Follow along with the video below to see how to install our site as a web app on your home screen.
Note: This feature may not be available in some browsers.
Man you guys have werid ideas of international law
Judging by america's recent weak reactions in the South China Sea issue, it seems that they are not really committed in backing the Philippines. I hope our next leader will wake up and see that america is not a trustworthy partner.
Oftentimes, law is what you make of it. Hence, we might be both right on what we argue about. But the issue of exit clause in UNCLOS, which both Philippines and Vietnam opted to utilize, is impossible to deny. Besides, as Martin says, UNCLOS cannot be executed retrospectively. What happens before UNCLOS stays outside the purview of UNCLOS.
Because you are Philippines vs. Philippines in the arbitration, we will most likely not hear these small technicalities.
LOL, maybe it's you that lack the basic understanding of international lawMan you guys have werid ideas of international law
LOL, maybe it's you that lack the basic understanding of international law
I guess the main difference is the enforcement.ok tell me this then what the difference between municipal law and international law then?
I guess the main difference is the enforcement.
I cannot. That is all I know and still a guess.well tell more you almost got it right
Vietnam and Philippines would make likely candidates for China to gain modern high-tech warfare experience.
you must have heard that from some drunkard and taken it seriously.Well still waiting for that nuke you chinese warmongers said that was coming to us it's been 2 years still no nuke man its been so long waiting its boring Oh dark ages how i miss you
Well still waiting for that nuke you chinese warmongers said that was coming to us it's been 2 years still no nuke man its been so long waiting its boring Oh dark ages how i miss you
I would like to offer a brief conceptual evaluation of the situation in the South China Sea which appears to be evolving into a dilemmatic condition for the parties that position themselves against China (Mainland+Taiwan).
As the security structure evolves in the South China Sea, the major parties (manly Vietnam and the Philippines) are seen to become relatively more influential in their informal alliance with the US. This, coupled with the US’ Pivot strategy, could, on the surface, provide these two countries a unique window of opportunity in balancing their economic relations with China and security relations with the US. However, this improved status can also invite the danger of US’ entrapment in its economic relations with China or the two countries’ abandonment by the US in the face of a rising China.
Hence I would like to point to a possibility of security dilemma in regards to VT and PH's informal alliance with the US, arguing that recent swift developments in the SCS, VT & PH and the US might singularly find themselves in a precarious position where one side (VT and PH) fears abandonment whereas the other side (the US) fears entrapment. These fears might be further strengthened by China’s further claims on its core national interests and the US’ stronger posture and revamped strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Obviously, each actor has so far taken several serious steps in ensuring their core interests and these individual interests are not often compatible with each other.
Another aspect of security dilemma is that it might trigger a securitization of inter-state interaction in a spiraling way. It occurs if a state is not sure whether its opponent is a security seeker or expansionist. There remains the likelihood that the opponent is a mere security seeker; then, an emboldened action taken by one of the partners (VT & PH) in an alliance might be perceived as aggressive or provocative (Adversary dilemma) by the other (US).
Thus, the security dilemma in informal alliance politics suggests a threat of entrapment or abandonment for the parties involved in informal alliance (Alliance dilemma). Entrapment occurs when one side is dragged into a conflict that its partner has with a third party. It often happens when the interests of the allies (VT & PH - US) are not one and the same. However, even formal alliances do not guarantee the support of a partner if the partner (US) feels that a defection is more profitable or less costly than remaining true to the alliance. This becomes even a greater possibility if alliance is informal because in this case it is less binding and not institutionalized.
However, in the case of SCS dispute, VT & PH might face a greater risk of abandonment (than the US of entrapment) since in an increasingly multipolar world system, alliances are as easily made as deserted.
Therefore, further institutionalization and inter-governmental dialogue with China, with an entirely regional character, seems to be a viable way for VT & PH to manage their informal alliance politics. A neorealist interpretation does not appear feasible because of the scale of the actors that VT & PH has to deal with. For, as China's military capabilities grow, US security assurances suffer a relative decline.