The Cold Start Doctrine Watch.

[Armstrong]

@Xeric @Rajput_Pakistani @Oscar @Argus Panoptes @notorious_eagle : I was reading up on Heinz Guderian as part of leisure reading on the German Blitzkrieg & I found some consonance in the views expressed here as to what the 'Cold Start Doctrine' is & what the German General argued in his book 'Panzer Leader', an excerpt of which I believe goes thus :

In this year (1929) I became convinced that tanks working on their own or in conjunction with infantry could never achieve decisive importance. My historical studies; the exercises carried out in England and our own experience with mock-ups had persuaded me that the tanks would never be able to produce their full effect until weapons on whose support they must inevitably rely were brought up to their standard of speed and of cross-country performance. In such formation of all arms, the tanks must play the primary role, the other weapons being subordinated to the requirements of the armour. It would be wrong to include tanks in infantry divisions: what were needed were armoured divisions which would include all the supporting arms needed to fight with full effect.

In a way is that not what the Cold Start Doctrine is 'Armor Supported by 'all' the Supporting Arms working in unison' & that the Blitzkrieg did envision concentrating such, what could be called as Integrated Battle Groups, on one focal point as part of multiple focal points concentrated on across the front instead of large cumbersome movements. Which is to say precision instead of blunt force to make an opening & trying to achieve critical breakthrough in an enemy's defensive line !

I'm no Military Scholar but from your above discussions the German Blitzkrieg, perhaps in its modified form, is what the Cold Start Doctrine sounds like - Would this be a correct assessment ?

 

[Xeric]

@Xeric @Rajput_Pakistani @Oscar @Argus Panoptes @notorious_eagle : I was reading up on Heinz Guderian as part of leisure reading on the German Blitzkrieg & I found some consonance in the views expressed here as to what the 'Cold Start Doctrine' is & what the German General argued in his book 'Panzer Leader', an excerpt of which I believe goes thus :

In this year (1929) I became convinced that tanks working on their own or in conjunction with infantry could never achieve decisive importance. My historical studies; the exercises carried out in England and our own experience with mock-ups had persuaded me that the tanks would never be able to produce their full effect until weapons on whose support they must inevitably rely were brought up to their standard of speed and of cross-country performance. In such formation of all arms, the tanks must play the primary role, the other weapons being subordinated to the requirements of the armour. It would be wrong to include tanks in infantry divisions: what were needed were armoured divisions which would include all the supporting arms needed to fight with full effect.

In a way is that not what the Cold Start Doctrine is 'Armor Supported by 'all' the Supporting Arms working in unison' & that the Blitzkrieg did envision concentrating such, what could be called as Integrated Battle Groups, on one focal point as part of multiple focal points concentrated on across the front instead of large cumbersome movements. Which is to say precision instead of blunt force to make an opening & trying to achieve critical breakthrough in an enemy's defensive line !

I'm no Military Scholar but from your above discussions the German Blitzkrieg, perhaps in its modified form, is what the Cold Start Doctrine sounds like - Would this be a correct assessment ?

^^ If you read the papers/articles which came out just after CSD was unvield, you will find all of them starting their premise as; "india's CSD which is based on Blitzkrieg strategy...blah blah.."

So yes, your statement is correct. CSD was an indian attempt on blitzkrieg warfare, but how succesful were/could they be is the real question.

 

[Armstrong]

@nuclearpak & @Aeronaut - I can't see my post or Xeric's reply to it !

 

[Kompromat]

@Armstrong

Posts are approved, i wonder why are you unable to see them?

 

[muse]

^^ If you read the papers/articles which came out just after CSD was unvield, you will find all of them starting their premise as; "india's CSD which is based on Blitzkrieg strategy...blah blah.."

So yes, your statement is correct. CSD was an indian attempt on blitzkrieg warfare, but how succesful were/could they be is the real question.

I don't see how we as responsible persons can think in any other terms than of them being able to employ these assets successfully, we don't a track record that inspires confidence

 

[Xeric]

I don't see how we as responsible persons can think in any other terms than of them being able to employ these assets successfully, we don't a track record that inspires confidence

Correct.

i wont go into the past but stick to what our big boss once said; 'we would see and react according to the indian capabilities, not intentions.'

Having said that, i belive we did fair enough by enacting NCWF. CSD is a dead horse, we have to look beyond it (Ref the Son) as indians are already on it and i am sure so are we.

 

[muse]

NCWF is a mystery - at least to me - All I know of it is that is NCWF - the details I am with Mr.Karnad on that, but even the outlines are so fuzzy and vague that it's difficult if not impossible to comment on it.

 

[Xeric]

NCWF is a mystery - at least to me - All I know of it is that is NCWF - the details I am with Mr.Karnad on that, but even the outlines are so fuzzy and vague that it's difficult if not impossible to comment on it.

And it shall remain so.

Dont blame yourself, though the new concept is not exactly 'new' or recent, but i doubt that it's details will surface in the near future. What the Express Tribune story revealed is all that is going to be available in the open source, atleast for now. BTW, do you know the exact name of the Son we are are beating about since the last 11 pages?!

 

[muse]

Yes I think I understand what you are pointing to - like I said there's nothing, quite literally, to go on

 

[Joe Shearer]

First, the conventional analysis, conclusions and the results thereof.

Indian military aims have failed in the past against Pakistan largely because of the demonstrated inability of Indian military leadership to take the offensive, to fight large formations with smaller, equal sized or larger formations, not because of Pakistani military skill. There is only one instance of a Pakistani general displaying superior battlefield command capability. It is the failure of Indian leadership, rather than Pakistani skills, that has preserved Pakistan in the past, in 1965 and on the western front in 1971. The case in East Pakistan/Bangaldesh was a special case, and it is obvious that all subsequent Indian planning has focused on how to reproduce that case. Most exercises showed that the overwhelming support of the local population was a significant factor, and except in pockets of Pakistan, this will not be present in realistic war conditions. So while military concentrations can be reproduced, social and political factors cannot.

The reverse of this, just to complete the matter, can be used in planning. If social conditions in any border, or extreme edge of Pakistan should degenerate to near-Bangladesh conditions, then the factors will exist for a reproduction of the overwhelming force build-up, and the bypassing strategy that was used in East Pakistan.

An aside: @Armstrong, what was important in the blitzkrieg was not merely the integration of all military arms and a significant combat air support capability but in addition, the concept of an expanding torrent. Military strongholds were not reduced, they were neutralised by supporting infantry, while the column continued to force its way further in. This contributed far more to the essence of the blitzkrieg - the rapid movement, the outflanking of enemy formations, the continuation of the thrust leaving behind disoriented formations whose decision loop had been penetrated.

The conclusion is that in the absence of the conditions prevailing for large military formations at division or corps level to prevail, leave aside concentrations at army or army group level, it was necessary to think of reproducing satisfactory winning conditions at a smaller, more manageable level. This conclusion avoids the painful task of thinking through why large-scale command performance was unsatisfactory, and slurs over the inherent bad DNA of the south Asian modern armies, that there has never been a tradition on either side, in the mechanised warfare age, of successful fighting of extensive wars, using very large formations, sometimes with success, sometimes failing. It has been noticed and commented upon that both sides are capable of successful command of brigade-level formations. Therefore, making a virtue out of a defect in command capability, it is logically necessary to look at smaller formations, and their war-fighting capability.

From the conclusion above, it is not difficult to look at the scenario with respect to brigade level formations and to create plans around these formations. Making smaller, less-than-divisional formations more effective has been the objective of military planners since the Korean War and various innovations in the order of battle have been tried, some having been extended to Pakistan during that honeymoon period when the Pakistan Army was close to NATO. That the concept behind these smaller, tougher formations did not register, and that there was no serious effect on the Pakistan Army of these ideas is another matter. The successful Pakistani general did, in fact, make a very successful campaign at less-than-division level (this construction is being used to avoid saying the slightly ridiculous 'sub-divisional' level), but his command style, what little is available to Indian analysts, suggests an origin in battalion level initiatives and very close battlefield control, rather than a successful marriage of staff work and communications, and integrated formations.

Leaving aside the what might have beens of history, there was another factor that came into play. For historical reasons, the Pakistan Army inherited cantonments close to the borders, and found deployment on the eastern front easy and straightforward. With exceptions, the Indian Army found that the remaining cantonments in its hands, at the early stages of the military engagements in the mid-twentieth century in south Asia, were badly placed for rapid deployment on the western front. There has been an enormous amount of rebuilding and re-orientation to address this issue, but evidently deployment at division or at corps level remains a problem, either because of the location of their cantonments, or because of the unavailability of sufficiently granularity of the formations themselves, preventing divisions or corps from completing their wartime staffing rapidly at component level rapidly, and leading to unacceptable delays in deployment. In effect, it was about logistics, almost entirely.

To return, both the need to leave battlefields to responsible and aggressive leaders and to overcome serious gaps in the logistics capabilities, the Indian Army looked seriously at IBGs, and at a division of its forces between strike and holding corps. This initial development was totally defeated by the inaction of the political and bureaucratic dispensation. It is interesting that one class of Pakistani commentators keeps looking at the problems that Pakistan has faced, and speculating that progress will be/ would be/ could be much faster with a relieving of the pressure on the western front, or with an improvement in the economy, no doubt held back by the events on the western front. If the Pakistan Army had to face the Indian Defence Ministry, I doubt that there would be an Army in Pakistan at all; only a constabulary of the dimensions of the FFC.

More.

 

[fatman17]

cold start as a doctrine has not been formalised by Indian planners - Pakistan's Azm-e-Nau-4 which is a riposte to india's cold start is also not formalised or can be implemented because in essence cold start dosnt exist as we know it. so both countries are merely posturing and war gaming.

india has not identified and clustered any of their formations into IBG's. further both the army and airforce are bickering over the control of the armed helos which shows that the level of co-ordination required for a successful foray into pakistani territory by IBG's could face such internal problems.

 

[Joe Shearer]

cold start as a doctrine has not been formalised by Indian planners - Pakistan's Azm-e-Nau-4 which is a riposte to india's cold start is also not formalised or can be implemented because in essence cold start dosnt exist as we know it. so both countries are merely posturing and war gaming.

india has not identified and clustered any of their formations into IBG's. further both the army and airforce are bickering over the control of the armed helos which shows that the level of co-ordination required for a successful foray into pakistani territory by IBG's could face such internal problems.

You are perfectly correct, but this was the previous phase of doctrine formulation, which did not get translated into reality for more or less the reasons you have mentioned: not the clustering into IBGs, but the failure to have self-contained formations which included attack helicopters, ground attack aircraft and highly mobile SAM and battlefield tactical missiles (not nuclear).

When it became clear that these miniature Panzer Korps were not going to happen, not least because the babus would not even speed up acquisition of rolling stock for mechanised infantry units, or for artillery, tubed or missile, the concept was revisited. It was this new variation, which was not primarily a reaction to Pakistan responses, but more in the nature of an internal re-assessment, that came to be known as Cold Start.

Consider the logic.

The so-called strike corps, the mobile units, were recognised to be liable to take more time to gather together and to launch. The holding corps were slower to move about, hence deliberately deployed closer to the border. Now, in a reversal of thinking, it was envisioned that this proximity itself would be used, rather than mobility. In other words, the doctrine changed from slow-moving holding corps and fast-moving strike corps to slow-to-deploy strike corps and fast-to-deploy pivot corps.

I hope that this transition and the chain of logic which fostered it, and the physical conditions which it acknowledged are visible and comprehensible.

I have to beg for some time to complete the note with some clues about thinking about the Pakistan nuclear threat, and to rivet on to the main doctrinal narrative some fanciful scenarios certified by nobody in particular. Bills have to paid.

More.

 

[Joe Shearer]

To resume our narrative about the thinking behind Cold Start, a preliminary word of caution. Events never occurred in the smooth, flowing manner that has been reported. Instead, there was a period of intense introspection, many conferences, an amount of discussion at staff levels and at intermediate levels, and reflections in defence institutions for the study of strategy and doctrine, which was unprecedented. It must be recalled that the cat set among the pigeons by Sundarji started a process of intense discussion and debate which cannot but be good for the thinking capacity of the Indian Army to be developed. But it was a messy process, and what has been presented here is a carefully sanitised version. That should be obvious for two reasons: the first being the remoteness of the reporter from the actual process, which filtered out in conversations, rants by overwrought individuals who didn't like some aspect or the other that was being discussed, the distinct exasperation with the bureaucracy which prevailed at a certain decision level, and, of course, gossip shared by professional reporters. What is not reported here about the sources will not be reported here, or anywhere else. The second, with respect, is the forum.

At this stage, the doctrine called for a 'banderilla' approach (not their phrase); the pivot corps, readily located close to the borders, able to mobilise and deploy faster than others, would deploy and would strike as swiftly as they could for stated strategic objectives that were within reasonable marching distances; they were to converge, and to threaten strong points or strategic features, but they are not needed to actually do much damage. The role of these preliminary attacks is more to pin down opposing formations to allow the faster-moving but slower deployed strike corps to strike at flaws and weaknesses in the enemy formations scrambling to meet the intrusive threat of the pivot corps. The rearward deployment of the strike corps is sought to be made an advantage; it is sought to allow a greater pause for target selection, and selection of the line of advance, to aim for weak spots and unguarded spots. Some small advantages that have fortuitously opened up for this concept have to do with the success of the Army Aviation Corps to wrest away control for attack helicopters from the very reluctant Air Force. However, the necessary addition of STOL fixed wing aircraft will be possible only if the Air Force allows this to be planned, acquires suitable aircraft for the purpose, coordinates deployment with planned Army formations, including the Cheshire cat IBGs, and builds up interoperation capabilities. Today even the wireless frequencies are different, so imagine the route of an urgent request for strikes against a build-up of motorised and mechanised infantry bridgehead, with or without armoured elements or an armoured spear-head within the general chaos. Imagine also the predicament of pilots arriving at a location and unable to talk to ground forces to chalk out their field of fire.

The doctrine, however, is smoothed and refined considerably, and requires only political approval, and political participation in the speeding up and creation where absent of component units and elements. This itself has very sensitive political exposed nerves, and has to be dealt with in a milieu of emollient and unexciting verbiage, with the risk of a political class starting out of their chairs at the thought of a military coup.

The current thinking on a response to Pakistan's evolution of graduated nuclear responses is not yet clearly apparent in even rough-hewn manners. What is apparent is that a completely different level, the alarm has reached the stake holders.

In conclusion, Cold Start as a doctrine evolved from earlier planning, and is ready in most aspects, ready, that is, in the minds of generals and their staff officers. Very sharp observers may have remarked on the strengthening of the staff function, through division of the higher levels of the organisation. However, to be a war-fighting tool, it needs troops to be earmarked for these IBGs; command structures, and well defined command organisations, and constant game fighting and battlefield exercise.

WHAT FOLLOWS IN SUBSEQUENT POSTS IS PURE FICTION.

 

[Joe Shearer]

It is to be hoped that the brief sketch of the thinking behind the development of military doctrine over posts #265, #267 and #268 will correct some misunderstanding that has been noticed among commentators. The most important point to be noted is that much of this doctrinal discussion was against the backdrop of an ill-provisioned, spitefully treated military. Very few other military formations in the world have shown the patience, the detachment from worldly rewards, the ability to execute their given work with quiet determination and after brushing aside petty, very personal attacks as the Indian Army. To some extent, the Indian Navy has suffered, but all three of them have been subjected to the most astonishing ill treatment and yet survived with honour bright and professional commitment intact. The next time someone sees a retired Indian officer of flag rank, it may occur to an observer from this country to comment on the slightly shabby-genteel look of such people, even very senior people. Obviously the contrast is with the dapper, smart, tweed jacketed, cavalry twilled retirees from their own country.

The contrast itself has a lesson to learn.

Other lessons to learn are that there is a consciousness that the proper integration of modern arms and technologies into war-fighting capability hasn't happened yet, that it is known but could not be implemented without a sustained, planned move into the future. If these impediments, almost entirely man-made, are to be removed by some magical stroke of a wand, the results may be painfully surprising.

That brings the question of nuclear parity.

To be honest, there are two schools of thought in the Indian Army, afaik. One school believes that the Pakistani Army are Serbians, the other that they are sane. The debate continues, and until one side or the other prevails, it will be difficult to predict exactly how the Indian Army will react in case of a conflict. Regrettably, there is some burden to be borne by the Pakistani side in this decision calculus, and threats of indiscriminate nuclear war raise very disturbing thoughts in the minds of the decision-makers on the other side of the border; thoughts which sometimes find momentary reflection in other minds further away. It would be improper to expand on that.

It is hoped that those who have points to raise will also understand that certain boundaries have to be observed, strictly, by the respondent. An apparently sullen silence may please be interpreted charitably and professionally.

 

[The SC]

Have we not discussed this here :

http://www.defence.pk/forums/indian...lead-massive-retaliation-india-warns-pak.html

But according to your cold start doctrine, your armoured divisions will be already on Pakistani territories, that is an invasion, and Pakistan can legally use any mean at its disposal to thwart your invasion including tactical nuclear weapon to be used on its own territories, but to decimate your integrated battle group (IBG) formations let us say once and as soon as the bulk of them has crossed into Pakistan.
If you answer with strategic nuclear weapons than your cold start theory is a hoax, and can not be implemented, and the whole thing will come back to India starting a nuclear war that it can not win either.

No wonder Cold Start has recently been renamed by the Indians as ‘proactive defence’ strategy, meaning mostly monitoring strategy.