Madali
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I saw this write up by a Reddit poster and thought it was interesting enough to repost it here.
PART THREE: The SAA, strategy, tactics, and equipment. A brief Overview : syriancivilwar
"
A HEADS UP I am a military historian (I have two degrees, Political Science and History with a specialization on 20th Century Military History) and I have a Juris Doctorate. The text below offers insight into the War in Syria, but not the whole picture. I am not an expert, and all input is appreciated.
This post was delayed several times, due to the changing situation on the ground as well as the difficulty researching the topic. Foreign fighters and assistance will be addressed in Part Four.
Also, don't down-vote peoples comments for disagreeing, no matter their affiliation. Vote Brigading is lame. This Thread is a valuable source of information and discussion for everyone. Lets not flood it with hateful shit.
However, neither side can be accused of any sort of tactical or strategic grace. There have been countless massacres in suicidal frontal attacks, such as the horrendous SAA loses in Salma in 2012 attacking up hill against a dug in enemy, or the horrendous FSA losses at Al-Qusayr, where rebels launched a counter attack across open ground, unsupported, that was annihilated by MLRS systems and Hezbollah machine guns.
So it goes without saying, both sides lost tremendous sums of manpower and resources, especially early in the war, to horrible military command and control, poor officer command, and wholesale desertion. As the war dragged on and on, the SAA and NDF hemorrhaged men to the point where they could no longer hold the line everywhere, and the Opposition began to break their lines.
Its easy to forgot now, with the rapid gains by Loyalist forces and the SAA, that 10 months ago it appeared that the SAA was on the verge of disintegrating. It had just been hurled with tremendous loss from Jish Shingur and Idlib, and Latakia itself was under direct threat. However, things have changed. And a big reason why is Russian Strategic thinking, and that thinking is guiding the SAA to take Aleppo.
The fighting to take Aleppo began days after the Russians arrived in Syria on September 30. Probing attacks, or attacks designed to test enemy defenses and mislead the enemy as to the real angle of attack and offensive objectives, were launched in the Aleppo, Homs, Daraa, Latakia, and Idlib Provinces. This was part of a larger strategic vision by the Russian and Iranian Military advisors, namely to confuse the opposition, and over extend them.
This is called strategic pivoting. The idea behind strategic pivoting is to force an enemy without significant reserves to move to and fro to counter attacks. The SAA attacks for several days, enemy reserves show up, the SAA consolidates its defenses and attacks somewhere else. This strategy has been used quite successfully by the SAA. This forces the Opposition to move back and forth, and eats up a lot of resources. This also exposes them to attack from the air.
What this was meant to do overall, is to draw the rebels out of major metropolitan areas and force them to fight on the SAA’s terms. Aleppo as a battle ground is a nightmare, and to take it by storm would require resources and manpower the SAA can no longer muster. So rather than take the city by siege, the SAA has forced the opposition out of the city, namely Al-Nusra, Al-sham, and other major Islamists groups; to fight at points around the city that are vital for the rebels supplies and tactical advantage. Areas such as Bashkoy, Khan Toumen, and now The Azaz Corridor.
We can now see the results of these operations starting to take fruit, the SAA are within just a few miles of completely encircling Aleppo for good, and the rebels are in complete disarray. And just for good measure, the Afrin Kurds are attacking JaN and other rebels in the Azaz corridor. As an added bonus, the long standing sieges and thousands of SAA troops and militiamen were freed up from Nubul and Zahraa.
So between Strategic Pivoting and Shaping Operations, the Regime has dramatically strengthened its positions. Around Damascus and Homs, the regime has bombed/stormed/starved many opposition groups into local truces or out right surrender, freeing up troops to aid in more important areas. It also helps secure Homs, Hama, and Damascus.
Additionally, the rebels have lost A TON of commanders. Many of the JaN commanders have been killed, Al Sham has had many of its high level commanders killed, and the Ghouta Pocket lost its leader and important power broker Zahran Alloush. In a war were militias are ripe and unity in short supply, powerful local commanders are incredibly important for founding working relations between multiple parties. Each senior rebel killed is more disunity to be thrown into the already volatile situation on the ground.
As for Latakia, the gains by the SAA in Latakia have involved comparatively few ground troops. The SAA instead have been relying heavily on sheer firepower to blast the rebels out of their positions. Airstrikes, artillery, and the formidable Tos-1 Burantino Thermobaric weapons system have led to many government successes, including the retaking of Rabia and Salma. This is also due to the rebels in Idlib and Aleppo provinces not having the strategic reserve necessary to send reinforcements to the rebels fighting in this area.
So what does this all mean? Russian Military Strategy has led to the depletion of the Rebels strategic reserve through Pivoting the lines and axis of advances, and shaping operations have drawn them into fights in places like Bashkoy where superior Russian firepower can be brought to bear, rather than in the ruined hellscape of Aleppo itself. As a result, the rebels have lost huge amounts of troops and material, and face defeat on many fronts.
That being said, the Rebels still have tens of thousands of fighters who are battle hardened. The fight for Aleppo will not be easy, for either side.
The NDF has often proven itself a pitiful defensive force, and its quality varies immensely. Some units like in Latakia, are very well equipped and well trained. Others, such as those facing ISIS earlier in November, are little more than barely trained conscripts.
The quality of the SAA and NDF varies wildly, with notable attachments such as the Desert Eagles, Tiger Forces, and the Republican Guard being examples of well trained and motivated forces, led by good commanders. These units have performed miracles throughout the war.
The SAA had an UNGODLY amount of tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and other vehicles prior to the start of the war. Before the war, the SAA had nearly 5000 tanks, manly T-54/55 (2000 or so, many in storage and requiring significant love to get up and running), 850-1000 T-62, and 1500-1600 T-72, however this is disputed between several sources.
Also, they had 2500 or more BMP's, and hundreds of other armored personnel carriers. Now, its hard to give a solid number on how many are still in use, but there has been a marked decline in the number used by the opposition. It has to be noted that maintaining and equipping these tanks and vehicles is difficult and expensive.
Now, its also important to note that many of the vehicles captured by the rebels are damaged. They are hard to repair without spare parts and skilled mechanics.
Now, the regime can repair damaged vehicles. Often, at least with ATGMs, the vehicles crew is killed, but the tank is salvageable. Also, recovering them from the battlefield is hard without specialized equipment. (You cant just tow a 45 ton tank with a truck).
By the start of 2014, nearly 1800 tanks and BMP's had been damaged, captured, or destroyed. However, many are repairable, and are fixed then returned to battle. Here, this is a good story.Syrian Rebel Commands Tank Battalion from Hospital Bed — War Is Boring — Medium So, I would say the government still has 2000+ tanks, the non isis probably no more than 100-200 fighting vehicles, with isis having far more thanks to the Iraqi military.
CONCLUSION
The SAA is at its core, a well trained military force that has suffered many hard knocks in the past five years. Its quality however varies wildly. The Civil War in Syria is nowhere near its conclusion, and many more will die before its over.
No matter what side you subscribe to, lets all hope that Syria will soon know peace."
PART THREE: The SAA, strategy, tactics, and equipment. A brief Overview : syriancivilwar
"
A HEADS UP I am a military historian (I have two degrees, Political Science and History with a specialization on 20th Century Military History) and I have a Juris Doctorate. The text below offers insight into the War in Syria, but not the whole picture. I am not an expert, and all input is appreciated.
This post was delayed several times, due to the changing situation on the ground as well as the difficulty researching the topic. Foreign fighters and assistance will be addressed in Part Four.
Also, don't down-vote peoples comments for disagreeing, no matter their affiliation. Vote Brigading is lame. This Thread is a valuable source of information and discussion for everyone. Lets not flood it with hateful shit.
- Shaping Operations, Strategic Pivots, and on the ground tactics.
However, neither side can be accused of any sort of tactical or strategic grace. There have been countless massacres in suicidal frontal attacks, such as the horrendous SAA loses in Salma in 2012 attacking up hill against a dug in enemy, or the horrendous FSA losses at Al-Qusayr, where rebels launched a counter attack across open ground, unsupported, that was annihilated by MLRS systems and Hezbollah machine guns.
So it goes without saying, both sides lost tremendous sums of manpower and resources, especially early in the war, to horrible military command and control, poor officer command, and wholesale desertion. As the war dragged on and on, the SAA and NDF hemorrhaged men to the point where they could no longer hold the line everywhere, and the Opposition began to break their lines.
Its easy to forgot now, with the rapid gains by Loyalist forces and the SAA, that 10 months ago it appeared that the SAA was on the verge of disintegrating. It had just been hurled with tremendous loss from Jish Shingur and Idlib, and Latakia itself was under direct threat. However, things have changed. And a big reason why is Russian Strategic thinking, and that thinking is guiding the SAA to take Aleppo.
The fighting to take Aleppo began days after the Russians arrived in Syria on September 30. Probing attacks, or attacks designed to test enemy defenses and mislead the enemy as to the real angle of attack and offensive objectives, were launched in the Aleppo, Homs, Daraa, Latakia, and Idlib Provinces. This was part of a larger strategic vision by the Russian and Iranian Military advisors, namely to confuse the opposition, and over extend them.
This is called strategic pivoting. The idea behind strategic pivoting is to force an enemy without significant reserves to move to and fro to counter attacks. The SAA attacks for several days, enemy reserves show up, the SAA consolidates its defenses and attacks somewhere else. This strategy has been used quite successfully by the SAA. This forces the Opposition to move back and forth, and eats up a lot of resources. This also exposes them to attack from the air.
What this was meant to do overall, is to draw the rebels out of major metropolitan areas and force them to fight on the SAA’s terms. Aleppo as a battle ground is a nightmare, and to take it by storm would require resources and manpower the SAA can no longer muster. So rather than take the city by siege, the SAA has forced the opposition out of the city, namely Al-Nusra, Al-sham, and other major Islamists groups; to fight at points around the city that are vital for the rebels supplies and tactical advantage. Areas such as Bashkoy, Khan Toumen, and now The Azaz Corridor.
We can now see the results of these operations starting to take fruit, the SAA are within just a few miles of completely encircling Aleppo for good, and the rebels are in complete disarray. And just for good measure, the Afrin Kurds are attacking JaN and other rebels in the Azaz corridor. As an added bonus, the long standing sieges and thousands of SAA troops and militiamen were freed up from Nubul and Zahraa.
So between Strategic Pivoting and Shaping Operations, the Regime has dramatically strengthened its positions. Around Damascus and Homs, the regime has bombed/stormed/starved many opposition groups into local truces or out right surrender, freeing up troops to aid in more important areas. It also helps secure Homs, Hama, and Damascus.
Additionally, the rebels have lost A TON of commanders. Many of the JaN commanders have been killed, Al Sham has had many of its high level commanders killed, and the Ghouta Pocket lost its leader and important power broker Zahran Alloush. In a war were militias are ripe and unity in short supply, powerful local commanders are incredibly important for founding working relations between multiple parties. Each senior rebel killed is more disunity to be thrown into the already volatile situation on the ground.
As for Latakia, the gains by the SAA in Latakia have involved comparatively few ground troops. The SAA instead have been relying heavily on sheer firepower to blast the rebels out of their positions. Airstrikes, artillery, and the formidable Tos-1 Burantino Thermobaric weapons system have led to many government successes, including the retaking of Rabia and Salma. This is also due to the rebels in Idlib and Aleppo provinces not having the strategic reserve necessary to send reinforcements to the rebels fighting in this area.
So what does this all mean? Russian Military Strategy has led to the depletion of the Rebels strategic reserve through Pivoting the lines and axis of advances, and shaping operations have drawn them into fights in places like Bashkoy where superior Russian firepower can be brought to bear, rather than in the ruined hellscape of Aleppo itself. As a result, the rebels have lost huge amounts of troops and material, and face defeat on many fronts.
That being said, the Rebels still have tens of thousands of fighters who are battle hardened. The fight for Aleppo will not be easy, for either side.
- SAA and NDF numbers and equipment.
The NDF has often proven itself a pitiful defensive force, and its quality varies immensely. Some units like in Latakia, are very well equipped and well trained. Others, such as those facing ISIS earlier in November, are little more than barely trained conscripts.
The quality of the SAA and NDF varies wildly, with notable attachments such as the Desert Eagles, Tiger Forces, and the Republican Guard being examples of well trained and motivated forces, led by good commanders. These units have performed miracles throughout the war.
The SAA had an UNGODLY amount of tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and other vehicles prior to the start of the war. Before the war, the SAA had nearly 5000 tanks, manly T-54/55 (2000 or so, many in storage and requiring significant love to get up and running), 850-1000 T-62, and 1500-1600 T-72, however this is disputed between several sources.
Also, they had 2500 or more BMP's, and hundreds of other armored personnel carriers. Now, its hard to give a solid number on how many are still in use, but there has been a marked decline in the number used by the opposition. It has to be noted that maintaining and equipping these tanks and vehicles is difficult and expensive.
Now, its also important to note that many of the vehicles captured by the rebels are damaged. They are hard to repair without spare parts and skilled mechanics.
Now, the regime can repair damaged vehicles. Often, at least with ATGMs, the vehicles crew is killed, but the tank is salvageable. Also, recovering them from the battlefield is hard without specialized equipment. (You cant just tow a 45 ton tank with a truck).
By the start of 2014, nearly 1800 tanks and BMP's had been damaged, captured, or destroyed. However, many are repairable, and are fixed then returned to battle. Here, this is a good story.Syrian Rebel Commands Tank Battalion from Hospital Bed — War Is Boring — Medium So, I would say the government still has 2000+ tanks, the non isis probably no more than 100-200 fighting vehicles, with isis having far more thanks to the Iraqi military.
CONCLUSION
The SAA is at its core, a well trained military force that has suffered many hard knocks in the past five years. Its quality however varies wildly. The Civil War in Syria is nowhere near its conclusion, and many more will die before its over.
No matter what side you subscribe to, lets all hope that Syria will soon know peace."
. What our friends fail to realize is that the Russian Army of today is not the Russian Army of the 1990's. The Army we have seen in Crimea, Ukraine and Syria is simply top notch. 
