interesting article.....but long reading for some!!!
ref:
http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/...301c62f015/S-2--Options-for-the-Pakistan-Navy
THE OPTIONS
Pakistan’s security situation is precarious, and the future is not bright. On one
hand, the differences between Washington and Islamabad that lately irked and
angered the latter now seem to be thawing.66 But on the other,New Delhi’s strategic
interests being “exactly aligned”with those ofWashington, India is getting
extensive mileage out of Pakistan’s current predicament.67 Despite the recent
diplomatic successes, then, Pakistan’s choices, if it is to address strategic asymmetry
and ensure the survivability of its nuclear forces, are contracting rapidly.
Pakistan’s existing means of delivering nuclear strikes are susceptible to air
and missile attacks. The Indian air defense system—potentially including the
Prithvi Air Defence capability and the upcoming U.S.-Israeli-Russian Ballistic
Missile Shield—reduces the possibility of penetration by eithermissiles or fighters.
68 The option of missiles with multiple warheads also is open to debate. For
now, the dispersal of the nuclear arsenal poses a question mark. The cuttingedge
technologies in the Indian inventory—surveillance means like IRS satellites
and the MiG-25, the day/night-capable Israeli surveillance satellite RISAT,
along with platforms like the Phalcon AWACS, Su-30 aircraft, etc.—put its value
in question.
Nonetheless, the recent parleys in the Conference onDisarmament in Geneva
on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) threaten to freeze the imbalance in
the stocks of these materials of Pakistan and India to the distinct advantage of
the latter. New Delhi gains from the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and a consequent
Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver that has allowed India to conclude agreements
with countries Russia, France, andmore recently the United Kingdom to supply
it with nuclear fuel.69 Pakistan’s resource imbalance, geographic disproportion
(differences in landmass), and now the launch of S-2 provide India a convincing
capacity to strike all over Pakistan from the deep south while ensuring the survivability
of its own forces.70 In the absence of Pakistani potential to deliver a nuclear
riposte, an economic threshold would certainly be reached in days if
Pakistan’s sea-lanes, particularly from the Persian Gulf, were to be obstructed.
94 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
Second Strike on board Conventional Submarines: The Agosta 90B
In October 2008, the chief of staff of the Pakistan Navy claimed that his service
was capable of deploying strategic weapons at sea.71 The details as to how strategic
or nuclear weapons would be deployed and whether Pakistan had developed
a capability to launch missiles from submarines were not disclosed. But it is
widely speculated that work on arming the Pakistan Navy’s conventional submarines
with nuclear-tipped missiles has been going on now for quite some
time.A sea version of the Babur cruise missile is thought to have been developed
by the country’s strategic organizations. If that is true, Pakistan would not be the
first country to arm conventionally powered submarines with such a capability.
Israel’s 1,900-ton Dolphin-class, German-origin submarines are believed to be
part of the country’s second-strike capability. They provide Tel Aviv the crucial
third pillar of nuclear defense complementing the country’smuch vaunted land
and air ramparts.72
Pakistan Navy’s Agosta 90B, or Khalid-class, attack submarines (SSKs) carry
crews of highly skilled and professionally trained officers andmen.The submarines,
designed by DCN (now DCNS) of France, are a version of the Agosta
series, with improved performance, a new combat system, and AIP(airindependent
propulsion) for better submerged endurance. A higher level of automation
has reduced the crew from fifty-four to thirty-six. Other improvements
include a new battery, for increased range; a deeper diving capability of
320 meters, resulting from the use of new materials, including HLES 80 steel;
and a reduced acoustic signature, through the installation of new suspension
and isolation systems.73
Three Agosta 90Bs were ordered by Pakistan in 1994. The first, Khalid (1999),
was constructed in France; the second, Saad (2003), was assembled at the Naval
Dockyard (Karachi); and the third, Hamza (2008), was constructed and assembled
in Karachi. These submarines are equipped with diesel-electric propulsion
and the MESMA (Module d’Énergie Sous-Marin Autonome) AIP system.74 The
diesel-electric plant consists of two SEMT-Pielstick 16 PA4 V185 VG diesels,
providing 3,600 horsepower, and a 2,200-kilowatt electric motor driving a single
propeller.
Pakistan is the only country bordering the Indian Ocean to have acquired AIP
submarines. The two-hundred-kilowatt MESMA liquid-oxygen system increases
significantly the submerged endurance of the submarine at four knots.75
It consists essentially of a turbine receiving high-pressure steam generated by a
boiler that uses hot gases from the combustion of a gaseous mixture of ethanol
and liquid oxygen.76 The AIP suite causes an 8.6-meter extension of the original
67.6-meter hull, increasing the boat’s submerged displacement from 1,760 tons
to 1,980.77
MUHAMMAD AZAM KHAN 95
The Agosta 90B is equipped with a fully integrated SUBTICS combat system.
SUBTICS processes signals from submarine sensors and determines the tactical
situation by track association, fusion, synthesis, and management, as well as
trajectory plotting. This track management allows appreciation of the surface
picture by the commander and consequent handling of weapons-related command
and control functions.
The Agosta 90B submarine has four bow-mounted 1Q63 A Mod 2 torpedo
tubes, 533 mm in diameter, and carries a mixed load of sixteen torpedoes and
missiles. The boat can also fire tube-launched SM39 Exocet subsurface-tosurface
missiles, capable of hitting targets out to twenty-seven nautical miles
(fifty kilometers) away. The sea-skimming missile has inertial guidance and active
radar homing and travels at 0.9 Mach.78 Target range and bearing data are
downloaded into the Exocet’s computer via SUBTICS. The boat can also launch
the DM2A4 wire-guided, active/passive, wake-homing torpedo, adding a new
dimension to its firepower.Targets up to forty-five kilometers away can now be
engaged.
In the short term (within five years), Pakistan Navy Khalid-class submarines
with their cutting-edge technology could be armed to carry nuclear-tipped
cruise missiles. Several formidable challenges would, however, have to be overcome.
Missile installation and subsequent integration with the onboard combat
system, as well as with the nuclear command-and-control infrastructure (C4I
network), could be daunting tasks.79 The combat system, meant for conventional
weapons, may require major changes to accommodate nonconventional
weapons.During operational deployments a Pakistan Navy submarine carrying
nuclear weapons would be under the operational control not of Commander
Pakistan Fleet, as in existing practice, but of theNational Command Authority.
Perhaps a greater challenge would be ensuring foolproof communications
between the submerged submarine and the shore-based command. An electromagnetic
pulse following a nuclear burst would disrupt the earth’s electromagnetic
spectrum, resulting in a partial or complete breakdown of communications,
including shore–submarine. The problemis compounded by the
absence of domestic communications satellites. A very-low-frequency (VLF)
communications system can provide an answer, to some extent.80 A sustained
program of tests and trials would be needed to develop a robust communication
system that can sustain such a contingency.
The submarine’s crew, obviously specially selected, would also require extensive
training in handling all kinds of unforeseen events, developing standard operating
procedures and planning ways to minimize uncertainty on board in the
absence of communications.81 Test firings of missiles will be required to ensure
crew confidence as well as weapon-systems credibility.
96 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
Numerous issues of a technical as well as an operational nature will thus have
to be addressed at each tier to integrate the vessel fully into national strategic
forces. Close cooperation and coordination between the Development and Employment
Control committees under the National Command Authority and
strategic organizations like the Kahuta Research Laboratories, the National Engineering
and Scientific Commission, the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research
Organization, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, the Maritime
Technology Complex, and the National Development Complex will also be essential
at every step. These organizations will have to rise above intraestablishment
rivalries and jealousies that could get in way of smooth and timely
achievement of milestones.
A word of caution may be in order here. The Pakistan Navy once enjoyed a
sharp edge over the Indian Navy’s conventional submarines, like the Sovietdesigned
Foxtrot-class boats, which were noisier than the French submarines
operated by Pakistan. But the Indian Navy has not only been catching up but is
now on the verge of surpassing Pakistani submarines. Its French Scorpènes are
supposedly a generation ahead of the Agosta 90B.82 On a positive note, however,
the recent introduction of advance platforms like the SAAB Erieye airborne
early warning and control system and Il-78 refuelers by Pakistan Air Force, besides
bolstering Pakistan’s strategic capability both on land and at sea, will significantly
strengthen the nation’s air defenses.83
Employing the P-3C
The P-3COrion long-range maritime-patrol aircraft (LRMP) has a provenmaritime
surveillance and reconnaissance record that dates back to the Cold War.
Several old and new versions of the aircraft continue to serve in more than eighteen
countries, including the United States. It is a turboprop,multidimensional
aircraft commonly known to the naval community as an “airborne destroyer.”
The PakistanNavy first acquired P-3Cs in 1991. The present inventory is suitably
modernized and equipped with cutting-edge sensors and weapons to track,
identify, and hunt surface and subsurface targets. The aircraft can carry a mixed
payload of eight Harpoonmissiles and six torpedoes, besides mines and bombs.
It has endurance inexcess of eighteenhours andcan operate as lowas three hundred
feet, making its detection quite difficult.
In the recent past, the Pakistan Navy brokered a fresh deal with the United
States for eight refurbished P-3Cs. In addition to improved sensors, a digital
tracking system, electro-optical and infrared sensors, a chaff dispenser, an electronic
support measures (ESM) suite, and sonobuoy detection system, the new
batch of P-3Cs is to be fitted with inverse synthetic-aperture radar (ISAR). ISAR
is a state-of-the-art radar that provides a dual advantage. First, it eases the
MUHAMMAD AZAM KHAN 97
identification problem by displaying a target’s silhouette, a physical image,
which improves the overall effectiveness of tracking and attacking. The other
advantage is variable power output, which makes ISAR difficult to identify via
ESM.
Following the Mumbai terror attacks, the Indian Navy too concluded a deal
with the United States for eight of a new type of LRMP—the Multi-Mission
Maritime Aircraft (MMA, or P-8 Poseidon, the successor to the P-3C). The Indian
Navy is currently operating older-generation LRMPs, Russian Il-38s and
Tu-142s. The jet-driven Poseidon will be suitably converted for anti-surfacevessel
and antisubmarine roles. The prototype is, however, not likely to roll out
before 2012, after which its true capabilities would be known.
The P-3C is a mainstay of the Pakistan Navy’s offensive arm. With its advanced
weapon and sensor outfit, it gives the Pakistan Navy a clear qualitative
edge over the Indian Navy’s LRMP capability—at least for now. Thanks to its
load-carrying capacity, altitude advantage, and other aerodynamic characteristics,
the P-3C could be armed with land-attack missiles or strategic weapons.
This modification, however, would require specialized equipment—currently
a grey area in the Pakistan Navy. A suitably equipped P-3C could serve as a
powerful backup to an undersea second strike on board Agosta 90Bs. A
well-thought-out employment strategy could render the P-3C a potent constituent
of the nuclear triad.
The Medium and Long Terms (beyond Five Years)
The absence of any opposition by the United States or the rest of the international
community to the prolonged and sustained Russian assistance to India in
the development of a sea-based nuclear deterrent potential was conspicuous.
That is not all; the now-shaping Indo-U.S. nuclear deal has never caused any uproar
in the West or among the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Besides raising concerns
on proliferation, the deal significantly undercuts the efficacy of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.84 This provides Pakistan enough justification
either to lease nuclear submarines or eventually development its own, or both.85
It is not a question of matching nuclear weapon for nuclear weapon but about
preserving stability and ensuring the survivability of nuclear forces. The national
maritime objectives and tasks assigned to the Pakistan Navymay not warrant
a nuclear submarine in its inventory, but maintenance of deterrence,
particularly in the evolving geopolitics of the Indian Ocean region, certainly
does merit consideration of it.
In China, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is currently involved in
one of the world’s most ambitious submarine expansion and construction programs.
It includes acquisition of conventional submarines, like the Russian Kilo
98 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
(SS), and the construction of the Jin-class (Type 094) SSBN and the Shang-class
(Type 093) SSN. These submarines are expected to be much more modern and
capable than China’s aging older-generation boats.86
In 1983 the PLAN built an eight-thousand-ton Xia-class SSBN, reportedly
armed with twelve JL-1 missiles with a range of a thousand miles. The submarine
twice test-fired its missiles but never ventured beyond China’s regional waters.
The new Type 094 Jin, which will replace the single Xia, will carry between
ten and twelve JL-2 SLBMs.87 However, the PLAN has major handicaps in its
limited capacity to communicate with submarines at sea or expose these platforms
on strategic patrols.88
The once slowly expanding military ties between Beijing and Islamabad have
nowmatured into a strategic partnership, as is evident fromlocal production of
the JF-17 Thundermultirole fighter, the Al-Khalid tank, and F-22P frigates.This
partnership is further evidenced by the PLAN’s regular participation in the large
multinational AMAN series of exercises hosted by the Pakistan Navy. Pakistan’s
strategic community and Beijing could plan the training and subsequent lease
of a nuclear-powered submarine.The PLAN’s Xia submarine could be an appropriate
start.Apool of selected PakistanNavy officers could be trained to operate
an SSBN, with theoretical/academic work ashore followed by operational training
at sea and finally a strategic deployment. Though such a plan seems ambitious
and the PLA Navy’s SSBNs rarely prowl far, this remains a viable choice
that would serve the two countries well strategically.89
{LINE-SPACE}
Deterrence is not a passive concept; it must be stepped up in proportion to an
adversary’s increases in arsenal or delivery means. For reasons all too well
known, Pakistan’s principal security perceptions will remain India-centric. To
keep deterrence credible, the indispensability of continuously bolstering Pakistan’s
nuclear assets, including delivery means, cannot be overstressed. The international
community would react sharply were Pakistan to field a sea-based
nuclear deterrent, given the country’s security situation and fears of radicalization
(real or imaginary) inWestern minds.90 Timing, therefore, is crucial. Pakistan
is currently too dependent on the American and multilateral financial
institutions for keeping its economy afloat, and that situation is not likely to alter
for the next few years. But if the issue is not addressed, Pakistan’s hard-earned
nuclear stabilitymay erode beyond recovery.
The role of armed forces was once to win a war if diplomacy had failed; in the
nuclear age their role is to prevent warfare from breaking out.91 Despite being on
the wrong side
said that he will do the test? 
