars

Cesar “Rico” Rodriguez gives a remarkable account of how he brought down three enemy fighters, two during Desert Storm and one during Allied Force.

www.thedrive.com

This is the process junior pilots must work through on an operational unit to progress from being a wingman, through two-ship lead, four-ship lead,...​

If we lose one, for any reason, the flight's effectiveness over the target is commensurately reduced, meaning our burden to do damage to the target is now even greater. If we lose two, most likely the target will survive to retaliate.

This calculus is NOT restricted to air forces.

It means for every four-ship PLA flight, Taiwanese defense just have to destroy one fighter-bomber in order to reduce the flight's effectiveness, and to increase the target's survival odds. The approximate could be applied to missile defense, tank defense, or against the PLA amphibious fleet. To survive as a viable armed force, Taiwanese defense just have to kill one element out of four, whatever it maybe. But more likely, Taiwanese defense will take two out of four.

This is why the element of surprise is so critical but the PLA will not have it over Taiwan.

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

No, it is going to be much more difficult. See this...

China’s Xi Jinping is forecasting he will invade Taiwan and Biden Vows to respond to any Chinese attempts on Taiwan

China’s Xi Jinping is forecasting he will invade Taiwan, the US better listen: Robert O’Brien Former national security advisor tells 'Kudlow' China 'badly' wants Taiwan Former National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien warned the Biden administration Thursday to not underestimate Xi Jinping’s...

defence.pk

Because you have never served, you do not know what you are talking about.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Iraqi casualties were about 650 rounded figures. When Desert Storm ended, Allied casualties were about 1200 rounded figures.

Why do war planners desire the element of surprise so much?

On the surface, it seems intuitive that if you catch the enemy by surprise, defeat should be swift. That is true. But there is more to a swift defeat to the enemy. A major reason why the element of surprise is so desirable is that it reduces your casualties even if you grossly outnumber the enemy. Up until Desert Storm, PLA doctrine have been to overwhelm enemy defense by sheer numerical superiority, aka the 'human wave' tactic. But Desert Storm proved that flexibility and maneuverability are able to focus force to weak points faster than the enemy could react, in other words, exploit the element of surprise where least expected. The start of the air war was when Iraqi air defense radars were destroyed to create a just wide enough radar gap for the coalition's air forces to fly thru relatively undetected.

With an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, the PLA have no available avenue to exploit the element of surprise. The sea restrict to only one method of troop delivery: by ships. The favorable landing sites are known. The weather openings are predictable. In other words, Taiwanese defense can practically mirror PLA invasion plans.

Absent the element of surprise, the PLA attacking force needs at least a 2-1 numerical superiority ON LAND just to even the odds, let alone sway the odds over to victory. But now the PLA amphibious fleet would be vulnerable for at least 180 km in transit in the strait. Assuming a reasonable surface speed of 20 kts, the fleet would be 4 hrs in open water, and each vessel location would be known to Taiwanese defense IN REAL TIME.

The problem for the PLAN is that Taiwanese artillery can reach out to 40 km and they do not need to destroy the entire fleet. Taiwanese defense, which includes artillery, manned fighter-bombers, and missiles, just have to do enough damage to reduce PLA numerical superiority enough to induce doubt that the invasion will succeed, and if the doubt is there due to enough losses in transit, PLA generals will have no choice but to turn back, else losing the rest on Taiwanese beaches.

When I was active duty, the USAF standard formation was a four-ship flight.

F-15 Eagle Pilot Explains Exactly How He Downed Three Migs During Two Wars

Cesar “Rico” Rodriguez gives a remarkable account of how he brought down three enemy fighters, two during Desert Storm and one during Allied Force.

www.thedrive.com

This is the process junior pilots must work through on an operational unit to progress from being a wingman, through two-ship lead, four-ship lead,...​

If we lose one, for any reason, the flight's effectiveness over the target is commensurately reduced, meaning our burden to do damage to the target is now even greater. If we lose two, most likely the target will survive to retaliate.

This calculus is NOT restricted to air forces.

It means for every four-ship PLA flight, Taiwanese defense just have to destroy one fighter-bomber in order to reduce the flight's effectiveness, and to increase the target's survival odds. The approximate could be applied to missile defense, tank defense, or against the PLA amphibious fleet. To survive as a viable armed force, Taiwanese defense just have to kill one element out of four, whatever it maybe. But more likely, Taiwanese defense will take two out of four.

This is why the element of surprise is so critical but the PLA will not have it over Taiwan.

great theory except it was proven in January of 2020 that PLAAF can surprise Taiwan with formations of 20-30 planes that they have no answer to and can only scramble a few F-16s to respond with. in addition they will also be surprised by thousands of cruise missiles and ballistic missiles hitting from non-west coast angles from PLAN assets in the East China Sea and South China Sea. And they will definitely be surprised when they find that their 5 non-AESA AWACs are no match for 35+ AESA AWACS and stealth interceptors. They'll be flying blind, deaf and mute.

Desert Storm is a great example of how the USAF paralyzed the Iraqi ground forces long before US ground forces moved in. A similar paradigm will be observed in Taiwan where PLAN marines will simply stroll onto the beach because all the defenders are dead or fled, since the defenders also have no surprise.

 

[gambit]

great theory except it was proven in January of 2020 that PLAAF can surprise Taiwan with formations of 20-30 planes that they have no answer to and can only scramble a few F-16s to respond with.

The surprise am talking about is for ships, not fighter aircraft, meaning there cannot be a surprise invasion of Taiwan.

in addition they will also be surprised by thousands of cruise missiles and ballistic missiles...

I commented about this with the Iron Dome system. By the time the PLA is battle readied, Taiwan will have a functional version of the Iron Dome. Again, all Taiwanese defense have to do to delay any launch of a Chinese amphibious fleet is to destroy 1/4, but more likely 1/3, of Chinese air assault.

...where PLAN marines will simply stroll onto the beach...

Could be as POW.

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

The surprise am talking about is for ships, not fighter aircraft, meaning there cannot be a surprise invasion of Taiwan.


I commented about this with the Iron Dome system. By the time the PLA is battle readied, Taiwan will have a functional version of the Iron Dome. Again, all Taiwanese defense have to do to delay any launch of a Chinese amphibious fleet is to destroy 1/4, but more likely 1/3, of Chinese air assault.


Could be as POW.

Ships will be very surprising seeing as Taiwan has almost no ASW, no ships with VLS, no ships with long range SAMs, no satellites, no OTH surface search radars etc. There is no mechanism by which they can even detect a 055 or 052D destroyer firing CJ-10 cruise missiles in the South China Sea towards Tainan. They have even less recourse to a 039 sub firing cruise missiles.

Iron Dome... ok, as a pilot you should understand that a Mach 2.2 max system with a 90 kg warhead is very unlikely to intercept a 500 kg IRBM warhead traveling at Mach 15. Iron dome has never been shown to intercept cruise missiles or ballistic missiles.

The system manufacturers themselves say the application is intercepting short range dumb rockets and artillery shells, not missile defense. And Iron Dome was not manufactured by Israel itself, but by France, with a GDP of 3 trillion USD and a proven record of aerospace achievement. Taiwan has a GDP 1/6 the size of France and no history of aerospace achievement.

 

[Beny Karachun]

Ships will be very surprising seeing as Taiwan has almost no ASW, no ships with VLS, no ships with long range SAMs, no satellites, no OTH surface search radars etc. There is no mechanism by which they can even detect a 055 or 052D destroyer firing CJ-10 cruise missiles in the South China Sea towards Tainan. They have even less recourse to a 039 sub firing cruise missiles.

Iron Dome... ok, as a pilot you should understand that a Mach 2.2 max system with a 90 kg warhead is very unlikely to intercept a 500 kg IRBM warhead traveling at Mach 15. Iron dome has never been shown to intercept cruise missiles or ballistic missiles.

The system manufacturers themselves say the application is intercepting short range dumb rockets and artillery shells, not missile defense. And Iron Dome was not manufactured by Israel itself, but by France, with a GDP of 3 trillion USD and a proven record of aerospace achievement. Taiwan has a GDP 1/6 the size of France and no history of aerospace achievement.

Iron Dome can and did intercept ballistic missiles in tests.
Intercepting ballistic missiles isn't the job of the Iron Dome but it's definitely possible, with the right radar and algorithms, Regardless of top speed. The Iron Dome doesn't chase missiles, it blows up near them, head on or from the side. It might limit the range of interception if the radar doesn't detect the incoming ballistic missile early enough. The difference in warhead weight makes absolutely no difference.

Around 50% of Iron Dome missiles are manufactured in Israel, the other half is by Boeing in the US. Where have you heard that France manufactures it?

 

[MH.Yang]

No, it is going to be much more difficult. See this...

China’s Xi Jinping is forecasting he will invade Taiwan and Biden Vows to respond to any Chinese attempts on Taiwan

China’s Xi Jinping is forecasting he will invade Taiwan, the US better listen: Robert O’Brien Former national security advisor tells 'Kudlow' China 'badly' wants Taiwan Former National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien warned the Biden administration Thursday to not underestimate Xi Jinping’s...

defence.pk

Because you have never served, you do not know what you are talking about.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Iraqi casualties were about 650 rounded figures. When Desert Storm ended, Allied casualties were about 1200 rounded figures.

Why do war planners desire the element of surprise so much?

On the surface, it seems intuitive that if you catch the enemy by surprise, defeat should be swift. That is true. But there is more to a swift defeat to the enemy. A major reason why the element of surprise is so desirable is that it reduces your casualties even if you grossly outnumber the enemy. Up until Desert Storm, PLA doctrine have been to overwhelm enemy defense by sheer numerical superiority, aka the 'human wave' tactic. But Desert Storm proved that flexibility and maneuverability are able to focus force to weak points faster than the enemy could react, in other words, exploit the element of surprise where least expected. The start of the air war was when Iraqi air defense radars were destroyed to create a just wide enough radar gap for the coalition's air forces to fly thru relatively undetected.

With an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, the PLA have no available avenue to exploit the element of surprise. The sea restrict to only one method of troop delivery: by ships. The favorable landing sites are known. The weather openings are predictable. In other words, Taiwanese defense can practically mirror PLA invasion plans.

Absent the element of surprise, the PLA attacking force needs at least a 2-1 numerical superiority ON LAND just to even the odds, let alone sway the odds over to victory. But now the PLA amphibious fleet would be vulnerable for at least 180 km in transit in the strait. Assuming a reasonable surface speed of 20 kts, the fleet would be 4 hrs in open water, and each vessel location would be known to Taiwanese defense IN REAL TIME.

The problem for the PLAN is that Taiwanese artillery can reach out to 40 km and they do not need to destroy the entire fleet. Taiwanese defense, which includes artillery, manned fighter-bombers, and missiles, just have to do enough damage to reduce PLA numerical superiority enough to induce doubt that the invasion will succeed, and if the doubt is there due to enough losses in transit, PLA generals will have no choice but to turn back, else losing the rest on Taiwanese beaches.

When I was active duty, the USAF standard formation was a four-ship flight.

F-15 Eagle Pilot Explains Exactly How He Downed Three Migs During Two Wars

Cesar “Rico” Rodriguez gives a remarkable account of how he brought down three enemy fighters, two during Desert Storm and one during Allied Force.

www.thedrive.com

This is the process junior pilots must work through on an operational unit to progress from being a wingman, through two-ship lead, four-ship lead,...​

If we lose one, for any reason, the flight's effectiveness over the target is commensurately reduced, meaning our burden to do damage to the target is now even greater. If we lose two, most likely the target will survive to retaliate.

This calculus is NOT restricted to air forces.

It means for every four-ship PLA flight, Taiwanese defense just have to destroy one fighter-bomber in order to reduce the flight's effectiveness, and to increase the target's survival odds. The approximate could be applied to missile defense, tank defense, or against the PLA amphibious fleet. To survive as a viable armed force, Taiwanese defense just have to kill one element out of four, whatever it maybe. But more likely, Taiwanese defense will take two out of four.

This is why the element of surprise is so critical but the PLA will not have it over Taiwan.

Honey, you may not know. Taiwan is 130 km away from the mainland, and China's WS2D rocket has a range of 480 km.
If the CCP does not care about civilian casualties, it can blow up the whole Taiwan Island into a desert with rockets across the sea.
What you said that airport, radar.etc all is useless. begin the war, they will become rotten iron for the first time.

 

[Wood]

Taiwan will collapse faster than Afghanistan if not for the US troops stationed there. But on the flip side, the US troops would also find it more manageable to hold Taiwan because of its smaller size.

 

[MH.Yang]

The Nanjing Military Region has 40 rocket gun battalions, more than 500 long-range rockets gun, and each vehicle launches 48 rockets in one round.
If we really want to go to war, it will not be a problem to expand 10 times in the short term.
So if 240k rockets attack within 5 minutes, what interception equipment can intercept?

 

[ZeEa5KPul]

This is why the element of surprise is so critical but the PLA will not have it over Taiwan.

Yeah, no. The first PLA Rocket Force barrages will be plenty surprising.

All your wars are failures, so why would I care what an American thinks about Taiwan's prospects? I honestly hope your war planners are as ridiculously inept as you are, talking about "human wave" tactics. You know nothing.

And the PRC doesn't rely on "the element of surprise" to take Taiwan, it relies on overwhelming precision fires. If those separatist traitors cross the line, they'll think God Himself demolished their would-be "country."

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

Iron Dome can and did intercept ballistic missiles in tests.
Intercepting ballistic missiles isn't the job of the Iron Dome but it's definitely possible, with the right radar and algorithms, Regardless of top speed. The Iron Dome doesn't chase missiles, it blows up near them, head on or from the side. It might limit the range of interception if the radar doesn't detect the incoming ballistic missile early enough. The difference in warhead weight makes absolutely no difference.

Around 50% of Iron Dome missiles are manufactured in Israel, the other half is by Boeing in the US. Where have you heard that France manufactures it?

It is hard to intercept something fast with something slow, in general. Blowing them up from the side or head on from Mach 5 vs Mach 2 is not realistic. Missile warhead size matters greatly for a fragmentation warhead, especially against a heavily armored reentry vehicle.

Plus Iron dome still doesn't protect against cruise missiles, as Israeli adversaries do not have a large cruise missile stockpile.

My mistake with France, I thought Rafael was a French company, but it is Israeli. Nonetheless, I still don't think Taiwan can make it, since Israel has a more proven record in aerospace than Taiwan.

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

Iron Dome can and did intercept ballistic missiles in tests.
Intercepting ballistic missiles isn't the job of the Iron Dome but it's definitely possible, with the right radar and algorithms, Regardless of top speed. The Iron Dome doesn't chase missiles, it blows up near them, head on or from the side. It might limit the range of interception if the radar doesn't detect the incoming ballistic missile early enough. The difference in warhead weight makes absolutely no difference.

Around 50% of Iron Dome missiles are manufactured in Israel, the other half is by Boeing in the US. Where have you heard that France manufactures it?

In addition, Iron Dome has well known limitations acknowledged by Israel itself and many other countries with similar systems.

Israel has David's Sling and Arrow as high end systems, for instance.

US and China both have equivalent short ranged missile systems for use against naval threats with similar speeds and missile size:

HQ-10 - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

 

[Beny Karachun]

It is hard to intercept something fast with something slow, in general. Blowing them up from the side or head on from Mach 5 vs Mach 2 is not realistic. Missile warhead size matters greatly for a fragmentation warhead, especially against a heavily armored reentry vehicle.

Plus Iron dome still doesn't protect against cruise missiles, as Israeli adversaries do not have a large cruise missile stockpile.

My mistake with France, I thought Rafael was a French company, but it is Israeli. Nonetheless, I still don't think Taiwan can make it, since Israel has a more proven record in aerospace than Taiwan.

It is realistic, the only downside is that range of protection decreases. 155mm artillery shells fly at Mach 4.5 and the Iron Dome was tested successfully against them. One thing for sure, Iron Dome would work against pretty much anything when you use it for point defense (10-20km radius, maybe slightly more).

I highly doubt 90kg missile with a 15kg warhead is not enough. Warheads aren't protected more than a lightly armored military vehicle.

About cruise missiles:

Iron Dome proved capable of intercepting cruise missiles in latest test of multilayered air defense system

IMDO head said the Defense Ministry is examining proposals for systems that can intercept hypersonic missiles

www.calcalistech.com

" Israel’s short-range rocket interceptor, Iron Dome, also took part in the tests and for the first time showcased its ability to intercept cruise missiles and UAVs and was tested for its ability to intercept targets in tandem with David’s Sling, demonstrating the interoperability of the multilayered air defense mechanism. Both systems were developed by the ministry’s Missile Defense Organization (IMDO). "

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

It is realistic, the only downside is that range of protection decreases. 155mm artillery shells fly at Mach 4.5 and the Iron Dome was tested successfully against them. One thing for sure, Iron Dome would work against pretty much anything when you use it for point defense (10-20km radius, maybe slightly more).

I highly doubt 90kg missile with a 15kg warhead is not enough. Warheads aren't protected more than a lightly armored military vehicle.

About cruise missiles:

Iron Dome proved capable of intercepting cruise missiles in latest test of multilayered air defense system

IMDO head said the Defense Ministry is examining proposals for systems that can intercept hypersonic missiles

www.calcalistech.com

" Israel’s short-range rocket interceptor, Iron Dome, also took part in the tests and for the first time showcased its ability to intercept cruise missiles and UAVs and was tested for its ability to intercept targets in tandem with David’s Sling, demonstrating the interoperability of the multilayered air defense mechanism. Both systems were developed by the ministry’s Missile Defense Organization (IMDO). "

There's a reason why Israel invested in Arrow 3, and did not use Iron Dome for everything.

Missile warheads for reentry have ablative armor that can withstand 2000+ C.

Atmospheric entry - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Artillery shells travel at 1000 m/s (only Mach 3) at the muzzle. Their terminal speed is lower and speed at intercept height lower still.

Anyhow this is a moot point until Taiwan makes or imports Iron Dome.

Muzzle velocity - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org