Reclaiming Pakistan's Frontier!

[RabzonKhan]

VIEW: The impending NWA operation from a Pakhtun perspective

Daily Times
Jack Azmaray
November 03, 2012

In his Independence Day speech at the military academy in Kakul, the Pakistani army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani said that no state could afford a parallel system of government. He added, “The fight against extremism and terrorism is our own war and we are right in fighting it. Let there be no doubt about it, otherwise we’ll be divided and taken towards civil war.” In mid-October the 69th Formation Commanders ‘meeting convened by COAS General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani decided to undertake an operation in North Waziristan with the joint consensus of the army and civilian leadership.

It is now clear that some kind of operation will be conducted in North Waziristan Agency (NWA) in the coming months. The big question is against whom this operation will be carried out. It is a common perception in Pakistan that if the military sincerely decides to confront extremism, it can totally eradicate Islamic militancy from the country. This euphoric perception is primarily based on the notion that militancy is regarded as an issue related mostly with FATA and the Pakhtuns; and support for Islamic militancy in Punjab especially in the state institutions has always been looked at as only strategic in nature. Thus it is widely believed that a genuine operation in FATA, especially in North Waziristan, will rapidly de-radicalise the entire Pakistani society. The Pakistan army has also implicitly indicated that the main target of the proposed operation will be the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and some elements of al Qaeda in North Waziristan.

Unfortunately, this assumption is not correct. Either the Pakistani military establishment has to engage in a limited civil war all over Pakistan now or risk waiting for total chaos in the future. NWA is the right place to start a confrontation against all shades of extremists who have established their strategic commands there, but this fight will not be decided in NWA. If there is a genuine desire to curb extremism in Pakistan, ****** organisations must be confronted and curtailed in Punjab and the Pakhtuns of Balochistan must be freed from the tyranny of the Quetta Taliban. This means a comprehensive operation in many parts of Pakistan, not just in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and FATA.

It is widely believed that the Punjabi Taliban, especially Lashkar-e-Tayaba (LeT), created the organisational structure of the TTP and it is impossible to keep LeT out of the fight if the TTP is relentlessly targeted. The LeT is the largest jihadist outfit in the country. Their spiritual headquarters is located at Muridke, which is around 30 kilometres from Lahore. Here the LeT has developed two townships, Mecca and Medina, where the puritan Salafi (Wahabi) Islam is practised. While jihadists are imparted religious education at the LeT headquarters, for militant training they have to rely on areas like North Waziristan.

If the LeT loses their most important safe haven in NWA to train people and send them into active jihad, their business and ideological model will be under a lot of pressure. For over two decades, members of the LeT acted as true religious Samurai, carrying all kinds of weapons in public, killing opponents with total impunity from the law and accumulating wealth through whichever way possible. Many jihadists feel the same anguish at General Kiyani’s speech that the Japanese Samurai must have felt with Emperor Meiji’s declaration of abolishing the Samurai’s powers. If you take their training camps, the sanctuaries, the weapons and the ****** economy away, these militants are nothing more than mullahs and madrassa students. That status is a big demotion from their current status. That is why the reaction to General Kayani’s speech in the form of an attack on Kamra air base was swift. Such an attack was not possible without support from inside the base and in the surrounding villages. In other words, such an attack was not possible without the help of Punjabi extremists.

A genuine operation in North Waziristan will not only be a loss to the LeT but other organisations like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba will lose significant influence in KP and FATA, especially in the DI Khan, Tank and Hangu districts. Other ****** organisations like Jaish-e-Muhammed, Harkat-ul-Ansar and Harkat-ul Mujahedeen will also suffer.

A selective operation in NWA, which only targets the so-called bad Taliban, is not possible and not even realistic. These operations cannot be carried out in a manner that the Punjabi ****** groups, the Quetta Taliban or the Haqqani network will not get offended. The problem is that there is no realisation in the military and security establishment about the fact that what they start in NWA will also need to be sorted out in Punjab. Since neither the military (which comes predominantly from Punjab) nor the political leadership of the province even admit that such a problem exists in the province, confronting these extremists in the province is simply out of the question.

There is a lot of anxiety about the upcoming operation in KP and FATA. The anxiety is mainly from the fact that this operation may again be high on theatrics and low on substance. The extremists and the military both will kill innocent Pakhtuns in abundance. The operation if halfheartedly carried out or improperly handled will enhance the political space for religious parties in KP and FATA to a level where opposing extremism may even be considered politically incorrect in the near future.

The writer is a freelance columnist

 

[RabzonKhan]

An inexplicable delay

Dawn
Zahid Hussain
Nov 06 2012

MALALA Yousufzai has defeated her assailant who sought to silence her voice which has been a source of inspiration not only for Pakistan’s young generation, but also for people across the world.

She has projected an image of Pakistan as a country which refuses to back down in the face of militant violence. The 15-year-old icon of bravery has shown the same resolve in fighting her gunshot wounds as she did by standing up against a barbaric order. But the resolve of people like Malala is being defeated by the pathetic inaction of our political leadership.

Although a long-pending military operation in North Waziristan would not be predicated on the attack on Malala, the incident did provide a window of opportunity to take decisive action against the hub of terrorism. The barbaric attack united an outraged country. The message was clear that the Taliban’s barbarism was unacceptable to the people of Pakistan.

It was a watershed moment for a country which has been engulfed in militant violence for the past several years — violence which has resulted in thousands of civilian casualties and incalculable economic losses. The Malala incident could well have been a turning point in Pakistan’s battle against violent extremism and militancy. The despicable attack on the young girl had reinforced the threat that terrorism poses to society.

But unfortunately our political and military leadership have failed the people yet again. The paralysis of the state has given space and more time to those who want to impose their ways through the barrel of the gun.

The attack by some 300 militants on the Matni police station outside Peshawar and the killing, including beheading, of several police officers has further demonstrated the growing stridency of the Taliban. The raid carried out some days after the attack on Malala was a manifestation of a state fast losing its authority. The Malala moment seems to have already been lost.

Our ubiquitous interior minister has a predilection for shooting his mouth off regarding any issue — whether it concerns foreign policy, domestic politics or is related to national security. A recent nugget came during his interview with a Pakistani TV channel in Britain last week in which he linked the operation in North Waziristan with the cessation of US drone strikes.

Ludicrous as it may sound, this pearl of wisdom contradicted Rehman Malik’s own statement a few weeks back when he had declared that the operation in the militant-infested tribal territory was under serious consideration. “North Waziristan has become the hub of terrorism,” he told reporters on Oct 12 in one of his many daily TV appearances.

Nothing can be more absurd than using drone strikes as an excuse for putting on hold the North Waziristan operation yet again. It is actually tantamount to saying that terrorists are free to operate and kill our people because the US is not prepared to stop drone strikes.

It is hard to make sense of Mr Malik’s utterance made after his hugely publicised visit to Malala in Birmingham’s Queen Elizabeth Hospital where the young girl is recuperating. It is not just Mr Malik, who many do not take seriously, that adopts this stance. President Zardari has also shifted the blame for his government’s inaction on society and lack of support from opposition parties.

Speaking at the concluding session of a South Asia Free Media Association forum, the president ruled out any military operation in North Waziristan until and unless a consensus was reached. He questioned whether the public was prepared for retaliatory attacks by the militants in other parts of the country.

This defeatist argument does not give much hope to the people who are bearing the brunt of militant violence. It is apparent that the term ‘consensus’ is being used as a ruse for not taking a tough decision on an issue which is of critical concern to our national security. In a society as diverse as ours, consensus on any issue is a myth and not a reality.

There will always be apologists for the Taliban who will resist any move to fight militancy. After all, there were many politicians and religious parties who opposed military operation in Swat and South Waziristan. But the use of military force was necessary to stop the Taliban offensive. Waiting for a consensus then would have meant a virtual Taliban takeover.

The dithering over the North Waziristan operation is even more inexplicable since the military leadership is unequivocal in its assessment that the region has become not only the main base of the Afghan Taliban, but is also a hideout for all kinds of Pakistani and foreign militants. It is also a fact that most of the recent terrorist attacks in Pakistan have their roots in the territory.

More than three divisions of troops are already deployed there and are said to have been battle-ready for some time. In fact, the operation was on the anvil much before the attack on Malala. So what is the reason for this ambivalence now? The civil and military leadership blame each other for the indecision. Both seem to be reluctant to bear the responsibility alone.

It is indeed the responsibility of both the civil and military leadership to mobilise public opinion for the operation which both agree is critical for the success in the battle against militancy. The issue is simple — no state can allow militants to take over a part of the country.

The issue here is not just the military operation in North Waziristan, but also how we confront widening violent extremism and terrorism which pose an existential threat to the country. A major reason for Pakistan’s failure to counter the militant threat and destroy terrorist networks is a lack of political will to deal with the menace. The politics of obfuscation has only increased the threat. The Taliban’s activities are no more restricted to the tribal territories and Khyber Pakthunkhwa, but are now threatening Karachi, the country’s economic jugular.

The writer is an author and a journalist.

 

[RabzonKhan]

In Former Taliban Sanctuary, An Eerie Silence Takes Over

The Wall Street Journal
By DION NISSENBAUM
January 25, 2013

Residents, shown above being searched in 2009, were displaced by fighting.

KOTKAI, Pakistan—In the midst of a sprawling desert stands a small town that has the look and feel for some of a prefab Potemkin village.

The military has tried for three years to transform this onetime Taliban sanctuary into a model village. Well-concealed caves once used by militants have been supplanted by cliff-side army outposts. Teens who might have become insurgent recruits now play soccer with soldiers on a refurbished sports field. Jobless men linger at a half-empty, army-subsidized roadside market nestled below a hillside peppered with abandoned homes.

Residents who have returned to South Waziristan spend hours at the army-subsidized town markets, which the military hopes will become small economic hubs for the area.

This is counterinsurgency, Pakistan-style. In 2009, the Pakistani government staged a major offensive to retake Kotkai and the rest of South Waziristan from al Qaeda militants and Taliban fighters who had turned the Delaware-size region into a perilous stronghold. Now, the government is waging a different campaign—trying to convince a wary population to return to a home they abandoned during the fighting.

The effort has produced some surreal scenery, with shuttered markets in virtual ghost-towns set alongside deserted stretches of highway. So far, the military has discovered that luring people back to a battle-scarred area—particularly while the fight goes on—may be as challenging as pushing the militants out.

"People want to go back, but they don't want to go back when they are afraid for their lives," said Reza Nasim Jan, a researcher at the conservative American Enterprise Institute who is studying the Pakistan counterinsurgency campaign.

The U.S. has a stake in the strategy, which is part of a stark reality of modern warfare, as countries try to stabilize risky battle zones before once-embedded militants can return. Since 2007, it has dedicated more than $1 billion in civilian aid to South Waziristan and the broader region. U.S. officials are hoping the military will use the 2009 offensive as a springboard to launch a major offensive in North Waziristan, now the most important sanctuary for the Taliban and anti-American militants.

In an effort to promote its campaign to reshape South Waziristan, the Pakistan military granted The Wall Street Journal rare access to the restricted military zone that has long been off-limits to international reporters. Pakistan said it was the first time in years that an American reporter had been given permission to enter the tightly controlled area.

Pakistani military leaders here say reviving impoverished towns remains the centerpiece of the country's evolving campaign to convert longtime insurgent havens into tranquil sanctuaries where militants can no longer hide. The campaign mirrors the strategy embraced by the U.S. itself in Iraq and Afghanistan, where American troops spent years rebuilding forsaken insurgent strongholds.

"That's the way out," said Brigadier General Hassan Hayat, the commander of Pakistani forces in-and-around Kotkai. "If you don't follow the counterinsurgency model of winning hearts and minds, you can keep fighting for years to come."

Though quieter now, the rocket-pocked cliff-side homes and hidden caves of South Waziristan were once used by al Qaeda and the Taliban as a staging ground for attacks against Pakistani officials, American soldiers in neighboring Afghanistan and adversaries across the globe. Armed CIA drones frequently buzzed overhead, searching for targets as some of the world's most sought-after terrorists trained suicide bombers, cultivated double agents and orchestrated political assassinations.

Faced with new Taliban leaders turning their deadly focus more toward Pakistan, the military sent 28,000 soldiers into the region in 2009, launching airstrikes and sending in paratroops to overwhelm the insurgents in two months. As the conflict unfolded, two-thirds of South Waziristan's 590,000 residents fled.

"They say even the birds left the area," General Hayat said during the tour of South Waziristan. "It was a challenge to bring people back."

To a large degree, that challenge remains. In the small rehabilitated zone around Kotkai, military leaders say three-quarters of residents have returned. But in all of South Waziristan, only about 10,000 families have come back, according to Pakistan government statistics; another 41,000 families, which could be more than 300,000 people, still live as de facto refugees in their own country. United Nations officials said many have settled with family nearby or are still living in refugee camps.

For those who do return, access in the zone is strictly regulated. Only Pakistanis who have gone through a formal repatriation process are allowed to freely come and go, military officials said. All other visitors, be they U.N. consultants or family relatives, must get military permission.

The process includes a long registration, and returnees must carry identification cards. They are given $250 and a card that entitles them to six months of food rations. They are not allowed to own weapons, prompting the more-creative residents to carry wood slingshots instead. Telephone service is also tightly regulated; military leaders worry that regular phone access could help the Taliban to reorganize there.

More than 10,000 members of the Pakistan military secure the area around Kotkai, officials said, a ratio of one soldier for every five civilians. The intensive security bubble gives the military so much confidence that commanding generals drive around without wearing flak jackets and officers pick up hitchhikers on the main road.

"South Waziristan is far better than Karachi," said Captain Fahim, head of a new military cadet college, in comparing the region to the major Pakistan port city that has been engulfed by political and sectarian violence. "There's no crime here."

The two-day Journal trip, conducted with armed military escorts and Pakistan officers monitoring virtually every interview, offered a unique window into the counterinsurgency campaign. Ground zero is Kotkai, which sits amid barren saffron and chocolate colored hillsides above a snaking river cutting through South Waziristan. The town was one of the first targets of the 2009 strike and now is at the heart of the military's rehabilitation zone.

General Hayat commands his forces from a nearby cliff side compound once used by Taliban leaders. Looking out on the surrounding scenery, he has high hopes, envisioning a day when tourists come to enjoy the red rock canyons that once served as insurgent sanctuaries.

To win support from residents, soldiers have established new training schools and computer labs. They have built a series of roadside markets, each with individual stalls that have a green-and-white Pakistani flag painted on sliding metal doors. Across the region, Pakistani officers spend their days teaching local residents where to set up rudimentary fish farms, how to manage chicken coops, and even take what it takes to become successful beekeepers.

But the government has given little to help individuals rebuild homes that were damaged or destroyed during the offensive. Some Kotkai residents were so discontented that they took the risk of publicly challenging the Pakistan military—as armed soldiers listened to their interviews.

"We were happy when the Taliban were here," Kotkai teacher Noor Rehman said during an interview in the sparsely filled library as half dozen Pakistani soldiers listened. "They created no problems for us in teaching." Only 150 boys have returned to the school, he said, compared with the 400 it once educated.

Like most residents of South Waziristan, Mr. Rehman fled the area before the 2009 offensive. Mr. Rehman returned in 2011 to help teach in Kotkai. But he hasn't been able to visit his home because it is in a part of South Waziristan still considered too dangerous.

At the central market, residents gathered around to complain that they had been lured back with unfulfilled assurances of a better life. "I was given six months of food and now that is finished, so now we don't know what to do," said Sadar Jan, an elderly Pakistani with a scruffy beard dyed with orange henna. "We are all unemployed and facing a lot of problems."

Pakistani generals acknowledge that the going is slow. But they say that they are expanding the security bubble across South Waziristan. "We are in the holding stage with no judicial system and no political system," said General Hayat. "This is only one area, but it is a model that is being replicated."

A spokesman for the country's president, Asif Ali Zardari, who has nominal control over the military, declined to comment.

Ultimately, said Joshua Foust, a fellow at the American Security Project familiar with the region, Pakistan must address the broader sense of political disenfranchisement that originally fed the insurgency. "It seems like all they have done is create a few showcases," he says. "There a lot of questions about repatriating people to an area of active insurgency for the sake of a photo op."

Beyond South Waziristan, Kotkai has emerged as a symbol in an international campaign against controversial U.S. drone attacks. Last October, dozens of American activists joined legendary cricket hero Imran Khan as the aspiring Pakistani presidential candidate unsuccessfully attempted to lead a convoy of 200 cars into the South Waziristan village to protest American drone strikes.

Drone strikes remain one of the most polarizing issues in Pakistan, where many view the American program as an assault on their country's sovereignty. U.S. officials defend armed drones as one of the most effective weapons against terrorists. Since 2004, as many as 600 civilians in Pakistan have been killed by American drone strikes, according to think tanks and human rights groups.

But the civilian death toll has fallen sharply since the Obama administration tightened up rules for such strikes, some analysts say.

In South Waziristan, the view of drones is divided. For some, their use only cultivates more anti-American animosity, and many in the military consider them anti-productive. "The whole nation is against drones," said General Hayat. "How can you say drones are winning the battle? You will produce hundreds of others to keep fighting."

But out of earshot of the soldiers, a few South Waziristan residents privately endorsed the American operation. While killing civilians, drones have also have played a key role in helping Pakistan drive the Taliban leadership out of South Waziristan.

Baitullah Mehsud, founder of the Pakistani Taliban, was reportedly killed by an American drone strike in 2009 as Pakistan prepared for the South Waziristan offensive. A similar U.S. strike in 2010 reportedly killed Qari Hussain, the Taliban deputy from Kotkai who American officials accused of training the suicide bomber who killed five Central Intelligence Agency officers at a U.S. base in eastern Afghanistan.

"I am a government servant so I can't say it publicly, but I really want the drones to increase because they have eliminated all of the bad people," said one man. "There should be more drone strikes."

Some residents of South Waziristan remain wary of their own military, which is sometimes seen as the heavy hand of the nation's dominant Punjab class used against the country's Pashtun population, a large ethnic group from which the Taliban draws most of its fighters.

For years, South Waziristan residents have accused the military of conducting a campaign of harassment, beating and extrajudicial killings that is alienating the population. Amnesty International released a recent report raising similar accusations of "unchecked abuses" in South Waziristan. The military has flatly denounced such claims.

Fear of the military is palpable. Many Pashtun Pakistanis were afraid to openly criticize the army, even when offered guarantees that their identities wouldn't be publicly revealed. In one case people were willing to discuss, residents told The Wall Street Journal that Pakistani soldiers opened fire on a car driving through South Waziristan last fall that didn't pull over as a military vehicle approached from behind, killing the driver. The military later apologized, they said, and paid the family $3,000.

Military officials would not comment on the specific case. But General Hayat said that the military needs to use tough tactics in the area to ensure that the insurgency doesn't regain an advantage.

"In case somebody fights me, I would still like to have a heavy hand," he said. "I would not like to spare them. The whole game plan revolves around peace."

Pakistan's gambit has also drawn grumbling from American officials, who continue to press for a major military offensive to rout out the Taliban in North Waziristan, which itself has a population of more than half a million.

But Pakistan commanders here are resistant to the U.S. calls for an operation that doesn't yet have widespread public support.

"From a Western perspective it may look like an immediate necessity," said General Hayat. "But from a Pakistani perspective, I think time should dictate."

If the remote region can be revived and terrorism is chased out, there is hope for an economic revival of sorts. The U.S. has been spearheading a "New Silk Road" initiative to establish a trade network through South Asia. America has spent $140 million for the Pakistan military to build new roads in South Waziristan that could become part of a new trade network with Afghanistan. Currently, Pakistan officials say they export about $2 billion in goods to Afghanistan, and both countries are hoping to double that in the coming years.

For now, the checkpoint-clogged roads are primarily used by Pakistani soldiers traveling across North and South Waziristan. "The real change will come once this route is fully functional," said Brig. Gen. Azhar Abbas, a commander of Pakistani forces in South Waziristan.

It is one goal that most residents enthusiastically endorse. Standing among scores of men accepting free blankets and clothes from the Pakistan military, Liaqat Ali Mehsud, a teacher, said the road is so good that he's forgotten that his home was destroyed.

"Tell Barack Obama to give $1 billion more to Pakistan," he said.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Pakistan army battles legacy of mistrust in Taliban heartland

By Mehreen Zahra-Malik

CHAGMALAI, Pakistan | Sun Feb 3, 2013 5:06am EST

(Reuters) - In a Pakistan army base high in the mountains on the Afghan frontier, a general explains a strategy for fighting the Taliban he calls simply "WHAM".

The name has a distinctly bellicose ring. But the soldiers are learning to fight a new kind of war in a region U.S. President Barack Obama has called the most dangerous on Earth.

"WHAM - winning hearts and minds," explains the straight-talking General Nazir Butt, in charge of converting the army's gains on the battlefield into durable security. "The plan is to turn militant sanctuaries into safe havens for the people."

The term WHAM has been used before, but the focus this time is South Waziristan, an enclave on the Afghan border once the epicenter of a spreading Pakistan Taliban insurgency that shocked the country with its challenge to the authority of the nuclear-armed state.

According to the army narrative, the campaign includes winning over the region's ethnic Pashtun tribes through dialogue, creating commercial opportunities and providing education in new schools and colleges.

During a three-day trip with the army, Reuters got a rare glimpse not just into the scale of the army's state-building project in South Waziristan, but also the challenges that lurk in the inhospitable territory.

However well-meaning the new approach, there are problems that won't go away - threats of retaliation by the al Qaeda-linked militants, a lack of effective civilian administration and endemic corruption.

And the campaign to win hearts and minds has an ignoble track record in other conflict zones which serve as a reality check for even the most optimistic Pakistani officials.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, Western nations poured in millions of dollars to rebuild militant strongholds and win affection. Results have been limited: many residents view the armies as occupiers and militants remain a danger.

The goal won't be any easier in South Waziristan. The area forms one-fifth of Pakistan's Federally
Administered Tribal Areas which are roughly the size of Belgium and governed under a system inherited from British colonialists.

Government-appointed political agents rule through the Pashtun tribes and collect and distribute revenue with little oversight. The people have limited rights.

While the Pakistani army backed the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s, and supported militants fighting Indian rule in the disputed Kashmir region, in South Waziristan it found itself under attack.

Decades of resentment felt by the population and the U.S. bombing campaign on the Afghan border following the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States spawned a generation of Pakistani militants who used South Waziristan to launch assaults against the Pakistani state and U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan.

A DONKEY AND A HIGHWAY

Unsure how to respond, Pakistan see-sawed between brief military campaigns and appeasing the militants with short-lived peace deals. Then, in 2009, Pakistan's army chief ordered the biggest offensive yet, pouring 40,000 troops into South Waziristan in a bid to tip the balance.

The 2009 offensive displaced almost half a million people as homes, schools and hospitals were turned into hideouts by militants and meager civic amenities were destroyed.

Today, a combination of the offensive and U.S. drones has helped drive the Pakistan Taliban leadership out of South Waziristan and the army is looking for ways to convince people it is safe for them to return.

But after having spent close to three years in camps, only 41,000 refugees have come back.

"The people can only feel fully secure if there is social and economic uplift," said a brigadier who commands a cliff-side compound near Wana, the main town in South Waziristan. "It took some time but we know now that 1,000 bullets can't do the work of one school."

Many of the refugees have resettled in Chagmalai, a village close to Jandola, where the army is headquartered in a fort built by the British in the nineteenth century - a reminder of a centuries-old policy of ruling the area through a mix of intimidation and armed intervention.

A small, colorful marketplace was inaugurated last year and the green-and-white Pakistani flag was painted on the shutters of shops given to traders for a nominal fee. In a courtyard next door, army officers and government officials teach people how to raise poultry and set up bee farms.

But despite the development, Chagmalai still resembles a ghost town, a collection of ruined houses and abandoned clinics and schools with falling plaster and bullet-pocked walls. The army says it wants to turn the secluded landscape into a new home for those who have found the courage to
return.

Ashraf Khan is a recently widowed farmer who has just returned from the Jandola fort where he asked the commanding officer for a loan.

"My wife used to gather firewood and collect water," he said. "Now I need to buy a donkey. I'm hoping the soldiers will keep their promise to help."

A few kilometers away, construction workers and army engineers have dug through rugged terrain to build a road, which will connect the isolated region with the northwest city of Peshawar, the nearest economic hub. The U.S. government has contributed $170 million for the 287-km (180-mile) road.

Agricultural land and poultry farms line the sides of the highway, which zips through a breathtaking chasm of mountains and cliffs, its dual-lanes in better shape than many of those in Pakistani cities.

"The road has made it so much easier to move flocks, feed and medicines," said Hamid Jan who runs a poultry farm. "I've never earned this much money before."

"ASK ME ABOUT MY BOOKS"

The army believes it can create goodwill by encouraging commerce and, more importantly, education. Officers say 33 schools have been restored and 4,000 students enrolled, 200 of them girls, but verifying such data is difficult.

The Taliban oppose girls' education and in October shot a 15-year-old Pakistani girl, Malala Yousafzai, for advocating schooling for girls.

But the army says it will power on. Having previously served in the disputed border region between Pakistan and India, Colonel Asim Iqbal now shows off a flagship technical institute and cadet college built as part of the WHAM initiative.

Seventy-five students graduated from the 11-million-rupee ($110,000) Waziristan Institute of Technical Education in December with diplomas in auto-mechanics, carpentry and IT. Nearby, a cadet college has been built at a cost of 500 million rupees.

In the college computer lab, Shamsullah, 15, learnt word-processing. A poor teenager whose uncle was a militant commander killed in a U.S. drone strike, Shamsullah could have been a ready Taliban recruit. Instead, he just wants to study.

"I have nothing to do with militancy," he said. "Ask me about my books."

But for all the high hopes, enthusiastic students, freshly plastered classrooms and tarmac roads, there is little sign of a credible civilian administration taking root.

The highest political officer in the area, the political agent, does not even live in South Waziristan out of fear of being killed by the Taliban, who have murdered hundreds of leaders in the tribal belt in recent years.

Pashtun elders said official records showed that school teachers absent for months were still drawing salaries while the administration took no action.

But political agent Shahidullah Khan said he was doing the best he could. "There is only so much I can do when I can't even travel outside the army camp," he said by phone from Tank, a town to the east of South Waziristan.

Only on Saturday, more than 30 people were killed in an attack on a military checkpost next to South Waziristan which the Taliban said was revenge for a drone strike that killed two commanders in North Waziristan last month.

Many of the boys playing cricket close to the market declined to answer when asked about army assurances of a better life. But referring to militants and the military, one said: "They're all the same."

Some army officers accept such criticism as valid, admitting to the state's decades-old heavy-handedness in the region.

"The budget for my brigade alone could take care of the education of all of South Waziristan," said General Butt. "We have made many mistakes. And we don't deny it anymore."

But while Butt insists that the militants are no longer a force to be reckoned with in South Waziristan, many people are less optimistic.

"The army has blocked them for now but the Taliban can return," said a shop-keeper.

A tribal elder whose family has moved away and is too afraid to return, asked: "If the Taliban are really gone for good, why doesn't the army also leave?"

(Editing by Nick Macfie and Robert Birsel)

 

[RabzonKhan]

“Militant groups have paralysed the whole area, they bomb schools and even destroy health centres,” the security official said. They have beheaded people and attacked troops. It is necessary to restrict them and push them back to the mountains,” he added."

This is what I don't understand, why do we “restrict them and push them back to the mountains” why not send them to hell, I mean, when it comes to Baloch separatist terrorist we do not “restrict them and push them back to the mountains” we (rightfully) send them to hell, why this duplicity, or, are there some elements in the establishment who still think that the TTP can become “good terrorists”, just like Gul Bahadur?





Military may target TTP in Tirah Valley

By AFP
March 21, 2013

PESHAWAR: The military is reportedly stepping up an offensive to dislodge the Taliban from a key stronghold in an effort to safeguard May’s general election and crack down on militants behind a wave of attacks.

The Tirah Valley, hemmed in by steep mountains and replete with numerous caves, has offered the Tehreek-e-Taliban a new base in the Khyber Agency beyond the reach of ground troops.

Long linked to the drugs trade and militia activities, with an influx of militants evicted from elsewhere, it poses a new threat to nearby Nato supply lines and to Peshawar, a city of 2.5 million and a key electoral battleground.

There in Tirah, the TTP has also formed a troubling alliance with the once hostile Lashkar-e-Islam, a militia run by warlord Mangal Bagh, to oppose the military’s efforts to dislodge them through air strikes and shelling.

Elections on May 11 are billed as Pakistan’s first democratic transition between one elected civilian government and another, but concerns about security are casting a shadow over preparations.

The campaign also marks the first time that parties are allowed to contest the vote in the tribal belt, a reform introduced by the outgoing government in a bid to clamp down on militancy.

“We have intensified our operation,” a senior security official told AFP. “Elections are approaching, Khyber is an important place, we have to restrict them and push them back,” he added.

Fighter jets are targeting safe houses in Tirah. Troops, who surround the valley from the outside, are also shelling, the official and residents said.

On Monday, four people were killed when a suicide bomber posing as a clerk and an accompanying gunman attacked the main courts complex in Peshawar.

Last month, militants attacked the office of the top government official for Khyber, Mutahir Zeb, killing six people as political leaders met to discuss a strategy for peaceful polls. Zeb was unhurt.

Also in February, a suicide bomber tried to kill provincial chief minister Ameer Haider Khan Hoti two months after his deputy, Bashir Bilour, was assassinated in Peshawar.

Security has declined markedly in the country since the last election in 2008.

Officials link some recent attacks to Khyber and fear that Tirah could pose an ongoing threat as the electoral campaign heats up.

Although the military pushed the TTP out of the Swat valley in 2009, the government has been unable or unwilling to crack down on the plethora of militant networks blamed for violence in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India.

Religious violence has reached dizzying levels, most recently against the Shia minority. Karachi is also suffering from record killings linked to political and ethnic tensions.

“Lots of us fear that these elections might entail a lot of violence,” said Raza Rumi, director of the Jinnah Institute think tank.

The air and shelling offensive is concentrated on Tirah, the town of Bara and Ghaljo, which would be the militants’ escape route into the neighbouring district of Orakzai. The army has also imposed strict curfews.

“Militant groups have paralysed the whole area, they bomb schools and even destroy health centres,” the security official said.

“They have beheaded people and attacked troops. It is necessary to restrict them and push them back to the mountains,” he added.

On the ground inside Tirah, there have been deadly clashes between the TTP and Ansar Ul Islam, according to residents.

No official data are available but a local charity has published adverts in local newspapers appealing for help for freshly displaced families.

Tribesmen confirm the difficulties.

“Militant groups and the TTP have taken refuge in Tirah. Even foreign militants have taken shelter there. The authorities fear that they can move nearer to Peshawar,” local tribal elder Hukam Khan told AFP.

Markets have closed and schools have shut, depriving thousands of students an education. An estimated 13,000 families have been displaced.

Refugees in the Jalozai camp speak of the terrors they encountered before being forced to flee.

But there are also calls from locals for the offensive to stop and a curfew to be lifted. It remains unclear how viable elections can be held in Tirah or Bara under such circumstances.

“We are patriotic tribesmen and loyal to Pakistan but we are in trouble. You can’t solve problems with war, talks are the only solution,” Malik Waris Khan Afridi, a former deputy minister told AFP.

But the government insists there can be no compromise.

“Militants are the root cause of the trouble. Take them out of the area and I assure you peace and lifting of the curfew,” Zeb told tribesmen recently.

“If we relax the curfew and ordinary people come out of their homes, there will be collateral damage,” he added.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Pakistan's Ambitious Program To Re-Educate Militants

NPR
by Dina Temple-Raston
April 01, 2013

Pakistani men who worked for the Taliban attend a class at Mishal, an army-run rehabilitation center in Pakistan's Swat Valley, on July 5, 2011. This and similar centers are trying to re-educate men taken in by the Taliban, who ruled Swat before the military drove out the insurgents in 2009.Farooq Naeem/AFP/Getty Images


A Pakistani army officer named Col. Zeshan is giving a tour of a ****** rehabilitation center secreted in the hills of northwest Pakistan's Swat Valley.

"This place was also captured by the Taliban," he says, walking me around the heavily guarded complex. "The army took over this place from them ... when the war was going on."

The war against the Pakistani Taliban in Swat began in 2009. It was a military offensive that took a year to drive most of the Pakistani Taliban out of the valley. And while the military action is considered a success, even today the Taliban's ghostly presence is everywhere in Swat.

Last year, Taliban militants stopped a bus just outside Swat's main city of Mingora and shot three girls returning home from school. One of them was Malala Yousafzai, a 15-year-old girl who has become a force for promoting girls' education.

Even today, for the young men of Swat there is the constant fear of Taliban fighters, who press whomever they want into service.

"The Taliban just grab these kids and take them into the hills," says Hussain Nadim, a professor at the National University of Sciences and Technology in Islamabad. He is part of an effort to re-educate these young men at a number of ****** rehab centers in the valley.

"These kids have no exposure, they have no education, there is no media to speak of, and the lack of these types of things in Swat breeds ignorance ... and fear," Nadim adds. "It makes it easy for the Taliban to recruit them and radicalize them."

Vocational School For Jihadis

That explains why the Pakistani army decided to make Swat ground zero for a quiet experiment: a little-known program aimed at re-educating thousands of young men who were taken in by the Taliban.

Classes such as this one at the Mishal center in Swat on July 5, 2011, teach former jihadis skills that will help them return to their families and be productive members of society.
Farooq Naeem /AFP/Getty Images

Using international funds and a contingent of army officers, Pakistan has tried its hand at turning would-be terrorists into law-abiding citizens. It has opened two ****** rehabilitation centers — one called Mishal, for teenage militants, and another called Sabaoon, for younger ones — to see if they can return the young men of Swat back to their families.

The two campuses are like vocational schools for jihadis — only with high walls, barbed wire and armed guards.

Zeshan takes me into an electronics class — it looks like a high school science lab, all electrical meters and alligator clips. A computer lab has rows of flat-screen PCs.

"We teach them very basic things, like how to use MS-Word and things like that," Zeshan says. I ask if they go on the Internet, and Zeshan looks surprised, saying, "Yes, of course."

Before coming to the army centers, very few of the young men even knew what the Internet was. Parts of the Swat Valley are that cut off from the rest of the world. And that isolation, rehabilitation center officials say, is one of the reasons the Taliban prey on young men from this area.

"We bring them here to make them productive members of society," says Zeshan. "The Taliban has put ideas in their heads, and we work to undo that and set them right."

There are different theories on how to re-educate violent jihadis and an even greater number of doubts about whether reverse indoctrination actually works. In Saudi Arabia, a 12-step program includes art therapy and helping young men find a job and a wife. In Singapore, jihadis are taught less violent interpretations of the Quran.

But in Swat, the approach is different — and simpler.

The focus at the centers is not specifically about jihad. Instead, it is more about skills.

"We tell them, you need to get your life back in order. We tell them that their mothers or their sisters are at home waiting for them ... waiting for them to take care of them," Nadim says. "We don't confuse them with ideas of what is a good jihad or a bad jihad. We tell them their focus should be on their families."

'The Taliban Had Misguided Me'

Farooq, 24, is a typical charge. I met him in a wood-working classroom at Mishal. He was putting the finishing touches on a wooden rubab, a Pakistani musical instrument that resembles a lute. He had graduated from Mishal only a couple of months earlier; now the army employs him as a wood shop teacher at the center.

It was the rubab that got Farooq involved with the Taliban in the first place, he says.

"I was playing it outside my shop, and they said it was haram [forbidden] to play this," Farooq says. "And this is how they caught me and then they forced me to join their ranks. The Taliban just took me away."

The Pakistani Taliban considers music evil. Farooq's punishment for his rubab playing: to run errands for the group for years. Eventually, the Pakistani army captured him and transferred him to its school at Mishal. After six months of classes, Farooq says he now understands that the Taliban used him.

Sabaoon, another center for re-educating former militant recruits, was held by the Taliban before the Pakistan army took it over during the offensive to clear the Taliban from Swat.
Dina Temple-Raston/NPR

"The Taliban had misguided me," he says. "They told me I had to wage jihad against the Pakistani army. But now I understand that they used me. They told me lies. The army and this school helped me understand that."

For the most part, these men — like Farooq — aren't driven by religious fanaticism. They stayed with the Taliban because they didn't know any better.

"The Taliban told me that the Pakistani army was just a puppet of the United States," Farooq says. "They said that we should fight the Pakistani army, wage a jihad against them. And so we did."

Since 2010, several thousand young men — and a handful of women — have graduated from the program. The funding for Mishal, Sabaoon and a couple of other rehab centers in Swat comes from the Pakistani army and from international aid groups. Zeshan says the recidivism rate is near zero.

"When they are provided an opportunity to come back to the society where they have a livelihood and a family, what's the point in going back to those people?" says Zeshan, referring to the Taliban.

A ****** On Parole


The army offered several handpicked graduates for interviews, but we wanted to find one independently. We met him in a Pashtun house in the middle of a field, hours from Mishal.

Newly constructed, the house was made of solid brick on three sides, with glass facing into a courtyard. The front door was made of steel.

We were escorted to a room where the men of the house sleep. Five double beds were pushed against the walls, and a single candle flickered on a table. There was no electricity. The recent graduate — who said his name was Fandula — came in from the darkness wearing a soft wool hat and a cape.

"I stayed with the army for two years, and I was accused of being one of the accomplices for the Taliban," he said in Pashtun.

Two years is a long time in the army's rehab program, and it suggests that Fadula was a hard case. He said that in addition to taking vocation classes and sitting down with a psychologist at the center, he was asked to talk to religious leaders.

"In the afternoon, the religious men told us whatever happened in the past was not good and killing in the name of religion is not good," Fandula said. "I know what they were trying to do: They were trying to undo what the Taliban did."

We asked if it worked. He nodded.

"Yes," he said quietly. "It worked."

Fandula checks in with the army once a week. He's on a kind of ****** parole. And he says he isn't tempted by the Taliban or the group's ideas anymore. He said he occasionally sees some of the students who were with him at the center, and, he says, they don't have any interest in the Taliban now, either.

 

[muse]

Best way to deal with militants is to make them dead -- The photo offered above is "incredible" - that is to say that it ought to reflect the steps take as prevention - this is what the Pakistani state should have done when religious extremism first appeared -- but waitt was the Pakistani state itself that was promoting and is even now promoting religious extremism, however now that the Weaponized Islam is directed towards the state, it seems to have had second thoughts.

Ok, so, some will object that these are after all "Pakistanis" - Stop right there, they are not Pakistanis, unless you think that Pakistanis have the right to carry weapons against the state to which they claim fealty and which affords them citizenship - if so, then we have no reason to even consider the objection, however, if the taking up of arms against the state and nation in the service of an ideal which seek the destruction of the state and nation, is an unforgivable crime, then it is clear what must be done.

By not killing off the religious extremist militant, by "REHABILITATING" him, we ensure that this demon will come to feast on the dead cascaras of our youth, our patriots, our ordinary and law abiding citizens. Kill them all and in doing so free the Pakistani state and nation of this mortal enemy.

 

[Abu Zolfiqar]

Muse, I largely agree though you also have to be pragmatic here

Those who put down their weapons and renounce violence and who realize their wrongs and who don't have blood on their hands and who DEMONSTRATE that they can be rehabilitated should be given a second chance.

I'm neither being naive nor over optimistic.

 

[muse]

Muse, I largely agree though you also have to be pragmatic here

Those who put down their weapons and renounce violence and who realize their wrongs and who don't have blood on their hands and who DEMONSTRATE that they can be rehabilitated should be given a second chance.

I'm neither being naive nor over optimistic.

In other words you are once again stuck with good TB and bad TB - Pakistanis learn very slowly, 49,000 and counting, at which number will the sympathizers of Islamism amongst us decide enough is enough? Actually there is no such number, to the sympathizers of Islamism, for those who have a "soft spot" for Islam as a ideology not of FAITH in God but instead of governance, politics and socio/political and economic engineering, there is no "tipping point". It's not that these do not realize the nature of the Islamists, it is the fact that their Utopian instinct to these persons is something they cannot give up.

How does one tell good TB from bad TB? Well, those who give up on political violence ? And what then does one do about the crime of taking up arms against the state?? You see where this is going? If you are going to forgive the TB and actually think they can be "rehabilitated", why not apply this line of reasoning to all categories of criminals?? Indeed, why would armed forces put so much effort to "rehabilitate" these criminals while the politics of the country wan to identify and punish criminals?? Why not rehabilitation for the murderers of Shahzeb? Are the Jatoi any less deserving? or the Menga, or the Marri, or the Bugti? or the murderers of Salman Tahseer? This duffer army is going to save her assets for another day, another day when Pakistan may need to be taught another lesson?

 

[Argus Panoptes]

Best way to deal with militants is to make them dead -- The photo offered above is "incredible" - that is to say that it ought to reflect the steps take as prevention - this is what the Pakistani state should have done when religious extremism first appeared -- but waitt was the Pakistani state itself that was promoting and is even now promoting religious extremism, however now that the Weaponized Islam is directed towards the state, it seems to have had second thoughts.

Ok, so, some will object that these are after all "Pakistanis" - Stop right there, they are not Pakistanis, unless you think that Pakistanis have the right to carry weapons against the state to which they claim fealty and which affords them citizenship - if so, then we have no reason to even consider the objection, however, if the taking up of arms against the state and nation in the service of an ideal which seek the destruction of the state and nation, is an unforgivable crime, then it is clear what must be done.

By not killing off the religious extremist militant, by "REHABILITATING" him, we ensure that this demon will come to feast on the dead cascaras of our youth, our patriots, our ordinary and law abiding citizens. Kill them all and in doing so free the Pakistani state and nation of this mortal enemy.

A question for @muse: At what point do we need to consider either killing millions upon millions of Pakistanis who are sympathizers with the Taliban, or concede that we have lost the propaganda war and need to accord this ideology the status of a popular rebellious movement with political aspirations?

 

[muse]

A question for @muse: At what point do we need to consider either killing millions upon millions of Pakistanis who are sympathizers with the Taliban, or concede that we have lost the propaganda war and need to accord this ideology the status of a popular rebellious movement with political aspirations?

It was always a movement with popular appeal and it's political aspiration are the destruction of the state and it's replacement by their version.

About a decade ago, we had argued that it is best to go all out and finish this evil once and for all, at that time, friends, argued that Algeria was an example and more than 100,000 may end up being killed - look at where we are now, half that number have been killed by the Talib and they will kill many times more of that number.
I would refer you to the "What is Pakistan" thread on the strategic board in particular "In Times of Uncertainty" post -- we have not been able to define the enemy - after all how can we?, we are in the position of arguing good Islam and bad Islam the ****** Pakistan Army against ****** "Mujahieen".

 

[Argus Panoptes]

It was always a movement with popular appeal and it's political aspiration are the destruction of the state and it's replacement by their version.

About a decade ago, we had argued that it is best to go all out and finish this evil once and for all, at that time, friends, argued that Algeria was an example and more than 100,000 may end up being killed - look at where we are now, half that number have been killed by the Talib and they will kill many times more of that number.
I would refer you to the "What is Pakistan" thread on the strategic board in particular "In Times of Uncertainty" post -- we have not been able to define the enemy - after all how can we?, we are in the position of arguing good Islam and bad Islam the ****** Pakistan Army against ****** "Mujahieen".

I am following that thread with interest.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Flawed policy: Rise of Mangal Bagh

Dawn
04/11/2013

USING militants as proxies is a flawed policy. Although this assertion has proved correct time and again, the Pakistani establishment has failed to abandon the policy. The latest evidence that this strategy has backfired comes in the form of the rise of the curiously named Mangal Bagh, a militant leader from the Khyber tribal region who reportedly enjoyed tacit state support to keep the TTP at bay. However, while Mangal Bagh had already turned his guns on the state, it has now emerged that he has joined forces with the Taliban after previously distancing himself from them. While he heads the Laskhar-i-Islam, his own militant group, he has also been chosen as the TTP’s ‘supreme commander’ for Khyber. The alliance will likely strengthen the TTP as it battles the army for control of the Tirah valley and its surrounding areas. Reports indicate that the militants are putting up stiff resistance. The militants also pose a danger to Peshawar, which is not too far from the areas currently under the extremists’ grip.

Mangal Bagh is a protégé of Mufti Munir Shakir, who previously led the LI. The mufti, belonging to the Deobandi school of thought, railed against Pir Saifur Rahman and his Barelvi-leaning Ansarul Islam, which was believed to enjoy government support. Both groups also fought a vigorous war over FM radio, in which they preached their respective versions of Islam in attempts to convert the local flock to their creed. From initially being involved in a sectarian conflict, Mangal Bagh went on to become Khyber’s most powerful militant. His rise is similar to that of Fazlullah in Malakand; Mangal Bagh established a parallel administration, including ‘courts’ and lock-ups, in Bara while the state looked the other way. But also like Fazlullah, he turned out to be too slippery to handle; now, along with his newfound allies in the TTP, he is occupying territory and giving the state a tough fight.

It is evident that in the short term, the state needs to clear and hold the territory occupied by the militants and pursue the current operation to its logical end — which means destroying the militant infrastructure and bringing the leaders to justice. In the long term, it should be conclusively settled that doing business with violent extremists is a dangerous and unwise proposition. Any militant group that challenges the state’s writ or threatens to do so must be dealt with before it turns into a monster.

 

[RabzonKhan]

A deafening silence


Dawn | Zahid Hussain | April 23 2013

A TRAUMATISED young boy fiercely slapping his face repeatedly and crying incessantly in the midst of burnt corpses — the scene from the latest bombing in Peshawar was haunting.

The footage, repeated several times on TV channels, told the story of the horror wreaked by the Taliban on the night of April 17 in an attack on an Awami National Party (ANP) election rally.

It was shocking to see the scale of destruction.

But even more appalling was the callous attitude of most political parties to the gruesome carnage. There was no reaction beyond routine messages of condolence on the loss of lives, no condemnation of the Taliban who have claimed responsibility for the attack and who are threatening to derail the democratic process.

This criminal silence on the part of the political parties, particularly the PML-N, the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf and the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl is meant to buy security for themselves in exchange while the militants target their rivals. This policy of appeasement makes them inadvertently complicit in the Taliban’s terrorist campaign against particular political parties. But this opportunism may cost them heavily in the future when the militants turn on them too.

It is not surprising that the Taliban have declared war on the ANP. The party during its tenure of power in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa had valiantly stood up to terrorist outfits and consequently borne the brunt of the relentless militant violence that has gripped the troubled province. Undoubtedly, the latest surge in the violence is aimed at preventing the party returning to power by denying it a level playing field in the run up to the elections.

Not surprisingly, once again the PPP and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) are also on the Taliban’s hit list. Both these parties have taken a relatively stronger stand against militancy and terrorism. The militants have claimed responsibility for killing a former MQM provincial legislator and a party candidate for the Sindh Assembly last month.

By sparing other political parties, the militants have shrewdly divided the political forces and created huge space for their activities. Spilling over from KP and the tribal areas, Taliban violence has reached Karachi and other parts of the country, creating an alarming scenario for the country’s political stability. Violence is likely to escalate as the election campaign picks up.

Over the past 10 years, militant violence has claimed thousands of innocent lives, crippled the economy and fuelled sectarian tensions. Yet, this grave threat to national security barely figures in the election campaign. Shockingly, the issue posing an existential threat to Pakistan is no more than a footnote in most of the political parties’ election manifestos which are devoid of any clear understanding of the menace, leave alone any concrete plan to deal with it.


Combating militancy and religious extremism certainly does not appear to be a priority for most political parties. For example, the PML-N, referring to Gen Musharraf’s regime, puts the blame squarely on the long authoritarian rule for the rise of militancy in Pakistan. “The distorted political activity and denied civil rights to the people, generated widespread anger and frustration, which may have encouraged some to opt for violence,” the PML-N manifesto declares.

Nothing could be more absurd and bizarre than this explanation of the rise of militancy and terrorism wrecking the country and threatening its unity and stability. So, according to the PML-N, the militants have been killing innocent people, forcibly using small children as suicide bombers, attacking defence installations and destroying schools because of the denial of fundamental rights.

But what is the PML-N’s explanation for the escalation in militant violence over the past five years when democracy was restored? Perhaps the PML- N will find some justification for that too.

Is it not ironic that perhaps the strongest defence of the Taliban and its terrorist activities comes not from any conservative Islamic group, but from a so-called moderate national party that may come into power in the coming elections. The manifesto has no mention of the thousands of members of security forces who lost their lives fighting the insurgents.

The PTI has taken the problems of terrorism and militancy even more lightly in its manifesto. The issue is literally covered in a few lines and that too as a sub-section of the security policy. There is obviously no mention of Taliban terrorism and its cost to the nation.

The party sees the menace linked with Pakistan’s support for the so-called US war on terror. This flawed argument distorts the whole genesis of militancy and extremism in Pakistan. The roots of militancy and radicalisation are much deeper and the problem will certainly not go away with the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Imran Khan has for long taken an extremely soft approach towards the Taliban and his confused views on terrorism and militancy are reflected fully in his party’s manifesto.

There is no doubt the PPP has covered the issue much more comprehensively in its manifesto. But during its five-year term, the party failed to evolve a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy. In fact, no urgency was witnessed in dealing with the menace of terrorism during its government.

It took almost five years for the party to get the bill on National Counterterrorism Authority passed by the National Assembly. So while the PPP manifesto gives a lot of detail on the measures it proposes to take, it leaves open the big question of why these measures were not implemented previously.

This widening division across Pakistan’s major political forces on how to deal with the country’s most critical threat does not augur well for the future. Instead of offering solutions in their party manifestos for a problem so critical for the stability of the country and for the future of democracy, there appears to be a state of denial. The cracks appear to be growing visibly and frighteningly larger.

The writer is an author and journalist.

 

[RabzonKhan]

When will the nuclear Pakistan stand up and say enough is enough, how long will we allow the Afghans, Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens and scumbag Uyghur’s terrorists to use our territory for terrorism.

Without any doubt, China is our closest ally, and the last thing we would want is to annoy them.

It’s high time to get each and every inch of our territory back from the enemy.




Chinese rebels operating camps in Waziristan

The News
Amir Mir
April 27, 2013



ISLAMABAD: In a worrisome development for Islamabad, which could strain Pak-China relations, the al-Qaeda-linked Chinese rebels have released a videotape showing young children being trained to use weapons at a camp of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in North Waziristan tribal agency on the Pak-Afghan border.

Islami Awazi, the propaganda wing of ETIM, which is also called the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) and seeks the establishment of an independent Muslim state of East Turkistan, has released the training video.

The ETIM operates from its sanctuaries in North Waziristan with the help of al-Qaeda. The group, largely dominated by the Uighurs, claims that the Chinese are a colonial force in the Muslim majority Xinjiang province of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region which many Uighurs prefer to call East Turkestan.

The Uighurs are Turkic Central Asian people who live primarily in the western Chinese province. Xinjiang, which borders Pakistan, is home to an estimated eight million Uighurs who are opposed to the increasing presence and economic grip of the Han Chinese in the region. A key source of tension between Beijing and Islamabad that has surfaced in recent years is China’s rising concern over the Uighur separatists receiving shelter and training in the largely lawless Waziristan region.

To pacify China’s concerns, Pakistan has already clamped down on Uighur settlements besides proceedings against the religious schools in Waziristan which are being used as training grounds for the Chinese militants.

When 20 people were killed in a terrorist attack in the Xinjiang province in July 2011, the Chinese authorities had criticised Pakistan’s failure to crack down on the Uighur rebels as well as their training camps. The Chinese media alleged that those who conducted the 2011 attacks in the Kashgar city had received training in the Waziristan tribal region of Pakistan.

Well placed diplomatic circles in Islamabad say the release of the video by the Chinese separatists would exert further pressure on Islamabad to uproot the ETIM/TIP network from Waziristan, as had been repeatedly promised in the past, especially after the July 2011 terror attack in Kashgar. In the training video, the children, some of whom appear to be no older than six, are shown firing handguns, AK-47 assault rifles and a machine-gun from various positions.

At one point, 13 Uighur children are seen firing AK-47s while standing and lying down. As the children fire their weapons, the black flag of the Taliban and a light blue banner used by the Turkistan Islamic Party can be seen flying in the background.

The video is similar to others released by the al-Qaeda-linked jehadi groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Islamic Jehad Group (IJG) and the Fidayeen-e-Islam (FI). These groups are running training camps in North and South Waziristan for the youngsters as well as the children are first indoctrinated and then trained in terrorism.

The Waziristan-based ETIM/TIP leaders also hold senior positions in al-Qaeda, just like Abdul Haq Turkistani, the slain chief of the Turkistan Islamic Party, who was a member of al-Qaeda’s Majlis-e-Shura and was killed in a military raid on his compound in Mir Ali, North Waziristan in February 2010. Abdul Shakoor Turkistani, who had replaced Abdul Haq and was killed in a US drone attack on his training camp in Shawal Valley of North Waziristan in August 2012, was al-Qaeda chief for the Fata of Pakistan.


To be continued