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Pakistan's Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircrafts

Nothing to do with a NVG suite. It is a radar system and hence is not limited by day or night. Moreover, it is a certified for IFR hence it goes around at night.

But no fixed probe hanging anywhere in ZDK-03?
 
But how does that translate into lesser capability and what difference does it make? None of Indian aircraft are Low Observable as far as I know. Given the ZDK-03's ability to provide surveillance and warning, I would not be complaining especially given the price and financing likely provided by Chinese friends.

Just a thought - could Erieye's capabilities include ability to provide accurate targeting information to a BVR missile fired by a combat plane? That is the only difference that I could imagine arising out of the difference in scan resolution between Erieye and ZDK-03. This is just a guess and I would like more knowledgeable forum members to provide more information. I would really like @gambit to comment on this, if he please.

Hopefully this may answer your query


Dear,

A bit of correction required, since presented information is being attributed to me.

1. Erieye uses AESA 75 deg on either side of perpendicular, meaning 75+75 = 150 deg on one side, 150 deg on the otherside, totaling 300 degree of total instantaneous coverage on both sides. Information is extracted from Erieye Brochures, and is confirmed since it is based on manufacturer's claims.

2. ZDK-03 must have atleast 60 deg on either side of perpendicular, meaning 120 deg cone, atleast. Information is a guess from my side as Chinese KJ2000 and KJ200 have AESA with atleast the same specs, but it could be higher. I have no hard evidence to support this because Chinese AESA have not been formally presented in any brochures etc. I am still looking for evidences regarding this, but so far no hard evidence.

Regards,
Sapper


If I am not mistaken, ZDK-03 features two AESA arrays instead of three on KJ-2000, therefore a rotating dome is needed. The lack of third array is purely a cost saving consideration.

Thats not the ONLY reason, another reason is that a larger array can be placed in a rotating dome giving more range, while placing triangular dome reduces the size of each array by ~20%.

A simple trignometric analysis shows that the maximum array size of triangular dome (like KJ2000 and Phalcon) is 20% less than a straight radial array along its diameter (like E-3-Sentry, E-2D-Hawkeye, ZDK03).

Moreover, previously the pulse doppler version of rotating domes gave a 20sec radar darkness over any perticular point due to the fact that they could only illuminate targets in direct line of sight in perpendicular to the array, but the AESA doesnot have that restriction. Instead AESA can electronically steer a radar beam to illuminate 60 degrees to either side of perpendicular. This covers 120 degree to each side totalling 240 degrees of instantaneous view, while leaving 60 degree on each corner in radar darkness. When rotating at same speed of 40 sec per rotation, same as with pulse dopler version, it will illuminate a full 360 degree circle in 6 seconds. Thus a target is re-illuminated 6 seconds after it goes into dark region. Also this is assuming ZDK-03 has AESA with 120 degree field of view, which is only an assumption. In actuality it might have 150 degree field of view AESA (like Erieye atop Saab2000) which will reduce re-acquisition time to 3 sec.

One more thing to note is that fixed dome suffers from constant side lobe attenuations in regions deviating close its electronic steering boundary, for extended periods of time; while giving good target data at regions close to perpendicular. On the other hand, rotating dome ensures maximum search precision for all 360 degrees within a maximum of 10 seconds, and that too without changing the heading of the platform itself.

If you ask me, having 20% plus range is much much more desirable than 3 seconds of radar darkness, besides being cost effective as well.

Regards,
Sapper







Now my first assumption is that two complimenting AESAs are placed inside the rotating dome, i.e. the similar kind of double sided Erieye configuration, but in rotating configuration. This is based on the assumption that
1. Dual sided aesa was already available with china on Y-8 platform at similar cost, but not opted for by PAF,
2. AESA is comparatively thin and does not require additional wasted space for dedicated transmitter assembly on the backside, since every single unit is itself a transmitter reciever on its own.
3. China already posses the technology to fit 3xAESA in a radome and 2xAESA in sandwitch-BalanceBeam configurations, placing the balance beam config would have been no problem to place into a rotating radome.

If thats the case for ZDK-03 (unless proven on the contrary) I will proceed with the following calculations.


Assume 40 sec per rotation, which is normal, and 120 arch illumination (60 deg from perpedicular) for AESA array, which is also normal.
360 deg per 40 sec = 9 deg per sec (RotationSpeed)

Assume a target is at 0-deg, Radar starts spinning, at radar's-0-deg, target is fully perpedicular and perfectly lit
Radar goes to 45-deg, still lit.
Radar goes 60-deg, still lit.
Radar goes 61-deg, target lost.
Now radar goes 90-deg, target is still lost.
Radar goes 119-deg, still lost.
Now radar comes to 120 deg, still lost for the array pointing 120, but the array facing exactly opposite to it i.e. at 120+180 deg = 300-deg has illumination till 360 deg, which is the same as 0-deg, target lit by opposing array, target acquired.

Now target lost at 61-deg ... and reacquired at 120-deg.
Lost-Time = 60-deg / RotationSpeed = 60 / 9 = 6.6 sec


I may be wrong, and ZDK-03 might only have a single AESA pointing to one side, as in legacy E3Sentry, in which case the re-acquisition will take 26 seconds to re-acquire target, but lets wait for the time when PAF or China releases specs. If thats the case apologies in advance.

Regards,
Sapper
 
But how does that translate into lesser capability and what difference does it make? None of Indian aircraft are Low Observable as far as I know. Given the ZDK-03's ability to provide surveillance and warning, I would not be complaining especially given the price and financing likely provided by Chinese friends.

Just a thought - could Erieye's capabilities include ability to provide accurate targeting information to a BVR missile fired by a combat plane? That is the only difference that I could imagine arising out of the difference in scan resolution between Erieye and ZDK-03. This is just a guess and I would like more knowledgeable forum members to provide more information. I would really like @gambit to comment on this, if he please.
There are two ways a missile could be 'guided': radar and data.

- Radar. This is where another radar source, assume an AWACS for convenience, illuminate a target, then the missile uses any reflections as guidance beacon.

Like this...

bistatic_rad_missile.jpg


It does not matter if the above illustration have the radar source as the parent missile launcher. The principle is still the same: the missile uses an external radar source.

- Data. This is where another radar source, assume an AWACS for convenience, illuminate a target, analyzes that information, then transmit that information to the missile. This is not saying: 'Turn here or there.' That would be command guidance. This is saying: 'The target is at X altitude, moving at Y speed, and at Z heading.' That is target data. The missile then analyzes its own position in relation to the target and make appropriate maneuvers.

Which of the above is applicable to the Erieye ? I will leave that answer to the Pakistani members to research.

However, the simplest answer would be 'radar'. This method places the burden of target guidance entirely upon the missile. All the AWACS does is provide target illumination. If the AWACS is threatened by hostiles or struck by lightning and cannot sustain target illumination over a certain duration, then the missile is SOL (sh1t out of luck), as we Americans would say.

Data guidance have the advantage in that the source radar can 'burst' target information and this tactic is often used in heavy EM traffic situation, which could include countermeasures by the enemy. The companion issue here is how to preserve data integrity, which includes encryption so as not to provide false guidance to others. Greater sophistication would be for multiple friendly assets to use the same data guidance to attack a target from directions. The disadvantage is that both sender and receiver of data must have the same level of technical sophistication.

If the missile have its own radar package, that would be helpful for either of the above. The missile could use its own radar to illuminate the target and uses that information to correlate external guidance information. A fully 'active' missile, like the American AMRAAM for example, is the best way to go. With its own radar package, it could work with less sophisticated radar systems via 'raw' target illumination from any external source, or it could be 'silent' and be in 'beamrider' mode towards a target, or switches from active to passive to correlate as it flies.

Can an AWACS provide both radar and data guidance as situations demands? Absolutely.

Does the Erieye ? You guys will have to research for that.

Erieye - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Erieye AEW&C mission system radar is an active, phased-array, pulse-doppler sensor that can feed an onboard operator architecture or downlink data (via an associated datalink subsystem) to a ground-based air defence network.
The wiki source seems to imply so, but it is rather limited and quite narrow in focus: a ground based air defense network. But at least the ability to transmit formulated data is there, and not just providing raw target illumination.
 
Thanks @gambit. BTW I am a yellow jacket and you need not worry about translating American idioms. I get 'em, or at least most of 'em. For the rest I think I have the requisite cultural perspective, having spent years in Mid West and South.

So, what I have learned is that the required technological sophistication is probably available, now whether or not Pakistanis are able / willing / permitted to use that capability is another matter.

But my question really was whether ZDK-03 is inferior in not providing a particular capability vis-a-vis Erieye. @mafiya has quoted posts from the past on this matter, but for me that does not clarify the issue well enough.

But never mind though. There are somethings people like me are not meant to know. They are best kept secret or under the cover of ambiguity.
 
Thanks @gambit. BTW I am a yellow jacket and you need not worry about translating American idioms. I get 'em, or at least most of 'em. For the rest I think I have the requisite cultural perspective, having spent years in Mid West and South.

So, what I have learned is that the required technological sophistication is probably available, now whether or not Pakistanis are able / willing / permitted to use that capability is another matter.

But my question really was whether ZDK-03 is inferior in not providing a particular capability vis-a-vis Erieye.
@mafiya has quoted posts from the past on this matter, but for me that does not clarify the issue well enough.

But never mind though. There are somethings people like me are not meant to know. They are best kept secret or under the cover of ambiguity.
What I explained was high level to clear up some misconceptions. At the lower levels, things get more technically problematic, but not impossible.

Take the American AMRAAM, for example, in pure receiver mode. I cannot simply fire-and-forget it in any environment and be confident that the missile will accept any target reflections created by a French AWACS, even though the French, Brits, and the Saudis uses the Boeing E-3. Inside every radar transmission are 'marker' signatures similar to IFF queries. The missile must be able to extract this identifier from target reflections in order to find the correct target, else the missile would be vulnerable to even innocuous atmospheric interference, let alone deliberate countermeasures.

So which is superior, the Erieye or the ZDK, in this regard? Neither. In pure receiver mode, the burden of target acquisition falls entirely upon the missile, remember? So if I, the AWACS maker, told you the transmission specs, it is up to you, the missile maker, to extract the relevant information to use.

High level? A missile can use reflections produced by an external source.

Low level? A missile must be able to somehow correctly identify the reflections as legitimate.

An example of this is with infrared sensor/guidance. IR is essentially produced by heat and currently, no one can manipulate IR radiation the way we can manipulate radar emissions. So there is really no way for an IR sensor to distinguish jet engine IR radiation from a cluster of flares. Even the sun can distract an IR sensor.

So which is superior, the Erieye or the ZDK, when it comes to providing target data from analyzing their own respective radar illumination of a target? We have to look at the sales brochures to see which have that capability, let alone buying/modifying missiles to exploit that capability.

So which is superior, the Erieye or the ZDK, when it comes to providing both radar illumination and target data analyses and guidance?
 
OMG
IS IT TRUE?
1102023089-1.gif
DAily express source
we lost 3 awacs

I agree principally, technicians may have nothing to do with the security.
Unless they were partners of attackers and were facilitating them etc. in which case they all needed to face firing squad.
 
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I agree principally, technicians may have nothing to do with the security.
Unless they were partners of attackers and were facilitating them etc. in which case they all needed to face firing squad.
but losing 3 AWACS and than saying our security is full proof
after attack on p=3 orions why paf did not built hangers for them
really feel sham
 
but losing 3 AWACS and than saying our security is full proof
after attack on p=3 orions why paf did not built hangers for them
really feel sham

Are you being suspicious of an Indian penetration in PAF, at policy level?

What a shame, Musharraf got them AWACS and they were unable to build bomb prof hangers for them.
 
I agree principally, technicians may have nothing to do with the security.
Unless they were partners of attackers and were facilitating them etc. in which case they all needed to face firing squad.
Dear Batman, No base can have a dedicated security force. All personnel being already trained perform security duty according to pre-defined roster. Even officers have to perform security duties according to a roster. Therefore, deployment of technicians is not of surprise. However, this is surprising that only technicians are being tried.


but losing 3 AWACS and than saying our security is full proof
after attack on p=3 orions why paf did not built hangers for them
really feel sham
Are you being suspicious of an Indian penetration in PAF, at policy level?

Agents can be present in all the institutions at all the levels. Internal security keeps weeding those out periodically. Giving you an example Mr Hussain Haqqani he was an influential agent. Such agents act at the time of policy making. Or for that matter what will you call a PM who is dying to allow indians to visit Pakistan freely, whereas Indian government is doing all it can to stop Pakistani's visit India, using techniques like mandatory sponsorship letter from a Hindu first class civil servant.
 
Are you being suspicious of an Indian penetration in PAF, at policy level?

What a shame, Musharraf got them AWACS and they were unable to build bomb prof hangers for them.
it was duty of armed forces to protect high value assets not ppp or pml n
i m so sad from last 2 days
now any idea what is the next plan of inducting new awacs
 

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