However, the irony is that Pakistani military is finally coming back to its senses, but the Indians have been spooked already, and there is no changing their minds. The resulting Indian developments are very destabilizing for the region, as it will drive Pakistan to continue the present approach, something for which the finances are the least of the concerns.
Pakistan's military position as alluded to by you above, is reminiscent of their approach towards efforts undertaken at settlement of the Kashmir dispute by PMs Vajpayee and MMS. The Indian willingness to reach a mutually acceptable solution along the lines as suggested by Musharraf were, ironically, put paid to by actions undertaken by the very same sub-set. The Indian antipathy to any overtures of peace and strategic
detente as far as Pakistan is concerned, is the result of these antics that have eroded the confidence in the intent of any Pakistani disposition today, with the Indian Political Environment evolving into realms that render any such solution impossible, given the political constraints placed by the Indian politicians on themselves out of their own posturing.
The sequence of events in immediate aftermath of PMs Modi-NS meet - that of increased political pressure on PM NS with actions of TLP, the Army's refusal to 'involve' itself in re-establishing the writ of the State and subsequent handing of cash rewards to their cadre, indicated a deliberate attempt at undermining the attempts of PM Nawaz's government at peace. The Uri incident also reinforced the antipathy, thereby making any kind of negotiation difficult. The
coup de grace was the decapitation of BSF soldier along recognized International Border carried out in immediate aftermath of PM Imran Khan's offer of unilaterally initiating peace talks with India. All this, a desire for peace et al, indicates a ruse on part of the Pakistan Army to 'buy time' as the economic condition of the country remained bad.
In this backdrop, a perceived 'upscaling' of Indian offensive military capability (I used perceived here as we have to upscale in order to maintain a dissuasive posture with respect to China, which is advancing by leaps and bound) with the ancillary effect of placing additional and perhaps, unsustainable burden (let us accept that it is unsustainable without severely denting/destroying the socio-economic programs of Pakistan) thereby disturbing a so called 'strategic balance', merely is now accepted as something that India could not care less about.
In my post to
@VCheng the other day over India's 'activities' in Baluchistan I had drawn attention to the fact that India is a rookie in the game being played out there. The Major League nations remain Pakistan's other neighbour who is playing out his own game with Pakistan's allies from the GCC. Average Pakistani's scepticism notwithstanding, India wants minimum footprint within Pakistan's internal problems for two fold reasons:
a. India does not want to lose the 'moral' spinoffs over Kashmir issue.
b. India remains a somewhat unifying factor for the various groups within Pakistan, both state and non-state, that otherwise continue to be at odds with each other, at times violently.
While it has been an observation repeated oft by me, and held within Indian establishment, that relatively stable Pakistan is needed to prevent the type of radicals as seen elsewhere in the region from gaining a foothold on India's borders, there is now a re-look, in the aftermath of the war on ISIS, on the wisdom of India continuing to pay a price without exacting costs in return. No longer does it seem a case wherein we really need to follow that policy any longer - irrespective of nuclear weapons or not. This, the latter point, is gaining traction within Indian policy makers.
A relative hands off approach allows India to let the internal players in Pakistan continue to play at odds with each other while putting pressure on Pakistan's finances by undertaking sustainable military modernization on own side. As more and more economic pressure extends over Pakistan, the effect on various programs will, in the longer run, create a vacuum, which can be filled up by groups financed by various interests/stakeholders, who themselves, are at odds.
This is purely my analysis of what seems to be Indian action insofar Pakistan is concerned. A relative hands off policy yields us much greater dividends.
Agreed, however what I'm pointing at is that the capability to respond to the imminent threat (before it hits) was not there before. India had ample landmass to conceal its assets, mobilize them gradually and bring them out only after a strike. Now, the military is starting to get its hands on a potentially destabilizing capability. What if, during the next mobilization, Pakistan brings out its toys (as always)
I assure you, never have your forces moved all the components required to actually mate a warhead with its delivery platform, simultaneously in any exercise for the apparent reason.
Anyone can claim to the contrary, but on this, I am pretty sure.
and India decides to try to take them out instead of diplomatic means of conflict resolution? This will drive Pakistan to ensure more mobilization and survivability, hence the destabilization.
I disagree for the reason above. The C3ISR for this particular field available with us is - 'interesting'.
The above image represents a stark change in policy, IMO. Previously, the IAF had the weapons shelter + designated HAS combo, meaning that mobilization would involve preparing the weapon and carting it out to mate it with the designated aircraft inside its normal HAS...which is more than enough.
Now, IAF is building these extremely hardened shelters, to house BOTH the designated aircraft and the weapons vault, meaning that the mating will be quite rapid and concealed...allowing no room for observation or a diplomatic message to be conveyed, or as I said, for any 'third' party to intervene.
As I said earlier, we have to prepare for a dissuasive capability with respect to China. Pragmatism indicates that in a theoretical scenario involving a future conflict with China, PLA/PLAAF will be using dedicated missile strikes against our airfields to aim for a quick air superiority. HAS can be considered pre-eminently to address that contingency. However, duality can not be ruled out, that I do concede.
I see. Well Nasr is not for the IBGs, I've been saying that for ages.
It is merely aimed at providing an option. By declaring it specifically for TNWs, the same is rendered unusable in most scenarios and paradoxically, lowers India's threshold itself. But then, this discussion is for some other time.
We have Prahaar on our side.
regards