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Security dilemma in informal alliance politics: The case of dispute in South China Sea

TaiShang

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I would like to offer a brief conceptual evaluation of the situation in the South China Sea which appears to be evolving into a dilemmatic condition for the parties that position themselves against China (Mainland+Taiwan).

As the security structure evolves in the South China Sea, the major parties (manly Vietnam and the Philippines) are seen to become relatively more influential in their informal alliance with the US. This, coupled with the US’ Pivot strategy, could, on the surface, provide these two countries a unique window of opportunity in balancing their economic relations with China and security relations with the US. However, this improved status can also invite the danger of US’ entrapment in its economic relations with China or the two countries’ abandonment by the US in the face of a rising China.

Hence I would like to point to a possibility of security dilemma in regards to VT and PH's informal alliance with the US, arguing that recent swift developments in the SCS, VT & PH and the US might singularly find themselves in a precarious position where one side (VT and PH) fears abandonment whereas the other side (the US) fears entrapment. These fears might be further strengthened by China’s further claims on its core national interests and the US’ stronger posture and revamped strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Obviously, each actor has so far taken several serious steps in ensuring their core interests and these individual interests are not often compatible with each other.

Another aspect of security dilemma is that it might trigger a securitization of inter-state interaction in a spiraling way. It occurs if a state is not sure whether its opponent is a security seeker or expansionist. There remains the likelihood that the opponent is a mere security seeker; then, an emboldened action taken by one of the partners (VT & PH) in an alliance might be perceived as aggressive or provocative (Adversary dilemma) by the other (US).

Thus, the security dilemma in informal alliance politics suggests a threat of entrapment or abandonment for the parties involved in informal alliance (Alliance dilemma). Entrapment occurs when one side is dragged into a conflict that its partner has with a third party. It often happens when the interests of the allies (VT & PH - US) are not one and the same. However, even formal alliances do not guarantee the support of a partner if the partner (US) feels that a defection is more profitable or less costly than remaining true to the alliance. This becomes even a greater possibility if alliance is informal because in this case it is less binding and not institutionalized.

However, in the case of SCS dispute, VT & PH might face a greater risk of abandonment (than the US of entrapment) since in an increasingly multipolar world system, alliances are as easily made as deserted.

Therefore, further institutionalization and inter-governmental dialogue with China, with an entirely regional character, seems to be a viable way for VT & PH to manage their informal alliance politics. A neorealist interpretation does not appear feasible because of the scale of the actors that VT & PH has to deal with. For, as China's military capabilities grow, US security assurances suffer a relative decline.
 
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The main goal of Pivotal to Asia to form an Asian NATO under the leadership of United States and Japan to contain China. Vietnam and Philippines are the first two to show interests. To deter the formation the AsiaN NATO, China has to work on both geopolitically and politically. Geopolitically China has to prove that the function of Asian Nato is limited; Politically China has to prove that joining an Asian NATO will hurt that country's interest. SCS happens to work in both fronts very efficiently. By establishing military bases in SCS, China can deter almost all ASEAN countries and also hurt the interests of Vietnam and Philippines badly. As long as China does not push United States into a SCS war, China clearly is winning in SCS. Vietnam and Philippines deserve the prices for their ignorance in great power strategies.

I would expect that China becomes tougher on Vietnam and Philippines while softer towards USA. China need to get back concrete interests from Vietnam and Philippines while saving the face for USA.

China will take more islands from Vietnam and Philippines and do more and more island reclamation in SCS. But at the same time, China may provide supplies and supports for US navy passing through SCS.
 
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The main goal of Pivotal to Asia to form an Asian NATO under the leadership of United States and Japan to contain China. Vietnam and Philippines are the first two to show interests. To deter the formation the AsiaN NATO, China has to work on both geopolitically and politically. Geopolitically China has to prove that the function of Asian Nato is limited; Politically China has to prove that joining an Asian NATO will hurt that country's interest. SCS happens to work in both fronts very efficiently. By establishing military bases in SCS, China can deter almost all ASEAN countries and also hurt the interests of Vietnam and Philippines badly. As long as China does not push United States into a SCS war, China clearly is winning in SCS. Vietnam and Philippines deserve the prices for their ignorance in great power strategies.

One another good thing about the SCS build-up is that it pushes the informal allies US-VT-PH into a precarious entrapment and abandonment dilemma. That's the main idea about the OP, that, instead of reinforcing the anti-China alliance in the region, China's recent activities have put the informal allies in a strategic trap.

China has the ability and window of opportunity to maintain this strategy for the foreseeable future.

I would expect that China becomes tougher on Vietnam and Philippines while softer towards USA. China need to get back concrete interests from Vietnam and Philippines while saving the face for USA.

I am also anticipating a sort of major power arrangement between the two, short of an alliance, however. It will therefore be a cold peace situation, a several notches below than the experience people had with US-USSR rivalry.
 
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The
One another good thing about the SCS build-up is that it pushes the informal allies US-VT-PH into a precarious entrapment and abandonment dilemma. That's the main idea about the OP, that, instead of reinforcing the anti-China alliance in the region, China's recent activities have put the informal allies in a strategic trap.

China has the ability and window of opportunity to maintain this strategy for the foreseeable future.



I am also anticipating a sort of major power arrangement between the two, short of an alliance, however. It will therefore be a cold peace situation, a several notches below than the experience people had with US-USSR rivalry.

The core interests of US hegemony can be separated into four layers: Hegemony in North and South American; hegemony in Western World (Europe plus Australia); hegemony in Mid-East( Lead Christian-Islam competition) ; hegemony in East Asia ( For Security of Alaska-Hawaii and West Pacific Coast ).

The United States is clearly falling. Its GDP share in this world has dropped from 40% to only 20% during last 50 years. When its GDP share was 40%, it could help rebuild Europe and Japan. Now it is only about 20%, it has to suck the blood from other countries include alliances to maintain the hegemony. If United States decides to make strategic retreat, the first island chain and ASEAN will be the first places to sacrifice since this sacrifice won't affect the core interests of United States as other places.

As long as China keeps rising and gives polite steps for US to retreat, China will get SCS as Americans are one of the most reasonable and negotiable people in the world. Americans believe in power balance. If you get stronger, you get more space; if you get weaker, you should get less space, or even get occupied. China can do whatever damages China like to Vietnam and Philippines as long as the face of United States is saved.
 
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The


The core interests of US hegemony can be separated into four layers: Hegemony in North and South American; hegemony in Western World (Europe plus Australia); hegemony in Mid-East( Lead Christian-Islam competition) ; hegemony in East Asia ( For Security of Alaska-Hawaii and West Pacific Coast ).

The United States is clearly falling. Its GDP share in this world has dropped from 40% to only 20% during last 50 years. When its GDP share was 40%, it could help rebuild Europe and Japan. Now it is only about 20%, it has to suck the blood from other countries include alliances to maintain the hegemony. If United States decides to make strategic retreat, the first island chain and ASEAN will be the first places to sacrifice since this sacrifice won't affect the core interests of United States as other places.

As long as China keeps rising and gives polite steps for US to retreat, China will get SCS as Americans are one of the most reasonable and negotiable people in the world. Americans believe in power balance. If you get stronger, you get more space; if you get weaker, you should get less space, or even get occupied. China can do whatever damages China like to Vietnam and Philippines as long as the face of United States is saved.






China will bully Vietnam more and more in 2016!


Right now the 981 is going to dig oil again in SCS, this is the testing and maybe the torture lesson starting again for Vietnam !!!
 
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The core interests of US hegemony can be separated into four layers: Hegemony in North and South American; hegemony in Western World (Europe plus Australia); hegemony in Mid-East( Lead Christian-Islam competition) ; hegemony in East Asia ( For Security of Alaska-Hawaii and West Pacific Coast ).

That's an interesting stratification. Interestingly, all of these hegemonies are turning into singularly military/security-oriented while the economic/development aspects are being ignored (Even the TPP in East Asia is a geostrategic tool rather than an economic one). In the Middle East, it seems to me it is not clearly an Islam vs. Christianity, given that the US is the closest ally to the most radical fundamentalist regimes in the region against the more secular ones.

As long as China keeps rising and gives polite steps for US to retreat, China will get SCS as Americans are one of the most reasonable and negotiable people in the world. Americans believe in power balance. If you get stronger, you get more space; if you get weaker, you should get less space, or even get occupied. China can do whatever damages China like to Vietnam and Philippines as long as the face of United States is saved.

I believe Vietnam is still an actor to be reasoned with although the same may not be said of the Philippines. Breaking down the US grip on the region through developmentalist policies is likely going to be China's strategy for the short to medium run. This also corresponds nicely with the fact that the US is in a continues relative decline vis-à-vis China.
 
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One of the most important geopolitical reason for building up 7 massive islands in SCS is having flexibility in who we allow to pass our national water and who doesn't. This allow us to keep pressure on our enemy while engaging friendly country in a win-win situation.
 
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think about that, China's STR defence line expanded to more than 1500KMs away!

even 3-4 CBGs can't worth more than that !


It's a game changing movement in China's south sea forever !


There is no SCS what's so ever in this world only China's south sea!
 
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One of the most important geopolitical reason for building up 7 massive islands in SCS is having flexibility in who we allow to pass our national water and who doesn't. This allow us to keep pressure on our enemy while engaging friendly country in a win-win situation.

Put in a less gentle way, these islands will grow both sticks and carrots. In the marketplace of regional security, it is up to the customers to make a choice.
 
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China will bully Vietnam more and more in 2016!


Right now the 981 is going to dig oil again in SCS, this is the testing and maybe the torture lesson starting again for Vietnam !!!

China is cowdirce, just bully small naighbors. Its shameful .
 
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Put in a less gentle way, these islands will grow both sticks and carrots. In the marketplace of regional security, it is up to the customers to make a choice.
These islands will serve our national interest and nobody can dictate our national interest. It comes first before anything else. If they dare to challenge our national interest, then be ready for a war. It is that simple.
 
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The main goal of Pivotal to Asia to form an Asian NATO under the leadership of United States and Japan to contain China. Vietnam and Philippines are the first two to show interests. To deter the formation the AsiaN NATO, China has to work on both geopolitically and politically. Geopolitically China has to prove that the function of Asian Nato is limited; Politically China has to prove that joining an Asian NATO will hurt that country's interest. SCS happens to work in both fronts very efficiently. By establishing military bases in SCS, China can deter almost all ASEAN countries and also hurt the interests of Vietnam and Philippines badly. As long as China does not push United States into a SCS war, China clearly is winning in SCS. Vietnam and Philippines deserve the prices for their ignorance in great power strategies.

I would expect that China becomes tougher on Vietnam and Philippines while softer towards USA. China need to get back concrete interests from Vietnam and Philippines while saving the face for USA.

China will take more islands from Vietnam and Philippines and do more and more island reclamation in SCS. But at the same time, China may provide supplies and supports for US navy passing through SCS.
do you mastubate into your pants when writing such rubbish?
 
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China doesn't have a border problem with Russia, as for Japan,there is one island is being disputed and military confrontation occurs on a frequent basis. Japan has more land disputes with Russia, not China. Of course ,Japan also has territorial disputes with South Korea, North Korea and Taiwan, basically it has disputes with every single neighbor in this region.
 
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