Pakistan's love for Saudi Arabia '95% favourable': Pew poll
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There are reasons for Pakistanis having favourable opinions on Saudi Arabia and most take it as if Pakistanis worship them which is far from the truth. To be honest i don't agree with all their policies and their stance on some of the issues in the Middle East but as a Pakistani and Muslim i would always feel a bond with them because of our beloved Prophet PBUH and every Pakistani no matter how much they might disagree with them would always have a deep emotional connection with the place.
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Hi,
Well---here is another look at this survey in relation to other results---. It tells you something very obvious and different about pakistan---only and only pakistan's responce is in single digit---and if comparing it to other nations----pakistan is the only country on the other extreme.
Result---paks do not have the ability to think right---.
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MastanKhan
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and if they love china the communist kaffir too then ?
MR Khan,
Chinese are not funding terrorist groups in pakistan---but saudis are---.
And MR Sage---i was born in a very educated 'wahabi' family---and I tell you---we don't have no love lost for saudis---never did and never will---and neither did we have any love lost for the OBL and his crew or other terrorists or fundos---.
And those others that you mentioned---possibly shias---I tell you what--keeping aside anyone's belief---for they are themselves answerable for---and me not the judge---they are some of the most wonderful people that I have ever come across.
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Pakistani sovereignty and the Saudi Arabian Interests
The following article is written by Feroz Khan who is an academic residing in Canada. PTH does not neccessarily agree with all the points made in the article.
By Feroz Khan
The reason why Pakistani sovereignty is being violated is that Saudi Arabia is the biggest sponsor of militancy inside Pakistan. Saudi Arabia not only funds the militant groups in Pakistan, it also funds and financially supports the religious parties in Pakistan. The reason that these religious parties never condemn suicide bombings and terrorism related violence inside Pakistan is because they are recipients of Saudi monetary support and political patronage and are being used by the Saudis as a proxy army against the state of Pakistan. The “hidden hand” responsible for creating, supporting and sustaining terror related activities inside Pakistan is not India, the United States, RAW or MOSSAD or CIA or Israel but Saudi Arabia and the Gulf nations.
Pakistanis are blind to the fact that Saudi Arabia is seeking the complete destruction of Pakistan because they seem to place a higher value on the idea of a religious loyalty and the support of a religious identity, which supercedes all other considerations. Pakistanis need to wake and realize that Saudi Arabia is not only funding a terror network inside Pakistan, but it is also actively seeking the destruction of Pakistan as a state by waging a war, in favor of Wahhabism, against the cultural traditions of Pakistan.
Saudi Arabia does not recognize the fact that Pakistan has an Islamic tradition or culture as much as the Pakistanis may wish to believe, because it considers Pakistanis as converts from Hinduism and thus, its treatment of Pakistanis is one that is similar to the manner in which Saudis treat non-Muslims.
Pakistani government officials know of this reality, but are too afraid to speak out in the fear of risking the oil subsidies, which the Pakistani army receives from Saudi Arabia. In this sense, the Pakistan army is not only playing a double game with the United States, it is being hypocritical with the Pakistani people and with the Saudis as well. The Pakistani army is fighting the very people funded by Saudi Arabia and yet it is receiving oil grants from the Saudis and at the same time, it claims to the Pakistani people that it is a defender of Islam and Pakistan’s Islamic and territorial values and yet does not tell the Pakistani people, who the “foreign militants” are and from where they have come to fight in Pakistan. Has no one really wondered in Pakistan, in all these years of fighting and killing that the Pakistani army has been engaged in a brutal religious insurgency and it is killing the insurgents, but their national identities of the militants have never been reveled and these militants are only identified as “foreign fighters”?
This brings the discussion to the presence of the Osama bin Ladin living inside Pakistan and his living in Pakistan, near the Mecca of the Pakistani army for such a long time, without being found out. The United States may not have direct evidence to identify the people in the leadership positions in Pakistan, who offered Osama bin Ladin sanctuary, because such evidence exists on a much lower level in the chain of command. The evidence of a support mechanism that might have offered bin Ladin sanctuary and supported and protected him lies in the realization that the Inter-Services-Intelligence (ISI) is ideologically divided between opposing views and this division is also present in the command structure of the Pakistani armed forces. The Pakistani armed forces and ISI is intellectually and ideologically fractured into three basic arguments, which as a policy consideration favors three opposing viewpoints and seeks a political alignment favoring either the United States, China or Saudi Arabia.
There are groups within the ISI and the Pakistani armed forces, which selectively, on the basis of their own interests, support a policy favoring China, the United States or Saudi Arabia and seek to make their own interests into an institutional policy and this is why, the presence of bin Ladin inside Pakistan starts to make sense. The present top tier of the ISI and Pakistani army might be in favor of a modus vivendi relationship with the United States, but this does not mean that lower tiers in the command structure might agree to such a policy shift and therefore, support for Osama bin Ladin probably existed on the middle level of the command structure and this support was a reflection of the multiplicity of competing interests that exist within the ISI and the Pakistani army and armed forces. In other words, there is a level of complicity in the Pakistani military leadership in the idea of offering sanctuary to bin Ladin, but mostly it is a case of sheer professional incompetence. This professional incompetence comes not from an institutional sense of a failure, but from the role of the individuals, who foresee their own individual preferences and choice of opinions, if those opinions clash with the accepted policy, as the more morally correct choice.
Once these individuals start to make moral judgments and rationalizations justifying their own choice, they endeavor to work at the cross-purposes to the institutional policy and it is because of this pervading sense of individualism and the lack of a tradition and practice of institutional accountability in Pakistan, that the idea of institutionalism and institutional professionalism is compromised and why Pakistani institutions are prone to suffer from a sense of professional incompetence. It is due to this issue that Pakistani institutions, such the ISI and the army, are not only fighting an external foe, but also have to contend with an internal enemy, who values personal choice over state interests and is more than willing to aid and abet the enemy against his/her own institution. Such individuals place a higher obligation on their own versions of right and wrong and do not feel themselves constrained to the idea of an institutional loyalty or a state interest, but to their own sense of a religious, political, social or even sectarian ethic.
Once these factors are considered and weighed, it becomes paramount as to why Pakistan is losing its own sense of authority over its own territorial sovereignty. In order to understand the logic of why the United States is increasingly using drones to target and eliminate militants inside Pakistan and why, it is also increasingly eyeing the use of conventional military forces inside Pakistan, it has to be understood that this war, being fought in Pakistan against the militants, is not a conventional war but it is a hybrid of an counter-insurgency intelligence war. It is a transnational war that is being fought outside the rules of the Geneva Conventions, because the Geneva Protocols on warfare cover and regulate the conduct of conventional armies engaged in conventional warfare and not an asymmetrical warfare. This asymmetrical war involves non-state actors fighting the state and such; they transcend the theoretical boundaries of international conflict theory from a realist theory to one of critical theory of international relations in which conflict exists between transnational entities supported by the state as proxies.
Herein, lies the duality of this war inside Pakistan, because Pakistan as a state is not only fighting the militant groups backed by Saudi Arabia as a proxy for Saudi interests in spreading their political ideology, but it is also fighting a civil and religious war with groups and individuals who favor Saudi Arabian interests over the interests of the Pakistani state.
Due to this reality, there exists an undeclared state of war between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in which Saudi Arabia is funding, supporting and encouraging forces that are fighting the state of Pakistan. It is within this context that the role of the United States and its military policies in the region has to be understood. The United States, being a rational actor like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, will pragmatically pursue its own interests in the region and it will ally itself with Pakistan and oppose Pakistan where its interests dictate such a course of action. Given the fact that Pakistani military and its intelligence services are divided between their sense of institutional loyalty to Pakistan and individual loyalties that are not in cognizance of the state interests, United States sees Pakistan as an untrustworthy ally in this war. This lack of trust, which is a reflection of the divided Pakistani loyalties, between the state and individualism of a policy choice, means that given the bureaucratic nature of the Pakistani armed forces, particularly the army and the its intelligence service (ISI), the United States has no credibility in the efficiency of the Pakistani state to persecute this war successfully and therefore, is gradually assuming more and more operational initiative of this war within Pakistan and this can be seen in the increased tempo of the drone attacks and the American statements of repeating the Osama bin Ladin raid again inside Pakistan if necessary.
The problem of realism, for Pakistan, in this war is that since it is an intelligence-counter insurgency war, it relies on the goodwill of the public opinion and in the case of Pakistan, the public opinion sees the United States, a country that shares similar interests with the state of Pakistan, which is the preservation of the state of Pakistan itself, as an enemy. The public opinion in Pakistan sees the role of Saudi Arabia in a more favorable light in terms of its sense of identification with Saudi Arabia in a religious sense and does not believe that Saudi Arabia is actually engaged in a war with the state of Pakistan. This view is then effectively argued by the religious parties that are funded and supported by the Saudi Arabia, as proxy supporters of the Saudi financed militants and militancy in Pakistan that the United States is waging a war on Pakistan and is undermining its sovereignty. This narrative finds a willing resonance within the Pakistani public and it further stokes anti-Americanism in Pakistan and also, effortlessly hides the fact that that it is Saudi Arabia that is undermining Pakistani sovereignty by weakening the state of Pakistan itself through its financial support of militancy in Pakistan.
The contradiction of this reality is that the United States, while it may be allied with the state of Pakistan against the militants and their politics of militancy is opposed by the Pakistani public opinion, which sees it as a threat to the security of Pakistan while supporting a view that basically favors Saudi Arabia and its policies of destruction of Pakistan itself and encourages the violation of Pakistani sovereignty. The fact of the matter is that the United States will not risk losing this war for the fear of alienating Pakistani public opinion and if the Pakistani state does not act in its own interests and combats this Saudi Arabian role in the internal politics of Pakistan, and educates its public opinion to the true face of the enemy it faces, the United States will continually ignore the protests of Pakistan while acting in its own interests.
Therefore, the crux of this war and how it impacts Pakistan’s ability to successfully fight it, rests on the ability of the Pakistani state to first institutionally purge itself from a culture of individualism that exists within it and foster a sense of loyalty to the state and then, convince the Pakistani public opinion that the real cause of Pakistan’s lack of sovereignty is not the United States and its drone and military incursions into the Pakistani territory, but the misplaced sense of Pakistani publics’ religious loyalty to Saudi Arabia, which is being exploited by Saudi Arabia and its financially supported religious groups in Pakistan to further destabilize Pakistan as a nation-state and that the Pakistan public, unwittingly, is becoming an army of Saudi Quislings and in the end if this reality is not exposed, the Pakistani public which believes that Pakistan was created in the name of Islam will end up destroying Pakistan in the name of Islam due to their own sense of fidelity to Islam.
Pakistani sovereignty and the Saudi Arabian Interests | Pak Tea House
The following article is written by Feroz Khan who is an academic residing in Canada. PTH does not neccessarily agree with all the points made in the article.
By Feroz Khan
The reason why Pakistani sovereignty is being violated is that Saudi Arabia is the biggest sponsor of militancy inside Pakistan. Saudi Arabia not only funds the militant groups in Pakistan, it also funds and financially supports the religious parties in Pakistan. The reason that these religious parties never condemn suicide bombings and terrorism related violence inside Pakistan is because they are recipients of Saudi monetary support and political patronage and are being used by the Saudis as a proxy army against the state of Pakistan. The “hidden hand” responsible for creating, supporting and sustaining terror related activities inside Pakistan is not India, the United States, RAW or MOSSAD or CIA or Israel but Saudi Arabia and the Gulf nations.
Pakistanis are blind to the fact that Saudi Arabia is seeking the complete destruction of Pakistan because they seem to place a higher value on the idea of a religious loyalty and the support of a religious identity, which supercedes all other considerations. Pakistanis need to wake and realize that Saudi Arabia is not only funding a terror network inside Pakistan, but it is also actively seeking the destruction of Pakistan as a state by waging a war, in favor of Wahhabism, against the cultural traditions of Pakistan.
Saudi Arabia does not recognize the fact that Pakistan has an Islamic tradition or culture as much as the Pakistanis may wish to believe, because it considers Pakistanis as converts from Hinduism and thus, its treatment of Pakistanis is one that is similar to the manner in which Saudis treat non-Muslims.
Pakistani government officials know of this reality, but are too afraid to speak out in the fear of risking the oil subsidies, which the Pakistani army receives from Saudi Arabia. In this sense, the Pakistan army is not only playing a double game with the United States, it is being hypocritical with the Pakistani people and with the Saudis as well. The Pakistani army is fighting the very people funded by Saudi Arabia and yet it is receiving oil grants from the Saudis and at the same time, it claims to the Pakistani people that it is a defender of Islam and Pakistan’s Islamic and territorial values and yet does not tell the Pakistani people, who the “foreign militants” are and from where they have come to fight in Pakistan. Has no one really wondered in Pakistan, in all these years of fighting and killing that the Pakistani army has been engaged in a brutal religious insurgency and it is killing the insurgents, but their national identities of the militants have never been reveled and these militants are only identified as “foreign fighters”?
This brings the discussion to the presence of the Osama bin Ladin living inside Pakistan and his living in Pakistan, near the Mecca of the Pakistani army for such a long time, without being found out. The United States may not have direct evidence to identify the people in the leadership positions in Pakistan, who offered Osama bin Ladin sanctuary, because such evidence exists on a much lower level in the chain of command. The evidence of a support mechanism that might have offered bin Ladin sanctuary and supported and protected him lies in the realization that the Inter-Services-Intelligence (ISI) is ideologically divided between opposing views and this division is also present in the command structure of the Pakistani armed forces. The Pakistani armed forces and ISI is intellectually and ideologically fractured into three basic arguments, which as a policy consideration favors three opposing viewpoints and seeks a political alignment favoring either the United States, China or Saudi Arabia.
There are groups within the ISI and the Pakistani armed forces, which selectively, on the basis of their own interests, support a policy favoring China, the United States or Saudi Arabia and seek to make their own interests into an institutional policy and this is why, the presence of bin Ladin inside Pakistan starts to make sense. The present top tier of the ISI and Pakistani army might be in favor of a modus vivendi relationship with the United States, but this does not mean that lower tiers in the command structure might agree to such a policy shift and therefore, support for Osama bin Ladin probably existed on the middle level of the command structure and this support was a reflection of the multiplicity of competing interests that exist within the ISI and the Pakistani army and armed forces. In other words, there is a level of complicity in the Pakistani military leadership in the idea of offering sanctuary to bin Ladin, but mostly it is a case of sheer professional incompetence. This professional incompetence comes not from an institutional sense of a failure, but from the role of the individuals, who foresee their own individual preferences and choice of opinions, if those opinions clash with the accepted policy, as the more morally correct choice.
Once these individuals start to make moral judgments and rationalizations justifying their own choice, they endeavor to work at the cross-purposes to the institutional policy and it is because of this pervading sense of individualism and the lack of a tradition and practice of institutional accountability in Pakistan, that the idea of institutionalism and institutional professionalism is compromised and why Pakistani institutions are prone to suffer from a sense of professional incompetence. It is due to this issue that Pakistani institutions, such the ISI and the army, are not only fighting an external foe, but also have to contend with an internal enemy, who values personal choice over state interests and is more than willing to aid and abet the enemy against his/her own institution. Such individuals place a higher obligation on their own versions of right and wrong and do not feel themselves constrained to the idea of an institutional loyalty or a state interest, but to their own sense of a religious, political, social or even sectarian ethic.
Once these factors are considered and weighed, it becomes paramount as to why Pakistan is losing its own sense of authority over its own territorial sovereignty. In order to understand the logic of why the United States is increasingly using drones to target and eliminate militants inside Pakistan and why, it is also increasingly eyeing the use of conventional military forces inside Pakistan, it has to be understood that this war, being fought in Pakistan against the militants, is not a conventional war but it is a hybrid of an counter-insurgency intelligence war. It is a transnational war that is being fought outside the rules of the Geneva Conventions, because the Geneva Protocols on warfare cover and regulate the conduct of conventional armies engaged in conventional warfare and not an asymmetrical warfare. This asymmetrical war involves non-state actors fighting the state and such; they transcend the theoretical boundaries of international conflict theory from a realist theory to one of critical theory of international relations in which conflict exists between transnational entities supported by the state as proxies.
Herein, lies the duality of this war inside Pakistan, because Pakistan as a state is not only fighting the militant groups backed by Saudi Arabia as a proxy for Saudi interests in spreading their political ideology, but it is also fighting a civil and religious war with groups and individuals who favor Saudi Arabian interests over the interests of the Pakistani state.
Due to this reality, there exists an undeclared state of war between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in which Saudi Arabia is funding, supporting and encouraging forces that are fighting the state of Pakistan. It is within this context that the role of the United States and its military policies in the region has to be understood. The United States, being a rational actor like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, will pragmatically pursue its own interests in the region and it will ally itself with Pakistan and oppose Pakistan where its interests dictate such a course of action. Given the fact that Pakistani military and its intelligence services are divided between their sense of institutional loyalty to Pakistan and individual loyalties that are not in cognizance of the state interests, United States sees Pakistan as an untrustworthy ally in this war. This lack of trust, which is a reflection of the divided Pakistani loyalties, between the state and individualism of a policy choice, means that given the bureaucratic nature of the Pakistani armed forces, particularly the army and the its intelligence service (ISI), the United States has no credibility in the efficiency of the Pakistani state to persecute this war successfully and therefore, is gradually assuming more and more operational initiative of this war within Pakistan and this can be seen in the increased tempo of the drone attacks and the American statements of repeating the Osama bin Ladin raid again inside Pakistan if necessary.
The problem of realism, for Pakistan, in this war is that since it is an intelligence-counter insurgency war, it relies on the goodwill of the public opinion and in the case of Pakistan, the public opinion sees the United States, a country that shares similar interests with the state of Pakistan, which is the preservation of the state of Pakistan itself, as an enemy. The public opinion in Pakistan sees the role of Saudi Arabia in a more favorable light in terms of its sense of identification with Saudi Arabia in a religious sense and does not believe that Saudi Arabia is actually engaged in a war with the state of Pakistan. This view is then effectively argued by the religious parties that are funded and supported by the Saudi Arabia, as proxy supporters of the Saudi financed militants and militancy in Pakistan that the United States is waging a war on Pakistan and is undermining its sovereignty. This narrative finds a willing resonance within the Pakistani public and it further stokes anti-Americanism in Pakistan and also, effortlessly hides the fact that that it is Saudi Arabia that is undermining Pakistani sovereignty by weakening the state of Pakistan itself through its financial support of militancy in Pakistan.
The contradiction of this reality is that the United States, while it may be allied with the state of Pakistan against the militants and their politics of militancy is opposed by the Pakistani public opinion, which sees it as a threat to the security of Pakistan while supporting a view that basically favors Saudi Arabia and its policies of destruction of Pakistan itself and encourages the violation of Pakistani sovereignty. The fact of the matter is that the United States will not risk losing this war for the fear of alienating Pakistani public opinion and if the Pakistani state does not act in its own interests and combats this Saudi Arabian role in the internal politics of Pakistan, and educates its public opinion to the true face of the enemy it faces, the United States will continually ignore the protests of Pakistan while acting in its own interests.
Therefore, the crux of this war and how it impacts Pakistan’s ability to successfully fight it, rests on the ability of the Pakistani state to first institutionally purge itself from a culture of individualism that exists within it and foster a sense of loyalty to the state and then, convince the Pakistani public opinion that the real cause of Pakistan’s lack of sovereignty is not the United States and its drone and military incursions into the Pakistani territory, but the misplaced sense of Pakistani publics’ religious loyalty to Saudi Arabia, which is being exploited by Saudi Arabia and its financially supported religious groups in Pakistan to further destabilize Pakistan as a nation-state and that the Pakistan public, unwittingly, is becoming an army of Saudi Quislings and in the end if this reality is not exposed, the Pakistani public which believes that Pakistan was created in the name of Islam will end up destroying Pakistan in the name of Islam due to their own sense of fidelity to Islam.
Pakistani sovereignty and the Saudi Arabian Interests | Pak Tea House
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that is because we are probably the only muslim country that came into existence as a result of a popular movement and we see muslim world as brotherly as possible...
FCPX
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There is nothing wrong in Pakistani's having a high degree of affinity with its Muslim brothers from the ME but would the feelings be the same say for an African Muslim country? After all if we want to love all Muslim's it should be irrespective.
About lineage I find it strange some Pakistani's calling themselves of Arab or Turkish or whatever origin. IMHO we are all of South Asian lineage and there is nothing wrong with that. So what if some of our great ancestors 1000 times removed might have come from some other land?
Speaking for myself, I am proud to be South Asian and I am proud of my inherited culture, language, food, etc. just as I am proud of my religion.
About lineage I find it strange some Pakistani's calling themselves of Arab or Turkish or whatever origin. IMHO we are all of South Asian lineage and there is nothing wrong with that. So what if some of our great ancestors 1000 times removed might have come from some other land?
Speaking for myself, I am proud to be South Asian and I am proud of my inherited culture, language, food, etc. just as I am proud of my religion.
flamer84
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I'm sorry but that's not what Mr. Jones said - his bodies say that too quite often -
http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=L_zisB9Ecb0
NATO = Saudi mercenaries
Where is @flamer84
I told you,the are a lot of theories out there,people like good conspiracies 
So,what happenned with Syria...forgot to pay the mercenaries ?
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Hyperion
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Pakistanis are one messed up bunch. They deserve their fate, and then some!
Conclusion, more of Pakistani women need to be locked up, beaten and mentally tortured. More citizens need to be "purified", only al-wahab lovers should exist in the land of the pure. Their feet and hands need to be amputated to totally enjoy and appreciate the al-Saud way.
May Allah give them more of the Ummah way of life, something they crave. Ameen. Summa ameen.
Conclusion, more of Pakistani women need to be locked up, beaten and mentally tortured. More citizens need to be "purified", only al-wahab lovers should exist in the land of the pure. Their feet and hands need to be amputated to totally enjoy and appreciate the al-Saud way.
May Allah give them more of the Ummah way of life, something they crave. Ameen. Summa ameen.
baron von richtofen
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Nawaz's paradise..
Hyperion
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LMFAO, tell Pakistani's about their lineage and they will blow a gasket.
Their history spans a maximum of 200 - 400 years, before that, it's a blank. They were all born pure Arab blood, aka true Muslims by default.
Rest of all the "connecting" lies they learn from Moasharti-Aloom and Islamiat. The story of their existence lies in those two books!
Their history spans a maximum of 200 - 400 years, before that, it's a blank. They were all born pure Arab blood, aka true Muslims by default.
Rest of all the "connecting" lies they learn from Moasharti-Aloom and Islamiat. The story of their existence lies in those two books!
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Well,
I understand how unhappy you are about this which is fine. But what I can't understand is why do you wish bad things to happen to your people, hating them too much is insanely unacceptable.
So,what happenned with Syria...forgot to pay the mercenaries ?
They never learn 
pity...I don't understand why some Indians are unpleasant about this. After all it is the free will of the Pakistani people, not Indians or whoever. But certainly, someone seems to be trying to spoil the broth
@Aeronaut
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Yzd Khalifa
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This wasn't a Pakistani guy to begin with, and the guy was jailed for mistreating that poor Bengal guy.
Next
No harm, you are one out of the %5 who dislike us
Makes no difference..
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My dear the common man here does not know about the political side political wars.
All they know Saudi Arabia has our holiest Muslim sites and all they know that Saudia is a land where poor lot from Pakistan, India, BD etc etc go to make their fortune.
If you ask me a question about liking disliking Saudia as a layman why would i dislike it with above mentioned knowledge??
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