The Cold Start Doctrine Watch.

[notorious_eagle]

Sir, kindly check my post. Regards

Excellent analysis, thumbs up to you Let me just add a few points to your post.

As soon as the IBG's move in and cross the border, attrition will kick in. Pakistan's Frontier Troops are much more mobile and carry enough firepower to rain down some serious steel on the moving IBG's. They will cause more damage than their weight before they die out. The IBG's will be forced to engage and destroy fortified posts along the border as they will hinder their axis of advancement. As we saw during 2006, the IDF couldn't bypass Hezbollah's fortifications and was forced to engage.

PA would know exactly where the IBG's are but the IBG's can only anticipate where the PA will launch a counter attack. For every mile the IBG's advance, they will have to peel of a tank from their main formations to guard their flanks. This will reduce the firepower against the reinforced fresh PA Armoured Formations whereas the IBG's will be exhausted and bruised. The logistical supply lines will be extremely vulnerable. A Tank Company requires at-least 4-5 trucks to keep the Company well fed, thats a lot of logistics. The IBG's will be continuously fighting flanking and encirclement battles to stay alive, if their supply lines are cut off they are as good as dead.

One more point i would like to raise which has not been discussed, it is the Officers Corps. Is the IA confident enough that its Officers can independently function and lead IBG's which are essentially Mini-Armies? The US Army demonstrated it perfectly during GW1 and the Iraq Invasion that its Officers are competent enough to function independently and at the same time work towards achieving a common goal. Reports from 3-4 years ago suggest that IA was suffering from a serious shortage of Competent Officers due to a booming private sector, i don't know if this issue has been rectified by the IA.

 

[Rajput_Pakistani]

Excellent analysis, thumbs up to you Let me just add a few points to your post.

As soon as the IBG's move in and cross the border, attrition will kick in. Pakistan's Frontier Troops are much more mobile and carry enough firepower to rain down some serious steel on the moving IBG's. They will cause more damage than their weight before they die out. The IBG's will be forced to engage and destroy fortified posts along the border as they will hinder their axis of advancement. As we saw during 2006, the IDF couldn't bypass Hezbollah's fortifications and was forced to engage.

PA would know exactly where the IBG's are but the IBG's can only anticipate where the PA will launch a counter attack. For every mile the IBG's advance, they will have to peel of a tank from their main formations to guard their flanks. This will reduce the firepower against the reinforced fresh PA Armoured Formations whereas the IBG's will be exhausted and bruised. The logistical supply lines will be extremely vulnerable. A Tank Company requires at-least 4-5 trucks to keep the Company well fed, thats a lot of logistics. The IBG's will be continuously fighting flanking and encirclement battles to stay alive, if their supply lines are cut off they are as good as dead.

One more point i would like to raise which has not been discussed, it is the Officers Corps. Is the IA confident enough that its Officers can independently function and lead IBG's which are essentially Mini-Armies? The US Army demonstrated it perfectly during GW1 and the Iraq Invasion that its Officers are competent enough to function independently and at the same time work towards achieving a common goal. Reports from 3-4 years ago suggest that IA was suffering from a serious shortage of Competent Officers due to a booming private sector, i don't know if this issue has been rectified by the IA.

Exactly sir, you have summed up the discussion really well. I am also emphasizing the same that CSD in itself has many flaws from military PoV. Its something else which Indians want to achieve behind the smoke screen of CSD. If IA in reality throw in all its strike capability in small 8 units to fight their own battles, i think that will be suicidal.

Lets suppose if each IBG is a Brigade size infantry supported by 50 odd tank regiment. Now if during the course of their movement, even 4 out of 8 IGBs are destroyed, that's a huge loss both in men and material. Would Indian Army be left with any face to say to their public "Hey look hum ne Pakistan se badla le liya hay"
Aur peechay se koi aa ke kahe "Hamaray 300 tank aur 50000 soldier maray gaye hain"

And sir you have raised a very valid point about Officer corps. I would like to add JCOs in that list too. Both India and Pakistan are not comparable to US Army tactical officer corps. Our JCO may be very brave and courageous, good at doing out tasks assigned but we cant compare them with an American Sergeant. Simply because of difference of literacy rate.

US army themselves establish a training center at Fort Irwin, California in 1980 or so. This was similar like USAF Topgun. They created an entire new unit, equipped with the Soviet equipment (tanks, IFVs even AD). Even their uniforms and Insignias were Soviet. Entire unit was organized and trained strictly on Soviet doctrine. US Army units then went there and participated in real life exercises. This was how they prepared their low-level leadership for future wars. We are far behind in such strategies.

Indians after their first disclosure of CSD has conducted many exercises to test new doctrine. But when a unit has so much time to rehearse its maneuvers against pretty much known pattern, how can you get exact situation. Have there been real life scenarios which test the nerves of soldiers right down to the ranks of rifleman, many deficiencies will expose.

No exercise can recreate the pressures and fatigues of actual battle. Its easy to say then done that IBG will continue its operation day/nite until objective is achieved. After very first 10 hours of continuous fight the unit will start to crumble, after all everyone is a human not Rajni Kant or Sunny Deol.
@Aeronaut @nuclearpak Sir, kindly check my post. Regards

 

[Xeric]

Yes, Indeed. We are not military professionals,

Well, i am

So, i am sure you can understand why i cant comment on the details and breakdown of an IBG.

But i wont mind participating in the general discussion.

 

[Xeric]

Military Doctrines:

Offensive doctrines are aimed to disarm an adversary or destroy his armed forces.
Defensive doctrines are aimed to deny an adversary the objective he seeks.

Types of warfare:

Attrition warfare is focused on destroying the enemy’s strength. Attrition operations required superior firepower and technology.
Maneuver warfare is a concept of moving forces into unpredicted locations at high speeds and making decisions faster than the opponent can, maneuver warfare seeks to destroy the enemy’s cohesion by disrupting his OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) loop.

Military doctrines are not restricted to these two kinds only.

Just to quote a few; Strategy of Annihilation, Strategy of Paralysis etc are a further two type of warfares.

Now Indian friends here claim that CSD objective is not to occupy Pakistani land but instead is to destroy its war machine i.e. Pakistan Army.

So it seems.

Now this in itself is the major flaw of CSD that its own objectives aren't clear even from Indian prospective.

They were quite clear in their aim, but they may not be now i.e. after they critically analyzed the CSD and found out that its not a child's play and that Pakistan is not a dummy.

CSD is about Attrition warfare or Maneuver Warfare??

It's both. For attrition to take place, maneuver is necessary.

 

[Argus Panoptes]

The most powerful is the Doctrine of Economic Strangulation, which always works.

 

[notorious_eagle]

The most powerful is the Doctrine of Economic Strangulation, which always works.

India alone is not strong enough to employ Economic Strangulation against Pakistan. The only country to have applied Economic Strangulation successfully is the US. India has very little leverage over Pakistan economically because trade between the two nations is almost non-existent and India is not a strong enough Global Power to make the World adhere to her wishes.

 

[RAMPAGE]

guys what happens if we detonate 1 megaton nuclear warhead over delhi at 200 kilometers altitude

 

[RAMPAGE]

guys what happens if we detonate a 1 megaton nuclear warhead over delhi at 200 kilometers' altitude

 

[Xeric]

Something i already hinted in this thread:

http://tribune.com.pk/story/564136/pakistan-army-to-preempt-indias-cold-start-doctrine/

Pakistan Army to preempt India’s ‘Cold Start Doctrine’


ISLAMABAD: The concluding ceremony of war games named “Azm-e-Nau 4″ took place on Sunday.

According to the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the war games were meant to operationalise new strategies against the evolving threat.

At the culmination of four years of war gaming and exercises, the Pakistan military has now adopted a ‘new concept of war fighting’ aimed at preempting India’s ‘Cold Start Doctrine,’ security officials said here.

The new concept seeks to improve troops’ mobilisation time and to put up a joint Army, Navy and Air Force response to any conventional threat.

The Azm-e-Nau exercises, which started in 2009, were part of the Army’s new concept of war fighting in response to India’s Pakistan specific Cold Start Doctrine.

The Cold Start doctrine is intended to allow India’s conventional forces to perform holding swift and unexpected attacks in a manner before international pressure could come to bear on India and before the Pakistani military could react i.e. in under 72 hours.

The Indian military, however, publicly denies the existence of any such doctrine.

The military official said under the new concept, in case of war, the Pakistan Army could mobilise in far less time as compared to India.

Speaking at the conclusion of two-week long war games, Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani sought people’s support to counter foreign military aggression against the country.

Kayani said military’s success hinges on being fully prepared, support of the people of Pakistan and other state institutions.

He also said the Army was fully committed to meet all future challenges squarely.

 

[SQ8]

India alone is not strong enough to employ Economic Strangulation against Pakistan. The only country to have applied Economic Strangulation successfully is the US. India has very little leverage over Pakistan economically because trade between the two nations is almost non-existent and India is not a strong enough Global Power to make the World adhere to her wishes.

Id disagree with that, Since the economic strangulation may come from dislodging Pakistani exports from the market and replacing it with their own. Sabotaging Pakistani export deals and forcing a curtailing of raw material and industrial expansion import..
so far.. they've been at it and getting results.

 

[Argus Panoptes]

India alone is not strong enough to employ Economic Strangulation against Pakistan. The only country to have applied Economic Strangulation successfully is the US. India has very little leverage over Pakistan economically because trade between the two nations is almost non-existent and India is not a strong enough Global Power to make the World adhere to her wishes.

The danger is not just India Sir. What are we exporting as a nation that someone else in the world is not trying to produce better, faster, cheaper or more reliably than us? We run the grave risk of becoming irrelevant in the world marketplace if we do not remain competitive in the 21st century.


======================================

I apologize for the lost formatting, but this list of our exports makes for sober reading indeed:

Section 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Live Animals; Animal Products $205,647,602 $238,425,696 $257,470,569 $335,378,325 $352,277,739 $450,512,736 $561,447,077
Vegetable Products $1,489,801,648 $1,509,644,538 $1,649,468,748 $2,846,273,425 $2,256,443,608 $2,812,105,031 $3,939,385,361
Animal or Vegetable Fats and Oils and Their Cleavage Products; Prepared Edible Fats; Animal or Vegetable Waxes $96,991,020 $99,500,229 $108,925,075 $168,288,324 $97,322,583 $85,871,030 $192,420,240
Prepared Foodstuffs; Beverages, Spirits and Vinegar; Tobacco and Manufactured Tobacco Substitutes $238,921,671 $287,682,643 $297,154,608 $554,715,425 $337,279,705 $403,350,562 $558,330,420
Mineral Products $176,456,403 $176,854,850 $374,304,390 $850,240,640 $648,785,644 $685,123,292 $692,481,736
Products of the Chemical or Allied Industries $286,880,286 $224,730,997 $198,949,050 $238,266,401 $325,103,664 $299,379,808 $365,594,082
Plastics and Articles Thereof; Rubber and Articles Thereof $302,656,847 $290,968,711 $202,072,554 $304,294,626 $312,938,112 $415,844,792 $554,397,994
Raw Hides and Skins, Leather, Furskins and Articles Thereof; Saddlery and Harness; Travel Goods, Handbags and Similar Containers; Articles of Animal Gut (Other Than Silk-Worm Gut) $692,700,357 $680,457,068 $691,806,174 $766,872,374 $578,617,002 $620,240,867 $682,249,466
Wood and Articles of Wood; Wood Charcoal; Cork and Articles of Cork; Manufactures of Straw, of Esparto or of Other Plaiting Materials; Basketware and Wickerwork $11,759,622 $10,539,209 $8,811,016 $17,674,353 $24,529,572 $30,016,106 $51,667,591
Pulp of Wood or of Other Fibrous Cellulosic Material; Recovered (Waste and Scrap) Paper or Paperboard; Paper and Paperboard and Articles Thereof $15,803,590 $17,850,993 $17,086,104 $22,984,713 $24,922,320 $18,142,657 $32,756,493
Textiles and Textile Articles $10,186,718,102 $10,798,638,818 $10,608,481,055 $10,530,348,709 $9,556,832,807 $11,494,024,292 $13,489,677,923
Footwear, Headgear, Umbrellas, Sun Umbrellas, Walking-Sticks, Seat-Sticks, Whips, Riding-Crops and Parts Thereof; Prepared Feathers and Articles Made Therewith; Artificial Flowers; Articles of Human Hair $155,553,160 $136,307,221 $114,973,279 $135,314,098 $118,938,258 $94,413,988 $114,055,390
Articles of Stone, Plaster, Cement, Asbestos, Mica or Similar Materials; Ceramic Products; Glass and Glassware $50,146,263 $59,024,894 $57,572,444 $65,381,199 $56,309,510 $46,310,805 $54,980,996
Natural or Cultured Pearls, Precious or Semi-Precious Stones, Precious Metals, Metals Clad With Precious Metal and Articles Thereof; Imitation Jewellery; Coin $20,599,492 $24,057,616 $120,274,543 $239,809,054 $478,831,478 $588,969,588 $469,065,977
Base Metals and Articles of Base Metal $183,911,166 $186,066,448 $253,406,684 $274,877,944 $270,579,729 $375,805,038 $487,420,332
Machinery and Mechanical Appliances; Electrical Equipment; Parts Thereof; Sound Recorders and Reproducers, Television Image and Sound Recorders and Reproducers, and Parts and Accessories of Such Articles $205,933,008 $217,714,295 $261,138,161 $425,728,200 $306,639,143 $314,598,847 $335,369,470
Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels and Associated Transport Equipment $80,425,461 $100,913,775 $515,414,797 $126,204,125 $87,409,855 $168,674,969 $99,710,003
Optical, Photographic, Cinematographic, Measuring, Checking, Precision, Medical or Surgical Instruments and Apparatus; Clocks and Watches; Musical Instruments; Parts and Accessories Thereof $190,040,690 $176,946,516 $244,082,095 $283,514,888 $259,819,722 $263,741,748 $305,708,434
Arms and Ammunition; Parts and Accessories Thereof $2,083,208 $1,137,202 $840,532 $1,148,296 $4,334,294 $4,115,791 $3,718,402
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles $373,987,474 $402,584,649 $272,922,781 $319,084,923 $290,074,072 $329,423,858 $344,590,122
Works of Art, Collectors' Pieces and Antiques $152,313 $287,042 $27,877 $31,248,016 $48,653 $117,179 $11,764,863
Other $9,785,755 $11,211,443 $38,470,909 $3,701,141 $1,587,448 $1,023,026 $331,564
Total $14,976,955,138 $15,651,544,853 $16,293,653,445 $18,541,349,199 $16,389,624,918 $19,501,806,010 $23,347,123,936

Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database

============
@Aeronaut @Oscar @nucelarpak or any other mod: Please approve this post.

 

[muse]

Alrighty then, back to bijnis:



India’s nuclear amateurism
By Bharat Karnad
Published: June 29, 2013


The writer is professor at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi and blogs at Security Wise | Bharat Karnad – India's Foremost Conservative Strategist

US Secretary of State John Kerry reminded New Delhi that the United States expects India to toe its line on non-proliferation and get a move on in signing the Missile Technology Control Regime, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. One hopes New Delhi will not give way on any of these issues even if membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group is the prize because, as it is, the Indian nuclear deterrent is grievously handicapped. First, by untested thermonuclear weapons with design flaws no amount of simulation can correct, whence resumption of testing becomes imperative, and secondly, matching this hardware deficiency are the “software” problems — doctrinal weaknesses and inadequate understanding in government circles of nuclear weapons and strategy.

The latter aspect was illustrated by Shyam Saran, convener of India’s National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and former foreign secretary, holding forth on May 3 on nuclear issues and, predictably, making a hash of it. Considering a Chinese military unit was holding Ladakhi real estate then, Saran went off on an anti-Pakistan tangent instead! It confirmed the suspicion that the government is unable to differentiate issues of strategic importance from lesser concerns and, as regards nuclear security, is all at sea. Informed Pakistanis promptly dismissed it as “bluster”, deeming India “a blundering nuclear power”.

At the heart of Saran’s talk was a wrong take on nuclear matters that has calcified into a strategic gospel in official quarters, courtesy the late K Subrahmanyam, starting with the belief that nuclear testing is incidental to the credibility of the deterrent, evident in his canvassing for India’s signature on the CTBT in 1995-96 which Saran rightly said “would have permanently foreclosed (development of) a credible and fully tested nuclear deterrent”. Except, the problem of untested hydrogen weapons persists owing to the no-testing predicate of the US-India nuclear deal supported by Subrahmanyam and Co, and negotiated by Saran. It reflects the cavalier disregard for nuclear testing which is stark in the context of the field director of the 1998 tests, K Santhanam, recommending the re-testing of a rectified thermonuclear weapon design because the one that was tested failed.

Saran’s plea to “make public” the official nuclear doctrine, which he said was virtually the draft produced by the NSAB in 1998, was of a piece with his asking for an annual numerical accounting of the country’s nuclear forces. He didn’t pause to wonder why no other nuclear weapon state to-date has disclosed its nuclear doctrine, and why China and Pakistan are unlikely ever to reveal inventory details of their weapons. The public release of the draft-doctrine to win points for transparency with America and gain traction for the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) was an appalling mistake by the BJP government that the Congress regime converted into the wrecking ball of the US-India nuclear deal, which destroyed the integrity of the country’s dual-use nuclear energy programme.

Ambiguity is at the core of nuclear deterrence and dissuasion. It isn’t advanced by making the doctrine an open document, even less by revealing weapons strength. Having disclosed the doctrine, however, the strategic initiative passed to the adversary states with the good sense to divulge nothing. China increased the “daunting uncertainties” for India by bringing conventional missiles under the control of its Second Artillery nuclear forces, and Pakistan developed the 60km Nasr (Hatf-IX) guided rocket.

The dense fog of ignorance of nuclear deterrence matters blanketing Indian government circles has eventuated in a hollow strategy emphasising “massive retaliation” as response to tactical first use of nuclear weapon by Pakistan (on Indian armour, say, inside Pakistani territory). Promising massive nuclear destruction as retaliatory action, in the circumstances, only undermines the credibility of the Indian deterrent as it violates the principle of proportionality — the essence of “flexible response”. A version of this concept — “punitive response” — was central to the original NSAB draft-doctrine. Owing to the usual mix of abominable advice and mindless attitudinising lashed with deep illiteracy on these issues, “punitive response” was replaced by “massive retaliation”. All it did was spur accelerated production of weapons-grade plutonium, warheads, and missiles by Pakistan which an India, fixated on Pakistan and “minimum” deterrence, finds unable to match, what to talk of China! Truth is massive retaliation cannot doctrinally coexist with the “minimum deterrence” notion the Indian government seems wedded to. That is common sense but try telling it to the glib talkers in official quarters.

Much was also made by him of commentaries concluding India acquired nuclear weapons for status and prestige, not for security. But why is this conclusion wrong, considering India reached the weapons threshold with its plutonium reprocessing capability in early 1964 but did not weaponise after China exploded an atomic device in October that year, and with the military humiliation of 1962 as backdrop? Contrast this with the single-minded, no-nonsense, threat-propelled Chinese and Pakistani programmes to obtain meaningful nuclear arsenals fast, even as the Indian weapons programme meandered, its progress hampered by dreams of disarmament last manifested in the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan.

That the Indian government has time and again veered off into the murk of nuclear power politics without being equipped for the task is due to the generalist diplomats and civil servants playing at nuclear strategists. Saran admitted that the country had suffered from bad advice to “defer the acquisition of a nuclear weapon arsenal as long as there was still hope that the world would eventually move towards a complete elimination of these weapons”, and that it was “undeniable” that “mistakes (were) made, sometimes opportunities (were) missed or our judgements were misplaced”.

The cumulative debilitating effect of such rank bad, and amateurish, counsel is reflected in the manner India is strategically handicapped today. It indicates a fool’s world our diplomats (especially, denizens of the MEA’s Disarmament Division that Saran served in), senior civil servants, political leaders and increasingly senior military officers hewing to the government line, live in. Elimination of nuclear weapons, really?

 

[fatman17]

Alrighty then, back to bijnis:



India’s nuclear amateurism
By Bharat Karnad
Published: June 29, 2013


The writer is professor at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi and blogs at Security Wise | Bharat Karnad – India's Foremost Conservative Strategist

US Secretary of State John Kerry reminded New Delhi that the United States expects India to toe its line on non-proliferation and get a move on in signing the Missile Technology Control Regime, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. One hopes New Delhi will not give way on any of these issues even if membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group is the prize because, as it is, the Indian nuclear deterrent is grievously handicapped. First, by untested thermonuclear weapons with design flaws no amount of simulation can correct, whence resumption of testing becomes imperative, and secondly, matching this hardware deficiency are the “software” problems — doctrinal weaknesses and inadequate understanding in government circles of nuclear weapons and strategy.

The latter aspect was illustrated by Shyam Saran, convener of India’s National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and former foreign secretary, holding forth on May 3 on nuclear issues and, predictably, making a hash of it. Considering a Chinese military unit was holding Ladakhi real estate then, Saran went off on an anti-Pakistan tangent instead! It confirmed the suspicion that the government is unable to differentiate issues of strategic importance from lesser concerns and, as regards nuclear security, is all at sea. Informed Pakistanis promptly dismissed it as “bluster”, deeming India “a blundering nuclear power”.

At the heart of Saran’s talk was a wrong take on nuclear matters that has calcified into a strategic gospel in official quarters, courtesy the late K Subrahmanyam, starting with the belief that nuclear testing is incidental to the credibility of the deterrent, evident in his canvassing for India’s signature on the CTBT in 1995-96 which Saran rightly said “would have permanently foreclosed (development of) a credible and fully tested nuclear deterrent”. Except, the problem of untested hydrogen weapons persists owing to the no-testing predicate of the US-India nuclear deal supported by Subrahmanyam and Co, and negotiated by Saran. It reflects the cavalier disregard for nuclear testing which is stark in the context of the field director of the 1998 tests, K Santhanam, recommending the re-testing of a rectified thermonuclear weapon design because the one that was tested failed.

Saran’s plea to “make public” the official nuclear doctrine, which he said was virtually the draft produced by the NSAB in 1998, was of a piece with his asking for an annual numerical accounting of the country’s nuclear forces. He didn’t pause to wonder why no other nuclear weapon state to-date has disclosed its nuclear doctrine, and why China and Pakistan are unlikely ever to reveal inventory details of their weapons. The public release of the draft-doctrine to win points for transparency with America and gain traction for the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) was an appalling mistake by the BJP government that the Congress regime converted into the wrecking ball of the US-India nuclear deal, which destroyed the integrity of the country’s dual-use nuclear energy programme.

Ambiguity is at the core of nuclear deterrence and dissuasion. It isn’t advanced by making the doctrine an open document, even less by revealing weapons strength. Having disclosed the doctrine, however, the strategic initiative passed to the adversary states with the good sense to divulge nothing. China increased the “daunting uncertainties” for India by bringing conventional missiles under the control of its Second Artillery nuclear forces, and Pakistan developed the 60km Nasr (Hatf-IX) guided rocket.

The dense fog of ignorance of nuclear deterrence matters blanketing Indian government circles has eventuated in a hollow strategy emphasising “massive retaliation” as response to tactical first use of nuclear weapon by Pakistan (on Indian armour, say, inside Pakistani territory). Promising massive nuclear destruction as retaliatory action, in the circumstances, only undermines the credibility of the Indian deterrent as it violates the principle of proportionality — the essence of “flexible response”. A version of this concept — “punitive response” — was central to the original NSAB draft-doctrine. Owing to the usual mix of abominable advice and mindless attitudinising lashed with deep illiteracy on these issues, “punitive response” was replaced by “massive retaliation”. All it did was spur accelerated production of weapons-grade plutonium, warheads, and missiles by Pakistan which an India, fixated on Pakistan and “minimum” deterrence, finds unable to match, what to talk of China! Truth is massive retaliation cannot doctrinally coexist with the “minimum deterrence” notion the Indian government seems wedded to. That is common sense but try telling it to the glib talkers in official quarters.

Much was also made by him of commentaries concluding India acquired nuclear weapons for status and prestige, not for security. But why is this conclusion wrong, considering India reached the weapons threshold with its plutonium reprocessing capability in early 1964 but did not weaponise after China exploded an atomic device in October that year, and with the military humiliation of 1962 as backdrop? Contrast this with the single-minded, no-nonsense, threat-propelled Chinese and Pakistani programmes to obtain meaningful nuclear arsenals fast, even as the Indian weapons programme meandered, its progress hampered by dreams of disarmament last manifested in the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan.

That the Indian government has time and again veered off into the murk of nuclear power politics without being equipped for the task is due to the generalist diplomats and civil servants playing at nuclear strategists. Saran admitted that the country had suffered from bad advice to “defer the acquisition of a nuclear weapon arsenal as long as there was still hope that the world would eventually move towards a complete elimination of these weapons”, and that it was “undeniable” that “mistakes (were) made, sometimes opportunities (were) missed or our judgements were misplaced”.

The cumulative debilitating effect of such rank bad, and amateurish, counsel is reflected in the manner India is strategically handicapped today. It indicates a fool’s world our diplomats (especially, denizens of the MEA’s Disarmament Division that Saran served in), senior civil servants, political leaders and increasingly senior military officers hewing to the government line, live in. Elimination of nuclear weapons, really?

boy what a smoke screen. you buy this then i got a bridge over the gobi desert to sell to you. typical indian ploy to get the govt to dispense funds to further their nuclear arsenal.

 

[fatman17]

the extract below belies what is said above....


"Indian leaders and hawkish analysts have expressed the view that their country could survive a nuclear war, whereas Pakistan would not. As former Defense Minister George Fernandes said in a 2002 interview, “f he should finally take that kind of step, perhaps out of desperation, he should realize that India can survive a nuclear attack, but Pakistan cannot.”70 Army Chief S. Padmanabhan echoed these sentiments when he said that “India would severely punish any state that is ‘mad enough to use nuclear weapons against any of our assets.’ Padmanabhan added, ‘the perpetrator shall be so severely punished that his very existence will be in doubt. We are ready for a second strike.’”71 Likewise, hawkish analyst Bharat Karnad wrote, “The problem here is not one of preventing nuclear war, but with believing that Pakistan can annihilate India, which is not possible, even as the reverse is eminently true.”72

dont fall for this cost-free excercise in sanctimonious propoganda...

 

[Xeric]

Really...?

At the first glance at author's name i thought that the piece has been written by some guy named 'Akhand Bharat' :p - too much obsession with india was my first response to my mistake, and then i felt embarrassed. However, after reading through the piece i came to know that my 'mistake' was not infact an obsession but a prophecy.

As usual, the piece just is an excuse for the indian policy makers to justify their likely increase in weaponisation, particularly the nukes.