Strategies/Tactics of Pakistani Military

[Teeta]

This thread only provides the 'shortcomings' of Pakistan Army's tactical planning in historical context. I thought that this thread would analyze over-all tactics , planning of Pakistan military.

Just like any other ideological state , Pakistan's military is the heart of the nation. Their destruction means huge setback to the ideological state of Pakistan. Same is the case with Israel , except the fact that Israeli military stays behind the curtain...

In terms of tactics , training , and war-planning etc , Indian and Pakistani militaries are similar thanks to their shared history under British.

With nuclear weapons in control , Pakistan Army is the nucleus of Islamic State of Pakistan...

Today , Pakistan military deploys most of their muscle on Eastern border along India. I guess General Kiyani learned from previous mistakes and a new synergy has risen between Pakistan Air Force and Pakistan Army. This would be critical in any ground war in the deserts and plains located in India/Pakistan's perceived theater of war.

 

[Pfpilot]

An undeniable fact is that some of Pakistan's Generals are brilliant in tactics but near zero in strategy. They lack foresight and planning especially the consequences of their actions in geopolitical terms.

They believe in that old adage, "Wham bam, thank you ma'am." Never mind the consequences of a military or political riposte that could ultimately lead to defeat.

This has been amply exhibited in all wars, especially the Kargil conflict. A brilliant tactical plan by Mush in the opening gambit, but strategically a disaster of galactic proportions as the war progressed. Well, one doesn't expect Army generals to be brilliant statesmen and diplomats too!

Mush and his ilk at the helm got so much egg on their faces, enough for a huge king sized omelet!

Cheers!

I think you may be looking at it wrong. The political angle is crucially important here. Musharraf may have failed in Kargil but he won Pakistan. The Army has operated alone from the very beginning for reasons that weren't singularly tactical or strategic; instead, the goals and aspirations of those in charge required valiant stands by the ground troops to really drive home the point of the might and aura of the PA. Much like the mediocrity of Yahya Khan didn't stop him from reaching the holy grail, in the form of the Pakistani presidency, Musharraf too was unfazed by his failures.

It is for this reason, the performance of the Pakistani army and the wider armed forces cannot be analyzed in a vacuum. The ideal of courageous Pakistani generals leading the troops into battle have always taken precedence over actual war fighting capability. The performance of the PN and PAF in conflicts were impressive under the circumstances, and at worst, they overachieved based on the available resources. The fact that they never had the requisite resources to begin with was due to the army hording a vast majority of the defense budget since inception, as it continues to do, today; even as the importance of airpower has been proven categorically as a game changer, while the protection of coastal supply lanes is vital to the war fighting capabilities and the survival of the nation. The fact that the PN and PAF have been actively excluded from the planning and implementation of cross border misadventures, as was the case in Kargil, speaks to the relative unimportance of their respective leaders in the wider political hierarchy of the nation. The Air Marshal and Admiral may be of benefit tactically, but they only add more moving parts to the political campaign that is every Indo-Pak conflict. The concept of sharing the spoils of victory is far outstripped by the convenience of excluding them, and then blaming them for their inability to protect the army.

Judging by the PA performance in 1965, during operation grand slam and Kargil, the two occasions when we had the upper hand at the onset, the eventual victory or defeat was not nearly as important as the act of fighting the said conflicts. The Army only benefited from the conflicts in the sympathy the top brass gained from the Pakistani populace in exchange for the senseless deaths of scores of Pakistani soldiers. Whether a conflict is won or lost, then is irrelevant, if the requirement is to only remind the public of the importance of the army.

If the strategy of the army wasn't solely victory or defeat in the theaters of conflict, but instead the resultant goodwill that helped launch many a political careers, then it can't be said that it failed.

 

[Capt.Popeye]

I think you may be looking at it wrong. The political angle is crucially important here. Musharraf may have failed in Kargil but he won Pakistan. The Army has operated alone from the very beginning for reasons that weren't singularly tactical or strategic; instead, the goals and aspirations of those in charge required valiant stands by the ground troops to really drive home the point of the might and aura of the PA. Much like the mediocrity of Yahya Khan didn't stop him from reaching the holy grail, in the form of the Pakistani presidency, Musharraf too was unfazed by his failures.

It is for this reason, the performance of the Pakistani army and the wider armed forces cannot be analyzed in a vacuum. The ideal of courageous Pakistani generals leading the troops into battle have always taken precedence over actual war fighting capability. The performance of the PN and PAF in conflicts were impressive under the circumstances, and at worst, they overachieved based on the available resources. The fact that they never had the requisite resources to begin with was due to the army hording a vast majority of the defense budget since inception, as it continues to do, today; even as the importance of airpower has been proven categorically as a game changer, while the protection of coastal supply lanes is vital to the war fighting capabilities and the survival of the nation. The fact that the PN and PAF have been actively excluded from the planning and implementation of cross border misadventures, as was the case in Kargil, speaks to the relative unimportance of their respective leaders in the wider political hierarchy of the nation. The Air Marshal and Admiral may be of benefit tactically, but they only add more moving parts to the political campaign that is every Indo-Pak conflict. The concept of sharing the spoils of victory is far outstripped by the convenience of excluding them, and then blaming them for their inability to protect the army.

Judging by the PA performance in 1965, during operation grand slam and Kargil, the two occasions when we had the upper hand at the onset, the eventual victory or defeat was not nearly as important as the act of fighting the said conflicts. The Army only benefited from the conflicts in the sympathy the top brass gained from the Pakistani populace in exchange for the senseless deaths of scores of Pakistani soldiers. Whether a conflict is won or lost, then is irrelevant, if the requirement is to only remind the public of the importance of the army.

If the strategy of the army wasn't solely victory or defeat in the theaters of conflict, but instead the resultant goodwill that helped launch many a political careers, then it can't be said that it failed.

@Pfpilot,
You seem to have hit it spot on!
Little wonder; that after the Kargil debacle (e.g.) the PA could still spin the story to its own benefit. As a matter of fact, there is an interesting study that I have (by a western think-tank) that concludes that Kargil 1999 was a victory for the PA.
Not on the Battle-field but in the polity of Pakistan. It wrested the initiative and control from the democratic dispensation that then ruled Pakistan and which was steadily eroding the Army's control over matters of governance in Pakistan.

Actually the PA in the last 6 decades in Pakistan seems to waged more combat with the political system than military actions and has never ever lost any of them. Now, that is not a bad combat record. While the PAF and PN are relegated to the role of side-kicks.

 

[arp2041]

I think you may be looking at it wrong. The political angle is crucially important here. Musharraf may have failed in Kargil but he won Pakistan. The Army has operated alone from the very beginning for reasons that weren't singularly tactical or strategic; instead, the goals and aspirations of those in charge required valiant stands by the ground troops to really drive home the point of the might and aura of the PA. Much like the mediocrity of Yahya Khan didn't stop him from reaching the holy grail, in the form of the Pakistani presidency, Musharraf too was unfazed by his failures.

It is for this reason, the performance of the Pakistani army and the wider armed forces cannot be analyzed in a vacuum. The ideal of courageous Pakistani generals leading the troops into battle have always taken precedence over actual war fighting capability. The performance of the PN and PAF in conflicts were impressive under the circumstances, and at worst, they overachieved based on the available resources. The fact that they never had the requisite resources to begin with was due to the army hording a vast majority of the defense budget since inception, as it continues to do, today; even as the importance of airpower has been proven categorically as a game changer, while the protection of coastal supply lanes is vital to the war fighting capabilities and the survival of the nation. The fact that the PN and PAF have been actively excluded from the planning and implementation of cross border misadventures, as was the case in Kargil, speaks to the relative unimportance of their respective leaders in the wider political hierarchy of the nation. The Air Marshal and Admiral may be of benefit tactically, but they only add more moving parts to the political campaign that is every Indo-Pak conflict. The concept of sharing the spoils of victory is far outstripped by the convenience of excluding them, and then blaming them for their inability to protect the army.

Judging by the PA performance in 1965, during operation grand slam and Kargil, the two occasions when we had the upper hand at the onset, the eventual victory or defeat was not nearly as important as the act of fighting the said conflicts. The Army only benefited from the conflicts in the sympathy the top brass gained from the Pakistani populace in exchange for the senseless deaths of scores of Pakistani soldiers. Whether a conflict is won or lost, then is irrelevant, if the requirement is to only remind the public of the importance of the army.

If the strategy of the army wasn't solely victory or defeat in the theaters of conflict, but instead the resultant goodwill that helped launch many a political careers, then it can't be said that it failed.

Thanks mate for ur analysis.

IMHO, This actually seems shocking, in an era where there is more demand of JOINTNESS among armed forces & even India is taking measures in this regard, PA still feels as if God has chosen it as the savior of the Pakistani nation, from nukes to ISI, from military budget to Foreign policy, there dominance & there say is everything. India even after victory in Kargil, took great lessons from it, if one analyze the Indian military policy since than, it can be easily seen that it is the IAF & IN that are in the forefront in Indian strategic planning & IA has taken a backseat. Yes, still the annual budget of IA is more than the other two due to the obvious reasons of large army consuming too much Revenue budget, but as far as the capital budget is concerned, both IN & IAF easily have the upper hand over IA. Be it an unprecedented naval expansion in Indian history, which calls for induction of 5-6 ships/year or the biggest tender of the world in the name of MMRCA, IN & IAF are really on a role.

This massive expansion drive is complimented by a concept of more jointness among the three forces, A&N command is the success story which was formed b'coz of the lessons learnt by the Kargil war, there are plans to form 3 more commands on the model of A&NC for - space, cyberspace and special operations. On the other hand the dominance of PA over Pakistani strategic thinking is really surprising.

I agree if another war (talking only of conventional war) takes place b/w India & Pakistan than PA would somewhat be able to resist Indian ground troops but i m sorry to say that PAF will have no answer for either Rafale or super sukhois or FGFA. The biggest conventional difference of the 3 forces will be that of the PN & IN where IN has taken undisputed lead by inducting SSN, SSBN, AC, Destroyers, mig-29ks,P-8Is etc.

@Oscar, sir, i would like to know from u, as to what are the PAF & PN plans to bridge this massive gap, when it is the PA that is eating the major chunk of the pie (defence budget).

 

[ajtr]

Indian military might is overplayed

Basing on tangible factors of its armed forces coupled with its nuclear strength, India claims to be the strongest military power in South Asia. America has now started to authenticate its claims. India fought three wars with Pakistan out of which two ended in a stalemate and one in controversial victory. In the 1948 war in Kashmir, when the position of Indian forces became precarious owing to stiff resistance put up by ragtag Pakistani forces together with Mujahideen, Nehru beseeched the UN to intervene and affect a ceasefire. Pakistan agreed to ceasefire only when Nehru gave his pledge that he would hold a plebiscite and allow right of self determination to the Kashmiris. His pledge was a ploy to save Kashmir but Liaquat Ali Khan believed him and thus lost a chance to reclaim Kashmir.

In August 1965, when Pakistani forces launched Operation Grand Slam in Indian Held Kashmir (***) and critical city of Akhnur was within their grasping reach, India declared all out war against Pakistan on 6 September. However, its pompous designs to humble Pakistan were effectively foiled by Pak forces. When the 17-day war ended inconclusively after India readily agreed to ceasefire, Pakistan forces had achieved superiority of strategic orientation. They were well poised to deliver the decisive blow and as such had an edge over numerically five times superior Indian military.

In the 1971 war, India used the instrument of psychological war to subvert East Pakistan, which was 1000 miles away from West Pakistan with a sea in between and surrounded by India from three sides. But for Indian military trained 2,87000 strong Bengali rebels who engaged Pakistani forces in high intensity insurgency for nine months, all out support of former Soviet Union and deleterious role of USA, Indian ten divisions together with 32 BSF battalions and Mukti Bahinis backed by massive artillery, tank, air and naval support could not have defeated the marooned force of 34000 regular troops and 11000 paramilitary forces devoid of air and armor support and cut off from rest of the world. In order to glamorize its so-called victory, Indian writers have been repeatedly mentioning false figure of 90,000 Pakistani soldiers surrendering to Indian forces.

Indian military was tested in 1962 when it was pitched against Chinese forces in Himalayan region and was trampled. It tried to show its prowess in Sri Lanka in 1987-88 by confronting LTTE but had to run home after bloodying its nose. The Indian sponsored LTTE was eventually eliminated by Sri Lankan forces in May 2009. In the two localized conflicts with Pakistan in Rann of Katch in April 1965 and in summer of 1999 in Dras-Kargil area, Pakistani forces had beaten Indian forces. Comparing the performance of UN missions in disturbed countries, Pakistani units have excelled and have earned the reputation of being the best among all nations in the world while Indian units do not figure out at all.

Performance of Indian security forces in combating insurgencies, separatist movements and freedom movements is also deplorable since they have not been able to smother any in spite of applying brutal force. In ***, over 700,000 Indian forces are battling with ragtag freedom fighters since 1989. They have massacred well over 100,000 Kashmiris and have used rape, torture and guile as weapons of war but have still been unable to quell the movement. India’s lame excuse that the freedom movement was not getting quashed due to Pakistan’s support was also taken care of when Gen Musharraf allowed India to fence the Line of Control and banned all Kashmir focused ****** groups. Indian forces are now firing at unarmed teenagers. With such a poor track record, it is strange that the US is betting on India and preparing it as a counterweight against China.

26/11 was the biggest disaster after 9/11 since ten terrorists took the Mumbai city hostage and battled elite forces of Indian Army, coastal guards, paramilitary forces and police for 72 hours. Nine of the attackers were ultimately killed after Israeli and South African commandoes barged in, otherwise the saga could have prolonged. 166 people including the attackers died in the shootout. Complete chaos and confusion prevailed in the city during the siege and security forces were found running around helter-skelter in utter panic. Instead of battling the terrorists, the media and political leaders trained their guns on Pakistan and held it responsible. In order to wash away the fear psychosis and to hide their embarrassment, the entire military might was deployed along Pakistan’s border and it started flexing its muscles. All this was done without having a shred of evidence against Pakistan. Instead of holding its security forces and intelligence agencies responsible for the debacle, Indian media undertook a frenzied campaign against Pakistan to malign its image and to prepare grounds to get ISI declared as a rogue outfit.

Taking advantage of widespread disorder in Mumbai city, Indian police officer Hemant Karkare was gunned down by RAW agents. He had netted the Hindu terrorist group involved in most terrorist attacks in India and had traced its linkage with Indian Army’s serving and retired officers including Lt Col Purohit. He had arrested the whole group and the case was under trial in law court. This discovery was just the tip of the ice burg. Many startling revelations would have surfaced had Karkare lived for some mort time. It was astonishing to note that all the Hindu terrorist groups in India, particularly those espousing Hindutva were patronized by Indian military intelligence, RAW and BJP. Western media is tightlipped over Hindu terrorism and extremism and rogue elements in Indian Army.

Attacks on GHQ and Mehran Base were executed by handful of terrorists but owing to swift and effective response of the security forces, the situation was brought under complete control within 18-20 hours. Some were overpowered while others were killed in action. These attacks did not disturb the routine life of Rawalpindi and Karachi nor caused any undue panic. Unlike the childish and panicky response of Indian media and its leaders, response of Pakistan leaders and media was dignified. No finger was raised at India or any other country. Rather, Pakistani media took the ruling regime and armed forces to task and held them accountable for intelligence failure and lack of preparedness. With regard to 2 May stealth helicopters assault, it was carried out deceptively by an elite force of USA against most wanted man and not against Pakistani target. There was anger but no nervousness in Pakistan. The incident galvanized the nation to confront the American challenge, which till then was considered an ally.

India claiming to be a world power capable of taking on China and Pakistan at a time didn’t pick up courage to take part in war on terror or to spare troops for invasion of Iraq. Instead it opted for cowardly covert war against Pakistan and that too using Afghan soil. RAW claiming to be the biggest intelligence agency in the region couldn’t get hold of a single al-Qaeda operative wanted by USA. On the other hand, Pakistan was instrumental in breaking the back of al-Qaeda by arresting its over 600 leaders. Indian civil, military and intelligence persons are present in Afghanistan in very large numbers, but al-Qaeda and Taliban have hardly targeted them, giving strong reason to suspect that there is a secret alliance between them, but the US remains mum. Pakistan Army and ISI have lost over 3550 at the hands of militants but the two are still accused of their linkage with them.

There are 37 insurgencies raging in different parts of India fighting Indian security forces due to injustices and discriminatory policies of rulers. There are over 100 non-Muslim and Muslim terrorist groups in India. Restive regions provide a fertile ground to ISI to foment anarchic conditions and fragment India. How is it that the ISI has not contacted any of the anti-state group or added fuel to any of the insurgencies particularly Naxalite or Maoist insurgency which has become an existential threat to India? Conversely, RAW is involved in Balochistan insurgency, FATA and Swat militancy, Karachi unrest, Balwaristan movement in Gilgit-Baltistan, Seraiki movement in South Punjab, and is linked with nationalist parties in rural Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It is supporting TTP, Fazlullah group, BLA, BRA, BLF and is associated with militant wing of a political party. Yet it is ISI which is maligned and no finger has ever been raised against RAW.

India is least interested in al-Qaeda or Afghan Taliban and has no interest in curbing terrorism in Afghanistan. It will never ever antagonize China what to talk of going to war with it, but feels elated when it is called a bulwark against China or a world power. Its sole interest is to destabilize, denuclearize and balkanize Pakistan so as to become an unchallenged super power of South Asia. It is more concerned with *** based Lashkar-e-Taiba which it projects as a bigger monster than al-Qaeda. If India is spending so much money in covert war against Pakistan, why can’t it divert part of it to fight Taliban and al-Qaeda that have become nightmares for USA and NATO, or to alleviate massive poverty and illiteracy in India?

India should be grateful to Pakistan since it is taking the brunt of terrorism for a decade and containing it. In case the terrorists succeed in gaining an edge over security forces, the natural course of their spill out is India. Since terrorism is a common threat to both India and Pakistan, it will be foolish on part of India to sink its head in sand like an ostrich and imagine that it will remain safe. Once terrorism over floods India, in no time it will get converted from India shining to India darkness. Wisdom and discretion demands India to come out of its fancy world of Mahabharata and become more levelheaded.

 

[arp2041]

@ajtr do u have problems understanding the difference b/w ON TOPIC & OFF TOPIC???

the topic is "Strategies/Tactics of Pakistani Military", how does - "Indian military might is overplayed" this goes with it???

 

[karan.1970]

@ajtr do u have problems understanding the difference b/w ON TOPIC & OFF TOPIC???

the topic is "Strategies/Tactics of Pakistani Military", how does - "Indian military might is overplayed" this goes with it???

Results of a free trolling pass

 

[Developereo]

IAF & IN that are in the forefront in Indian strategic planning & IA has taken a backseat.

Off-topic, but that has nothing to do with lessons of Kargil. The Indian priorities are driven by the Chinese focus.

 

[rockstarIN]

Whats PAF role in Pakistan political system? I never see anything talk about it. They blindly follow CO AS or did anybody listen PAF chief has to say.

I know in a war, they will listen...i'm talking about the political system.

Whats PAF role in Pakistan political system? I never see anything talk about it. They blindly follow CO AS or did anybody listen PAF chief has to say.

I know in a war, they will listen...i'm talking about the political system.

 

[Developereo]

Logic says after such gross mis-planning of events, political position of Pak military would be weakened, but instead military rule still continued.

To understand Pakistani politics, all you need to know is that it is a precarious balance -- a gentlemen's agreement -- between the three power brokers:

- Punjabi feudals
- Sindhi feudals
- Military generals

Once you understand that these three groups stay in power by not messing with each other, then you will understand everything: why 1971 happened, why Baluchistan is happening, why governance is AWOL, why sectarianism and extremism are flourishing, etc, etc.

 

[MilSpec]

As the thread is to discuss the stratigies/tactics of pakistani military, the following is my discussion on the atricle which is posted by m/s @ajtr, which I presume is a rhetoric that she closely prescribes to.

Indian military might is overplayed

Basing on tangible factors of its armed forces coupled with its nuclear strength, India claims to be the strongest military power in South Asia. America has now started to authenticate its claims. India fought three wars with Pakistan out of which two ended in a stalemate and one in controversial victory.

India doesn't claim to be the strongest military power in context of an aggressor force, but as the strongest, most reliable stable and responsible military force that has never waged any wars in the region, has successfully protected Indian interests in all it's conflicts against pakistan and has continued to serve the democracy of the Republic of India.

In the 1948 war in Kashmir, when the position of Indian forces became precarious owing to stiff resistance put up by ragtag Pakistani forces together with Mujahideen, Nehru beseeched the UN to intervene and affect a ceasefire. Pakistan agreed to ceasefire only when Nehru gave his pledge that he would hold a plebiscite and allow right of self determination to the Kashmiris. His pledge was a ploy to save Kashmir but Liaquat Ali Khan believed him and thus lost a chance to reclaim Kashmir.

Understandably, when the kingdom of jammu and kashmir came under assault from the nation of pakistan, a reinforcing Indian military did face opposition from "rag tag" looters hell bent on looting kashmir. Indian Army successfully repelled attacks and was able to gain a substantial area in the conflict, which today stands as the state of jammu and kashmir. As far as the right to self determination is concerned, I would recommend the author as well as the distinguished member @ajtr to look up UN resolutions on kashmir to understand which side primariy has not conformed to the pre-requisites of a plebiscite.
For your further reference
http://www.defence.pk/forums/centra...lebiscite-un-security-council-resolution.html

In August 1965, when Pakistani forces launched Operation Grand Slam in Indian Held Kashmir (***) and critical city of Akhnur was within their grasping reach, India declared all out war against Pakistan on 6 September. However, its pompous designs to humble Pakistan were effectively foiled by Pak forces. When the 17-day war ended inconclusively after India readily agreed to ceasefire, Pakistan forces had achieved superiority of strategic orientation. They were well poised to deliver the decisive blow and as such had an edge over numerically five times superior Indian military.

The author and the subscribers to such school of thought for lack of better words can only be termed delusional, or stark raving mad, for the fact of matter remains that an invading army of pakistan in kashmir in the beginning would end up defending it's own borders in lahore, meant it did not foresee the reply of Indian establishment which in the fallacy of pakistani leaders was apparently weakened by the chinese debacle. The conflict was very well commented on by an ex-PAF air chief marshal. Forget about any edge that pakistani military had, it is a wonder that ayub still remained in power after such a remarkable failure in strategy of PA during the conflict.

In the 1971 war, India used the instrument of psychological war to subvert East Pakistan, which was 1000 miles away from West Pakistan with a sea in between and surrounded by India from three sides. But for Indian military trained 2,87000 strong Bengali rebels who engaged Pakistani forces in high intensity insurgency for nine months, all out support of former Soviet Union and deleterious role of USA, Indian ten divisions together with 32 BSF battalions and Mukti Bahinis backed by massive artillery, tank, air and naval support could not have defeated the marooned force of 34000 regular troops and 11000 paramilitary forces devoid of air and armor support and cut off from rest of the world. In order to glamorize its so-called victory, Indian writers have been repeatedly mentioning false figure of 90,000 Pakistani soldiers surrendering to Indian forces.

As far as 90000 figure, it is PoW, fighting force was around 55000,

Instead of me reminding the foolishness of "security of east lies in west", I will quote @Oscar from a previous post
Yet, the "Sahibs" of W.Pakistan saw it better to treat the Bengalis as servants rather than equals.. not understanding their PoV and trying to impose theirs. CSP officers posted in E.Pakistan were sourced mostly if not all from the western wing to keep watch over the Bengalis whom they did not trust.
Racism had a lot to do with the downfall of Pakistan in Dhaka(and may do the same soon now.. but that is for another topic).
Ayub was just a representation of the attitude that stemmed from the northern feudal's wish for control of Pakistan.
He just provided impetus to this biased behavior.
Behavior that was not always seen within the ranks of the military, and many officers within the Armed forces of Pakistan still felt betrayed by their Bengali counterparts since they were not aware nor sensitive to the extent of the problem and placed a lot of trust in whom they considered their colleagues.
This attitude varied from the AF to the Army.. with the latter being comprised more of lackey's and "turnable" attitude officers.

26/11 was the biggest disaster after 9/11 since ten terrorists took the Mumbai city hostage and battled elite forces of Indian Army, coastal guards, paramilitary forces and police for 72 hours. Nine of the attackers were ultimately killed after Israeli and South African commandoes barged in, otherwise the saga could have prolonged. 166 people including the attackers died in the shootout. Complete chaos and confusion prevailed in the city during the siege and security forces were found running around helter-skelter in utter panic. Instead of battling the terrorists, the media and political leaders trained their guns on Pakistan and held it responsible. In order to wash away the fear psychosis and to hide their embarrassment, the entire military might was deployed along Pakistan’s border and it started flexing its muscles. All this was done without having a shred of evidence against Pakistan. Instead of holding its security forces and intelligence agencies responsible for the debacle, Indian media undertook a frenzied campaign against Pakistan to malign its image and to prepare grounds to get ISI declared as a rogue outfit.

Now this just turned into a comic piece with addition of israeli and south african commandos.

Taking advantage of widespread disorder in Mumbai city, Indian police officer Hemant Karkare was gunned down by RAW agents. He had netted the Hindu terrorist group involved in most terrorist attacks in India and had traced its linkage with Indian Army’s serving and retired officers including Lt Col Purohit. He had arrested the whole group and the case was under trial in law court. This discovery was just the tip of the ice burg. Many startling revelations would have surfaced had Karkare lived for some mort time. It was astonishing to note that all the Hindu terrorist groups in India, particularly those espousing Hindutva were patronized by Indian military intelligence, RAW and BJP. Western media is tightlipped over Hindu terrorism and extremism and rogue elements in Indian Army.

One wonders, why arrest such government backed agents in the first place when police officials will be murdered in this far fetched tom clancy thriller novel, if this rhetoric is a best seller in pakistan... then houston we have a problem!

Attacks on GHQ and Mehran Base were executed by handful of terrorists but owing to swift and effective response of the security forces, the situation was brought under complete control within 18-20 hours. Some were overpowered while others were killed in action. These attacks did not disturb the routine life of Rawalpindi and Karachi nor caused any undue panic. Unlike the childish and panicky response of Indian media and its leaders, response of Pakistan leaders and media was dignified. No finger was raised at India or any other country. Rather, Pakistani media took the ruling regime and armed forces to task and held them accountable for intelligence failure and lack of preparedness. With regard to 2 May stealth helicopters assault, it was carried out deceptively by an elite force of USA against most wanted man and not against Pakistani target. There was anger but no nervousness in Pakistan. The incident galvanized the nation to confront the American challenge, which till then was considered an ally.

All it indicates is a terrorist event, destruction of important military equipment, and completely absurd logic to confront americans for the actions of taliban.

India claiming to be a world power capable of taking on China and Pakistan at a time didn’t pick up courage to take part in war on terror or to spare troops for invasion of Iraq.

India did not consent to unilateral military action of US against iraq

Instead it opted for cowardly covert war against Pakistan and that too using Afghan soil.

Again, not true, no prof, baseless allegation based on thin air. No such proof has been provided against india, nither has any indian operative been arrested or linked back to RAW in balochistan

RAW claiming to be the biggest intelligence agency in the region couldn’t get hold of a single al-Qaeda operative wanted by USA.

Actually raw is a minuscule intelligence agency with no role whatsover outside India according to our national rhetoric. As far as arresting Al quada is concerned, we have no jurisdiction in pakistan.

On the other hand, Pakistan was instrumental in breaking the back of al-Qaeda by arresting its over 600 leaders.

Ahem, airlift of konduz, OBL, Haqqanis,

Indian civil, military and intelligence persons are present in Afghanistan in very large numbers, but al-Qaeda and Taliban have hardly targeted them, giving strong reason to suspect that there is a secret alliance between them, but the US remains mum.

Conspiracy theories and consistent Indian boogeyman syndrome at display

Pakistan Army and ISI have lost over 3550 at the hands of militants but the two are still accused of their linkage with them.

Again isn't that attributed to failure of pakistans strategic plans

India is least interested in al-Qaeda or Afghan Taliban and has no interest in curbing terrorism in Afghanistan. It will never ever antagonize China what to talk of going to war with it, but feels elated when it is called a bulwark against China or a world power. Its sole interest is to destabilize, denuclearize and balkanize Pakistan so as to become an unchallenged super power of South Asia. It is more concerned with *** based Lashkar-e-Taiba which it projects as a bigger monster than al-Qaeda. If India is spending so much money in covert war against Pakistan, why can’t it divert part of it to fight Taliban and al-Qaeda that have become nightmares for USA and NATO, or to alleviate massive poverty and illiteracy in India?

As far as to the strategic policy related incoherent rambling of the author, India's policy remains "India first always". We will not care about what rest of the world wants us to, we will follow our interests.

India should be grateful to Pakistan since it is taking the brunt of terrorism for a decade and containing it.[/B] In case the terrorists succeed in gaining an edge over security forces, the natural course of their spill out is India. [/B]Since terrorism is a common threat to both India and Pakistan, it will be foolish on part of India to sink its head in sand like an ostrich and imagine that it will remain safe. Once terrorism over floods India, in no time it will get converted from India shining to India darkness. Wisdom and discretion demands India to come out of its fancy world of Mahabharata and become more levelheaded.

Thank you pakistan, rest : Doesn't deserve any reply...

 

[MilSpec]

To understand Pakistani politics, all you need to know is that it is a precarious balance -- a gentlemen's agreement -- between the three power brokers:

- Punjabi feudals
- Sindhi feudals
- Military generals

Once you understand that these three groups stay in power by not messing with each other, then you will understand everything: why 1971 happened, why Baluchistan is happening, why governance is AWOL, why sectarianism and extremism are flourishing, etc, etc.

But similar system dominated by certain power blocs proved very counter productive in 1971 by alienating a big section of the country. I have often wondered what is the number of civil servants in pakistani administration, education and military establishment that represent balochs or pakhtoons.

 

[Developereo]

But similar system dominated by certain power blocs proved very counter productive in 1971 by alienating a big section of the country.

That was my whole point. The Bengalis saw the writing on the wall and walked.

 

[anilindia]

Indian military might is overplayed

No prize for guessing article author.

"Asif Haroon Raja is a retired Brigadier from Pakistan Army and author of several books. He is an analyst on security and political matters."

 

[arp2041]

Off-topic, but that has nothing to do with lessons of Kargil. The Indian priorities are driven by the Chinese focus.

Sir, off-course that have to do with Kargil lessons, whats the point if we don't learn from our mistakes??

After Kargil war a high powered committee was formed which was chaired by strategic affairs analyst K. Subrahmanyam, this committee found many deficiencies in Indian security apparatus, committee gave many recommendations, two of the most important are:

Form Separate agency for Technical Intelligence - NTRO was formed as a result.

More Synergy among the three armed forces - Now this needed time since that would mean complete change in organisational structure of the armed forces, so as a small (prototype) project A&NC was formed, to see if jointness can work out & this turned out to be a huge success.

I agree that the massive expansion drive of Indian forces are b'coz of the new Indian Focus on China but it all started with Kargil.