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Well, judging the history of China, then one must fear that a confrontation between China and Japan is inevitable!
The Dangerous Math of Chinese Island Disputes
OPINION ASIA
October 28, 2012, 12:11 p.m. ET - The Wallstreet Journal
If history is any guide, there's a real risk Beijing will use force against Japan over the Senkakus.
By M. TAYLOR FRAVEL
China's standoff with Japan over the rocky Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands has entered its second month. The current confrontation, however, is more dangerous than is commonly believed. China's past behavior in other territorial disputes demonstrates why the Senkaku standoff is primed to explode.
Since 1949, China has been involved in 23 territorial disputes with its neighbors on land and at sea. Seventeen of them have been settled, usually through compromise agreements. Nevertheless, China has used force, often more than once, in six of these disputes. And it's these cases that most closely parallel the Senkaku impasse.
To start, China has usually only used force in territorial disputes with its most militarily capable neighbors. These include wars or major clashes with India, Russia and Vietnam (several times), as well as crises involving Taiwan. These states have had the greatest ability to check China's territorial ambitions. In disputes with weaker states, such as Mongolia or Nepal, Beijing has eschewed force because it could negotiate from a position of strength. Japan is now China's most powerful maritime neighbor, with a modern navy and a large coast guard.
China has also used force most frequently in disputes over offshore islands such as the Senkakus. Along its land border, China has used force only in about one-fifth of 16 disputes. By contrast, China has used force in half of its four island disputes. Islands are seen as possessing much more strategic, military and economic value because they influence sea-lane security and may hold vast stocks of hydrocarbons and fish.
In addition, China has mostly used force to strengthen its position in disputes where it has occupied little or none of the land that it claims. In 1988, for example, China clashed with Vietnam as it occupied six coral reefs that are part of the Spratly Islands. China had claimed sovereignty over the Spratlys for decades—but had not controlled any part of them before this occupation.
In cases where China already possessed some of the contested territory, such as a border dispute with Kazakhstan, China had a strong bargaining position and little reason to use force. But in the East China Sea, China does not currently hold any of the Senkaku Islands, which are under Japanese control.
Most importantly, China has used force in territorial disputes during periods of regime insecurity, when leaders have a greater incentive to show resolve: They believe that opposing states seek to take advantage of China's domestic woes, and that a weak or limited response might increase popular discontent.
China's leaders today may feel on the ropes for several reasons—elite conflict at the highest levels of the ruling Chinese Communist Party; a slowing economy that undermines the legitimacy of the CCP; and a delicate transition of power from one generation of leaders to the next. These factors increase the value of using firm action to signal resolve to both Japan and the Chinese public. They also decrease Beijing's willingness to compromise or be seen as backing down.
To Chinese eyes, Japan's Senkaku moves look like attempts to capitalize on Chinese difficulties. The current standoff began in April, when nationalist Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara announced a plan to buy three of the islands from their private Japanese owner. Mr. Ishihara's announcement came just days after Beijing suspended Politburo member Bo Xilai from all his positions in the CCP—arguably the biggest upheaval in elite Chinese politics in more than two decades.
Diplomatic positions hardened as China's economic growth slowed much faster than expected, an increasing source of worry for Beijing's leaders. Then Japanese Premier Yoshihiko Noda announced his decision to buy the islands on the July anniversary of the 1937 Marco Polo Bridge incident, which marked Japan's bid to conquer all of China. Finally, the sale was completed in September just days before the anniversary of the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria.
The final destabilizing factor in the Senkaku standoff is that both sides are simultaneously engaged in other island disputes. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak recently broke with tradition and became the first Seoul leader to visit the disputed Dokdo (Takeshima) Islands, which are occupied by the Koreans but also claimed by Japan. Meanwhile, China has been dueling with Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea. Tokyo and Beijing may both conclude that whoever prevails in the Senkakus will have a better chance at prevailing in these other disputes.
History is not destiny. China has not used force in a territorial dispute for more than 20 years. Escalation over the Senkakus may be avoided. Nevertheless, the current situation is fraught with danger. Should a fatal incident occur involving government ships from either country, a real crisis may begin whose end cannot be foretold.
Mr. Fravel is an associate professor of political science and member of the Security Studies Program at MIT, and author of "Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes" (Princeton, 2008).
