Security dilemma in informal alliance politics: The case of dispute in South China Sea

[TaiShang]

Let me state that the notion of American interventionism being a catalytic of anti-historical or anti-progressivism is nothing new. It is a continuation of Anglo interventionism that started as early as the 17th century . In fact , if we were to apply a comprehensive historical reference , this Anglo interference was part of a greater socio-economical paradigm of European imperialism, and hegemony of this region. The America. Domination, my friend , is merely the extension of that historically parasitic and unilateralist interventionism.

I agree that it is a continuation from European colonialism to US soft interventionism. European colonialism has been broken down for long now and some argue that was bound to happen due to growing (and in fact belated) nationalism that already dissolved empire-nations such as the Ottomans or in part due to Japan's own brand of colonialism across the East and South East Asian peripheries. In any case, colonialism is long dead while imperialism/soft interventionism is still alive and kicking.

Perhaps the question to be asked here is not only “how” in the descriptive sense, but also ”why“ in the critical sense. Why does soft/neo imperialism is still alive in our region? For sure, US has some 500 other military bases across the world, not just in East Asia, but, especially in the case of Northeast Asia which hosts world's some the most advanced polities with excellent public governance, suggests me, like you put it very nicely, a powerful anti-historicist dynamic at play.

Oftentimes, it is prudent to look inwards before outwards to seek shortcomings; hence, I do not wish to spend too much time on the merits of US strategy-making in creating this situation, but look into the underlying causes that render the situation as it is today. I am not sure you have clear cut answers to this problematic, but, I would point out:

1. Historical baggage

2. Varying/disparate levels of development

3. Lack of a "regionalist" outlook (I do not consider the ASEAN Way as perfectly regionalist. ASEAN Way is the poor man's regionalism. We need to move beyond it. Perhaps Japan came close to it with its AMF proposal. CJK FTA would also be another potential candidate)

And perhaps you can point out other underlying factors from more behavioralist/culturalist perspective. I guess national psyches also play a significant role.

 

[CAPRICORN-88]

EXAMPLE: There are many but this is only one of them.

It is simply UNBELIEVABLE that any Government will agree to sign a deal with a remarkable clause. The leaders of the TPP states did so against the people's will.

Foreign Investors meaning the Big Corporations through the secretive panel of corporate lawyers can now sue these countries for millions of dollars for defending their right to a clean air, environment or good health.

The agreement allows them bypass any ruling made to the contrary by the highest national court in these TPP nations; and deny the will of their Parliament or the protection guaranteed by their nation Constitution.

They have to conclude these deals before China move up and become the biggest consumer market in the world.
But is China sitting idle. Naturally not (otherwise Japan will not be admitting that leaving out China of TPP is unwise. But it is not up to her as big brother USA is dictating all the T&C for the TPP)

We will reserved that for future discussion.

 

[Zero_wing]

Oftentimes, law is what you make of it. Hence, we might be both right on what we argue about. But the issue of exit clause in UNCLOS, which both Philippines and Vietnam opted to utilize, is impossible to deny. Besides, as Martin says, UNCLOS cannot be executed retrospectively. What happens before UNCLOS stays outside the purview of UNCLOS.

Because you are Philippines vs. Philippines in the arbitration, we will most likely not hear these small technicalities.

Wow a reasoning of child

Nuking Philippines? Overkill much? Just one single type 52d destroyer is worth more than the whole Filipino navy combined as it is.

Well some you imperials said that i forgot who and i dont care because its rediculous and your reply is even more so why try it a still waiting for your fellow imperial crazy treats to come true just add yours crazy nonsense to list

 

[jhungary]

You're just ranting. I'm tired of arguing with an idiot.

Are you retarded?

Please do NOT use inflammatory word against fellow member. Using personal insult would not reinforce your point, only make your point weaker.

You Viets are retarded.

Please do NOT use inflammatory word against fellow member.

This is worthy of being a published opinion piece in the Journal of Developing Economies, my friend. Excellent piece of penmanship, regional political dialectics and security legation initiative processes. I agree with you that a central variable in security parameters is the notion of American interventionism in the region. Tho we , East Asian integrationist academics have sometimes resigned the notion of American interventionism as a recent phenomenon evidenced at the end of the 2nd World War and after the total collapse of the Dai Nippon Teikoku (The Japanese Empire) and her extra-national territories in Asia and the Pacific, this paradigm has actually existed centuries prior.

Let me state that the notion of American interventionism being a catalytic of anti-historical or anti-progressivism is nothing new. It is a continuation of Anglo interventionism that started as early as the 17th century . In fact , if we were to apply a comprehensive historical reference , this Anglo interference was part of a greater socio-economical paradigm of European imperialism, and hegemony of this region. The America. Domination, my friend , is merely the extension of that historically parasitic and unilateralist interventionism.

From this, now we can direct our discourse. Looking forward to your input @TaiShang .

lol, I found it more of a publication of Conspiracy Theorist.

The informal relation between US and Vietnam and Philippine DOES NOT EXIST. What exist is the existing Economic Relationship and the Power struggle between an old friend and old enemy.

Problem with Asiatic region is and always is trust. And none of the Asiatic country as I recall will give any to each other, let alone to the foreigner. A great example is the North Korean problem, South Korean have to trust enough to Chinese and North Korean to not to meddling with their own country before they can ask the American to vacate their country, however, Chinese and to some extend, North Korean have to trust the South Korean enough that THEY WILL indeed ask the American to leave before engage into any kind of talk. Result? nobody doing anything in both Koreas.\\

The question now is whether or not Vietnam have enough trust on China to not to "Close Off" the SCS as the Vietnamese fear, and Chinese have enough trust on the Vietnamese to not harass their own people, namely fisherman in the region, again, that spoil down to two factor, what would China get and what would Vietnam get. And whether or not what they can get over these "Trust" issue. From the situation we saw as of now, the trust is not there and any gain would be for one side of the party, and that will be China.

US on the other hand, have repeated illiterate that they do not care about the claim in SCS, only the right for freedom of Navigation. Now, the trust problem appear again as would China actually believe US only concern is the freedom of navigation or would China more lean to believe US have an ulterior agenda on the SCS issue, at this stage, China believe is the latter.

But on the other hand, while US is an interventionism country, the question is why would US intervene on SCS on behalf of anybody? The answer is quite simple, they don't. Say what you will or say what you want about the US, the US look at nothing but their own interest in the region, and their interest is lying on their own soil. While it would be quite crazy to suggest an all out war between China and US over territories in Vietnam or Philippine, but it is not far fetch at all for US to get into a tangling with China over their own turf, namely Guam and the Marianas. The problem is, US will not need a reason to shore up defences in Asian region, they could have simply say they want to secure their overseas territories, hence what is the need to intervene on behalf of Vietnam and Philippine when you can simply put it up on their own country??

Hence, what @TaiShang say is conspiracy theory at best. They are seeing more economic and defence cooperation as a threat, but while it may be upsetting the balance in the region, it does not always have to relate to China, I mean, in the end, each country have their independent Foreign Policy, would it be wrong to choose one over the other?

 

[Aepsilons]

lol, I found it more of a publication of Conspiracy Theorist.

The informal relation between US and Vietnam and Philippine DOES NOT EXIST. What exist is the existing Economic Relationship and the Power struggle between an old friend and old enemy.

Problem with Asiatic region is and always is trust. And none of the Asiatic country as I recall will give any to each other, let alone to the foreigner. A great example is the North Korean problem, South Korean have to trust enough to Chinese and North Korean to not to meddling with their own country before they can ask the American to vacate their country, however, Chinese and to some extend, North Korean have to trust the South Korean enough that THEY WILL indeed ask the American to leave before engage into any kind of talk. Result? nobody doing anything in both Koreas.\\

I like the theme of trust and inter-state cooperation being the catalyst of diplomatic rapprochement in the Asian Pacific Region. That’s an interesting analysis also that you made about how the issue of mist-trust has been the barrier for any effective development in the Korean Unification paradigm that was initiated in 2000 between South Korean President Kim Dae Jung and North Korean President Kim Jong IL , in the brokering of the June 15th North-South Declaration of Korean Unification [남북공동선언]. Due to Chinese and North Korean distrust of American evacuation of South Korea, likewise the South Korean distrust of Pyongyang’s demilitarization , as well as America’s mistrust of Beijing’s commitment of not intervening in the event of a unification paradigm is reached and implemented operationally. The catalyst of this mistrust that you so identify is national sovereignty and national interest of both China and the United States, the two major players in the East Asian Region.

The United States, which had effectively won the 2nd World War and a bloody conflict it shouldered against the Japanese Empire, subsumed all former central pacific mandates of the Japanese Empire, and thus by mandate of the San Francisco Treaty, assumed total hegemony of the central and western pacific islands , which were all former territories of the Japanese Empire and which the said entity had renounced by terms of unconditional surrender. The United States also currently enjoys this pacific hegemony and critical to her Asia-Pacific Mandate is presence in Japan (where she has based some 53,000 US servicemen) and South Korea (where she has based some 25,000 US servicemen). In fact US Forces Japan and US Forces Korea are the forward deployed units of the US Pacific Command, which is centered around the nexus of Guam-Palau-Hawaii. The loss of Japan and South korea would mean a restricted US Pacific Command and strategic loss to inject its forces into Asia. Hence, Washington will do everything it can to cultivate an environment where its presence in Japan and Korea is pertinent for their (Japan and Korea) security.

In regards to China, it is contradictive for Chinese state interest to have a unified Korean Republic that will be governed by Seoul and thus more strategically aligned to Washington. Having a pro-US entity so close to the Chinese border is a strategic threat to China. Hence in the event of a Korean unification, Beijing will try to encourage a dual sharing process where Pyongyang’s historically friendly relations with Beijing remain a national policy in the newly federated unified Korea. Either way the only way Beijing will acquiesce to unification would be if :

1. The United States evacuates South Korea

2. South Korea maintains an equidistant strategic position between Beijing and Washington, preferably with a closer relationship with Beijing

3. Unified Korea de-nuclearizes , as a nuclear-powered unified Korea would pose a strategic threat to China as well as Russia (this becomes vital in the event that Seoul maintains close relationship with Washington). ​

So , as we can see, there are various interests to consider. In the end, it is the interest of Beijing and Washington that are centrifugal to Korean paradigm.

 

[Aepsilons]

The question now is whether or not Vietnam have enough trust on China to not to "Close Off" the SCS as the Vietnamese fear, and Chinese have enough trust on the Vietnamese to not harass their own people, namely fisherman in the region, again, that spoil down to two factor, what would China get and what would Vietnam get. And whether or not what they can get over these "Trust" issue. From the situation we saw as of now, the trust is not there and any gain would be for one side of the party, and that will be China.

US on the other hand, have repeated illiterate that they do not care about the claim in SCS, only the right for freedom of Navigation. Now, the trust problem appear again as would China actually believe US only concern is the freedom of navigation or would China more lean to believe US have an ulterior agenda on the SCS issue, at this stage, China believe is the latter.

Ultimately the issue between Viet Nam and China can only be solved through proper interdiction forces , meaning enabling respective coast guard units to do civilian patrols. Vietnam should realize the futility in sending naval military to engage Chinese civilian forces in the East Sea as it would only encourage a military response by Beijing. The 2012 Scarborough Shoal between the Philippines and China should serve as case study for government analysts , especially from those who have a stake in the South China Seas.

Vietnam has two possible strategies when in regards to China:

1. Cooperate with China and forge a Sino-Vietnamese defense pact, and enable bilateral channels to design a compromise in regards to Sino-Vietnamese claims and patrol / fishing areas. Vietnam effectively closes its counter-claim with China and in response she secures greater rapport with Beijing, greater access to China’s immense market, receives economic and military support from Beijing. Vietnam can thus enter into joint scientific and joint military projects with China (in the same capacity as the Sino-Pak defense projects that led to the genesis of JF-17 fighter program).

2. Vietnam adopts a multilateral policy where she encourages greater rapproachment with Washington and other major players, maintains her territorial claims against Beijing, encourages nationalism and strategic ambiguity with Beijing. ​

You are right , however, the United States would milk the situation for what its worth. By tapping into Vietnamese and Filipino contention with Beijing, Washington then effectively embeds herself in the region long term. She thereby inhibits Beijing’s eastern push to the pacific, which threatens Washington’s pacific mandates and hegemony. Afterall you yourself said , and I do agree with this analysis of yours, the United States is an interventionist state, she will implement statecraft to affect local political economy so as to secure US interests. To the chagrin of Beijing. In other words , Washington will play to the tune of the old Roman tactical doctrine of : Divide Et Impera.

 

[jhungary]

I like the theme of trust and inter-state cooperation being the catalyst of diplomatic rapprochement in the Asian Pacific Region. That’s an interesting analysis also that you made about how the issue of mist-trust has been the barrier for any effective development in the Korean Unification paradigm that was initiated in 2000 between South Korean President Kim Dae Jung and North Korean President Kim Jong IL , in the brokering of the June 15th North-South Declaration of Korean Unification [남북공동선언]. Due to Chinese and North Korean distrust of American evacuation of South Korea, likewise the South Korean distrust of Pyongyang’s demilitarization , as well as America’s mistrust of Beijing’s commitment of not intervening in the event of a unification paradigm is reached and implemented operationally. The catalyst of this mistrust that you so identify is national sovereignty and national interest of both China and the United States, the two major players in the East Asian Region.

The United States, which had effectively won the 2nd World War and a bloody conflict it shouldered against the Japanese Empire, subsumed all former central pacific mandates of the Japanese Empire, and thus by mandate of the San Francisco Treaty, assumed total hegemony of the central and western pacific islands , which were all former territories of the Japanese Empire and which the said entity had renounced by terms of unconditional surrender. The United States also currently enjoys this pacific hegemony and critical to her Asia-Pacific Mandate is presence in Japan (where she has based some 53,000 US servicemen) and South Korea (where she has based some 25,000 US servicemen). In fact US Forces Japan and US Forces Korea are the forward deployed units of the US Pacific Command, which is centered around the nexus of Guam-Palau-Hawaii. The loss of Japan and South korea would mean a restricted US Pacific Command and strategic loss to inject its forces into Asia. Hence, Washington will do everything it can to cultivate an environment where its presence in Japan and Korea is pertinent for their (Japan and Korea) security.

In regards to China, it is contradictive for Chinese state interest to have a unified Korean Republic that will be governed by Seoul and thus more strategically aligned to Washington. Having a pro-US entity so close to the Chinese border is a strategic threat to China. Hence in the event of a Korean unification, Beijing will try to encourage a dual sharing process where Pyongyang’s historically friendly relations with Beijing remain a national policy in the newly federated unified Korea. Either way the only way Beijing will acquiesce to unification would be if :

1. The United States evacuates South Korea

2. South Korea maintains an equidistant strategic position between Beijing and Washington, preferably with a closer relationship with Beijing

3. Unified Korea de-nuclearizes , as a nuclear-powered unified Korea would pose a strategic threat to China as well as Russia (this becomes vital in the event that Seoul maintains close relationship with Washington). ​

So , as we can see, there are various interests to consider. In the end, it is the interest of Beijing and Washington that are centrifugal to Korean paradigm.

While I wanted to continue the discussion of Korean Situation and what it could have been with you, I do feel that this is off topic and even though I regarded the North Korean situation is a single biggest Foreign Policy failure by the Chinese, I would refrain from discussing the situation herein. Maybe opening a separate thread??

The question between Vietnam and Philippine is quite different than the Korean Situation actually. While as I said, one is a former enemy, and one is a former friend. While both country were and did enjoy US assistance at some point but the problem is, nationalism have prevented said assistance to continue with both the government.

Problem is this, Chinese's term on SCS is not acceptable by both Vietnamese and Philippine standard, and while I do understand Chinese foreign policy behind such decision, the question is why Chinese does not do more subtle than what they already did.

It always take 2 to tango, and even if US wanted to pivot to Asia, and if no one in the region beside the usual suspect agrees, the US can do absolutely nothing to pivot whatever in the region. There is an old Chinese saying 空穴來風 未必無因. It always need another party for the US to portrait as bad guys. And China simply fall for it. I mean, the best way for Chinese is to do nothing, then there will be no reason or no one will see the need for the American to pivot. Hence this untrust and paranoia that the Chinese Government have directly fuelled the US pivot to Asia. It basically give the US a "Perfect" bad guy for them to push China into.

For the US, they do not need anything, as I said before, if the US were to try and find an excuse to increase security cooperation in Asia, they do not need any excuse. They would simply say we want to secure West Pacific (Guam) to Central Pacific (Hawai'i) or the Allies in South Pacific (Australia and NZ). And US, Philippine and Vietnam leader knows that too, they know they could not count on the US if things really did hit the fans, but then one question needed to be ask, would that change anything? Nope. Business carry on as usual.

Ultimately the issue between Viet Nam and China can only be solved through proper interdiction forces , meaning enabling respective coast guard units to do civilian patrols. Vietnam should realize the futility in sending naval military to engage Chinese civilian forces in the East Sea as it would only encourage a military response by Beijing. The 2012 Scarborough Shoal between the Philippines and China should serve as case study for government analysts , especially from those who have a stake in the South China Seas.

Vietnam has two possible strategies when in regards to China:

1. Cooperate with China and forge a Sino-Vietnamese defense pact, and enable bilateral channels to design a compromise in regards to Sino-Vietnamese claims and patrol / fishing areas. Vietnam effectively closes its counter-claim with China and in response she secures greater rapport with Beijing, greater access to China’s immense market, receives economic and military support from Beijing. Vietnam can thus enter into joint scientific and joint military projects with China (in the same capacity as the Sino-Pak defense projects that led to the genesis of JF-17 fighter program).

2. Vietnam adopts a multilateral policy where she encourages greater rapproachment with Washington and other major players, maintains her territorial claims against Beijing, encourages nationalism and strategic ambiguity with Beijing. ​

You are right , however, the United States would milk the situation for what its worth. By tapping into Vietnamese and Filipino contention with Beijing, Washington then effectively embeds herself in the region long term. She thereby inhibits Beijing’s eastern push to the pacific, which threatens Washington’s pacific mandates and hegemony. Afterall you yourself said , and I do agree with this analysis of yours, the United States is an interventionist state, she will implement statecraft to affect local political economy so as to secure US interests. To the chagrin of Beijing. In other words , Washington will play to the tune of the old Roman tactical doctrine of : Divide Et Impera.

The question is not that simple for the Vietnamese at least. It again come down to the "trust" issue.

While the Vietnamese does not trust the Chinese, are they actually trusting the American?? The answer is simply no. The question is rather which benefit more to Vietnam? China or the US?

In the scenario, it's neither, China have their own agenda, the US have their own agenda, and neither of them coincide the Vietnamese own agenda. The sole problem is that while Vietnam share a border with China, US is ten thousand (13,000 to be exact) miles away and while the intention of the US is as clear as China, which the Vietnamese would see China present a more Clear and Present danger than US pose to them. Trust issue aside. This is national integrity at stake.

While you can say Vietnam don't trust the US or China, but only one of them can be an immediate issue with them, and that's China. Problem with what you suggest is that, either Vietnam concede to what Chinese demand, then it gave no point for China to share what they have with Vietnam, which effectively negate the whole point of a defence pact (You do not form a pact with people most likely to attack you) While another solution is a problem too because how do you know even with greater rapprochement with everybody, anybody would come to rescue you when it counts?

The only solution left with the Vietnamese is that what they do is to lean toward the west and hopefully to gain a better ground in order to bring to a near even dialogue to the Chinese, then and only then can a defence pact to sign with the Chinese. Otherwise it would not be a defence pact but a dictated term for Chinese demand....

On the other hand, gaining a positive relationship with the US have its own advantage, while I would say Vietnam will not dip into the American pool because they want protection. I would actually doubt if the American would actually give any. But not everything are related, a good relationship with US will encourage investment, technology development and also defence cooperation between each country, and in this process lifted Vietnam from the current dilemma it has been in. While the Vietnamese can and would still be trading with China, just not totally depending on Chinese trade.

Philippine, on the other hand, would be like between a rock and a hard place. Years of US dependence have totally destroy their ability to defend themselves, so there would be hard to restart a situation that you have not begin in the first place. Therefore a more drastic measure we can actually see the Philippine is doing, either give in to the Chinese demand and secure a peaceful future, or they have no choice but to invite the American back to their soil, but this time, it will be the American not trusting the Filipino. And that would be another problem.