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Russia threatens Romania and Poland

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Longer range missiles > fewer ships needed.
I would think land bases help with that too (and to plug coverage gaps)
 
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Time and time again the biased media portray Russia as the bad man. They are hosting a missile base for countries who have made themselves Russia's enemies. What do they expect?

How about if the Eastern European countries declare neutrality? There would be no threat from Russia, and the world would be a safer place.

The US has threatened, destabilized and invaded country after country, and it's Russia that's the villain?
The Orthodox Russians and other religions of that Federation are a threat to the Zionist's strategic plans; hence why all the aggro against Russia.
 
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The Orthodox Russians and other religions of that Federation are a threat to the Zionist's strategic plans; hence why all the aggro against Russia.

Yes. One of the last countries not totally locked down by the zionists.
 
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The Orthodox Russians and other religions of that Federation are a threat to the Zionist's strategic plans; hence why all the aggro against Russia.
Yeah, sure.
 
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no, but they already got mobile systems on their ships in the region, so how, specifically, does an 'Ashore' variant in Romania make things worse for Russia's strategic forces ?
I don't know why you ask me, since I never said or suggested an aegis ashore in Romania makes things worse for Russia's strategic forces. QUite the contrary actually. Note there are just 3 8-cell VLSs, thats just 24 ready missiles. If Russia fires off for real, 24 is just a drop in the bucket (and there may not be enough time to reload the launchers)

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really, so you need land based BMDs in Romania to deal with a possible DPRK threat, even with that big US presence in RoK, Japan and everywhere else ? o_O
It has been suggested KN-08 may achieve an “emergency operational status” by 2020. Firing that missile at Europe would take it over China and Russia i.e. the opposite direction of US units in RoK, Japan.
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again, the US/West/NATO already have a huge global military presence and enough counters in virtually every part of the world to deal with China, what is the need for sticking one in Romania (right on Russia's borders)
I'm just saying that these states have missiles capable of reaching Europe and that they have them in smaller numbers that e.g. Russia so that they do not necessarily have the capability to overwhelm a BMD system.

You seem to assume that simply because I post something about Aegis Ashore, I therefor am in favor of it and somehow must defend it.

jokes aside, let's not kid ourselves with this NATO move in Romania, it is squarely directed at Russian ballistic missiles, but given their known capability, in my limited knowledge, I'd say it's largely an optics play letting Putin know just how close they can get with their defensive systems, which implies they could also get so close with offensive wmds.

unless this Aegis ashore thing is actually strategically a much bigger headache than their already established capabilities
Why THAAD was proposed for South Korea and Aegis Ashore for Romania and Poland (and why not vice versa).

There are two main technical issues that almost certainly drove the decision of which system went where:

(1) Europe can be almost completely covered by two Aegis Ashore sites but achieving similar coverage with THAAD would require a prohibitive number of THAAD batteries. On the other hand, S. Korea is small enough to be covered by one or two THAAD batteries.

A single Aegis Ashore site (with the Block IIA interceptor) can cover a much larger geographical area than a single THAAD deployment. The Block IIA interceptor is scheduled to begin deployment in 2018. This larger coverage area occurs because the Aegis Block II interceptor has a much higher burnout speed (likely about 4.5 km/s) than a THAAD interceptor (likely about 2.6-2.8 km/s) and thus can reach out to make intercepts at much greater ranges.

(2) Due to the short distances involved, Aegis BMD cannot defend South Korea against short range ballistic missile attack.
This problem arises because the Aegis SM-3 interceptor (all versions) can only intercept above the atmosphere (exo-atmospheric). While the precise lower altitude limit for the SM-3 interceptor is not publicly available, it is generally taken to be at about 100 km or higher.

https://mostlymissiledefense.com/2015/07/27/aegis-ashore-vs-thaad-july-27-2015/

By extention of point 2 >
1. AEGIS BMD CAN ALSO NOT DEFEND EUROPE AGAINST SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE ATTACK.

RUSSIA HAS MORE THAN PLENTY NUCLEAR CAPABLE SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES e.g. the Iskander-M in Kaliningrad Oblast (right next to Poland, just a few km down the road). And Iskander-K.

On 05 November 2008 Anatoly Tsyganok, head of the Moscow-based Military Forecast Center, told RIA Novosti that the deployment of Iskander systems with a range of 500 km (310 miles) would allow Russia to target the entire territory of Poland and also parts of Germany and the Czech Republic. The 152nd Independent Missile Brigade deployed outside Chernyakhovsk, Kaliningrad Region, was planned to be re-armed with Iskanders as early as the beginning of 2008.The 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone) would certainly have a range to strike the Redzikowo missile defense facility in Poland, which is a bit more than 200 km from Kaliningrad. But only an extended range version would be capable of striking the Brdy facility in the Czech Republic, which is more than 600 km from Kaliningrad. Russia has 88 units Iskander-M there
ss-26-kaliningrad.jpg

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/ss-26.htm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9K720_Iskander

Iskander-M (500+km SRBM)
Iskander_SS-26_Stone_tactical_missile_system_Russia_Russian_army_640_002.jpg

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/ss-26.htm

Iskander-K (2000km GLCM)
iskander-k-2007-image1.jpg

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/iskander-k.htm
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/207816/russian-cruise-missiles-revisited/
 
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Of course, the real head-ache is ballistic missiles from Iran

Never say never, but realistically for what purpose would Iran want to launch missiles at Poland or Romania?
 
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Never say never, but realistically for what purpose would Iran want to launch missiles at Poland or Romania?
Neither Poland nor Romania in particular would be target. These are just the sites intended for the EUROPEAN anti-ballistic missile defence system, protecting NATO's European members i.e. the whole area. Which includes US military assest located there.

Their purpose is not to defend Poland and Romania from nukes, they are to defend the USA.

In fact these systems in Poland and Romania are making them targets, when they were not before.
This shows a clear lack of understanding. Just look at any map and attempt to explain how exactly an Aegis ashore in Poland or Romania would stop any missile attack on the USA? Also, as indicated, Poland and Romania (and many other former Warsaw pact countries) have been under the gun already since as early as 2008, when Russia began stationing SS-26 Iskander in its Western Defence Region.
 
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I'm guessing Aegis boats were enough of a headache for Russia, but putting that system on land just bordering Russia is a big optics move by NATO who want to be seen reasserting themselves, such a move was due after Crimea.

The contract for Aegis Ashore in Romania was finalized in 2010:

Lockheed Martin received the contract for Aegis Ashore in Romania in 2010, which heavily leveraged the proven shipboard Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system.

http://lockheedmartin.com/us/news/p...ing-southern-europe-from-missile-threats.html

Construction began in 2013:

The site first broke ground Oct. 28, 2013. At a ceremony hosted by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dec. 18, 2015, U.S. and Romanian government officials announced the major military components of the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System in Romania were complete and had been transferred to the Commander, U.S. 6th Fleet.

A second Aegis Ashore site began construction in May of the following year:

Construction of a second Aegis Ashore site in Poland is part of the final phase of EPAA. The ground breaking is scheduled for May 13.

http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=94662


Russia's annexation of Crimea was in 2014:

The Ukrainian territory of Crimea was annexed by the Russian Federation on 18 March 2014.

https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-describes-secret-operation-seize-crimea-212858356.html?ref=gs

You have your timelines mixed up. Aegis Ashore began in 2009, with President Obama's EPAA initiative:

On Sept. 17, 2009, President Obama announced the concept of EPAA, which calls for using Aegis-based BMD capabilities, both afloat and ashore, to defend Europe against ballistic missile threats originating from outside the Euro-Atlantic Area.

http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=94662

Only now in 2016 has the Romanian site become operational:
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At the moment the site is using an SM-3 Block 1B:
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But will be outfitted with the larger, more capable SM-3 Block IIA in the near future:
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The two aren't related to Russian developments in Crimea, though Aegis Ashore is related to Russia and is designed to provide defense against ballistic missiles of all classes and can, obviously, be trained against Russian missiles as well.

But, it is not a response to Russia's Crimea annexation as Aegis Ashore came about and began prior to that event.

Additionally, BMD capable destroyer's, also as part of the EPAA initiative, began showing up in Europe in 2011. This is DDG 71 USS Ross in Rota, Spain:
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maybe @Sven or @Penguin can shed some more light on it, I'd like to know how much of a difference these Ashore systems make strategically.

Enough of an impact. While limited by a lack of SM-3 block IIA at the moment, that'll be solved in the near future. Additionally, newer kill vehicles are going to be coming online that are designed to defeat MIRV warheads. These include the MKV.

Note: this is an older version, the newer version is still classified:
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Ballistic missile defense sites will be able to provide an effective defense against all classes of ballistics missiles. These aren't undefended, as they'll be coupled with additional tiers like PAC-3, for defense against theater or short range ballistic missiles like Iskander:
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And European solutions like Aster 30:
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THAAD may also be integrated into the defense system if necessary, though no deployment of THAAD to Europe is imminent.

This setup, long and short ranged weapons, is similar the Russian concept of high-low defenses using long-ranged S-XXX series missiles coupled with short-ranged point-defense systems like Pantsir-S1:
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Rather then for general air-defense, the European system is for ABM.

I will comment it like this bla bla bla bla nothing new we where the target and we are the target with or without the defence shield ...

And thus, if you're always the target regardless, it's best to have some form of contingency and defenses, rather then go completely defenseless.

This shows a clear lack of understanding. Just look at any map and attempt to explain how exactly an Aegis ashore in Poland or Romania would stop any missile attack on the USA?

Great point. North Korean missiles? Nope, they're going to be going North or East, not west over Europe. Iranian missiles? Can't reach the Continental US or Alaska. They don't have the range. Russian missiles? They'll be going North... where Aegis Ashore lacks the range to hit them.

Aegis Ashore and Aegis BMD destroyers in Europe can't act as a defense for the US because they're either positioned incorrectly to counter weapons that could target the US, or because the adversaries Aegis in Europe is designed to counter, like Iran, don't have weapons that could hit the US.
 
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And thus, if you're always the target regardless, it's best to have some form of contingency and defenses, rather then go completely defenseless.

Yes i agree better something than nothing when the big mushroom rises to eat us :lol: But my when we where finishing our surface-to-air missile deal Russia was fealing treaten to ... But i think if we where buying S-300 S-400 there would be no problem :sarcastic:
 
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You seem to assume that simply because I post something about Aegis Ashore, I therefor am in favor of it and somehow must defend it.
not at all, in fact I think it was me who tagged you here to get your input here, right ? it's because you seem knowledgeable on this stuff.

If I came across across slightly combative, it was because your first response read, "the real threat is Iranian missiles" or something to that extent, which is total bs, right ?
 
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not at all, in fact I think it was me who tagged you here to get your input here, right ? it's because you seem knowledgeable on this stuff.

If I came across across slightly combative, it was because your first response read, "the real threat is Iranian missiles" or something to that extent, which is total bs, right ?
Well no, that is not total bs. As I indicated AEGIS Ashore is for intercepting long range incoming missiles. It is not well suited to defending against incoming short range systems. The Russians have more than sufficient short range balistic capability (plus a bunch of other systems) to level the part of Europe to its west if it so chooses. Given that the 2 sites each have (I believe) 3x 8-cell launchers for SM-3. The implication is that they will quickly run out of ready missiles and have to reload. This places an opponent with a lot of missiles (e.g. Russia) at an advantage and an opponent with few missiles (Iran) at a disadvantage: the latter won't be able to saturate the missile defences.
 
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Well no, that is not total bs.

How exactly?

You're talking about the threat of Iranian, North Korean and even Chinese ballistic missiles in this post here:

With Poland being right next to Kaliningrad Oblast, where the Iskander-M are stationed, that's convenient (but means the site is already vulnerable to missile and air strike from very close by, or could even be physically taken).

Of course, the real head-ache is ballistic missiles from Iran

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Or, eventually
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In more distant future maybe also to consider

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Russia has a variety of means to nuclear strike, including SSBNs, SSGNs, cruise missiles from long range bombers. So, compared to e.g. Iran or North Korea, it retains significant nuclear strike portential even in the face of the land and seabased BMD facilities of NATO. And may well be able to overwhelm current stage BMD in the European area.


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U.S. DOD map of Soviet ICBM bases, 1980s
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Missile_Troops

I suppose landbased ICBM bases would remain approximately in same locations, plus there are land-mobile systems.

Plus, Russia has its own counter to BMD
https://www.rt.com/news/217695-abm-killer-missile-russia/

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HOW exactly.... are any of these a threat to Romania or Poland?

You're simply backing up my previous point. There is only one shared target between Iranian, North Korean and Chinese ballistic missiles. And it's not anywhere in Europe (it is in fact in the continent of North America).
 
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Stop thinking this is to protect Romania and Poland from an attack.

That was my entire point in the first place. :lol:

It was @Penguin who argued against it.

We all know that the Iranian, North Korean and Chinese ballistic missiles that he referenced in a previous post are no threat to Romania/Poland, in fact the target that is shared between these three is not even on the continent of Europe.
 
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