S-400,NASAMS,BMD and Now THAAD !! Is India preparing to tweaks it’s Nuclear Policies?

[Tom M]

LOL how much damage can India's non-miniaturized atomic fissile iron bombs not even mated to your unreliable liquid fueled rockets do when we already have ABM from Tibet to Beijing and 3000 km in between?

Some things are best done than said. Keep guessing.

 

[Arsalan 345]

@Oscar @Joe Shearer@MilSpec @Vibrio @Nilgiri

I strongly believe that India has changed its nuclear posture, and is a couple years down the line already. Reason to do so is unclear to me, it could be either Mumbai or Pakistan's own rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal, or both. Somehow it seems that the Indian military thinkers are now open to the idea of risking a nuclear war, in an attempt to ''win'' it. The probably proposed solution is something similar to the US's Skyfall/Snapcount, i.e. upon escalation of tensions beyond a certain level, initiate a massive pre-emptive CF strike against Pakistani first strike elements while bracing for retaliation and taking out as many birds as the BMD can.

The related developments are as follows:

1. Open suggestions of abandoning NFC by ex-SFC and ex-NCA leadership, sometimes even hinting that India is ready for a pre-emptive counter-force nuclear strike. These statements should not be taken lightly, as they represent the current policy of India's nuclear doctrine.

2. Increase of underground tunneled nuclear weapons storages from 2x (pre-2010) to 9x (post-2010), discovered so far. To put things into perspective, 6x are lined up against Pakistan, 1x is deep in central India and 2x are on the eastern coast.

3. Build-up of hardened nuclear weapons shelters in 17x IAF bases since 2010. 10x against Pakistan, 6x against China, 1x in southern India. Post-2013, IAF has started building additional extremely hardened aircraft shelters in the same bases to house aircrafts designated for nuclear weapons delivery. This will allow IAF to mate nuclear weapons with aircrafts secretly and have them on standby for imminent strikes, giving no room for any third party to intervene.

4. Recent SFC exercises for Agni-IV & Agni-V, both at 2000km. This should not be surprising, however Agni-IV has been already trialed at this range before. The coincidence of aiming both exercises at the same range could hint towards a possible operational scenario, where the SFC might have to launch IRBMs from eastern India towards Pakistan, in case the forward missile bases of Agni-I & II have been taken out.

5. Build-up of 8x BrahMos garrisons, 7x against Pakistan, 1x against China.

6. Finalizing purchase of S-400 System, along with bringing up homegrown BMD solutions. Although the potentially included ABM is not extraordinary (60km range, 30km ceiling, 4800m/s target velocity...basically low-MRBM class targets), it does destabilize the strategic balance and gives confidence to the first-strike doctrine.

i appreciate.very good and informative post.i can see a pattern too.india believes in first strike policy but they are making us fool by denying this fact.i think we should focus more on air defense systems.

 

[thinkingcap81]

Can it not be that Indian planners are trying to make our posture more vague rather than an actual change in doctrine?

So we take steps to show that we are trying a lot of measures to blunt Pakistan's nuke policy via missile defence, while at the same time allow some important folks to say that our NFU policy is being seriously reconsidered. Who knows what the actual policy is - maybe we are still with NFU.

Our army chief has said that we will call Paks nuclear bluff in case of hostilities. This means that we believe that Paks nuclear threshold is much higher than what is claimed, or to a lesser extent it could mean that we don't care about the nuke threshold and will fight even with the current nuke threat.

Simultaneously we also say that we may abandon or seriously dilute our NFU.

This will also cause problems with Pakistani military planners.

It makes no sense that despite being the stronger conventional military power we are allowing Pakistan's nuke threat to dictate our military actions (or the lack of it).

But if their delusion will sign the death of millions in the subcontinent in the near future, then its on them not us.

We may not go for a big military option unless we are more confident of the outcomes. Such outcomes will imply that we have most of the powerful countries more aligned with us (whatever be the reasons for this) and even neutral players not supporting any nuclear option. This aspect is still quite sometime off. Till then we can hope to apply diplomatic pressure to gain a significant upper hand; we are in the process of acquiring the means of applying such diplomatic pressure. Hopefully diplomacy will suffice to resolve the most important cause of conflict.

 

[Hellfire]

However, the irony is that Pakistani military is finally coming back to its senses, but the Indians have been spooked already, and there is no changing their minds. The resulting Indian developments are very destabilizing for the region, as it will drive Pakistan to continue the present approach, something for which the finances are the least of the concerns.

Pakistan's military position as alluded to by you above, is reminiscent of their approach towards efforts undertaken at settlement of the Kashmir dispute by PMs Vajpayee and MMS. The Indian willingness to reach a mutually acceptable solution along the lines as suggested by Musharraf were, ironically, put paid to by actions undertaken by the very same sub-set. The Indian antipathy to any overtures of peace and strategic detente as far as Pakistan is concerned, is the result of these antics that have eroded the confidence in the intent of any Pakistani disposition today, with the Indian Political Environment evolving into realms that render any such solution impossible, given the political constraints placed by the Indian politicians on themselves out of their own posturing.

The sequence of events in immediate aftermath of PMs Modi-NS meet - that of increased political pressure on PM NS with actions of TLP, the Army's refusal to 'involve' itself in re-establishing the writ of the State and subsequent handing of cash rewards to their cadre, indicated a deliberate attempt at undermining the attempts of PM Nawaz's government at peace. The Uri incident also reinforced the antipathy, thereby making any kind of negotiation difficult. The coup de grace was the decapitation of BSF soldier along recognized International Border carried out in immediate aftermath of PM Imran Khan's offer of unilaterally initiating peace talks with India. All this, a desire for peace et al, indicates a ruse on part of the Pakistan Army to 'buy time' as the economic condition of the country remained bad.

In this backdrop, a perceived 'upscaling' of Indian offensive military capability (I used perceived here as we have to upscale in order to maintain a dissuasive posture with respect to China, which is advancing by leaps and bound) with the ancillary effect of placing additional and perhaps, unsustainable burden (let us accept that it is unsustainable without severely denting/destroying the socio-economic programs of Pakistan) thereby disturbing a so called 'strategic balance', merely is now accepted as something that India could not care less about.

In my post to @VCheng the other day over India's 'activities' in Baluchistan I had drawn attention to the fact that India is a rookie in the game being played out there. The Major League nations remain Pakistan's other neighbour who is playing out his own game with Pakistan's allies from the GCC. Average Pakistani's scepticism notwithstanding, India wants minimum footprint within Pakistan's internal problems for two fold reasons:

a. India does not want to lose the 'moral' spinoffs over Kashmir issue.
b. India remains a somewhat unifying factor for the various groups within Pakistan, both state and non-state, that otherwise continue to be at odds with each other, at times violently.

While it has been an observation repeated oft by me, and held within Indian establishment, that relatively stable Pakistan is needed to prevent the type of radicals as seen elsewhere in the region from gaining a foothold on India's borders, there is now a re-look, in the aftermath of the war on ISIS, on the wisdom of India continuing to pay a price without exacting costs in return. No longer does it seem a case wherein we really need to follow that policy any longer - irrespective of nuclear weapons or not. This, the latter point, is gaining traction within Indian policy makers.

A relative hands off approach allows India to let the internal players in Pakistan continue to play at odds with each other while putting pressure on Pakistan's finances by undertaking sustainable military modernization on own side. As more and more economic pressure extends over Pakistan, the effect on various programs will, in the longer run, create a vacuum, which can be filled up by groups financed by various interests/stakeholders, who themselves, are at odds.

This is purely my analysis of what seems to be Indian action insofar Pakistan is concerned. A relative hands off policy yields us much greater dividends.

Agreed, however what I'm pointing at is that the capability to respond to the imminent threat (before it hits) was not there before. India had ample landmass to conceal its assets, mobilize them gradually and bring them out only after a strike. Now, the military is starting to get its hands on a potentially destabilizing capability. What if, during the next mobilization, Pakistan brings out its toys (as always)

I assure you, never have your forces moved all the components required to actually mate a warhead with its delivery platform, simultaneously in any exercise for the apparent reason.

Anyone can claim to the contrary, but on this, I am pretty sure.

and India decides to try to take them out instead of diplomatic means of conflict resolution? This will drive Pakistan to ensure more mobilization and survivability, hence the destabilization.

I disagree for the reason above. The C3ISR for this particular field available with us is - 'interesting'.

The above image represents a stark change in policy, IMO. Previously, the IAF had the weapons shelter + designated HAS combo, meaning that mobilization would involve preparing the weapon and carting it out to mate it with the designated aircraft inside its normal HAS...which is more than enough.

Now, IAF is building these extremely hardened shelters, to house BOTH the designated aircraft and the weapons vault, meaning that the mating will be quite rapid and concealed...allowing no room for observation or a diplomatic message to be conveyed, or as I said, for any 'third' party to intervene.

As I said earlier, we have to prepare for a dissuasive capability with respect to China. Pragmatism indicates that in a theoretical scenario involving a future conflict with China, PLA/PLAAF will be using dedicated missile strikes against our airfields to aim for a quick air superiority. HAS can be considered pre-eminently to address that contingency. However, duality can not be ruled out, that I do concede.

I see. Well Nasr is not for the IBGs, I've been saying that for ages.

It is merely aimed at providing an option. By declaring it specifically for TNWs, the same is rendered unusable in most scenarios and paradoxically, lowers India's threshold itself. But then, this discussion is for some other time.

We have Prahaar on our side.

regards

 

[Zarvan]

Yet another reason for Pakistan to be focusing on the development of hypersonic missiles.

MIRV Missiles are the answer. And yes also Super Sonic Cruise Missiles.

 

[Hakikat ve Hikmet]

No sense discussing anything with buffoons whose understanding of the current geo-political climate, is equivalent of a primate.

I would urge my fellow Pakistanis, to disengage and ignore these buffoons.

Souls (Ruh) reflect and deflect one another...

Hence, I restrict myself and am selective....

 

[zeeshangul]

A good read and a valuable information gained from the posters through this thread. I think Mods should make a new section in the PDF open for discussion and no trolling. Anyone trolling there should be kicked out or banned from the site. It will really help the guys looking for genuine information. i hope Mods will look upto this...

 

[The Deterrent]

But the SSBNs are the only change. Everything else you see is simply a product of more money being disbursed so old plans could be implemented.

See my earlier replies for this.

Yeah, the SCs can now mobilise in only a few days.

I was referring to the SFCs, which already could mobilize in a few days. Now I believe they can mobilize within 24 hours, specially the Airforce SFC.

I suppose India sees deployment of tactical nukes as more destabilising. So if the "withdrawal of NFU" threat works, then status quo is more stabilising.

If Pakistan deploys tac nukes, then, as @Vibrio has always wanted, India may go ahead with the withdrawal of NFU. You can say that the ball is in Pak's court on this one.

Yes, but Nasr was introduced because of India started working on a new doctrine. This is a never ending cycle.

I thought the same once upon a time, until I was told GoI won't allow Brahmos for CF strikes.

Of course, you can't dismiss it. But it's also possible that defanging Pakistan may involve other countries also, and may include far more subtle but more effective methods, which would make Brahmos strikes counterproductive in the implementation of those other more effective methods. Airstrikes may also be far more effective than the Brahmos.

I can assure you this, there is no 'defanging' Pakistan, it is way too late now.

Adequate deployment of BMD is going to take many years. It's going to take us until 2023 to just absorb all 5 regiments of S-400. And we have only taken nascent steps in inducting the indigenous BMD. Then we have to get the personnel trained in a system we have no experience operating. It's gonna be a long process.

Of course, it will take a decade (at least) before India has any sort of 'umbrella' over its major cities. But Pakistan must plan ahead, therefore the counter-measures. I personally believe that the only good an Indian BMD could do is to defend against an rogue launch, which has an almost zero probability of occurring. Against a coordinated launch at a mass scale, using all available resources...its pointless.

 

[CriticalThought]

See my earlier replies for this.



I was referring to the SFCs, which already could mobilize in a few days. Now I believe they can mobilize within 24 hours, specially the Airforce SFC.


Yes, but Nasr was introduced because of India started working on a new doctrine. This is a never ending cycle.


I can assure you this, there is no 'defanging' Pakistan, it is way too late now.


Of course, it will take a decade (at least) before India has any sort of 'umbrella' over its major cities. But Pakistan must plan ahead, therefore the counter-measures. I personally believe that the only good an Indian BMD could do is to defend against an rogue launch, which has an almost zero probability of occurring. Against a coordinated launch at a mass scale, using all available resources...its pointless.

Sir, here is the problem. You talk peace only from a position of accepted equity. Your enemy must accept you as an equal. Today, this is not the case. Hence, peace overtures only cause us to lose stature.

I do believe Pakistan should perform a few thermobaric explosions in front of an international crowd.... Just for the effects, you know.

 

[The Deterrent]

Pakistan's military position as alluded to by you above, is reminiscent of their approach towards efforts undertaken at settlement of the Kashmir dispute by PMs Vajpayee and MMS. The Indian willingness to reach a mutually acceptable solution along the lines as suggested by Musharraf were, ironically, put paid to by actions undertaken by the very same sub-set. The Indian antipathy to any overtures of peace and strategic detente as far as Pakistan is concerned, is the result of these antics that have eroded the confidence in the intent of any Pakistani disposition today, with the Indian Political Environment evolving into realms that render any such solution impossible, given the political constraints placed by the Indian politicians on themselves out of their own posturing.

The sequence of events in immediate aftermath of PMs Modi-NS meet - that of increased political pressure on PM NS with actions of TLP, the Army's refusal to 'involve' itself in re-establishing the writ of the State and subsequent handing of cash rewards to their cadre, indicated a deliberate attempt at undermining the attempts of PM Nawaz's government at peace. The Uri incident also reinforced the antipathy, thereby making any kind of negotiation difficult. The coup de grace was the decapitation of BSF soldier along recognized International Border carried out in immediate aftermath of PM Imran Khan's offer of unilaterally initiating peace talks with India. All this, a desire for peace et al, indicates a ruse on part of the Pakistan Army to 'buy time' as the economic condition of the country remained bad.

In this backdrop, a perceived 'upscaling' of Indian offensive military capability (I used perceived here as we have to upscale in order to maintain a dissuasive posture with respect to China, which is advancing by leaps and bound) with the ancillary effect of placing additional and perhaps, unsustainable burden (let us accept that it is unsustainable without severely denting/destroying the socio-economic programs of Pakistan) thereby disturbing a so called 'strategic balance', merely is now accepted as something that India could not care less about.

In my post to @VCheng the other day over India's 'activities' in Baluchistan I had drawn attention to the fact that India is a rookie in the game being played out there. The Major League nations remain Pakistan's other neighbour who is playing out his own game with Pakistan's allies from the GCC. Average Pakistani's scepticism notwithstanding, India wants minimum footprint within Pakistan's internal problems for two fold reasons:

a. India does not want to lose the 'moral' spinoffs over Kashmir issue.
b. India remains a somewhat unifying factor for the various groups within Pakistan, both state and non-state, that otherwise continue to be at odds with each other, at times violently.

While it has been an observation repeated oft by me, and held within Indian establishment, that relatively stable Pakistan is needed to prevent the type of radicals as seen elsewhere in the region from gaining a foothold on India's borders, there is now a re-look, in the aftermath of the war on ISIS, on the wisdom of India continuing to pay a price without exacting costs in return. No longer does it seem a case wherein we really need to follow that policy any longer - irrespective of nuclear weapons or not. This, the latter point, is gaining traction within Indian policy makers.

A relative hands off approach allows India to let the internal players in Pakistan continue to play at odds with each other while putting pressure on Pakistan's finances by undertaking sustainable military modernization on own side. As more and more economic pressure extends over Pakistan, the effect on various programs will, in the longer run, create a vacuum, which can be filled up by groups financed by various interests/stakeholders, who themselves, are at odds.

This is purely my analysis of what seems to be Indian action insofar Pakistan is concerned. A relative hands off policy yields us much greater dividends.

Interesting analysis. I do agree that certain cross-border adventures haven't worked out for Pakistan, and the timings couldn't have been worse. However now we have a PM and an Army that are on the same page, and both want peace.

I also agree that a stable Pakistan is in India's interest, and therefore India will always try to not put too much pressure on Pakistan, just enough to make sure that the threats are minimized.

I assure you, never have your forces moved all the components required to actually mate a warhead with its delivery platform, simultaneously in any exercise for the apparent reason.
Anyone can claim to the contrary, but on this, I am pretty sure.

Of course, we never came that close to being hours away from the complete mating to be necessary...and I sincerely hope that we don't. However Pakistan did increase the alert levels, and thereby began mobilization of 'parts' of toys in the past in response to escalations. Thankfully the situations were diffused.

As far as the exercises are concerned, we both know that some stuff can be replaced with some other stuff that does not do the actual stuff, despite doing all the necessary stuff.

I disagree for the reason above. The C3ISR for this particular field available with us is - 'interesting'.

I know, Pakistan's alert levels are designed by default to alert the enemy on purpose. The primary reason for having nuclear weapons is deterrence, and it does not work if Pakistan conceals everything. You won't need any C3ISR for the highest alert level.

What I was trying to convey, was that we never actually came that close to war. Consider a scenario where we do, and all hell is mere hours away from breaking loose. In such a situation, India could choose to initiate a 'Snapcount' (which would be extremely difficult to implement, regardless), and that makes Pakistani military a bit nervous since the worst possibility has to be considered.

As I said earlier, we have to prepare for a dissuasive capability with respect to China. Pragmatism indicates that in a theoretical scenario involving a future conflict with China, PLA/PLAAF will be using dedicated missile strikes against our airfields to aim for a quick air superiority. HAS can be considered pre-eminently to address that contingency. However, duality can not be ruled out, that I do concede.

I don't believe that, as the developments indicate that India is preparing very little for a nuclear war against China, at least on land. The IAF has less than half the amount of assets dedicated to China (both conventional and nuclear), and the IA has a small fraction of the same. I think that against China, SSBNs will be the major deterrent, and the overall nature of deterrence will be minimal.

It is merely aimed at providing an option. By declaring it specifically for TNWs, the same is rendered unusable in most scenarios and paradoxically, lowers India's threshold itself. But then, this discussion is for some other time.

We have Prahaar on our side.

regards

For its actually intended purpose, it will be very useful. The mistaken assumption is that TNWs will be unleashed quite early in the conflict, whereas Pakistan intends to wait until the dust settles.

Sir, here is the problem. You talk peace only from a position of accepted equity. Your enemy must accept you as an equal. Today, this is not the case. Hence, peace overtures only cause us to lose stature.

I do believe Pakistan should perform a few thermobaric explosions in front of an international crowd.... Just for the effects, you know.

And in your invaluable opinion, will those 'thermobaric' explosions give us a higher stature at the international table?

 

[CriticalThought]

And in your invaluable opinion, will those 'thermobaric' explosions give us a higher stature at the international table?

It will definitely work better than one thingy in another thingamabobby threats. Will knock sense into thick heads and give them one more threat to counter. It will also have a psychological effect on troop morale. It's easy to feed lies about radiation decay rates. It's much more effective if their troops see the destruction with their own eyes.

You stature is what you make of it. Meek or confident is your choice. Currently you come across as meek.

 

[The Deterrent]

It will definitely work better than one thingy in another thingamabobby threats. Will knock sense into thick heads and give them one more threat to counter. It will also have a psychological effect on troop morale. It's easy to feed lies about radiation decay rates. It's much more effective if their troops see the destruction with their own eyes.

You stature is what you make of it. Meek or confident is your choice. Currently you come across as meek.

You know, we could definitely use someone like you in the upper echelons of decision-making.

 

[VCheng]

This is purely my analysis of what seems to be Indian action insofar Pakistan is concerned. A relative hands off policy yields us much greater dividends.

Here I will agree with you. Why would India need to cause trouble for Pakistan when it can see that Pakistan is doing that job for itself so well even without outside encouragement. (Except for the occasional "helping hand". )

 

[Hellfire]

Here I will agree with you. Why would India need to cause trouble for Pakistan when it can see that Pakistan is doing that job for itself so well even without outside encouragement. (Except for the occasional "helping hand". )

That is why I said, we are the rookies. Not even making the cut into minor league!

Recall Modi's 15 Aug 2016 statement and actual change in ground situation in Baluchistan. Now correlate with the last time India actually did decide to do something.

US $ 5 Billion is simply quite a lot of money, and hardly petty change for Indian security expenditure, to put to work, if it was decided.

Nah, we would rather sit out and watch the fun. Neighbour and allies of Pakistan are more than enough, with willing parties in Pakistan readily acting as pawns.

Helping hand? Finger maybe, at most ... not more.

 

[VCheng]

That is why I said, we are the rookies. Not even making the cut into minor league!

Recall Modi's 15 Aug 2016 statement and actual change in ground situation in Baluchistan. Now correlate with the last time India actually did decide to do something.

US $ 5 Billion is simply quite a lot of money, and hardly petty change for Indian security expenditure, to put to work, if it was decided.

Nah, we would rather sit out and watch the fun. Neighbour and allies of Pakistan are more than enough, with willing parties in Pakistan readily acting as pawns.

Helping hand? Finger maybe, at most ... not more.

I can see your point, and agree with that, actually. It is a sad commentary on my own team, but I can recognize better play by the opposing side when I see it.