Reclaiming Pakistan's Frontier!

[Abu Zolfiqar]

Life at the Durand Line​

A media trip was organised by the army to show the apparent progress in the battles against homegrown Taliban insurgents. An army commander said that the military has no imminent plans to launch an offensive in the North Waziristan tribal region. In contrast, the US officials have increased pressure on Pakistan to mount a major offensive in the district, considered the premier Taliban and Al-Qaeda fortress along the Afghan border.



A helicopter lands at an army base where a soldier stands near displayed weapons the military said were collected from militants in Mohammad Gat, located in Mohmand Agency.

Soldiers load artillery before firing towards suspected militants’ hideout in the mountainous area of the Mohamad Gat tribal district of Mohmand Hills.

Soldiers monitor the mountainous area of the Jhanda tribal district.

Soldier guards outside a school.

 

[Abu Zolfiqar]

Tribesmen gather at a military compound

Seized weapons recovered from insurgents at a military compound in the mountainous area of the Mohamad Gat tribal district of Mohmand Hills

An army soldier guards on a hilltop post in Hadambar

Local elders and tribesmen wait to speak to journalists and army officials

 

[Abu Zolfiqar]

no govt. officials in site! not a ''peep'' from them...

figures!!

 

[Xeric]

 

[Slides]

^ other episodes from FATA available on YouTube - ‪dawnnewspakistan's Channel‬‏

 

[RabzonKhan]

Conspiratorial paranoia

Dawn
Zahid Hussain
Aug 28 2012


IT was nauseating to listen to some TV commentators ranting about a foreign hand behind the Kamra airbase attack. Some even found vindication of their insane conspiracy theories in a report in an American newspaper that claimed the base may be involved in Pakistan’s nuclear programme. They conveniently ignored the statement of a TTP spokesman claiming responsibility for the daring raid.

It is not just conspiratorial paranoia dominating this narrative; some of these analysts, mainly retired military officials who are now often seen on TV screens, sounded like outright apologists for militants. One retired general declared that after Pakistan’s decision to reopen Nato supply lines, militants might have felt justified under the Sharia in attacking military installations. Instead of condemning militancy, many political leaders joined the chorus of ‘this is not our war’.

What is most troubling is that we are still caught up in this inane discussion about whether it is our war while rising militancy and violent religious extremism are threatening the very existence of this country. These are militants who have declared a war against the state and its people. The only choice before us is to fight or to surrender to the armed marauders who seek to push Pakistan into the dark ages.

Gen Kayani in his Independence Day speech at Kakul was absolutely correct in declaring that the fight against extremism and terrorism is our own war and we are right in fighting it. One cannot agree with him more that no state can afford a parallel system or militant force. But the division among the people on the issue will push the country into civil war.

No state can maintain its sovereignty if it allows armed militias to impose their will on the people through brute force. The policy of appeasement has already cost the country hugely, both in terms of human casualties and its overall impact on society and the economy. Gen Kayani’s speech marked a fundamental change in the strategy for fighting militancy and extremism in the country.

Although security forces have been fighting the Taliban in the tribal territories and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the past several years, the army leadership had maintained a deliberate ambiguity about who the enemy was. Soldiers were motivated by the cant that they were fighting Indian and foreign agents. As Gen Kayani explained, it is the most difficult task for any army to fight against its own people.

Nevertheless, it is also imperative that the people, particularly soldiers, should know who they are fighting and for what. The enemy is from within our own society and not from outside. The fight against militancy and extremism is also an ideological battle, so it is important to shed this ambiguity about who the enemy is.

It is about time we came out of this dangerous delusion of being victims of some foreign conspiracy. These are our own people who are blowing up our schools, homes and religious places. Thousands of Pakistani soldiers have been killed battling the groups which were once developed as security assets. These groups have now turned to jihad inside. Defying the bans on them, they are not only still active, but have also expanded. They are certainly not outsiders but home-grown militants trying to impose their retrogressive worldview through force.

The attack on the base at Kamra showed that militants have regenerated and reorganised despite some setbacks after the military operations in Swat and South Waziristan, and their attacks have become more sophisticated. It is not only military installations that are under attack. Even mosques, shrines and other places of worship are not spared.

The country has virtually been turned into a killing field with thousands of people becoming victims of terrorism and sectarian and religion-based violence. More than two dozen members of the Shia community were pulled out from buses and gunned down in cold blood on the day the Kamra base came under attack.

Although no direct link between the two incidents could be established, the perpetrators seemed to be driven by the same ideological worldview. The sectarian massacre in Pakistan is not an isolated phenomenon. It is intertwined with the rise of the Taliban movement in the country.

More worrisome, however, is the abdication by the government of its responsibility to provide protection to its citizens. Some of the mainstream, moderate political parties have also joined the radical bandwagon, whipping up zealotry for their narrow political interests. Their refusal to support the battle against militancy has helped strengthen extremist forces. What the government and the opposition political parties do not realise is that by giving in to extremists they are digging their own graves. Militancy and extremism present the biggest threat to democracy.

Meanwhile, militants have succeeded in creating a sense of fear. With a weak administration giving in to their rhetoric, they seem to have gained far greater space than their actual public support would imply. They have also been helped by a section of the media to project their extremist narrative.

The continuing selective patronage by the security agencies of some militant factions has also been a major reason for the failure of the state to stem the tide. Gen Kayani has acknowledged that mistakes had been made by all state institutions, including the army, in realising the gravity of the threat to the country’s integrity that militancy poses. One hopes that those mistakes will not be repeated.

It is now a battle to save Pakistan that demands greater unity among the forces who want to revive the vision of Pakistan as a liberal democratic state. And this battle cannot be won through military means alone. It is imperative to defeat the forces of extremism politically and ideologically as well.

 

[Capt.Popeye]

^
Welcome back, Rabzon! Good to see you back on the board.

 

[RabzonKhan]

^
Welcome back, Rabzon! Good to see you back on the board.

Hi Capt, thanks, and nice to see you too.

Cheers!

 

[RabzonKhan]

EDITORIAL: The Haqqani matter

Daily Times
Sep 09 2012

The US’s designation of the Haqqani network as a terrorist group was not unexpected. The US State Department’s intent was telegraphed ahead, aimed as much at limiting the network’s funding as eliminating its safe haven on Pakistani soil and alleged support for it from the Pakistani military establishment. No doubt Islamabad expected this development, and must have thought out appropriate responses in the near two years this issue gestated in the US Congress. Yet it chooses to stick to its usual ambiguity, its initial response terming it an “internal American matter”. Internal or not, the Haqqanis are housed in Pakistani territory, which will invite sanctions if not checked, that too to eventual US satisfaction. Indeed, the situation grows grim for Pakistan as the US authorities move to tighten the noose around the Haqqani network. Much has been made in the international press about Pakistan’s ‘hedging policy’ regarding the Haqqanis, about Islamabad’s game plan of using the outfit to resist increasing Indian influence and a growing presence of personnel in Afghanistan, especially as occupation forces begin preparations for the 2014 pullout. Despite Islamabad’s repeated denials, there is enough in its hosting of the Haqqanis, and tolerating their border incursions, to suggest active support for the group. However much such strategy might have been profitable in the past, continuing with it in the present circumstances is clearly counter-productive for Pakistan, and the larger war effort. Even if the proxy war strategy, enduring since the CIA-ISI novelty of the anti-Soviet jihad, were to be accepted as initially feasible, there can be little doubt it has now crossed its sell-by date. If the press can notice ominous signs of erstwhile proxies straining at the leash, supporting the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the like, enabling suicide attacks and espionage inside Pakistan, so too must the security establishment. That the prospect of finally ditching the Haqqanis seems to unsettle elements in the deep state is more a reflection of policy inertia rather than serious strategic or tactical thinking.

Perhaps Islamabad needs a textbook lesson in cost-benefit analysis, especially where national security imperatives are concerned. We have endured sanctions before, but these are not the 1990s, and the economy cannot survive deficits bloating further. The IMF will not come to the rescue, neither will other donor agencies as long as Washington is displeased. Such economic strangulation for the sake of the Haqqani proxies does not make sense. Especially as the longer we shelter them, the more the chances that they will help the TTP hit us to maximum effect. We must move with the world, not against it. The Haqqani network is a regressive element at the best of times, and a criminal terrorist one in the present scheme of things. It has no place in a progressive society, which is why the state should leverage the moment to root it out once and for all.

 

[RabzonKhan]

A militant’s stereotype

Dawn
Muhammad Amir Rana
Sep 23 2012

A MILITANT, if we were to stereotype one in Pakistan, would appear to have three characteristics. He would be considered emotionally charged with a narrow worldview, be seen as religiously conservative and appear to have poor educational credentials. This stereotype would usually be applied to a madressah graduate.

These stereotyped notions portray a person who is barbaric in both thought and appearance and who belongs to a primeval or tribal society. The metropolitan mindset is afraid of this image, which reduces the level of sympathy for a fellow human being and also probably his chances of reintegration in society.

But empirical data provides a different picture and is not in conformity with the stereotypical image. It is certainly not a given that a militant bears all these characteristics. He could be well educated, graduating from a modern educational institution, be modest, accommodating and well-behaved in his personal life and aware of societal and cultural norms.

Empirical evidence collected by security institutes and think tanks on militants’ profile shows that they come from diverse educational, social and ethnic backgrounds. A study based on the profiles of 20 militants conducted by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) shows that only two had come from madressahs. The majority had received a graduate-level education and most of them also had an interest in sports and social activities. Their early lives did not demonstrate any signs of abnormal behaviour.

Many of them were known to be fond of books — their reading was not found to be confined to literature on a specific ideology, sect or interest. For example, one of the militants mentioned that he was fond of philosophy, history and fiction and he had extensively read Karl Marx. Dr Mubarak Ali, a Pakistani historian, and Ghani Khan, a secular Pushto poet, were his favourite writers. In fact, before joining militant organisations, listening to music, watching television and movies were tendencies common to most of the 20 militants.

Most were not extraordinary in their childhood, but, quite naturally, their parents wished they would be successful in life. But once they fell into the militants’ trap, their families suffered much — mainly at the hands of law-enforcement agencies, something the 20 militants regretted. They still aspired for a normal life but were not hopeful of achieving that.

Politics and religion were critical aspects of their lives. The soul of the militant was caught between two different ideals. For example, some of the militants had tried to simultaneously value and practise the teachings of Baacha Khan, Mullah Omar and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Another cited Ahmed Shah Abdali, Allama Iqbal and Haq Nawaz Jhangvi as his ideal figures. It seemed that they were trying to reconcile their militant tendencies with influences which had come through their educational curriculum.

Their religious and political affiliation or support had been diverse as well. They had at some point in their lives backed the secular Awami National Party, the Muslim League, and mainstream religious parties including the Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam. But now they considered all political parties and the military leadership responsible for the crises in the country. They cited the failure to enforce Sharia, economic disparity, absence of justice and pursuit of pro-US polices as the causes of the crises. They were not very optimistic about the crises ending soon and the solution, they believed, was jihad.

There was a consensus among all 20 militants that the US was the biggest enemy of Islam.

While the common Pakistani may hold similar views, two key factors delineated the militants from the rest of their countrymen.

The first factor was the influence on their lives of preachers from militant organisations who, through their publications and literature, had indoctrinated and recruited them. The second factor was that they were politically conscious and not satisfied with the situation in the country and the Muslim world.

An important finding noted in the PIPS study was that to a large extent the recruiters had not exploited the militants’ socioeconomic deprivations (although these factors compelled some militants to join extremist organisations), but only played on their religious sentiments to urge them to extricate the nation and the ummah from the prevailing crises.

After joining the militants, most of them were not comfortable with their new lives and it took them several months to get used to the unfamiliar environment. It was noted that the number of new recruits quitting the organisations and going back to their previous lives remained quite high during the initial stages. To counter these attempts, different strategies were adopted and recruits were offered financial benefits and initially easy assignments at the camp or offices.

The militants who were arrested and detained by the law-enforcement agencies were found to be more hard-line. They alleged that some of their companions had either been killed after arrest or tortured in custody and complained that several innocents, mainly their family members, had also been arrested.

The general profile of these 20 militants showed they were young, not properly guided or supervised by their parents, and were inspired by militants’ literature and publications, which remained easily available across the country. But, they still harboured hopes and aspirations for a normal life.

Although the state has made a few attempts to exploit this desire among militants for reverting to a normal life and has set up some rehabilitation initiatives in Swat and other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, these programmes are on a small scale and their effectiveness has also been called into question.

Disengaging a militant from violence and extremist tendencies is an uphill task because of his entrenched ideological and political associations. The Swat model can be replicated in other parts of the country after addressing its deficiencies and intellectual and financial constraints. But at the same time, the civil administration there and in all conflict-affected areas needs to shoulder responsibility.

In other countries, such initiatives have been taken by the political government and implemented by the civilian administration. Only a representative and accountable political set-up can have the credibility, legitimacy and mandate to take on the ideological and political sensitivities involved in the de-radicalisation process.

For effective reintegration of militants, breaking of the stereotype is vital. Militants should be punished, prosecuted and brought to justice if they are involved in terrorism or violation of the law. At the same time, they should not be labelled on the basis of certain narratives, which may not be completely different from the majority’s thinking patterns. Countering narratives is a separate area and deserves due attention, but first considering militants a part of society and reflecting on what prompted them to go to extremes is imperative.

The writer is editor of the quarterly research journal Conflict and Peace Studies.

 

[RabzonKhan]

On the North Waziristan operation

Editorial
The Express Tribune
October 17th, 2012

Following the attack on Malala Yousufzai, Pakistan seemed to develop a popular view that time has now come to grasp the nettle of the Taliban in their stronghold of North Waziristan. The nation swung around to the US-led international consensus that Pakistan should attack the region to end the Taliban and al Qaeda’s growing ability to stage global terrorism. There were internal contradictions, however, that stood in the way of any practical decision to carry out what the people wanted. There was an earlier national consensus orchestrated by the state against American drones that actually sent the following American message: you have foreign terrorists sitting in North Waziristan and if you don’t go after them, America will go on using drones. To counter that, Pakistan protested its state sovereignty and territorial integrity and relied heavily on the rising anti-Americanism in the country.

Hence, the first big contradiction was the anti-Americanism signalled by the religious and political parties in their post-Malala statements: that the attack on the girl should be seen as an extension of the drone-and-blasphemy problem and thus ignored. After that came the electoral fixations of various parties. Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf eyed votes in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa which irked the JUI-F relying on votes in the semi-tribal belt, stretching from Dera Ismail Khan to northwestern Balochistan under the shadow of a vague accommodation with the Taliban. Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N stuck to its line of ‘talking to the Taliban’ because of its vulnerability to the Punjabi Taliban and their hinterland elements capable of delivering suicide bombers. The Jamaat-e-Islami did not want to suffer an erosion of votes in the face of Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s refusal to revive the clerical alliance called the MMA and was, surprisingly, more decisive in its rejection of the Malala incident through its leaders Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Amirul Azeem and finally its current chief, Dr Munawwar Hasan. Malala’s ‘American connection’ began to be highlighted on the Internet. One great persuader in this respect was the intent to isolate the MQM, which seemed to harvest the post-Malala feeling more daringly than others, by calling on the army to go after the Taliban.

The ANP, despite its clash with the MQM in Karachi, decided to advocate the attack because of its virtual collapse in the face of Taliban terror in Peshawar, which threatened also to underscore the folly of rejecting the PPP-MQM decision to stage local government polls in Sindh. Deluded by the army chief’s newfound conviction that fighting extremism is Pakistan’s own war, the PPP hoped that North Waziristan would now be attacked to avenge the assassination of its leader, Benazir Bhutto, and to give it a level playing field during the coming general election, during which the Taliban terror would be the deciding factor. The PPP’s minister then suffered a deflation of his chest announcing that no attack was in the offing because the army said that a political decision was needed before it could go into the agency. This time, it did not say that it would choose its own timing vis-à-vis the attack against several communities of terrorists congregating in North Waziristan in the presence of a full complement of Pakistan’s military positioning. Suddenly, the army chief seemed keen to dispel the impression given by his remarks on Malala’s tragedy.

North Waziristan is where Hakimullah Mehsud is hiding after his near-successful attack on Times Square, New York. It is where the Haqqani network has its base from where it spreads out to Kurram Agency conducting Shia killings and attacking inside Afghanistan. It is where the Wahhabi-Takfiri Arabs and al Qaeda rank and file are located. It is where the Uzbeks and the Punjabi Taliban, holding governor Salmaan Taseer’s son, are spending rest and recreation time after destroying Pakistan’s peace. The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is also there as a formal ally of al Qaeda together with Jundullah. Pakistan has to fight terrorism and North Waziristan is the battleground. The world will rally around Pakistan if it decides to fights its own war.

 

[TalibanSwatter]

NWA has become a haven for TTP and its Al Qaeda affiliates including militant thugs from all over the world. Militants who are ideologically driven and intent on setting up their own fascist fiefdom. We have already seen the TTP operate in Swat. There were no drones in Swat. Have we not learnt our lesson? And what a costly lesson it was.

We have lost 40,000 civilians and 4000 soldiers thanks to the TTP and their Al Qaeda affiliated terrorists. When will people like Khan Sahib wake up? Imran Khan wants to negotiate with the TTP. How and what, can you negotiate with a rabid dog?

Importantly, when will our Generals stop equivocating, and give up this nonsensical notion of achieving strategic depth through non state actors?When will our Generals start caring about our people - our soldiers, our policemen, our shia, our women, our barelvis, our ahmadis and christians, our Malalas trying to get a decent education - all people targeted by the very groups the military nurtured in the past.

This is an existential battle. A battle of ideology. A battle between darkness and sanity. The battleground is NWA. And this is a battle that must be fought sooner rather than later.

The military must kill the monster it spawned and fed, if we are to survive as a viable state. Period.

 

[TalibanSwatter]

Kamran Shafi

On October 9, 2012, little Malala Yousufzai was shot in the head and neck by a brave and, according to Imran Khan, an ‘ideological’ member of the great TTP, as she travelled home from school in a Suzuki van. Two masked men (which leads one to ask immediately why they were so cowardly as to mask themselves if they are so ‘ideological’?) stopped the van; one of them climbed aboard; asked the girls which of them was Malala; put a .30 Takharov pistol to her head and pulled the trigger.

Two of her friends who were sitting by her were also injured, one in the hand as it was then reportedly raised above and in front of Malala’s head, and the other in the foot as the brave warrior fired one more time hitting Malala in the neck, the bullet piercing it and exiting to hit the third child in the foot.

On the same day, the Pakistan Army moved Malala to CMH Peshawar by helicopter where the COAS went to see her and said, as reported in this newspaper of record: “The cowards who attacked Malala and her fellow students have time and again shown how little regard they have for human life and how low they can stoop to impose their twisted ideology.”

‘He said this was not the first time that militants had targeted children, the attack on Parade Lane in Rawalpindi “was a reminder of their bloodlust”.

‘Quoting Prophet Muhammad’s (pbuh) saying that “the one who is not kind to children, is not amongst us”, Kayani said the militants did not have respect for the words of the Holy Prophet (pbuh).

‘He said, “By attacking Malala, the terrorists have failed to understand that she is not only an individual, but an icon of courage and hope, which vindicates the sacrifices that the people of Swat and the nation had given …”

‘He said, “These are the intrinsic values of an Islamic society, based on the principles of liberty, justice and equality of man. Islam guarantees each individual — male or female — equal and inalienable right to life, property and human dignity, with faith and education as the chief obligations to achieve enlightenment.”

“We wish to bring home a simple message: We refuse to bow before terror. We will fight, regardless of the cost we will prevail,” he said. The COAS reiterated that the terrorists underestimated the resolve and resilience of the people of Pakistan.

“It is time we united and stood up to fight the propagators of such barbaric mindset and their sympathisers.”’

On October 15, Malala was flown to Birmingham for further treatment and on October 16 it was put out that the army had, as usual, passed the buck to the civilian leadership having said repeatedly in the past that it would move into North Waziristan at a time of its choosing. On October 16, our National Assembly quite cravenly shelved the resolution for backing military action against the terrorists. It was heart-breaking to see our legislators miss an opportunity when even the army leadership was on board for action to target those among the Taliban who are unmoved by any argument for the rule of law, as part of a Grand Strategy to defeat the mindset that shoots little girls simply because they demand an education.

But why were we ‘heart-broken’? Why do we Pakistanis hope against hope? Why do we cling to straws as we are swept along in a swift and deadly river? Why don’t we realise that all of the standing at the crossroads is over and done for us? That there are no more crossroads for our tortured land and it’s hapless, helpless people; that we’ve taken the wrong turns at all of the many crossroads that did appear before us? That we are at the mercy of self-aggrandising elites who do not even have the courage to call the TTP the TTP when its spokespeople openly and arrogantly accept responsibility for shooting helpless little girls?

And Imran Khan wants to separate the ‘ideologues’ from the ‘good’ Taliban, and then have the tribes go after them? Does he even know how many peace deals these rogues have gone back on? Is he aware of the brazenness with which they are now operating: in the latest action on the outskirts of the city of Peshawar attacking a police station, and when the SP of the area appeared in defence of his by then scattered men, cutting off his head and taking it along with them? The man doesn’t cease to amaze one, just as the brutes of the TTP never fail to astound one with their savagery.

One cannot conclude a piece on the pusillanimous way in which our state is ceding more and more ground to the terrorists who are hell-bent upon its takeover without one more comment on our cowardly National Assembly which, too, has chosen to put up its hands in surrender. Kudos to Altaf Hussain, however, for at least having the guts to stand against the terrorists.

It is time, my friends; it is time.

 

[TalibanSwatter]

Talat Husain

The expected military operation in North Waziristan has been put on hold yet again. Ironically, this has happened in part because of the very event that was supposed to spur the nation and the government into taking decisive action against the last bastion of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan i.e., the attack on Malala Yousufzai. Just last week, the outpouring of national outrage against this heinous assault seemed to bring all stakeholders on the page of cleansing the cities and towns of North Waziristan of the stranglehold of the militants. Now, this has changed. That consensus seems to have been lost in the haystack of heated controversies and cold calculations of the leaderships of various political parties. The national debate is now divided and fragmented and public opinion is confused. Going purely by opinion trends on social media and the conduct of national leadership, the stomach for taking the battle to the Taliban of Waziristan has become squeamish. The counter-narrative of the religious right, and also of those spearheading protests against the blasphemous video, clearly has had an effect. In popular perception, the Malala incident is no longer an open and shut case of the Taliban attempting to silence an ardent spokesperson for female education and a budding activist for her liberal values. The insinuation doing the rounds borders closely on the conspiracy theory that this could well have been staged to either distract media attention from the derogatory video or the growing voices against drone strikes. Another oft-heard assertion is that perhaps, the entire incident was meant to create momentum to launch an operation on North Waziristan.

These are wild theories and have no empirical basis. Some of them are plainly outrageous. But then that hardly matters. What matters is that these have blunted, what a few days ago, looked like a fairly straightforward and pointed demand: the Taliban have started to attack schoolgirls for speaking and writing about education, so the state should say enough is enough and tackle them decisively. What also matters is that these theories have put both the state and the government on the back foot, forcing them to reconsider their options and scale back their enthusiasm for going after the hub of such attacks. The PPP, whose president and prime minister, mouthed valiant bluster when Malala was attacked, have gone completely quiet leaving the field open to the ramblings of Rehman Malik. The PML-N, while continuing to position itself against the stance of the PTI does not want to push the demand of the North Waziristan operation too hard. Its support to the operation is “conditional”, which essentially means that its leaders would gingerly and even haltingly follow rather than lead the march on this score. Imran Khan’s party continues to weigh against another military operation, hammering the point that use of force is not an option anymore and can only lead to more violence. The PTI leadership’s peace plea, however, remains skeletal and without any meaningful details about its implementation. This leaves the ANP as the sole pitcher for the North Waziristan operation. However, it would not surprise anyone if it, too, begins to tone down its stance: the cost of speaking against the militants is paid not in sweat but only in blood.

Interestingly, the army’s interest in the North Waziristan operation, too, has ebbed and flowed in tune with the political mood and public opinion trends. The generals make the argument that a fractured political scene and divided public opinion makes any battle-plan impractical. The same argument is couched in the statement that the political leadership has to give a go-ahead for the operation to start. However, like everything else in Pakistan, this issue, too, is not as simple as it is made out to be. The army high command has been in two minds about North Waziristan for three years. In the wake of, nay almost parallel, to South Waziristan’s Rah-e-Nijat Operation, there was this should-we or should-we-not circular reasoning about the fate of North Waziristan.

So, the confusion is quite chronic and it showed again after the Malala incident in all its ugliness. Immediately after the attack, the army took charge of all developments concerning Malala. Inter-Services Public Relations started to run a health bulletin on the injured child. The army chief’s visit to her produced an incredible press release that had this sentence in capital letters: “We refuse to bow before terror. We fill fight, regardless of the cost, we will prevail Inshallah.” This almost suggested as if commandos were about to rope down in terror-infested compounds of North Waziristan. There was much hype and plenty of meetings. Now, however, this leaping fire of rage has calmed down to a sputtering flame. The health bulletin has stopped. Malala is recuperating in London. Tolerance for audacious attacks on police checkposts and IED blasts have returned. The army brass has gone back to the familiar drawing board, thinking yet again, ‘What to do about North Waziristan? Should we or should we not?’ It is stalemate all over again.

 

[TalibanSwatter]

The Crumbling State

Babar Sattar

At what point does loss of control over territory rise to a level that it becomes unacceptable for the state? Let us consider a few random events. A while back the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) slaughtered 11 soldiers of Pakistan Army, taped the massacre and released the gruesome video for public viewing. What is the impact of a harrowing event such as this on the morale of troops fighting for the Pakistani flag? Is the beheading of Pakistani soldiers at the hands of militants entrenched within our ‘sovereign’ territory acceptable damage for our military high command and political elite? Is some larger national interest being served here that the simpletons amongst us can’t fathom?

This past Monday, the TTP attacked a police check post on the Peshawar-Kohat road and killed a superintendent of police and six other officers of the police and FC. The attack reportedly lasted some three hours and the militants took away rocket launchers, Kalashnikovs and other weapons that they found at the post. But that wasn’t all. They also severed the heads of the SP and the two FC officials and took them along as trophies. How did the state respond? It announced a bravery award for the SP. How long do we expect our soldiers and police officials to exhibit the resolve to confront ruthless terrorists and risk agonising deaths when the state itself is found dithering?



We have had fearless officers like Malik Saad and Sifwat Ghayur taken out by the TTP – and the state did nothing. We have probably lost more than 500 police officers in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa alone over the last decade. A few days ago a brigadier of Pakistan Army, presently serving at the ISI, was abducted from Defense Housing Authority, Islamabad in broad daylight and his driver shot. The TTP is now also threatening the ‘pro-Malala enemy media’ and has apparently prepared a hit list of journalists. These incidents are as heart wrenching as they are thought provoking.

The Pakistani state has been failing to uphold the citizens’ right to life and freedom from fear for a while. When it exhibits no determination to protect the life of those who are responsible for protecting the lives of everyone else, one wonders not just about the resolve of the state but also its capacity. If the perception that the state lacks the will and ability to fight terrorists becomes entrenched, wouldn’t rationality demand those sitting on the fence to hedge their bets and acquiesce in the agenda of terrorists?

If the state is unable or unwilling to secure life and property, wouldn’t people at some point, out of sheer necessity, switch sides and submit to the will of those capable of inflicting harm on them? Wouldn’t those who have successfully annexed state territory and possess effective control, as well as the ability to enforce their orders, emerge as the de facto sovereigns? Isn’t this what happened in Swat? And didn’t we learn from our own bitter experience that it is impossible to appease terrorists or negotiate with them and that the longer you allow them to thrive the harder it is to dislodge them?

Let’s go back to the basics of statecraft. When a citizen kills another it is murder. When the state executes a citizen in accordance with law, it is justice. When a soldier, policeman or citizen stakes their life in pursuit of declared national security or foreign policy, it is patriotism. When a citizen picks up arms to fight the state for its pursuit of stated foreign or national security policy objectives, it is treason. These are bright-line rules. You can disagree with state policy, its law and order strategies, excessive use of force or with its breach of due process and try to foster change. But you cannot declare war on the state due to disagreement.

The foundational requirements of a functional state in this context include (i) its monopoly over use of force within its territory, (ii) peoples’ acceptance of state’s monopoly over use of force (i.e. writ of the state), and (iii) state’s ability to enforce its writ and have in place a system of credible deterrence against those inclined to defy state authority. A functional state cannot share its monopoly over use of force with non-state actors or allow non-state actors to prevail upon state actors. And if it does, that marks the state’s descent into anarchy.

The Pakistani state has lost control over North Waziristan, which everyone agrees has become the den of terrorists of all hues and the staging ground for attacks across Pakistan. The opposition to retaking control of North Waziristan is mainly of two sorts: pragmatic and ideological. The pragmatists argue that blowback of retaking territory from TTP will be attacks in Pakistan’s urban centres and if public opinion and political elites aren’t ready for such a consequence, let the status quo prevail.

In other words, the network of TTP and its allies is well entrenched across Pakistan. And the Pakistani state will continue to appease the TTP and tolerate the massacre of its soldiers, policemen and citizens in Fata and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in order to keep big cities relatively safe.

On the ideological front flawed arguments are being propounded most vociferously by the PTI. It opposes the North Waziristan operation on the basis that the militant ideology and beheading brigade of TTP will vanish into thin air as soon as the US withdraws from Afghanistan. A secondary argument is that the military operation will not work since, despite superior force, the US failed to assert control over Vietnam or Afghanistan. That the US was a foreign occupation force while the Pakistani state would be reestablishing control over its own territory is simply ignored. It is further argued that just as military action is disagreeable in Karachi and Balochistan, it is disagreeable in North Waziristan.

Again, there is no appreciation that comparing Karachi or Balochistan with North Waziristan is comparing apples and oranges. Karachi is the victim of an internecine warfare between competing political parties over control for power and resources in the face of changing demographic realities. This can be resolved through the political process and a functional criminal justice system.

The grievance of Balochistan relates to its sense of being exploited and mistreated. It seeks equality, empowerment and control over its resources. The problem is ethnic and the solution ought to be political; the matter can be resolved within the framework of our constitution.

The TTP, on the contrary, wishes to pursue its retrograde worldview inspired by its intolerant and violence-prone view of Islam through a new legal order inspired by its flawed understanding of the Shariah. In doing so it seeks to rely exclusively on cruelty and use of force. It wishes to assume control of the Pakistani state as a first step to be able to export this mission to the rest of the world. It is on the basis of this agenda that it has formed alliances with other religious militias across Pakistan. Where is the room for political settlement in any of this? Which of the TTP’s long-term demands can be accommodated by the state within our constitutional framework through talks?

Does our political and military leadership not realise that everything that TTP and its allies stand for poses an existential threat to our state and society? And yet they are more consumed by extraneous considerations such as whether uprooting TTP from North Waziristan might incidentally benefit the Americans or if denying TTP the sanctuary from where it plans and launches human bombs and beheading squads might be a ploy to delay elections. Is it not obvious to thinking minds in khakis and civvies that we are witnessing a crumbling of the state itself?