Rouhani in Oman. Will the GCC Crack From Within?
March 17th 2014
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s March 12th visit to Oman, where he was received by Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said, and where the Islamic Republic won a highly lucrative deal to supply its closest Arab ally with natural gas, is the tip of the iceberg of a much larger Iranian maneuver in the Gulf – one that Iran hopes will significantly enhance its regional position. Tehran’s game is multi-faceted and it hopes to keep most of its cards close to the vest, however regional actions and reactions can be discerned.
First of all, Rouhani’s visit to Muscat occurred shortly after the surfacing of the conflict between three members of the Gulf Cooperation Council – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain – and a fourth member – Qatar. With tensions plaguing four of the six GCC countries, the visit by the President of the Islamic Republic to the GCC’s fifth member has raised increased expectations of the emergence of a new strategic alliance in the Gulf.
The visit and its timing have raised alarm in Riyadh.
As reported, the visit did in fact focus on economic cooperation between the two nations, particularly in the oil and gas sector. But while the spotlight was put on the bilateral contracts to supply Oman with Iranian gas, the real issue was much larger in scope and effect. Rouhani wanted to give quiet support to the controversial project of building a $5 billion, 875 mile (1,400 kilometer) deep sea pipeline to India through Oman to export the giant South Pars gas field production to the Indian coast. In early March, 2014, trilateral talks occurred involving Indian Foreign Minister Salmanush Khrid, Omani Foreign Minister Yousif bin Alawai bin Abdullah, and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif about this project, which is seen as an alternative to the long-delayed Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline. The trilateral meeting was the highest level discussion that has taken place on this project to date.
Overall, Rouhani saw the visit as a win-win move. By being in Muscat, he would have sent a message to Riyadh that Tehran is not isolated even on the other shore of the Gulf. At the same time, Iran could exert additional pressure on Pakistan to take a decisive step in fulfilling its commitment to complete its portion of the land pipeline between the two nations by this winter. Thirdly, Tehran was also laying the foundation for yet a larger alternative to the Iran–Pakistan project.
However, the most significant part of the Rouhani visit was related to the status of inter-relations within the GCC. For Iran, what is required ultimately is to improve Tehran’s position in the Great Game of building a new regional order in the Middle East in which Riyadh and Tehran are the main competing players.
The strong military presence and power projection of the United States in the second half of the last century helped reduce the importance of any meaningful security ties among members of the GCC. Personal and historical issues were, and still are, latent in the inter-relations between its various members. With the U.S. reducing its power projection—whether in reality or in perception—the historical pattern proposes only one of two starkly opposing choices: to close ranks or to reveal deepening cracks.
Riyadh believes that Tehran is working carefully to push events on the second historical path. It sees the Iranian moves on the GCC front as a message that while Saudi Arabia is pursuing its plan to consolidate its positions in Egypt and Syria, it may begin to face troubles in places more closely related to the Kingdom.
With Iranian–Omani ties growing stronger, a majority of the population in Bahrain being Shia’a, a neutral policy from Kuwait, and Qatar’s “do-whatever-Riyadh-does-not-want-you-to do” policy, Tehran hopes to see Saudi Arabia pushed to a strategic corner. It is a chess game, and the problem for the Saudis is that Iranians are good at it.
Middle East Briefing (MEB) is a publication of Orient Advisory Group (OAG). OAG is a research and risk assessment firm based in both Washington DC and Dubai UAE. Dr Samir Altaqi and Esam Aziz are the editors of MEB which bases its input on sources, regular contributors, researchers and correspondents in the main capitals of the Middle East in addition to Washington.
Rouhani in Oman. Will the GCC Crack From Within? | Middle East Briefing
March 17th 2014
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s March 12th visit to Oman, where he was received by Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said, and where the Islamic Republic won a highly lucrative deal to supply its closest Arab ally with natural gas, is the tip of the iceberg of a much larger Iranian maneuver in the Gulf – one that Iran hopes will significantly enhance its regional position. Tehran’s game is multi-faceted and it hopes to keep most of its cards close to the vest, however regional actions and reactions can be discerned.
First of all, Rouhani’s visit to Muscat occurred shortly after the surfacing of the conflict between three members of the Gulf Cooperation Council – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain – and a fourth member – Qatar. With tensions plaguing four of the six GCC countries, the visit by the President of the Islamic Republic to the GCC’s fifth member has raised increased expectations of the emergence of a new strategic alliance in the Gulf.
The visit and its timing have raised alarm in Riyadh.
As reported, the visit did in fact focus on economic cooperation between the two nations, particularly in the oil and gas sector. But while the spotlight was put on the bilateral contracts to supply Oman with Iranian gas, the real issue was much larger in scope and effect. Rouhani wanted to give quiet support to the controversial project of building a $5 billion, 875 mile (1,400 kilometer) deep sea pipeline to India through Oman to export the giant South Pars gas field production to the Indian coast. In early March, 2014, trilateral talks occurred involving Indian Foreign Minister Salmanush Khrid, Omani Foreign Minister Yousif bin Alawai bin Abdullah, and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif about this project, which is seen as an alternative to the long-delayed Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline. The trilateral meeting was the highest level discussion that has taken place on this project to date.
Overall, Rouhani saw the visit as a win-win move. By being in Muscat, he would have sent a message to Riyadh that Tehran is not isolated even on the other shore of the Gulf. At the same time, Iran could exert additional pressure on Pakistan to take a decisive step in fulfilling its commitment to complete its portion of the land pipeline between the two nations by this winter. Thirdly, Tehran was also laying the foundation for yet a larger alternative to the Iran–Pakistan project.
However, the most significant part of the Rouhani visit was related to the status of inter-relations within the GCC. For Iran, what is required ultimately is to improve Tehran’s position in the Great Game of building a new regional order in the Middle East in which Riyadh and Tehran are the main competing players.
The strong military presence and power projection of the United States in the second half of the last century helped reduce the importance of any meaningful security ties among members of the GCC. Personal and historical issues were, and still are, latent in the inter-relations between its various members. With the U.S. reducing its power projection—whether in reality or in perception—the historical pattern proposes only one of two starkly opposing choices: to close ranks or to reveal deepening cracks.
Riyadh believes that Tehran is working carefully to push events on the second historical path. It sees the Iranian moves on the GCC front as a message that while Saudi Arabia is pursuing its plan to consolidate its positions in Egypt and Syria, it may begin to face troubles in places more closely related to the Kingdom.
With Iranian–Omani ties growing stronger, a majority of the population in Bahrain being Shia’a, a neutral policy from Kuwait, and Qatar’s “do-whatever-Riyadh-does-not-want-you-to do” policy, Tehran hopes to see Saudi Arabia pushed to a strategic corner. It is a chess game, and the problem for the Saudis is that Iranians are good at it.
Middle East Briefing (MEB) is a publication of Orient Advisory Group (OAG). OAG is a research and risk assessment firm based in both Washington DC and Dubai UAE. Dr Samir Altaqi and Esam Aziz are the editors of MEB which bases its input on sources, regular contributors, researchers and correspondents in the main capitals of the Middle East in addition to Washington.
Rouhani in Oman. Will the GCC Crack From Within? | Middle East Briefing
