Talking to the Taliban

[muse]

Yes, I do take your point - It's like always having to deal with children.

You know how we go about our school text books presenting ideas that pervert ethics and understanding of Islam -- take a look at Afghan school text books, especially those relating to history - and you thought we had problems?

Complete trash history, it is really chuvanism and plain distortion and lies posing as history and putting young minds on a path to hostility.

You have made the point that in "history" of Afghanistan there has never been a no hostile or reasonable government -- always kep that in mind when some Afghans mouth off about Pakistani involvement, they should always be remind or rather asked, what is that they have achieved that did not have pakistani involvement? In their entire history?

Because there is a reality most Afghans have a problem with - they think of Afghanistan as another normal country - it isn't. It's a collection of tribal groups tied together in their hostility to the "other" - it's all that binds them and if there is no foreign "other", they fall on each other.

I am not suggesting that Afghanistan allow for such a role exclusively for Pakistan, Iran also has influence and power there, but I think it's a dificult argument that pashtun or Afghan have any sort of cultural affiliation with Iran.

 

[fatman17]

True, but I think that what Muse may be suggesting is that perhaps the hostility is not irreconcilable at the people to people level, at least the Pashtun parts. We do share strong historical and cultural bonds, and increasing interaction with them may actually work in our favor.

As it is, its not like a hostile GoA will not commit any mischief if we don't interact with them. Might as well intertwine their interests with ours as much as we can.

i dont disagree - nothing better than a friendly neighbour but afghanistan is not made up of pashtuns only, persians, tajiks (the motley northern alliance) will ensure that the "history" is preseved.

 

[salman nedian]

Is it possible to convince USA to split Afghanistan and merging the Pushton areas like Kabul, Jalalabad and Kandahar with Pakistan?

 

[Kasrkin]

I'm with Muse on this one, there is just something...inheritly barbarian about Afghanistan. Just read their history...brother kills king, general kills brother, general killed by kings friends. But they all do have one thing that is common; hate for Pakistan.

In this world you cant make excuses, in the end its the Afghan people who are responsible for how things turn out in their country. Pakistan or no Pakistan they are seriously messed up. Best thing for us to do is contain them because these people dont care about Islam or Muslim brotherhood, I say we put them in their place...and maybe even team up with Iran to that end.

 

[muse]

I would to add a few comments and observations with regard to the ethnic groups in Afghanistan:

The most hard working, delighful and pleasant people you can hope to meet are Turkoman and uzbeks of Afghanistan.

The hazara, it's personal prejudice or bias, but I really feel for them, no group has been so poorly treated as the hazara, but they are ambitious, hard working - Hazara, from hazar or thousand - said to be decendants of Changiz khan's 1000 man garrison - predominantly Shia -- very pro Iranian, however; very very poorly treated by the Iranian, who have their own chauvanism based or "aryan" BS - the Aryan BS is also strong among "educated" Tajik.

Tajik are somewhat of a mystery - they are actually very close to us culturally - but the experience of taliban and especially masood's success in moulding an "identity" as "shomali" has really, in my opinion, set the stage for the enventual civil war or break up of afghanistan along ethnic lines.

From our conversations with individuals from these groups in camps, it is my strong sense, that Afghanistan is like a piece of meat that it's population and leaders and neighbors are tearing into.

Into this mess the American -- they wanted to do Afghanistan on the cheap - they thought if only regime can be changed, then US can be satisfied. The difference between US and English is that while US are masters of organization, the English are committed to it (or at least were - withness the Indian civil service) -- To preserve Afghanistan, a long term effort at building the kind of civil servce the English built in india is required - and of course the US does not do "nation building".

So, starting with a unclear strategy, Us began this, in a way, with one of it's hands tied behind it's back -- no one else to back but the NA, and that came with it's own problems -- the geography of the country makes communication a huge challenge, so the reliance on warlords for some sort of semblance of control.

I, and I think most people when they begin to see the challenges of keeping afghanistan afloat and the US as true "partner" - will see that it is tragic that this effort will not produce what the people of afghanistan and I think most people in the US would have liked to see.

 

[muse]

Below is an interesting piece - note some of the ideas - especially what "victory" in Afghanistan might mean and you will understand what I meant by doing Afghanistan on the cheap




A manhunt or a vital war?
By Robert D. Kaplan

Sunday, October 5, 2008
The rising violence in Afghanistan and fractious political situation in Pakistan have become leading issues in the American presidential campaign and the debates between the candidates. Indeed, after seven years of war in the region, it's time to ask a very impolite set of questions: If we did, by chance, capture or kill Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, would Afghanistan still matter? Would there be public support for sending more American troops to stabilize a country that has rarely in its history enjoyed strong central government and that abuts a tribal area in Pakistan that neither the British nor the Pakistanis have ever been able to control? Is the war in Afghanistan, deep down, anything more than a manhunt for a handful of individuals? And if it is, how do we define victory there?

After all, Afghanistan is not the only ungovernable space with an Islamic setting around the world that can provide a base for terrorists who want to attack the United States. The world is full of them: from Somalia to the southern Philippines to the Indonesian archipelago.

Better, perhaps, not to be tied down with thousands of troops in one or two places, and instead use sophisticated, high-tech covert means to hunt down hostile groups wherever they crop up. The problem with Osama bin Laden, one could argue, was not that he had a haven in Afghanistan in the 1990s but that he was not pursued there with sufficient vigor.

So, here's my answer: In fact, Afghanistan is more than a manhunt, and it does matter, for reasons that have not been fully fleshed out by policymakers or the military.

Just because you can't pacify all the ungovernable Islamic spaces on the map doesn't mean you can't fix the one or two that are the most important, that have strategic weight over wide regions. For Afghanistan looms larger than it appears.

Strategically, culturally and historically speaking, Afghanistan and Pakistan are inseparable. In the 16th and 17th centuries, both countries, along with northern India, were united under the Mughal Empire. Today Pakistan, with 165 million people, is a nuclearized Yugoslavia in the making, and threatens to be torn apart by the Taliban rebellion in its North-West Frontier Province (and, possibly, by the growing Baluchi and Sindhi separatist movements in its southern half).

Since its birth 60 years ago, Pakistan has had darkly Shakespearean politics driven by passion and vendetta in which a small cast of individuals - Mohammad Zia ul-Haq; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his daughter, Benazir; Nawaz Sharif; Pervez Musharraf - have in turn executed, replaced and imprisoned one another. The only qualification of the new president, Asif Ali Zardari, is that he is Benazir Bhutto's widower. The soap opera goes on, as Sharif, a two-time former prime minister, will undoubtedly seek to undermine him by leveraging his native Punjab against Zardari's Sindhi base.

Yet Pakistan is salvageable: It has an expanding urban middle class, and recent elections have by and large seen the defeat of religious extremists in favor of moderates. Pakistan's future may hinge on the degree to which the United States can work with the Pakistani military to keep the Taliban rebellion from expanding not only throughout Afghanistan, but into Pakistan's own cities as well.

Paradoxically, that will mean making deals with some Taliban groups against others. For the Taliban are not a monolithic organization, but bands of ornery Pashtun backwoodsmen who have been cut out of the power base in Afghanistan by an increasingly corrupt and ineffectual government in Kabul. They are not Al Qaeda: They lack a well-defined worldview and some are susceptible to political entreaties.

But if our drone air strikes are not accompanied by nation-building steps like constructing roads and water wells, we will fail and Pakistan will be further destabilized.

A failure in Afghanistan that destabilized Pakistan would do India no favors. Indeed, Pakistan would not go quietly into history. Sindhi and Baluchi separatists talk openly of an alliance with India if Pakistan unravels. But India, while its intelligence services now and then stoke Baluchi separatism, is terrified of such a development.

India's gravest problem - the one that has bedeviled its rise to great power status and with which its army is obsessed - is the fact that it shares long borders with dysfunctional states like Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal. The more responsible Indian nationalists see their country's expansion not in terms of hard conquest, but in terms of soft economic envelopment of its neighbors.

And an American failure in Afghanistan would set in motion a string of consequences that threaten such a benign vision.

In the end, victory in Afghanistan can be defined by achieving the kind of security there that existed in the 1960s, when King Zahir Shah controlled the major cities and the roads connecting them, and a relative peace reigned. Even under a weak central government, Afghanistan could finally achieve economic salvation: the construction of a web of energy pipelines that have been envisioned for years connecting Central Asia with the Indian Ocean.

These might run, for example, from the natural gas fields of Turkmenistan down through Afghanistan and into the dense population zones of Pakistan and India, with terminals at ports like Gwadar in Pakistani Baluchistan and Surat in the Indian state of Gujarat.

In other words, in Afghanistan we are not simply trying to save a country, but to give a whole region a new kind of prosperity and stability, united rather than divided by energy needs, that would be implicitly pro-American.

Indeed, a main reason the Pakistanis have been hesitant to work with us in the tribal areas is their fear that a manhunt is all we care about, rather than the region's long-term prospects.

The Pakistanis take note of our burgeoning strategic partnership with India, even as they believe that India's recent opening of several consulates in Afghanistan is aimed at helping Baluchi separatists weaken Pakistan.

Consequently, they feel squeezed, and on the brink of being deserted by us once we track down Al Qaeda's leading figures.

Afghanistan is a strategic rear base that India and Pakistan are now fighting over; both countries fear chaos there and desperately want us to calm it.

What the Pentagon calls the "long war" is the defining geopolitical issue of our time, and Afghanistan is at its heart. The fate of Eurasia hangs in the balance].

Robert D. Kaplan is a national correspondent for The Atlantic and a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington.

 

[fatman17]

^^^hasnt all the above been covered in the scores of comments posted by the forum members. we all know this. this is nothing new.

> pakistan feeling marginalised by indian actions in afghanistan (consulates).
> US dumping pakistan like it did during after the soviet withdrawl from afghanistan.
> umpteenth attempts to lay a oil pipeline from CAR's through afghanistan and ending in pakistan (remember unocal, TAP etc)
>the shenanigans of our civilian and military leaders to destabalise afghanistan until it accepts a subserviant role viz-a-vie pakistan.

and we expect that the US has all the "answers" to this quagmire when it is clear that the US is not a "fair" arbiter in this game.

 

[muse]

We know this, but US coming to these realizations is new - Kaplan is a an influential writer, lets wait and see if this piece represents a signal as to the substance of the policy review underway.

 

[muse]

Khaleej Times Online
Time to Face Reality of Afghan Mission
Eric S. Margolis (AMERICA ANGLE)

6 October 2008
Among the steady stream of bad news coming from Afghanistan, there was some moderately hopeful news this past week.

The US-installed and sustained Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, revealed he had asked Saudi Arabia to broker peace talks with the alliance of tribal and political groups resisting Western occupation, collectively known as Taleban. Saudi Arabia had been one of the few nations to recognise the erstwhile Taleban government and retains considerable influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Taleban leader Mullah Omar quickly rejected Karzai’s offer, and claimed the US was heading toward the same kind of catastrophic defeat in Afghanistan that the Soviet Union had met.

The ongoing financial panic in the United States lent substance to his words. The US economy is in grave peril and its three big automakers face bankruptcy.

At the same time, the US commander in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, urgently called for at least 10,000 more troops. US and NATO forces in Afghanistan are increasingly on the defensive, hard pressed to defend vulnerable supply lines in spite of massive fire-power at their disposal.

Startlingly, Gen. McKiernan appeared to break with Bush administration policy by proposing talks with the Taleban and admitting that the war needs to be dealt with diplomacy. His predecessor, General Dan McNeil, had asserted that 400,000 Western troops would be needed to pacify Afghanistan. The military men know this war cannot be won on the battlefield.

By sharp contrast, I recently asked Karl Rove, President Bush’s former senior advisor, how the US could ever hope to win the war in Afghanistan. His eyes dancing with imperial fervour, Rove replied to me, “More predators (missile armed drones) and helicopters!” Which reminded me of poet Hilaire Beloc’s wonderful line about 19th century British imperialism that I use in my new book, ‘American Raj:’ “Whatever happens/we have got/the Maxim gun (machine gun)/and they have not.”

Though Karzai’s olive branch was rejected, the fact he made it public is very important. By doing so, both he and General McKiernan broke the simple-minded Western taboo against negotiations with Taleban and its allies.

Taleban was founded as an Islamic movement dedicated to fighting Communism and the drug trade. It received US funding until May, 2001. In fact, the CIA maintained close contacts with Taleban, many of whose members were Mujahideen from the anti-Soviet war of the 1980’s, for possible future use against the Communist regimes of Central Asia and against China.

The 9/11 attacks made CIA immediately cut its links with Taleban and burn its associated files. In recent years, Western war propaganda has so demonised Taleban that few politicians have the courage to propose the obvious and inevitable: a negotiated settlement to this pointless seven-year war.

A noteworthy exception came last April when NATO’s Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, while calling for more troops, said the war could only be ended by negotiations, not military means. Taleban and its allies are mostly Pashtoons, who comprise half of Afghanistan’s population. They have been largely excluded from political power by the US-backed Kabul regime, which relies on Tajik and Uzbek ethnic minorities, chiefs of the old Afghan Communist Party, and the nation’s leading drug lords.

The Karzai government cannot extend its authority beyond Kabul because that would mean overthrowing the very same drug-dealing warlords that are its allies.

There is no real Afghan national army, just a bunch of unenthusiastic mercenaries who pretend to fight while playing footsie with Taleban.

Contrary to Western propaganda, Taleban are not `terrorists.’ The movement had nothing to do with 9/11 — though it did shelter Osama bin Laden, a national hero of the war against the Soviets. The 9/11 attacks were plotted in Germany and Spain, not Afghanistan. Only a handful of Al Qaeda members are left in Afghanistan. The current war is not really about Al Qaeda and `terrorism,’ but about opening a secure corridor through Pashtoon tribal territory to export the oil and gas riches of the Caspian Basin of Central Asia to the West.

The US and NATO forces in Afghanistan are essentially pipeline protection troops. As that great American founding father Benjamin Franklin said, “there is no good war, and no bad peace.” It’s time for the West to face reality in Afghanistan.

Eric S MargoFlis is a veteran American journalist and contributing foreign editor of The Toronto Sun

 

[fatman17]

^^^i admire eric s margolis who is amongst a few influential writers/analysts (like robert fisk etc) who write against the current policies of the west in general but once again isnt this what musharraf and pakistan in general have been calling for - a political solution - to talk to all parties not just the pashtuns. but no pakistan has to do more and more whilst the US/Nato look the other way as the "narco-trade" of the afghan warlords creates more problems for pakistan and afghanistan - gun-running, addiction, and funding the militants.

the US must realise that white is might aint gonna work for long!

 

[Cheetah786]

WASHINGTON: The United States said on Monday it’s 'very supportive' of an Afghan reconciliation effort that could bring the Taliban back into the government in Kabul after severing their ties with al-Qaeda.
A CNN report claimed that the Taliban had already agreed to dump al-Qaeda, a militant group the United States blames for sponsoring the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States.
'We’re very supportive of an Afghan reconciliation programme,' US State Department’s deputy spokesman Robert Wood told a briefing in Washington.
The State Department official also made it clear that the US had only two preconditions: renunciation of violence and adherence to the Afghan Constitution.
'And, in fact, the Afghan government has outlined criteria for that programme, which we fully support, one of which is renouncing violence, the second, adherence to the constitution,' he said.
Mr Wood emphasised that the talks would not affect 'a long-term US goal' to try to build up the Afghan army. 'It’s important that Afghans be able to take on security responsibility for themselves,' he said.
US military commanders have acknowledged that there’s no military solution to the Afghan conflict.
In a recent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen restated his concern that the military effort alone could not bring peace to Afghanistan. 'Afghanistan doesn’t just need more boots on the ground…I’m not convinced we’re winning it in Afghanistan,' he said.
Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, commander of Britain’s 16 Air Assault Brigade, which had just completed its second tour in Afghanistan, told the Sunday Times this weekend that people should 'lower their expectations' about how the conflict would end.
He also said they should prepare for a possible deal with the Taliban.
Diplomatic sources here claimed that while the Afghan government had long advocated talks with the Taliban, a mounting death toll among coalition troops and a worsening violence inside Afghanistan forced the Americans to involve Saudi Arabia in the talks.
The Taliban agreed to participate because they also believed that they could not win a war against the US-led coalition, sources said.DAWN.COM | World | US supports Taliban return to power QS

 

[muse]

In my earlier post I had mentioned that the US does not do Nation Building and wanted to do Afghanistan on the cheap - I mentioned that while the US are masters of organization, it is the English who have out done them with the creation of the Indian civil service - and that a similar effort is required for Afghanistan --

In today IHT, the following:

FONT="Arial"]Winning the battle, losing the faith
By Nathaniel C. Fick and Vikram J. Singh

Monday, October 6, 2008
WASHINGTON:

'The lion of the people will turn on you," warned Mullah Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, a former Taliban foreign minister, as we sipped green tea at his home in Kabul a few weeks ago. He noted that while Americans had been shocked by a series of spectacular insurgent attacks over the summer, the U.S.-led coalition faced a far greater danger than the resurgent Taliban: growing despair among average Afghans that their government is fundamentally illegitimate.

Every aspect of sound counterinsurgency strategy revolves around bolstering the government's legitimacy. When ordinary people lose their faith in their government, then they also lose faith in the foreigners who prop it up. The day that happens across Afghanistan is the day the coalition loses the war.

With more than 230 military deaths since January, this year is on track to be the deadliest yet for the coalition in Afghanistan. July alone saw a brazen attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul, the deaths of nine Americans at a combat outpost in Nuristan and the killing of 10 French soldiers on the outskirts of Kabul. The response has been a growing consensus around sending two to four more combat brigades to Afghanistan - 8,000 to 16,000 troops.

Although larger and more populous than Iraq, Afghanistan has fewer than half the coalition forces, and critical programs to advise the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police operate at one-third to one-half of their authorized strength. As the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Michael Mullen, told Congress last year, "In Afghanistan we do what we can; in Iraq we do what we must."

Reduced violence in Iraq will probably free up troops to do what we must in Afghanistan, but a government viewed by its people as worth fighting for is at least as important as adequate numbers of troops, helicopters and reconnaissance drones.

The timing of two coming events, however, give cause for hope: the American election next month and the Afghan presidential election next year. The new American administration will have greater freedom to pressure the Afghan government, and anyone aspiring to win the Afghan presidency will need to secure the support of the new man in the White House.

One sign of the current government's unpopularity is that nearly all the prominent Afghans we met on our recent trip hinted at being presidential candidates in 2009. Still, when asked who will win that election, they responded unanimously, "Whichever candidate the United States supports." Washington should send a message to every candidate that even tacit support depends on a serious commitment on three fronts: combating corruption; decentralizing governance; and negotiating political reconciliation with Taliban members who renounce violence.

First, the Afghan government must confront corruption in its own ranks. Tribal elders in Ghazni told us that they are "slapped on one cheek by the Taliban, and on the other cheek by the government." They talked of extortion by the police, dysfunctional courts and rampant bribery in government offices. The average Afghan spends one-fifth of his income on bribes. It's no surprise so many actively or passively support the Taliban.

To fight corruption, President Hamid Karzai should immediately do three things: Fire those seen as the most corrupt cabinet ministers, provincial governors and district governors; arrest and prosecute the most notorious warlords from the civil war in the 1990s, who committed unspeakable atrocities but are living openly in Kabul or the provinces; and break the relationship between the government and the country's largest industry, the poppy trade.

The coalition can assist in these reforms by "embedding" Western civilian experts in law, government and business management at every level of the Afghan government. This can improve performance and transparency. For example, one government worker described to us how a corrupt land deal was reversed because "locals were able to confront the governor together with a coalition representative, which made the issue hard to ignore."

Second, the Afghan government must rethink its approach to extending central government control throughout the country. Afghanistan's remote valleys have long sheltered tribesmen with an antibody reaction to outside power. Yet the Afghan Constitution, drafted under close American tutelage, posits a highly centralized government, with the leaders of Afghanistan's 34 provinces appointed by and beholden to Kabul, rather than to their own people.

Decentralizing power does not necessarily require amending the Constitution, but it does demand that central authorities in Afghanistan focus on providing services of national scope: an army and police force, roads, electricity, a postal service and the like.

Actual governance at the district level must stem from traditional tribal, social and religious structures.

Third, the Afghan government must negotiate with Taliban groups that have shown an honest willingness to renounce violence in exchange for a path back into the country's political life. Most Afghans we spoke with drew a sharp distinction between Afghan Taliban and other groups opposing the government - Al Qaeda, Arab foreign fighters and members of the Pakistani Taliban. They view Afghan Taliban as "sons of Afghanistan" who deserve to be treated differently than their more extreme foreign counterparts.

Afghanistan is a rural, conservative country, and there will inevitably be districts where the people elect local Taliban rule.

What's essential is that these places don't provide a staging area for a coup against the Kabul government or terrorist plots beyond Afghanistan. Incorporating the unarmed Taliban members into the government would give them something to lose, thus providing Kabul with new leverage over them.

Enhancing the legitimacy of an elected, representative government is the coalition's central task. With the help of "the lion of the people," the Afghan government and the coalition can defeat all spoilers in Afghanistan; otherwise, no amount of force will ever be enough to win.[/FONT]

Nathaniel C. Fick, a former Marine officer who served in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Vikram J. Singh, a former Defense Department official, are fellows at the Center for a New American Security.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Arabia brokering Kabul-Taliban talks: ‘Militia severs ties with Al Qaeda’




By Our Special Correspondent

LONDON, Oct 6: King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia recently hosted talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban, CNN’s Senior International Correspondent Nic Robertson reported on Monday quoting a source.

The CNN online alert said the historic four-day meeting took place during the last week of September in Makkah, according to the source, who spoke on the condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the negotiations.

King Abdullah broke the fast with a 17-member Afghan delegation — an act intended to show his commitment to ending the conflict.Taliban leader Mullah Omar was not present, the source said.

It marks a significant departure by the Saudi leadership to take a direct role in Afghanistan, hosting some delegates who have until recently been their enemies.

In the past, Saudi Arabia has generally dealt with Afghanistan through Pakistan.

The CNN correspondent said the desert kingdom’s current foray marks a significant shift and appears to recognise the political weakness of Pakistan and the need to stem the growth of Al Qaeda.

The current round of talks is anticipated to be a first step in a long process. According to the source close to the talks, it has taken two years of behind-the-scenes meetings to get to this point.

The talks took place between Sept 24 and 27 and involved 11 Taliban delegates, two Afghan government officials, a representative of former mujahideen commander and US foe Gulbadin Hekmatyar, and three others.

It was the first such meeting aimed at finding a negotiated settlement to the Afghan conflict and for the first time, all parties were able to discuss their positions and objectives openly and transparently, the source said.

Saudi Arabia was one of only three countries that recognised the Taliban leadership during its rule over Afghanistan in the 1990s, but that relationship was severed over Mullah Omar’s refusal to hand over Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

While Mullah Omar was not present at the Makkah talks, the source said the Taliban leader had made it clear he was no longer allied with Al Qaeda — a position that has never been publicly stated but emerged at the talks. It confirms what another source with an intimate knowledge of the Taliban and Mullah Omar has told CNN in the past.

During the talks, all parties agreed that the only solution to Afghanistan’s conflict is through dialogue, not fighting. The source described the talks as an ice-breaking meeting where expectations were kept necessarily low. Further talks are expected in Saudi Arabia involving this core group and others.

The reasons for Saudi Arabia’s involvement are numerous, including having the trust of the United States and Europe to play a positive role, at a time when the conflict appears to be worsening and the coalition’s casualty toll is climbing. Also, Saudi Arabia may fear that Iran could take advantage of US failings in Afghanistan, as it is seen to be doing in Iraq.Several Afghan sources familiar with Iranian activities in Afghanistan have said that Iranian officials and diplomats who were investing in business and building education facilities are lobbying politicians in Kabul.

Coalition commanders regularly accuse Iran of arming the Taliban, and Western diplomats privately suggest that Iran is working against US interests in Afghanistan, making it harder to bring peace.

Saudi sources say perceived Iranian expansionism is one of Saudi Arabia’s biggest concerns.

AP adds from Kabul: The Taliban’s former ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul Salam Zaeef, said on Monday that he met last month in Saudi Arabia representatives of the Taliban, the Afghan government and Mr Hekmatyar but the meeting could not be construed as peace negotiation.

He said he was invited by King Abdullah to Iftar.

“This is not new, it’s a kind of a guest celebration,” Mr Zaeef told AP.

“They invited some people for this. The list included me, (former Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad) Mutawakil, some from the Taliban, some from Hekmatyar, some from the government.”

“We didn’t discuss any issue of Afghanistan with” King Abdullah, he said.

Mr Zaeef, who spent almost four years in the US military prison in Guantanamo Bay, said there were no “official” representatives from the Taliban or Hekmatyar’s group, meaning no one authorised to carry out peace talks.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s government has long encouraged militants to lay down arms and accept the country’s constitution, but the Taliban leadership has largely rebuffed repeated overtures from Afghan officials aimed at ending the country’s six-year conflict.

An Afghan opposition leader, former president Burhanuddin Rabbani, had told the AP earlier this year that the country’s political leaders had been meeting Taliban and other anti-government groups in hopes of negotiating peace. He said some Taliban were willing to negotiate, but others were opposed.

One of the Afghan officials at the meal in Saudi Arabia was the country’s former Supreme Court chief justice Fazel Hadi Shinwari, Mr Zaeef said. He said Bismillah Khan, the army chief of general staff, also was in Saudi Arabia, though it wasn’t clear if he was part of the group that met the king.

Taliban spokesman Qari Yousef Ahmadi denied on Monday that any peace talks had taken place, while a Taliban commander in southern Afghanistan said the issue was raised recently during a Taliban meeting.

“We have been hearing of such talks in Saudi Arabia from our different sources for some days. A representative of Mullah Omar also present at the meeting denied it categorically,” Mullah Abdul Rahim said.

He said the Taliban would continue the war until US and British forces left Afghanistan.

 

[muse]

Taliban severing ties with AQ? - on the face of it, pretty implausible. This is really a political or geo-strategic problem between the US and Pakistan - should a understanding be effected between these two, both the Karzai regime and the taliban will become non-entities -- which leaves AQ, and these need killing not negotiations.

 

[fatman17]

To fight corruption, President Hamid Karzai should immediately do three things: Fire those seen as the most corrupt cabinet ministers, provincial governors and district governors; arrest and prosecute the most notorious warlords from the civil war in the 1990s, who committed unspeakable atrocities but are living openly in Kabul or the provinces; and break the relationship between the government and the country's largest industry, the poppy trade.

a president who cannot leave the confines of his presedential palace is going to do the above which only the taliban were ever able to do with their draconian methods!

what have these 2 analyst's been smoking - i want some of it!