AFAIK it is around the $22-26,000 mark (the Rafale's cost per hour is pretty much half that)..
However, that is a very fickle figure. For e.g. the South Korean F-15Ks initially costed only 9 million won went ten times higher over the ten years they have had the type..
Something that is ignored by many of the EF proponents is the current real world costs of the EF have been reported close to $33000 per hour although the advertised figure was less than half of that.
This is an interesting and rather funny read
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/dae/articles/communiques/FighterCostFinalJuly06.pdf
The important bit is this
1. Aircraft designed by a single country are not necessarily more expensive than those developed through international cooperation.Gripen and Rafale were both developed by single countries, but end up costing substantially less than Eurofighter, which is produced by a four-nation consortium.
2. But single-nation development does not guarantee lower costs, as the three US fighters
all cost substantially more than the two European “national” fighters, and are comparable to those of Eurofighter, a four-nation cooperative program. Conversely, the projected unit cost of the only (partly) cooperative US aircraft, the Joint Strike Fighter, already exceeds that of Gripen and Rafale and of two other US aircraft, F-18E and F-15E,all of which are single-nation designs.
3. Long production runs do not always lead to less expensive aircraft.
The F-18E, with a production run of 462 aircraft, costs half as much again as the Rafale, which has a much smaller production run of 294 aircraft. JSF will cost twice as much as Rafale, despite having a production run almost ten times as large, and half as much again as the F-18E, whose production run is five times smaller. All three are modern, multirole combat aircraft.
4. While charges for major program stoppages and restructurings add to program costs, the
increase is not proportional to the length of the hiatus. Both Eurofighter and Rafale programs
were halted and restructured, adding eight or ten years to their development cycle, while F-15E, F-18E and Gripen were not, yet this is not demonstrably reflected by the difference in their
respective cost.
5. Continuity in development is the best way to avoid cost overruns. Gripen and F-18E (the
F-15E is not significant in this respect) are the only programs to have avoided lengthy “freezes”
and large-scale re-designs, and their production costs are notably lower than competitors’.
Program unit costs of Rafale, Eurofighter and F-22 exploded after they were “suspended” for
several years for major re-designs or funding shortfalls.
6. Although these aircraft were all developed beginning in the late 1980s, and for broadly similar missions, there is no common ratio between R&D and acquisition costs. Indeed, there seems to be no correlation whatsoever between these costs, reflecting each aircraft’s unique R&D itinerary and development history.
In other words, development costs are influenced not by so much be an aircraft’s actual capabilities as by a “smooth” management and development history.
