S-400,NASAMS,BMD and Now THAAD !! Is India preparing to tweaks it’s Nuclear Policies?

[The Deterrent]

@Oscar @Joe Shearer@MilSpec @Vibrio @Nilgiri

I strongly believe that India has changed its nuclear posture, and is a couple years down the line already. Reason to do so is unclear to me, it could be either Mumbai or Pakistan's own rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal, or both. Somehow it seems that the Indian military thinkers are now open to the idea of risking a nuclear war, in an attempt to ''win'' it. The probably proposed solution is something similar to the US's Skyfall/Snapcount, i.e. upon escalation of tensions beyond a certain level, initiate a massive pre-emptive CF strike against Pakistani first strike elements while bracing for retaliation and taking out as many birds as the BMD can.

The related developments are as follows:

1. Open suggestions of abandoning NFC by ex-SFC and ex-NCA leadership, sometimes even hinting that India is ready for a pre-emptive counter-force nuclear strike. These statements should not be taken lightly, as they represent the current policy of India's nuclear doctrine.

2. Increase of underground tunneled nuclear weapons storages from 2x (pre-2010) to 9x (post-2010), discovered so far. To put things into perspective, 6x are lined up against Pakistan, 1x is deep in central India and 2x are on the eastern coast.

3. Build-up of hardened nuclear weapons shelters in 17x IAF bases since 2010. 10x against Pakistan, 6x against China, 1x in southern India. Post-2013, IAF has started building additional extremely hardened aircraft shelters in the same bases to house aircrafts designated for nuclear weapons delivery. This will allow IAF to mate nuclear weapons with aircrafts secretly and have them on standby for imminent strikes, giving no room for any third party to intervene.

4. Recent SFC exercises for Agni-IV & Agni-V, both at 2000km. This should not be surprising, however Agni-IV has been already trialed at this range before. The coincidence of aiming both exercises at the same range could hint towards a possible operational scenario, where the SFC might have to launch IRBMs from eastern India towards Pakistan, in case the forward missile bases of Agni-I & II have been taken out.

5. Build-up of 8x BrahMos garrisons, 7x against Pakistan, 1x against China.

6. Finalizing purchase of S-400 System, along with bringing up homegrown BMD solutions. Although the potentially included ABM is not extraordinary (60km range, 30km ceiling, 4800m/s target velocity...basically low-MRBM class targets), it does destabilize the strategic balance and gives confidence to the first-strike doctrine.

 

[Joe Shearer]

@Oscar @Joe Shearer @hellfire @MilSpec

I strongly believe that India has changed its nuclear posture, and is a couple years down the line already. Reason to do so is unclear to me, it could be either Mumbai or Pakistan's own rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal, or both. Somehow it seems that the Indian military thinkers are now open to the idea of risking a nuclear war, in an attempt to ''win'' it. The probably proposed solution is something similar to the US's Skyfall/Snapcount, i.e. upon escalation of tensions beyond a certain level, initiate a massive pre-emptive CF strike against Pakistani first strike elements while bracing for retaliation and taking out as many birds as the BMD can.

The related developments are as follows:

1. Open suggestions of abandoning NFC by ex-SFC and ex-NCA leadership, sometimes even hinting that India is ready for a pre-emptive counter-force nuclear strike. These statements should not be taken lightly, as they represent the current policy of India's nuclear doctrine.

2. Increase of underground tunneled nuclear weapons storages from 2x (pre-2010) to 9x (post-2010), discovered so far. To put things into perspective, 6x are lined up against Pakistan, 1x is deep in central India and 2x are on the eastern coast.

3. Build-up of hardened nuclear weapons shelters in 17x IAF bases since 2010. 10x against Pakistan, 6x against China, 1x in southern India. Post-2013, IAF has started building additional extremely hardened aircraft shelters in the same bases to house aircrafts designated for nuclear weapons delivery. This will allow IAF to mate nuclear weapons with aircrafts secretly and have them on standby for imminent strikes, giving no room for any third party to intervene.

4. Build-up of 8x BrahMos garrisons, 7x against Pakistan, 1x against China.

5. Finalizing purchase of S-400 System, along with bringing up homegrown BMD solutions. Although the potentially included ABM is not extraordinary (60km range, 30km ceiling, 4800m/s target velocity...basically low-MRBM class targets), it does destabilize the strategic balance and gives confidence to the first-strike doctrine.

Without going into detail, might not these steps be the general steps to be taken to upgrade the housing and protection to be given to nuclear devices at each iteration of their recovery and maintenance cycle?

 

[The Deterrent]

Without going into detail, might not these steps be the general steps to be taken to upgrade the housing and protection to be given to nuclear devices at each iteration of their recovery and maintenance cycle?

Its just that the build-up has been too rapid lately. Since 1998, India kept the nukes in dispersed, non-hardened locations. Post-2005 there were only 2 major hardened facilities. Post-2010 the number exploded to 9. India hasn't drastically increased its production of nukes, which means that the existing arsenal is being secured. And some facilities (including IAF bases) suggest that features have been added to ensure rapid launch capability.

For comparison, in Pakistan's case, the build-up has been gradual (although the total is still quite larger than India's).

 

[Joe Shearer]

Its just that the build-up has been too rapid lately. Since 1998, India kept the nukes in dispersed, non-hardened locations. Post-2005 there were only 2 major hardened facilities. Post-2010 the number exploded to 9. India hasn't drastically increased its production of nukes, which means that the existing arsenal is being secured. And some facilities (including IAF bases) suggest that features have been added to ensure rapid launch capability.

For comparison, in Pakistan's case, the build-up has been gradual (although the total is still quite larger than India's).

I have to think this one through, and also look at the data, and ask the knowledgeable (I was telling one of the two current military experts among the Indians that my batch were all retired at least 8 years ago, so no further inside insights). While I'm still not convinced, and your post above has some corroborative elements, it's probably better to go cautiously on this one.

Will get back to this thread later.

 

[randomradio]

@Oscar @Joe Shearer @hellfire @MilSpec

I strongly believe that India has changed its nuclear posture, and is a couple years down the line already. Reason to do so is unclear to me, it could be either Mumbai or Pakistan's own rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal, or both. Somehow it seems that the Indian military thinkers are now open to the idea of risking a nuclear war, in an attempt to ''win'' it. The probably proposed solution is something similar to the US's Skyfall/Snapcount, i.e. upon escalation of tensions beyond a certain level, initiate a massive pre-emptive CF strike against Pakistani first strike elements while bracing for retaliation and taking out as many birds as the BMD can.

The related developments are as follows:

1. Open suggestions of abandoning NFC by ex-SFC and ex-NCA leadership, sometimes even hinting that India is ready for a pre-emptive counter-force nuclear strike. These statements should not be taken lightly, as they represent the current policy of India's nuclear doctrine.

2. Increase of underground tunneled nuclear weapons storages from 2x (pre-2010) to 9x (post-2010), discovered so far. To put things into perspective, 6x are lined up against Pakistan, 1x is deep in central India and 2x are on the eastern coast.

3. Build-up of hardened nuclear weapons shelters in 17x IAF bases since 2010. 10x against Pakistan, 6x against China, 1x in southern India. Post-2013, IAF has started building additional extremely hardened aircraft shelters in the same bases to house aircrafts designated for nuclear weapons delivery. This will allow IAF to mate nuclear weapons with aircrafts secretly and have them on standby for imminent strikes, giving no room for any third party to intervene.

IMHO, I don't think there's anything extraordinary happening here. All this stuff must have taken years to work out, not counting tons of delays along the way. The biggest change is naturally the new class of SSBNs coming up after S4*.

As for the nuclear doctrine, nothing has really changed. That thing about pre-emptive strikes should be taken in context, it's still part of the existing doctrine. We have given ourselves some leeway that allows the SFC to commit to pre-emptive strikes even before WMDs have struck Indian assets or soil.

I suppose any talk of changing the NFU policy is being used as a threat to Pakistan. Potentially to prevent Pakistan from deploying tactical nukes.

4. Build-up of 8x BrahMos garrisons, 7x against Pakistan, 1x against China.

It doesn't look like GoI is going to allow the army to use the Brahmos for a counterforce strike... yet. I don't know if that's because it's the IAF's job. Or it's only to avoid spooking Pakistan.

5. Finalizing purchase of S-400 System, along with bringing up homegrown BMD solutions. Although the potentially included ABM is not extraordinary (60km range, 30km ceiling, 4800m/s target velocity...basically low-MRBM class targets), it does destabilize the strategic balance and gives confidence to the first-strike doctrine.

Our BMD will be based on indigenous solutions, not foreign ones. So the S-400's main business will be air defence. Indigenous BMD is still quite some time away. Only the AAD is ready for induction along with the sensor network. And the first phase is only meant for these low-MRBM class targets. Not to mention, we still do not know the size and scale of the BMD program. You can expect the S-400s to fulfil some BMD requirements for now, but there's no point in overestimating India's BMD capability.

Btw, Hellfire is now @Vibrio.

 

[Hellfire]

@Oscar @Joe Shearer@MilSpec @Vibrio @Nilgiri

Thanks for the tag, changed over to Vibrio.

I strongly believe that India has changed its nuclear posture, and is a couple years down the line already.

That would be the apparent change in the political thinking that you may be referring to. As far as Military was concerned, the thinking was first introduced in Ex Brasstacks (assuming that Pakistan had at least a couple of Chinese supplied devices at the time; I think assumption was of about 6 to 8 as overall stock) and followed up in various Exercises subsequently, with the most overt one being of Strike Corps in 2015.

Reason to do so is unclear to me, it could be either Mumbai or Pakistan's own rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal, or both.

A combination of lessons learned after Operation Parakaram and the evolution of the Pakistani Nuclear Forces. The biggest challenge as a military planner being faced in India is the tendency of Pakistan to declare all platforms as 'nuclear capable'. With the level of ambiguity that prevails, a move made by planners with an intent to prevent any kind of Indian conventional actions in response to any incident emanating from what GoP calls the non-state actors, the probability of miscalculation rises, as conventional battlefield may see long range artillery/rocket systems, capable of being a platform of delivery of nuclear weapons, being used extensively, thereby creating a sense of uncertainty.

However, as far as I can make out, the threshold of Indian first strike will very well be within it's defined policy of what constitutes a 'nuclear aggression' for India, i.e. "the threat or use of Nuclear weapons against territory or military forces of India". With improved C3ISR capabilities, I do not foresee any Indian action as long as an imminent threat is not felt.

Somehow it seems that the Indian military thinkers are now open to the idea of risking a nuclear war, in an attempt to ''win'' it.

As I said earlier, this thinking was always there, it is the political acceptance that you notice now. The political will to take a risk, is firming up?

The probably proposed solution is something similar to the US's Skyfall/Snapcount, i.e. upon escalation of tensions beyond a certain level, initiate a massive pre-emptive CF strike against Pakistani first strike elements while bracing for retaliation and taking out as many birds as the BMD can.

May or may not be exactly. It, the Indian posture, is directly proportional to the Pakistani actions. For example, if Pakistan makes a move to mate the warheads with the delivery platform, appropriate decision will be taken depending on the condition. I am very sure that any such move will entail a diplomatic message being conveyed immediately even as a military option is bing prepared simultaneously.

The related developments are as follows:

1. Open suggestions of abandoning NFC by ex-SFC and ex-NCA leadership, sometimes even hinting that India is ready for a pre-emptive counter-force nuclear strike. These statements should not be taken lightly, as they represent the current policy of India's nuclear doctrine.

Been making it since 2010 myself. Mentioned the same to @saiyan0321 on Kashmir thread. But then, majority of other members here think I am trolling. When I dismiss Nasr, there is a reason for that too.

But all is contingent to posture assumed by the Pakistani military forces.

2. Increase of underground tunneled nuclear weapons storages from 2x (pre-2010) to 9x (post-2010), discovered so far. To put things into perspective, 6x are lined up against Pakistan, 1x is deep in central India and 2x are on the eastern coast.

3. Build-up of hardened nuclear weapons shelters in 17x IAF bases since 2010. 10x against Pakistan, 6x against China, 1x in southern India. Post-2013, IAF has started building additional extremely hardened aircraft shelters in the same bases to house aircrafts designated for nuclear weapons delivery. This will allow IAF to mate nuclear weapons with aircrafts secretly and have them on standby for imminent strikes, giving no room for any third party to intervene.

4. Recent SFC exercises for Agni-IV & Agni-V, both at 2000km. This should not be surprising, however Agni-IV has been already trialed at this range before. The coincidence of aiming both exercises at the same range could hint towards a possible operational scenario, where the SFC might have to launch IRBMs from eastern India towards Pakistan, in case the forward missile bases of Agni-I & II have been taken out.

5. Build-up of 8x BrahMos garrisons, 7x against Pakistan, 1x against China.

6. Finalizing purchase of S-400 System, along with bringing up homegrown BMD solutions. Although the potentially included ABM is not extraordinary (60km range, 30km ceiling, 4800m/s target velocity...basically low-MRBM class targets), it does destabilize the strategic balance and gives confidence to the first-strike doctrine.

Astute observations, commenting as I understand your rationale here.

Its just that the build-up has been too rapid lately. Since 1998, India kept the nukes in dispersed, non-hardened locations. Post-2005 there were only 2 major hardened facilities. Post-2010 the number exploded to 9. India hasn't drastically increased its production of nukes, which means that the existing arsenal is being secured. And some facilities (including IAF bases) suggest that features have been added to ensure rapid launch capability.

For comparison, in Pakistan's case, the build-up has been gradual (although the total is still quite larger than India's).

Let me add on to the perspective as presented by @Joe Shearer in the post earlier.

If you look at the military infrastructure being built up in India, pace has gathered after 1998-2005 period. There is a reason for that, which perhaps, can explain the above.

Improvement in Economic conditions.

Till 1998, Indian Army barely had money to cover the revenue expenditure in terms of Pay & Pensions. Tanks were mothballed and stored, Aircraft sorties were reduced and flying hours curtailed (just to put things into perspective). Post Nuclear tests, sanctions had some effect too, but our economy picked up. Post-2005, economy has been doing well. More money is now available and Cantonments are being re-developed (especially under Smart Cities initiative launched by the present dispensation) and modernized, permanent structures are being built as money is made available. One can look at the development of cantonments all over, including in Kashmir. Temporary shelters have made way to built up housing for troops in quite a few places.

I would read all this as a part of the same.

 

[SQ8]

@Oscar @Joe Shearer@MilSpec @Vibrio @Nilgiri

I strongly believe that India has changed its nuclear posture, and is a couple years down the line already. Reason to do so is unclear to me, it could be either Mumbai or Pakistan's own rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal, or both. Somehow it seems that the Indian military thinkers are now open to the idea of risking a nuclear war, in an attempt to ''win'' it. The probably proposed solution is something similar to the US's Skyfall/Snapcount, i.e. upon escalation of tensions beyond a certain level, initiate a massive pre-emptive CF strike against Pakistani first strike elements while bracing for retaliation and taking out as many birds as the BMD can.

The related developments are as follows:

1. Open suggestions of abandoning NFC by ex-SFC and ex-NCA leadership, sometimes even hinting that India is ready for a pre-emptive counter-force nuclear strike. These statements should not be taken lightly, as they represent the current policy of India's nuclear doctrine.

2. Increase of underground tunneled nuclear weapons storages from 2x (pre-2010) to 9x (post-2010), discovered so far. To put things into perspective, 6x are lined up against Pakistan, 1x is deep in central India and 2x are on the eastern coast.

3. Build-up of hardened nuclear weapons shelters in 17x IAF bases since 2010. 10x against Pakistan, 6x against China, 1x in southern India. Post-2013, IAF has started building additional extremely hardened aircraft shelters in the same bases to house aircrafts designated for nuclear weapons delivery. This will allow IAF to mate nuclear weapons with aircrafts secretly and have them on standby for imminent strikes, giving no room for any third party to intervene.

4. Recent SFC exercises for Agni-IV & Agni-V, both at 2000km. This should not be surprising, however Agni-IV has been already trialed at this range before. The coincidence of aiming both exercises at the same range could hint towards a possible operational scenario, where the SFC might have to launch IRBMs from eastern India towards Pakistan, in case the forward missile bases of Agni-I & II have been taken out.

5. Build-up of 8x BrahMos garrisons, 7x against Pakistan, 1x against China.

6. Finalizing purchase of S-400 System, along with bringing up homegrown BMD solutions. Although the potentially included ABM is not extraordinary (60km range, 30km ceiling, 4800m/s target velocity...basically low-MRBM class targets), it does destabilize the strategic balance and gives confidence to the first-strike doctrine.

Their attempts to “win” aside, our focus hasn’t really been on CF and is mostly focused on tiers of destruction level.
It would be ridiculous and delusional on their side to assume that Snapshot type CF’s are applicable with BMD protection in flight times 15 minutes or less .

Their hawks have gotten impetus after Mumbai and now have the driving seat with the current atmosphere there with bigotry and hate rampant so even saner voices are going through mob mentality.

I think there has been a change of operational tempo and readiness after Mumbai which from their perspective can just be taken as them waking up to higher standards. The cold start concept prompted them to prepare for retaliation and hence the HAS - what those pilots in the HAS will return to seems to have been completely excluded from the equation.

Frankly the BMD gambit is going to destabilize the situation by pushing us to build more warheads to ameliorate the situation and lower our already bottemed out threshold.

But if their delusion will sign the death of millions in the subcontinent in the near future, then its on them not us.

 

[Nilgiri]

@Oscar @Joe Shearer@MilSpec @Vibrio @Nilgiri

I strongly believe that India has changed its nuclear posture, and is a couple years down the line already. Reason to do so is unclear to me, it could be either Mumbai or Pakistan's own rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal, or both. Somehow it seems that the Indian military thinkers are now open to the idea of risking a nuclear war, in an attempt to ''win'' it. The probably proposed solution is something similar to the US's Skyfall/Snapcount, i.e. upon escalation of tensions beyond a certain level, initiate a massive pre-emptive CF strike against Pakistani first strike elements while bracing for retaliation and taking out as many birds as the BMD can.

The related developments are as follows:

1. Open suggestions of abandoning NFC by ex-SFC and ex-NCA leadership, sometimes even hinting that India is ready for a pre-emptive counter-force nuclear strike. These statements should not be taken lightly, as they represent the current policy of India's nuclear doctrine.

2. Increase of underground tunneled nuclear weapons storages from 2x (pre-2010) to 9x (post-2010), discovered so far. To put things into perspective, 6x are lined up against Pakistan, 1x is deep in central India and 2x are on the eastern coast.

3. Build-up of hardened nuclear weapons shelters in 17x IAF bases since 2010. 10x against Pakistan, 6x against China, 1x in southern India. Post-2013, IAF has started building additional extremely hardened aircraft shelters in the same bases to house aircrafts designated for nuclear weapons delivery. This will allow IAF to mate nuclear weapons with aircrafts secretly and have them on standby for imminent strikes, giving no room for any third party to intervene.

4. Recent SFC exercises for Agni-IV & Agni-V, both at 2000km. This should not be surprising, however Agni-IV has been already trialed at this range before. The coincidence of aiming both exercises at the same range could hint towards a possible operational scenario, where the SFC might have to launch IRBMs from eastern India towards Pakistan, in case the forward missile bases of Agni-I & II have been taken out.

5. Build-up of 8x BrahMos garrisons, 7x against Pakistan, 1x against China.

6. Finalizing purchase of S-400 System, along with bringing up homegrown BMD solutions. Although the potentially included ABM is not extraordinary (60km range, 30km ceiling, 4800m/s target velocity...basically low-MRBM class targets), it does destabilize the strategic balance and gives confidence to the first-strike doctrine.

Mate, didn't get your tag for some reason. I will read this (and the thread in general) through a bit later...and respond then. Looks to be an interesting one.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Its just that the build-up has been too rapid lately. Since 1998, India kept the nukes in dispersed, non-hardened locations. Post-2005 there were only 2 major hardened facilities. Post-2010 the number exploded to 9. India hasn't drastically increased its production of nukes, which means that the existing arsenal is being secured. And some facilities (including IAF bases) suggest that features have been added to ensure rapid launch capability.

For comparison, in Pakistan's case, the build-up has been gradual (although the total is still quite larger than India's).

It seems on detailed consideration that this is directly proportionate to the additional military expenditure available after easing of financial constraints by the early 2000s. Improvement of infrastructure was not the first priority; the very tight leash kept on military expenditure after Rajiv Gandhi's brief tenure, the stigma that lay on military procurement, and the general public aversion to purchase of required material resources for the military and its operations led to a very high degree of shortfall in every single aspect. From tanks, artillery - towed and self-propelled alike, armoured cars, infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers, even the humble lorries, and four-wheel drive vehicles, through 3" and 2" mortars, anti-tank guided missiles and MANPADs in general, even the ubiquitous battle rifle or assault rifle, or ammunition for all these, all were in short supply in the Indian Army.

We can identify the identical situation for the Air Force - leading to a very serious situation in terms of availability of planes, and to a seriously under-equipped Navy. None of the services were able to fulfil their missions.

When finances were easier, the first priority was to bring critical, front-line equipment up to date. This is an on-going effort; the gaps were too huge to be filled instantaneously. That is why infrastructural development took so long to start, and continues.

It is only over the last decade or so that the initial halting steps were taken to repair the military infrastructure.

After carefully reviewing whatever has appeared in print, and after discussions with usually knowledgeable economists specialising in Indian economics, a clear picture has emerged. Our Pakistani friends may worry at a lesser pace.

What we have as evidence is this: the long-neglected infrastructure related to strategic resources is being created where needed, and refurbished where already established. There is no shift in nuclear weapons deployment policy. There has been a lot of talk about the existing deployment policy; there has been no change in it yet. However, there is increasing pressure to change it, due to the increasing vertical proliferation that has been prevalent in hostile quarters. There is no guarantee that this policy of nuclear restraint, that was closely dovetailed with the overarching national policy of strategic restraint, will continue into the future, especially as the doctrine of strategic restraint is under severe strain.

 

[HariSinghNalwa]

Recent SFC exercises for Agni-IV & Agni-V, both at 2000km. This should not be surprising, however Agni-IV has been already trialed at this range before. The coincidence of aiming both exercises at the same range could hint towards a possible operational scenario, where the SFC might have to launch IRBMs from eastern India towards Pakistan, in case the forward missile bases of Agni-I & II have been taken out.

those tests were more in context of a lofted trajectory to show that these missiles can also double as anti-satellite weapons

 

[The Deterrent]

IMHO, I don't think there's anything extraordinary happening here. All this stuff must have taken years to work out, not counting tons of delays along the way. The biggest change is naturally the new class of SSBNs coming up after S4*.

Of course it took years, but the scale of the developments is unusual. The SSBNs don't add much to the equation against Pakistan, India has plenty of strategic depth to be able to strike back.

As for the nuclear doctrine, nothing has really changed. That thing about pre-emptive strikes should be taken in context, it's still part of the existing doctrine. We have given ourselves some leeway that allows the SFC to commit to pre-emptive strikes even before WMDs have struck Indian assets or soil.

I don't believe it was a part of the existing doctrine, rather exactly what has changed. As @Vibrio mentioned, the Indian policy to mobilize is (was IMO) proportional to Pakistan's. To execute CF pre-emptive strikes, SFC has to have the capability to mobilize at a very short notice, which I believe it is getting closer to.

I suppose any talk of changing the NFU policy is being used as a threat to Pakistan. Potentially to prevent Pakistan from deploying tactical nukes.

That is NOT stabilizing for the region. As @Oscar mentioned above, these kind of moves will literally 'lower our already bottomed out threshold.'

It doesn't look like GoI is going to allow the army to use the Brahmos for a counterforce strike... yet. I don't know if that's because it's the IAF's job. Or it's only to avoid spooking Pakistan.

It does look like that when 5 of them garrisons are less than 100km from the IB.

Our BMD will be based on indigenous solutions, not foreign ones. So the S-400's main business will be air defence. Indigenous BMD is still quite some time away. Only the AAD is ready for induction along with the sensor network. And the first phase is only meant for these low-MRBM class targets. Not to mention, we still do not know the size and scale of the BMD program. You can expect the S-400s to fulfil some BMD requirements for now, but there's no point in overestimating India's BMD capability.

Agreed, still it is a capability that works, now. And it will be inducted soon, so even if it defends against SRBMs, it does potentially diminish Pakistan's offensive capability.

 

[Feng Leng]

Thank god Peking will be safe and secure.

LOL how much damage can India's non-miniaturized atomic fissile iron bombs not even mated to your unreliable liquid fueled rockets do when we already have ABM from Tibet to Beijing and 3000 km in between?

 

[The Deterrent]

A combination of lessons learned after Operation Parakaram and the evolution of the Pakistani Nuclear Forces. The biggest challenge as a military planner being faced in India is the tendency of Pakistan to declare all platforms as 'nuclear capable'. With the level of ambiguity that prevails, a move made by planners with an intent to prevent any kind of Indian conventional actions in response to any incident emanating from what GoP calls the non-state actors, the probability of miscalculation rises, as conventional battlefield may see long range artillery/rocket systems, capable of being a platform of delivery of nuclear weapons, being used extensively, thereby creating a sense of uncertainty.

Exactly, Pakistan's policy of being the horny rooster with a nuke-injecting thing with different platforms being the hens, has been a double-edged sword. However, the irony is that Pakistani military is finally coming back to its senses, but the Indians have been spooked already, and there is no changing their minds. The resulting Indian developments are very destabilizing for the region, as it will drive Pakistan to continue the present approach, something for which the finances are the least of the concerns.

However, as far as I can make out, the threshold of Indian first strike will very well be within it's defined policy of what constitutes a 'nuclear aggression' for India, i.e. "the threat or use of Nuclear weapons against territory or military forces of India". With improved C3ISR capabilities, I do not foresee any Indian action as long as an imminent threat is not felt.

Agreed, however what I'm pointing at is that the capability to respond to the imminent threat (before it hits) was not there before. India had ample landmass to conceal its assets, mobilize them gradually and bring them out only after a strike. Now, the military is starting to get its hands on a potentially destabilizing capability. What if, during the next mobilization, Pakistan brings out its toys (as always) and India decides to try to take them out instead of diplomatic means of conflict resolution? This will drive Pakistan to ensure more mobilization and survivability, hence the destabilization.

As I said earlier, this thinking was always there, it is the political acceptance that you notice now. The political will to take a risk, is firming up?

Precisely. Of course the military wargames all scenarios, but now the political will and finances are behind it.

May or may not be exactly. It, the Indian posture, is directly proportional to the Pakistani actions. For example, if Pakistan makes a move to mate the warheads with the delivery platform, appropriate decision will be taken depending on the condition. I am very sure that any such move will entail a diplomatic message being conveyed immediately even as a military option is bing prepared simultaneously.

Aptly put. But, take an example I mentioned in the post.

The above image represents a stark change in policy, IMO. Previously, the IAF had the weapons shelter + designated HAS combo, meaning that mobilization would involve preparing the weapon and carting it out to mate it with the designated aircraft inside its normal HAS...which is more than enough.

Now, IAF is building these extremely hardened shelters, to house BOTH the designated aircraft and the weapons vault, meaning that the mating will be quite rapid and concealed...allowing no room for observation or a diplomatic message to be conveyed, or as I said, for any 'third' party to intervene.

Been making it since 2010 myself. Mentioned the same to @saiyan0321 on Kashmir thread. But then, majority of other members here think I am trolling. When I dismiss Nasr, there is a reason for that too.

But all is contingent to posture assumed by the Pakistani military forces.

I see. Well Nasr is not for the IBGs, I've been saying that for ages.

Astute observations, commenting as I understand your rationale here.

Thank you. For those who don't, my concern is merely the destabilization of the region.

Let me add on to the perspective as presented by @Joe Shearer in the post earlier.

If you look at the military infrastructure being built up in India, pace has gathered after 1998-2005 period. There is a reason for that, which perhaps, can explain the above.

Improvement in Economic conditions.

Till 1998, Indian Army barely had money to cover the revenue expenditure in terms of Pay & Pensions. Tanks were mothballed and stored, Aircraft sorties were reduced and flying hours curtailed (just to put things into perspective). Post Nuclear tests, sanctions had some effect too, but our economy picked up. Post-2005, economy has been doing well. More money is now available and Cantonments are being re-developed (especially under Smart Cities initiative launched by the present dispensation) and modernized, permanent structures are being built as money is made available. One can look at the development of cantonments all over, including in Kashmir. Temporary shelters have made way to built up housing for troops in quite a few places.

I would read all this as a part of the same.

I would agree, however as I've mentioned earlier, certain developments are not mere 'upgrades'. They signify an official policy shift, and the effort to attain a capability which will not bode well for the region.

It seems on detailed consideration that this is directly proportionate to the additional military expenditure available after easing of financial constraints by the early 2000s. Improvement of infrastructure was not the first priority; the very tight leash kept on military expenditure after Rajiv Gandhi's brief tenure, the stigma that lay on military procurement, and the general public aversion to purchase of required material resources for the military and its operations led to a very high degree of shortfall in every single aspect. From tanks, artillery - towed and self-propelled alike, armoured cars, infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers, even the humble lorries, and four-wheel drive vehicles, through 3" and 2" mortars, anti-tank guided missiles and MANPADs in general, even the ubiquitous battle rifle or assault rifle, or ammunition for all these, all were in short supply in the Indian Army.

We can identify the identical situation for the Air Force - leading to a very serious situation in terms of availability of planes, and to a seriously under-equipped Navy. None of the services were able to fulfil their missions.

When finances were easier, the first priority was to bring critical, front-line equipment up to date. This is an on-going effort; the gaps were too huge to be filled instantaneously. That is why infrastructural development took so long to start, and continues.

It is only over the last decade or so that the initial halting steps were taken to repair the military infrastructure.

After carefully reviewing whatever has appeared in print, and after discussions with usually knowledgeable economists specialising in Indian economics, a clear picture has emerged. Our Pakistani friends may worry at a lesser pace.

What we have as evidence is this: the long-neglected infrastructure related to strategic resources is being created where needed, and refurbished where already established. There is no shift in nuclear weapons deployment policy. There has been a lot of talk about the existing deployment policy; there has been no change in it yet. However, there is increasing pressure to change it, due to the increasing vertical proliferation that has been prevalent in hostile quarters. There is no guarantee that this policy of nuclear restraint, that was closely dovetailed with the overarching national policy of strategic restraint, will continue into the future, especially as the doctrine of strategic restraint is under severe strain.

Good arguments, but I beg to disagree. The shift in nuclear weapons deployment policy is reflected on the ground. I don't wish to share more imagery to reinforce my point (although everything is publicly available), however there is plenty of evidence that India is not merely using more funds to increase survivability of the strategic assets (which is more than enough), but also implementing rapid mobilization and deployment options.

 

[randomradio]

Of course it took years, but the scale of the developments is unusual. The SSBNs don't add much to the equation against Pakistan, India has plenty of strategic depth to be able to strike back.

But the SSBNs are the only change. Everything else you see is simply a product of more money being disbursed so old plans could be implemented.

To execute CF pre-emptive strikes, SFC has to have the capability to mobilize at a very short notice, which I believe it is getting closer to.

Yeah, the SCs can now mobilise in only a few days.

That is NOT stabilizing for the region. As @Oscar mentioned above, these kind of moves will literally 'lower our already bottomed out threshold.'

I suppose India sees deployment of tactical nukes as more destabilising. So if the "withdrawal of NFU" threat works, then status quo is more stabilising.

If Pakistan deploys tac nukes, then, as @Vibrio has always wanted, India may go ahead with the withdrawal of NFU. You can say that the ball is in Pak's court on this one.

It does look like that when 5 of them garrisons are less than 100km from the IB.

I thought the same once upon a time, until I was told GoI won't allow Brahmos for CF strikes.

Of course, you can't dismiss it. But it's also possible that defanging Pakistan may involve other countries also, and may include far more subtle but more effective methods, which would make Brahmos strikes counterproductive in the implementation of those other more effective methods. Airstrikes may also be far more effective than the Brahmos.

Agreed, still it is a capability that works, now. And it will be inducted soon, so even if it defends against SRBMs, it does potentially diminish Pakistan's offensive capability.

Adequate deployment of BMD is going to take many years. It's going to take us until 2023 to just absorb all 5 regiments of S-400. And we have only taken nascent steps in inducting the indigenous BMD. Then we have to get the personnel trained in a system we have no experience operating. It's gonna be a long process.

 

[Joe Shearer]

This is an uncommonly good thread. Please nurture it. I would like to contribute further a few hours later.

Exactly, Pakistan's policy of being the horny rooster with a nuke-injecting thing with different platforms being the hens, has been a double-edged sword. However, the irony is that Pakistani military is finally coming back to its senses, but the Indians have been spooked already, and there is no changing their minds. The resulting Indian developments are very destabilizing for the region, as it will drive Pakistan to continue the present approach, something for which the finances are the least of the concerns.


Agreed, however what I'm pointing at is that the capability to respond to the imminent threat (before it hits) was not there before. India had ample landmass to conceal its assets, mobilize them gradually and bring them out only after a strike. Now, the military is starting to get its hands on a potentially destabilizing capability. What if, during the next mobilization, Pakistan brings out its toys (as always) and India decides to try to take them out instead of diplomatic means of conflict resolution? This will drive Pakistan to ensure more mobilization and survivability, hence the destabilization.


Precisely. Of course the military wargames all scenarios, but now the political will and finances are behind it.


Aptly put. But, take an example I mentioned in the post.

View attachment 535047

The above image represents a stark change in policy, IMO. Previously, the IAF had the weapons shelter + designated HAS combo, meaning that mobilization would involve preparing the weapon and carting it out to mate it with the designated aircraft inside its normal HAS...which is more than enough.

Now, IAF is building these extremely hardened shelters, to house BOTH the designated aircraft and the weapons vault, meaning that the mating will be quite rapid and concealed...allowing no room for observation or a diplomatic message to be conveyed, or as I said, for any 'third' party to intervene.


I see. Well Nasr is not for the IBGs, I've been saying that for ages.



Thank you. For those who don't, my concern is merely the destabilization of the region.


I would agree, however as I've mentioned earlier, certain developments are not mere 'upgrades'. They signify an official policy shift, and the effort to attain a capability which will not bode well for the region.



Good arguments, but I beg to disagree. The shift in nuclear weapons deployment policy is reflected on the ground. I don't wish to share more imagery to reinforce my point (although everything is publicly available), however there is plenty of evidence that India is not merely using more funds to increase survivability of the strategic assets (which is more than enough), but also implementing rapid mobilization and deployment options.