Pakistan to become 4th largest nation by population in 2050
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TopCat
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hahahahahah... i did not know women gets ovulation only on holidays... Jokers..............
mjnaushad
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Actually they cant control themselves from having sex and feel shy to buy condoms.....thats why they try to stop such law..
I think you are right in a way, but some people do love lots of kids, i cant understand why? why are they crazy about kids that much? they feel shy about buying condoms because of our super strict culture about issues related to sex, i think we really need to loosen the strickness about sex in our culture, it will bring us alot of benefit and reduce the problems.
TopCat
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You hardly need condoms if you are carefull..
They are just ignorant and produce bunch of kids...
Nahraf
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Nobody can do anything about it except the parents themselves.
The Palestinian birthrate was one of the highest in the world but it has now plummeted. There are some people/websites claiming that Zionazis are adding drugs to water/food supply to keep the Palestinian birth rate lower.
Archie
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unless the govt take stringent action , the population growth rate will continue to be high , frankly i believe in having a 1-2 child policy like china to be a good idea for rest of south asia to follow , i mean look at this birth rate in china is 18 per 1000 ,while death rate stands at 7 per 1000, that translate to a net growth rate 1.1% coz there ,urban people are allowed only 1 child , while rural people are allowed a max of 2 children
In india , even though the growth rate of population has been declining over the year , but it is still quite high simply becoz the govt has not forced its people to have less children , thanks to a fear of being voted out of power , something which happen to the Indra Gandhi govt in the late 1970s where its compulsary vasectomy policy backfired badly
Currently birth rate stands at 22.5 per thousand , while death rate stands at 8.2 per 1000 , translating into a growth rate of 1.43% , the birth rate has fallen from nearly 30 per 1000 in 1991 to 22.5 per 1000 in 2009 , so you can see that it is a painfully slow process by any standard
Now the family planning department hopes to reduce the birth rate to 16 per thousand by 2020 , now lets see how they manage convincing people specially rural people to be satisfied with just one or two kids
In india , even though the growth rate of population has been declining over the year , but it is still quite high simply becoz the govt has not forced its people to have less children , thanks to a fear of being voted out of power , something which happen to the Indra Gandhi govt in the late 1970s where its compulsary vasectomy policy backfired badly
Currently birth rate stands at 22.5 per thousand , while death rate stands at 8.2 per 1000 , translating into a growth rate of 1.43% , the birth rate has fallen from nearly 30 per 1000 in 1991 to 22.5 per 1000 in 2009 , so you can see that it is a painfully slow process by any standard
Now the family planning department hopes to reduce the birth rate to 16 per thousand by 2020 , now lets see how they manage convincing people specially rural people to be satisfied with just one or two kids
ramu
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sparklingway
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As I narrated earlier, Algeria, Iran and Bangladesh have become wise unlike our country where Mullah rules the bedroom as well.
This is a weekly post by Nidhal Guessoum (see his earlier posts here). Nidhal is an astrophysicist and Professor of Physics at American University of Sharjah.
The population of Egypt has increased from 44 million to 84 million people in the past 30 years! According to World Bank statistics, it is expected to reach 130 million in 2050. That is undoubtedly a stunning explosion, and it surely must elicit various reactions and comments, including panic and despair, as the issue here strikes directly at human development, through demographics, economics, sociology, state policies, and religion (stands w.r.t. birth control).
Even more depressing is the news that Egypt is not a special and lone case with such a population explosion occurring over the last few decades. Let us look briefly at the figures for a few other important Muslim countries:
· Algerias population increased from 19 to 35 million between 1980 and 2010 and is expected to reach 50 million in 2050;
· Irans population increased from 39 to 74 million in the past 30 years and is expected to reach 96 million in 2050;
· Pakistans population increased from 83 to 173 million in the past 30 years and is expected to reach 321 million in 2050;
· Even Malaysia (a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and well-managed country) is seeing the same doubling of population trend: from 14 to 28 million in the past 30 years, reaching 39 million by 2050;
· Finally, Saudi Arabia is a complicated case: the figures show even more staggering explosions (from 9 to 26 million in the past 30 years, reaching 42 million in 2050), but these numbers include expatriates (about a third of them), varying with economic growth and recession; still, the numbers are stunning.
The trends are indeed clear and startling; as I said above, they induce panic and despair when one thinks of the standards of living that these countries could then be expected to produce for their populations now and in the next few decades.
Now, if economic growth cannot be expected to match such population increases (over many years and decades), the only other option is to limit population growth. But one cannot envisage a Chinese-style one child per couple policy, for cultural and religious reasons.
Which leads me to the question of birth control and Islam. Although Muslim scholars have now largely accepted contraception as a permissible procedure that couples can adopt (though this was a matter of debate and disagreement for many years until recently, just like in the Catholic Church), they still set stringent conditions, among them that the procedure be freely adopted by the couple and not imposed by the state. Many scholars also distinguish between the contraceptive pill, which they usually accept, and between the Copper-T Intra-Uterine Device (IUD), which is often described as a destructive tool that acts after fertilization has occurred. And juristic (Islamic) schools differ over the period (weeks to months) over which abortion under special circumstances (e.g. serious health risks to the pregnant woman) can be practiced. Furthermore, permanent procedures like vasectomy (in males) and tubecotomy (in females) are largely rejected (on grounds that they involve changing human physiology).
And if one prods the scholars a bit hard, they will mostly reject economic and standard-of-living reasons for family planning and population growth. They will insist that Allah will provide bountifully for pious people, and better education and quality of life depends more on other factors than on the size of a family.
It was thus very interesting for me to notice an Egyptian state TV campaign attempting to convince people (especially the less educated farmer communities of the south) to limit the number of children they should have. In a funny scene, Uncle Said asks a not-so-young fellow why he wants to marry a second (younger) wife, and when the latter tells him he wants more children (now that the others have grown up), Uncle Said brings a jug of juice and a few empty glasses and shows him how dividing the juice among 6 glasses yields less (per glass) than if it is divided among two or three
I should also mention some interesting statistics provided by the World Bank regarding the usage of contraceptives in various countries. Here are the numbers for the Muslim countries mentioned above for recent times (the data often not being available before the 80s or the 70s); what is available is still very interesting:
· In Algeria the fraction of women (between the ages of 15 and 49) who regularly use contraceptives was only 7 % in 1977, then it jumped to 47% in 1992 (due to a large state campaign after it was discovered that the countrys birth rate had for the previous two decades been one of the highest in the world), and it is now at 61 %;
· In Egypt, it was 24% in 1980 (there are no data figures previous to that), and it has similarly increased to about 60% now;
· In Iran, 23 % of women used contraceptives in 1978 (the earliest data figure, just before the Islamic revolution), steadily increasing to about 80 % now;
· In Pakistan, the fraction has increased from 11 % in 1984 to about 30 % now;
· For Malaysia, we only have data from the 1980s when the fraction was about 50 %;
· And for Saudi Arabia, the only figure available is from 1996 when 32 % of women were reported to be using contraceptives, though again, no information is given on whether those were Saudi women or a mixture of Arab/Muslim and non-Muslim/expat women.
I find all these statistics highly significant and critical to these countries future development, and I am surprised that little is made of them in terms of public discourse by government officials and state planners, not to mention reporters and public intellectuals
Population Explosion in the Muslim World
This is a weekly post by Nidhal Guessoum (see his earlier posts here). Nidhal is an astrophysicist and Professor of Physics at American University of Sharjah.
The population of Egypt has increased from 44 million to 84 million people in the past 30 years! According to World Bank statistics, it is expected to reach 130 million in 2050. That is undoubtedly a stunning explosion, and it surely must elicit various reactions and comments, including panic and despair, as the issue here strikes directly at human development, through demographics, economics, sociology, state policies, and religion (stands w.r.t. birth control).
Even more depressing is the news that Egypt is not a special and lone case with such a population explosion occurring over the last few decades. Let us look briefly at the figures for a few other important Muslim countries:
· Algerias population increased from 19 to 35 million between 1980 and 2010 and is expected to reach 50 million in 2050;
· Irans population increased from 39 to 74 million in the past 30 years and is expected to reach 96 million in 2050;
· Pakistans population increased from 83 to 173 million in the past 30 years and is expected to reach 321 million in 2050;
· Even Malaysia (a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and well-managed country) is seeing the same doubling of population trend: from 14 to 28 million in the past 30 years, reaching 39 million by 2050;
· Finally, Saudi Arabia is a complicated case: the figures show even more staggering explosions (from 9 to 26 million in the past 30 years, reaching 42 million in 2050), but these numbers include expatriates (about a third of them), varying with economic growth and recession; still, the numbers are stunning.
The trends are indeed clear and startling; as I said above, they induce panic and despair when one thinks of the standards of living that these countries could then be expected to produce for their populations now and in the next few decades.
Now, if economic growth cannot be expected to match such population increases (over many years and decades), the only other option is to limit population growth. But one cannot envisage a Chinese-style one child per couple policy, for cultural and religious reasons.
Which leads me to the question of birth control and Islam. Although Muslim scholars have now largely accepted contraception as a permissible procedure that couples can adopt (though this was a matter of debate and disagreement for many years until recently, just like in the Catholic Church), they still set stringent conditions, among them that the procedure be freely adopted by the couple and not imposed by the state. Many scholars also distinguish between the contraceptive pill, which they usually accept, and between the Copper-T Intra-Uterine Device (IUD), which is often described as a destructive tool that acts after fertilization has occurred. And juristic (Islamic) schools differ over the period (weeks to months) over which abortion under special circumstances (e.g. serious health risks to the pregnant woman) can be practiced. Furthermore, permanent procedures like vasectomy (in males) and tubecotomy (in females) are largely rejected (on grounds that they involve changing human physiology).
And if one prods the scholars a bit hard, they will mostly reject economic and standard-of-living reasons for family planning and population growth. They will insist that Allah will provide bountifully for pious people, and better education and quality of life depends more on other factors than on the size of a family.
It was thus very interesting for me to notice an Egyptian state TV campaign attempting to convince people (especially the less educated farmer communities of the south) to limit the number of children they should have. In a funny scene, Uncle Said asks a not-so-young fellow why he wants to marry a second (younger) wife, and when the latter tells him he wants more children (now that the others have grown up), Uncle Said brings a jug of juice and a few empty glasses and shows him how dividing the juice among 6 glasses yields less (per glass) than if it is divided among two or three
I should also mention some interesting statistics provided by the World Bank regarding the usage of contraceptives in various countries. Here are the numbers for the Muslim countries mentioned above for recent times (the data often not being available before the 80s or the 70s); what is available is still very interesting:
· In Algeria the fraction of women (between the ages of 15 and 49) who regularly use contraceptives was only 7 % in 1977, then it jumped to 47% in 1992 (due to a large state campaign after it was discovered that the countrys birth rate had for the previous two decades been one of the highest in the world), and it is now at 61 %;
· In Egypt, it was 24% in 1980 (there are no data figures previous to that), and it has similarly increased to about 60% now;
· In Iran, 23 % of women used contraceptives in 1978 (the earliest data figure, just before the Islamic revolution), steadily increasing to about 80 % now;
· In Pakistan, the fraction has increased from 11 % in 1984 to about 30 % now;
· For Malaysia, we only have data from the 1980s when the fraction was about 50 %;
· And for Saudi Arabia, the only figure available is from 1996 when 32 % of women were reported to be using contraceptives, though again, no information is given on whether those were Saudi women or a mixture of Arab/Muslim and non-Muslim/expat women.
I find all these statistics highly significant and critical to these countries future development, and I am surprised that little is made of them in terms of public discourse by government officials and state planners, not to mention reporters and public intellectuals
Population denominator
Governance
Dr Sania Nishtar
July 11, World Population Day, holds special significance for Pakistan, the sixth-most populous country in the world. In a country where food, water, energy, education, healthcare, social welfare, and job opportunities are scarce for the existing population of 173.5 million, the addition of another 173.5 million over the next 34 years will pose a crippling burden in view of prevailing resource constraints.
Population, therefore, is a true denominator for development. Additionally, a burgeoning young population with limited economic opportunities and social welfare means fuelling the fire of extremism, given that these "bleak youths" would be the perfect targets for exploitation by the extremists. For Pakistan population is also the denominator for internal security.
We tend to place the responsibility for rising population on the underperforming population welfare programme. That shouldn't be the case. International experiences show that fertility decline is correlated with the level of socioeconomic development in a society. In other countries where it has been achieved, regulatory measures--as in the case of China's one-child policy--have been at play. The former is not the context in Pakistan and the latter not possible owing to the mistaken notion among the masses that family planning is forbidden by religion.
All hopes are therefore pinned on the performance of the country's population programme. This, perhaps, is also the reason for the current interest in the National Population Policy, 2010, which is in the final stages of review. The policy is important as it will come at a time when many structural changes are taking shape. In essence, therefore, the policy will be indicative of how the state system is adapting. With resources now shifted to the provinces--the 18th Amendment's calling for the wrapping up of the ministry of population welfare (MoPW), after the abolition of the concurrent list and the IMF's conditionality stipulating likewise--a policy issued from a federal level in a domain which is normatively and fiscally provincial will have to make very good sense in order for it to be palatable. These points are likely to be raised at the next meeting of the National Commission on Population Welfare, the inter-provincial forum where the policy is likely to be discussed prior to the cabinet's review.
This comment outlines three areas.
First, the policy should be commensurate with stipulated mandates in the sector. It must garner provincial ownership and clearly outline roles and responsibilities. With population as a sector now completely in the provincial domain, would it be possible to carve out a role to justify the existence of the ministry of population welfare? It would, if the ministry devolves its service delivery responsibilities and focuses on a normative role. The MoPW has an untapped potential to assume a leadership role in the population-development paradigm, which remained overshadowed because service delivery responsibilities had previously crowded out the space for normative functions. Given the strategic importance of population control, a transformed MoPW, lean and competent, could be a good economic investment even in today's resource-challenged environment.
A service delivery mandate doesn't mean the provinces shouldn't pay heed to evidence. An earlier, pre-18th Amendment draft of the policy--the current draft is not in the public domain--had outlined an ambitious plan for increasing infrastructure with targets outlined for increase in the number of Family Welfare Centres and Reproductive Health Centres. Even if this has provincial consent, the strategy needs revisiting for a number of reasons: there is currently a moratorium on new infrastructure in many government polices, with which this clearly conflicts. Additionally, there is no convincing evidence of existing arrangements being efficient, which is why the fundamental premise of "state-owned and -operated infrastructure" is under question.
Secondly, the policy should be clear on one of the burning governance issues in the population/health sectors, relating to the standalone status of the respective ministries. Pakistan is one of the two countries in the world, Egypt being the other, where the health and population ministries are separate. Several attempts have been made by the government in the past to merge both the institutional hierarchies. When this didn't appear feasible, the UNFPA coined the term "functional integration" in 1998, which then became the mantra and endpoint in efforts to achieve institutional collaboration. However, reluctance on the part of both sides--federal and provincial--has been evident with many directives remaining unimplemented, including directives of the executive committee of the National Economic Council, the federal cabinet and the National Commission on Population Welfare in 1985, 1991 and 2006, respectively. The rationale for functional integration is strong. Health and population have shared agendas, as emphasised by the International Conference on Population and Developments, which aimed at a paradigm shift from family planning being a demographic target to a reproductive health endpoint.
A special supplement of the Journal of the Pakistan Medical Association featured an analysis on this subject last year, outlining actions that could be taken to bridge the health-population disconnect ( http://www.heartfile.org/pdf/SHPP-JPMA.pdf ). It would be an imperative for a new policy to come out loud and clear with the specifics of "what," "how" and "when" to eliminate duplications and maximise synergies.
Since changes are also happening simultaneously in the health sector, it appears that the sustainable long-term solution to the existing population-health disconnect centres on strengthening capacity of both the ministries for normative and oversight functions and grouping and benchmarking health and family planning as essential services to be provided through reconstituted service delivery arrangements.
Thirdly, the policy should adequately recognise existing inefficiencies in the population programme. MoPW functionaries are well aware of the pervasive collusion in the field operations of the population programme. Commodities are pilfered, fees are charged for services that are meant to be provided free and there is deliberate inattention to oversight. State resources are wasted as a result and service delivery is undermined. Changes within the existing payment and incentive systems to remedy these fault lines should be a priority for the new policy.
In a way, this links to the critical question in governance--one relating to implementation of policies. There has been no dearth of population "policy instruments" in Pakistan. The work of the Family Planning Association of Pakistan, an NGO, which predated the governments programme, was supported officially by the government in the early 1950s. Since the early 1960's every Five-Year Plan has made allocations for the sector, regardless of whether "population" was housed under the ministry of health and labour (as during the first four Five-Year Plans) or the Planning Commission, and later when it was a given the status of a ministry in 1990. Additionally, the Population Policy was enunciated in 2002 and the NCPW was created in 2006. Furthermore, all health policies, enunciated to date in 1990, 1997 and 2001 have focused on the population issue to some extent.
In theory, Population Policy 2010 has been well articulated, especially with respect to the domains, which needed to be covered in a policy document. However, this framework must be more than stated rhetoric. It must empower institutions to "do more," so that the systemic constraints that stand in the way of implementing the policy can be overcome.
The writer is the author of a recently published book on health reform, Choked Pipes. E mail: sania@heartfile.org
Governance
Dr Sania Nishtar
July 11, World Population Day, holds special significance for Pakistan, the sixth-most populous country in the world. In a country where food, water, energy, education, healthcare, social welfare, and job opportunities are scarce for the existing population of 173.5 million, the addition of another 173.5 million over the next 34 years will pose a crippling burden in view of prevailing resource constraints.
Population, therefore, is a true denominator for development. Additionally, a burgeoning young population with limited economic opportunities and social welfare means fuelling the fire of extremism, given that these "bleak youths" would be the perfect targets for exploitation by the extremists. For Pakistan population is also the denominator for internal security.
We tend to place the responsibility for rising population on the underperforming population welfare programme. That shouldn't be the case. International experiences show that fertility decline is correlated with the level of socioeconomic development in a society. In other countries where it has been achieved, regulatory measures--as in the case of China's one-child policy--have been at play. The former is not the context in Pakistan and the latter not possible owing to the mistaken notion among the masses that family planning is forbidden by religion.
All hopes are therefore pinned on the performance of the country's population programme. This, perhaps, is also the reason for the current interest in the National Population Policy, 2010, which is in the final stages of review. The policy is important as it will come at a time when many structural changes are taking shape. In essence, therefore, the policy will be indicative of how the state system is adapting. With resources now shifted to the provinces--the 18th Amendment's calling for the wrapping up of the ministry of population welfare (MoPW), after the abolition of the concurrent list and the IMF's conditionality stipulating likewise--a policy issued from a federal level in a domain which is normatively and fiscally provincial will have to make very good sense in order for it to be palatable. These points are likely to be raised at the next meeting of the National Commission on Population Welfare, the inter-provincial forum where the policy is likely to be discussed prior to the cabinet's review.
This comment outlines three areas.
First, the policy should be commensurate with stipulated mandates in the sector. It must garner provincial ownership and clearly outline roles and responsibilities. With population as a sector now completely in the provincial domain, would it be possible to carve out a role to justify the existence of the ministry of population welfare? It would, if the ministry devolves its service delivery responsibilities and focuses on a normative role. The MoPW has an untapped potential to assume a leadership role in the population-development paradigm, which remained overshadowed because service delivery responsibilities had previously crowded out the space for normative functions. Given the strategic importance of population control, a transformed MoPW, lean and competent, could be a good economic investment even in today's resource-challenged environment.
A service delivery mandate doesn't mean the provinces shouldn't pay heed to evidence. An earlier, pre-18th Amendment draft of the policy--the current draft is not in the public domain--had outlined an ambitious plan for increasing infrastructure with targets outlined for increase in the number of Family Welfare Centres and Reproductive Health Centres. Even if this has provincial consent, the strategy needs revisiting for a number of reasons: there is currently a moratorium on new infrastructure in many government polices, with which this clearly conflicts. Additionally, there is no convincing evidence of existing arrangements being efficient, which is why the fundamental premise of "state-owned and -operated infrastructure" is under question.
Secondly, the policy should be clear on one of the burning governance issues in the population/health sectors, relating to the standalone status of the respective ministries. Pakistan is one of the two countries in the world, Egypt being the other, where the health and population ministries are separate. Several attempts have been made by the government in the past to merge both the institutional hierarchies. When this didn't appear feasible, the UNFPA coined the term "functional integration" in 1998, which then became the mantra and endpoint in efforts to achieve institutional collaboration. However, reluctance on the part of both sides--federal and provincial--has been evident with many directives remaining unimplemented, including directives of the executive committee of the National Economic Council, the federal cabinet and the National Commission on Population Welfare in 1985, 1991 and 2006, respectively. The rationale for functional integration is strong. Health and population have shared agendas, as emphasised by the International Conference on Population and Developments, which aimed at a paradigm shift from family planning being a demographic target to a reproductive health endpoint.
A special supplement of the Journal of the Pakistan Medical Association featured an analysis on this subject last year, outlining actions that could be taken to bridge the health-population disconnect ( http://www.heartfile.org/pdf/SHPP-JPMA.pdf ). It would be an imperative for a new policy to come out loud and clear with the specifics of "what," "how" and "when" to eliminate duplications and maximise synergies.
Since changes are also happening simultaneously in the health sector, it appears that the sustainable long-term solution to the existing population-health disconnect centres on strengthening capacity of both the ministries for normative and oversight functions and grouping and benchmarking health and family planning as essential services to be provided through reconstituted service delivery arrangements.
Thirdly, the policy should adequately recognise existing inefficiencies in the population programme. MoPW functionaries are well aware of the pervasive collusion in the field operations of the population programme. Commodities are pilfered, fees are charged for services that are meant to be provided free and there is deliberate inattention to oversight. State resources are wasted as a result and service delivery is undermined. Changes within the existing payment and incentive systems to remedy these fault lines should be a priority for the new policy.
In a way, this links to the critical question in governance--one relating to implementation of policies. There has been no dearth of population "policy instruments" in Pakistan. The work of the Family Planning Association of Pakistan, an NGO, which predated the governments programme, was supported officially by the government in the early 1950s. Since the early 1960's every Five-Year Plan has made allocations for the sector, regardless of whether "population" was housed under the ministry of health and labour (as during the first four Five-Year Plans) or the Planning Commission, and later when it was a given the status of a ministry in 1990. Additionally, the Population Policy was enunciated in 2002 and the NCPW was created in 2006. Furthermore, all health policies, enunciated to date in 1990, 1997 and 2001 have focused on the population issue to some extent.
In theory, Population Policy 2010 has been well articulated, especially with respect to the domains, which needed to be covered in a policy document. However, this framework must be more than stated rhetoric. It must empower institutions to "do more," so that the systemic constraints that stand in the way of implementing the policy can be overcome.
The writer is the author of a recently published book on health reform, Choked Pipes. E mail: sania@heartfile.org
sparklingway
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Population control
Dawn Editorial
Sunday, 11 Jul, 2010
On World Population Day, Pakistan should re-visit the issues surrounding unchecked population growth and its consequences. While exact numbers are not available as no census has been under- taken since 1998, the World Bank put the country’s population at nearly 170 million in 2008.
The Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 2006-07, undertaken by the National Institute of Population Studies under the authority of the government, estimates that if current trends persist, the size of the population will swell to a staggering 450 million by 2050. To keep pace with its existing resource base and progress on the path of development, the country must effect measures to slow down the growth rate from the current 1.9 per cent to replacement levels. Higher population figures translate, after all, to tougher governmental targets regarding healthcare, housing and all other basic rights.
It is hoped that the National Population Policy 2010, which aims to make family planning services more effective, contraceptives more easily accessible, lobby support from religious leaders and raise male awareness on the issue, has a demonstrable effect. These are effective approaches that ought to be set into motion immediately. Amongst the reasons for the high population growth rate are the lack of awareness about and access to contraceptive methods, a patriarchal societal mindset where sons are valued more than daughters, and the entrenched belief that birth control has no religious sanction. These realities must be altered if the country is to see significant success in bringing down the population growth rate, which is one of the factors that keep us on the lower rungs of development indexes. The task is tough, but not impossible. Other countries, including Bangladesh which a few decades ago had amongst the highest population growth rates in the world, have achieved success in this area. Pakistan should follow suit.
Dawn Editorial
Sunday, 11 Jul, 2010
On World Population Day, Pakistan should re-visit the issues surrounding unchecked population growth and its consequences. While exact numbers are not available as no census has been under- taken since 1998, the World Bank put the country’s population at nearly 170 million in 2008.
The Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 2006-07, undertaken by the National Institute of Population Studies under the authority of the government, estimates that if current trends persist, the size of the population will swell to a staggering 450 million by 2050. To keep pace with its existing resource base and progress on the path of development, the country must effect measures to slow down the growth rate from the current 1.9 per cent to replacement levels. Higher population figures translate, after all, to tougher governmental targets regarding healthcare, housing and all other basic rights.
It is hoped that the National Population Policy 2010, which aims to make family planning services more effective, contraceptives more easily accessible, lobby support from religious leaders and raise male awareness on the issue, has a demonstrable effect. These are effective approaches that ought to be set into motion immediately. Amongst the reasons for the high population growth rate are the lack of awareness about and access to contraceptive methods, a patriarchal societal mindset where sons are valued more than daughters, and the entrenched belief that birth control has no religious sanction. These realities must be altered if the country is to see significant success in bringing down the population growth rate, which is one of the factors that keep us on the lower rungs of development indexes. The task is tough, but not impossible. Other countries, including Bangladesh which a few decades ago had amongst the highest population growth rates in the world, have achieved success in this area. Pakistan should follow suit.
Hyde
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Our population growth rate is not 1.9 percent. It was 1.56% in 2010. Here is the data from the United Nations estimating our population to be 335 million by 2050.
World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population Database
This is estimated Growth rate till 2050
You can visit above mentioned link for more statistics or for the time period of your own choice
sparklingway
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Zaki the numbers can vary. They took the numbers from PDHS 2006-07. You can check it from NIPS website.
World Bank estimates our population growth rate at 2.14%. How's that?
World Bank estimates our population growth rate at 2.14%. How's that?
