What's new

Pakistan, China ‘keen to get hands on leaked subs documents’

It is no-doubt a goldmine to those who know how to make use of such information and without doubt it is .

It will surely help to know certain parameters of the submarines if not its capacity entirely. It will be most beneficial for Chinese naval ambitions though. Improving further and making counter-measures. It will give them quite more than an Idea of the type of equipment and the doctrine that can be potentially used. IMHO, This incident should be downplayed as much as it can be, make them believe this is such an insignificant issue and try to gather a much as information possible. It is good that Indian establishment is already downplaying this greatest incident.
 
.
What's to stop the French releasing secrets of PNs Agosta 90b subs to keep IN happy?
There is not much left to reveal. The 90B is essentially an upgraded 70 and information on the 70 is widely available. Also, there was a massive mole at PN for a while anyway. The 90B is a good sub, but the scorpene is better.
 
.
is it possible that this leak is the main reason for agusta 90b sudden upgrade? as these were not that old

No, Agosta-90B upgrade was already due and needed at our side and beside that see post 107 of @Oscar Sir.

Also the same vendor, to please a new customer, would never leak any other's info as the new customer would be the next victim like if this was India this time then next is Australia and so on but No. Weapons business does not work like this until & unless a designed deal to corner someone. Furthermore, the data is not leaked by french but an-ex employee posted in India.

For the topic: who knows how many interested minds would have reached and obtained the data way before the news hits mainstream media. The leak is not fake, as the experts in world can evaluate, this is going to be massive chunk of info for rivals as well as going to cost a lot of money to India. Seems like, MMRCA competitors pissed by French leading in India. This leaks seems to be more of a competition fight where the one can go to any limit for benefits especially when it comes to weapons business and no nation is involved in this or directly involved though everyone loves free meal when the hunger is high.
 
.
No, Agosta-90B upgrade was already due and needed at our side and beside that see post 107 of @Oscar.
Furthermore, the data is not leaked by french but an-ex employee posted in India.
Complete BS.It was leaked by a retired French Navy official who was a contractor for DCNS: to assist in a commercial venture for a regional navy.
However, The Australian has been told that the data on the Scorpene was written in France for India in 2011 and is suspected of being removed from France in that same year by a former French Navy officer who was at that time a DCNS subcontractor.
The data is then believed to have been taken to a company in Southeast Asia, possibly to assist in a commercial venture for a regional navy.
It was subsequently passed by a third party to a second company in the region before being sent on a data disk by regular mail to a company in Australia. It is unclear how widely the data has been shared in Asia or whether it has been obtained by foreign intelligence agencies.

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/nat...k=759b67970c080dd9855c17bc8b0fff9d-1472281246

Anyways we know everything there is to know about Agosta-90B
 
.
.It was leaked by a retired French Navy official who was a contractor for DCNS

You did not get the idea of words but jumped in hurry. I said, he was an-ex (sounds like revenge) not in service (that may prove the french deliberately did it). Just think about it wisely and avoid to use such BS word that everyone has opinion and observation that you can differ but not insult.

Anyways we know everything there is to know about Agosta-90B

Indeed, 90B before upgrade, is such an old tech and details are available. We are not worried about that but the real deal is, the most competent and lethal Sub's details are leaked way before it's first voyage. We are talking about leaks and its implications not about what you got. This particular leak is not that only we got it, the world knows it now but rather to give it a thorough view, you came with a counter claim of knowing details of 90B that we did not even bother with.
 
.

Pak brothers, do realise that when you buy a foreign platform all of its capabilities will be known to that supplier and their intelligence community. It is SOP.

So there is always a danger. And a real one. However, with the Tukish upgrade your subs should at least be unkown in these upgraded areas.

The new Chinese subs that are coming will be different in parameters..best thing to do is to guard their secrets and not worry about the French ones.

Also, with the infrastructure upgrade your good country can start building its own subs...long way to go to design and build your own. But if you dont try you will never succeed.

But for now count your blessing and make the best of the leaking indian subs!
 
.
You did not get the idea of words but jumped in hurry. I said, he was an-ex (sounds like revenge) not in service (that may prove the french deliberately did it). Just think about it wisely and avoid to use such BS word that everyone has opinion and observation that you can differ but not insult.



Indeed, 90B before upgrade, is such an old tech and details are available. We are not worried about that but the real deal is, the most competent and lethal Sub's details are leaked way before it's first voyage. We are talking about leaks and its implications not about what you got. This particular leak is not that only we got it, the world knows it now but rather to give it a thorough view, you came with a counter claim of knowing details of 90B that we did not even bother with.
The BS part is you said that ylthe leak was from India, but The Australian who first published this clearly says, The documents were removed from France
The leak about Scorpene only gives helps in knowing how it is maintened not how to detect it or how to build it's systems:
The documents were not classified and at this stage appeared to only focus on how the submarines are operated not how they are built and whether they can be detected, the source said.
"The Indians can object to the fact that these documents show the Pakistanis how to maintain their submarines and that's annoying, but it doesn't tell the Pakistanis how to detect an Indian ship, or how we build a submarine in France. Not at all," the source said.
http://uk.mobile.reuters.com/article/idINKCN11013Z?irpc=932
 
.
The BS part is you said that ylthe leak was from India, but The Australian who first published this clearly says, The documents were removed from France
The leak about Scorpene only gives helps in knowing how it is maintened not how to detect it or how to build it's systems:

The documents were not classified and at this stage appeared to only focus on how the submarines are operated not how they are built and whether they can be detected, the source said.
"The Indians can object to the fact that these documents show the Pakistanis how to maintain their submarines and that's annoying, but it doesn't tell the Pakistanis how to detect an Indian ship, or how we build a submarine in France. Not at all," the source said.




Just a bit for your knowledge and be civilized before calling anyone's opinion as BS as it is an insult that may result in an insult in return. Just go through the read in detail, take it for information and don't read it only to reply.

Indeed there is detail enough about these Subs hence desperation and observations over security breach. The man who allegedly leaked data was posted at India (obviously French) during the project and was fired though it was pressed that the leak is not by the French officials but an Ex.

upload_2016-8-26_19-40-33-png.329210

upload_2016-8-26_19-48-42-png.329215




It’s in the mail: how submarine secrets surfaced in Australia

d707e02491fe98e4a8c61e564596a0e0

Secrets surfaced

In late April 2013 a Sydney postman reached into his satchel and pulled out a small envelope containing the secrets of India’s new submarine fleet.

He dropped the letter, with a Singapore stamp on it, in a private post office box and moved on.

The envelope, containing a small data disc, remained there for days, along with a Telstra bill and junk mail, before being picked up on April 24, 2013, by a man who took it home and pushed the disk into his computer.

This week the contents of that disk have become front-page news in Australia, India and France as each country grapples with the ramifications of an Edward Snowden-style leak of confidential documents disclosing the entire secret combat capability of India’s new Scorpene-class submarine fleet.

The leak is of more than passing interest to Australia because the documents come from the same French shipbuilder, DCNS, that will design 12 submarines for the Royal Australian Navy in the country’s largest and most expensive defence project.

But it is of far greater urgency to India, which fears that if a foreign spy service has acquired the data its six Scorpene submarines, costing a total of $US3 billion ($3.93bn), could be dead in the water before they sail. France is also in damage control as it tries to understand and explain how 22,400 of its secret documents on India’s submarines crossed the world to be delivered by a Sydney postie.

None of these three countries was aware of the leak until this week, when The Australian asked DCNS Australia on Monday afternoon to comment on an astonishing data file it had seen, marked “Restricted Scorpene India”, which laid bare almost every secret capability of India’s new submarines. These included the contracted parameters and capabilities of the submarine’s stealth features, its noise signatures at different speeds, its range, endurance, diving depths, magnetic and infra-red data. In other words, the full suite of submarine capability spread over 22,400 documents that any navy would consider to be classified and highly sensitive.

The news set off a remarkable chain of events, which says much about the high stakes involved for each country. On receiving questions about the leak from The Australian on Monday, the Canberra office of France’s DCNS immediately deferred to its head office in Paris.

The ramifications of a news story revealing the mega-data dump on such a sensitive project were immediately obvious. India would be furious, but so too would Malaysia, Chile and Brazil, which also have, or will soon have, DCNS Scorpene submarines. And Australia was also likely to be concerned about the security of its own new partnership with the French defence giant.

DCNS officials in Paris urgently checked their files, looking for signs of espionage.

On Tuesday morning, DCNS officials in Paris came back to their Canberra DCNS colleagues with the news that they could find no immediate evidence of a security breach that would explain such a massive data leak.

The DCNS team in Canberra met to workshop the problem. It was a sobering moment for them. The tight-knit group led by Sean Costello, former chief of staff to former defence minister David Johnston, were considered heroes by DCNS in Paris for pulling off an unlikely victory against the more heavily favoured Germans and Japanese to win the lucrative contract to design Australia’s future submarines. The leak was not their fault, but they would be saddled with its legacy, which would be that their commercial rivals would exploit every opportunity to say the French can never be trusted with Australia’s secrets.

The group reasoned that the most likely scenario was that a commercial competitor was seeking to sabotage the company and had somehow obtained and then leaked the data. The obvious suspects were the losers in the submarine bid, Germany and Japan, but why would they wait for four months after the decision to strike?

If the leak was a global attack on DCNS then Norway, rather than Australia, would have been the obvious place to strike given that DCNS is now trying to pitch its Scorpene submarine to the Norwegian Navy, whereas the Australian deal was already stitched up.

DCNS had no answers and so it was assumed the most likely source of the leak was from the Indian side. The company wrote a carefully worded statement that implied — but did not state — that the leak came from India.

By late Tuesday afternoon DCNS realised it had to tell the Australian government that some very bad news was to be published the next day. The company called the head of Defence’s Future Submarine Project, Rear Admiral Greg Sammut, who then called Defence Department secretary Dennis Richardson. Defence Industry Minister Christopher Pyne was also briefed.

In New Delhi, India’s Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar was asleep when an aide woke him at midnight and showed him the report on The Australian’s website.

For Parrikar the news was devastating. He had a strong personal investment in India’s Scorpene submarines. Just over a year earlier, on April 6, 2015, he had watched the “undocking” ceremony in Mumbai as the first of India’s six Scorpene submarines, Kalvari, meaning Tiger Shark, was celebrated. The new submarine, decked in garlands and Indian flags, represented the pinnacle of the Indian Navy. A prayer ceremony was held to bless the boat.

The Scorpenes were a badly needed replacement for India’s ageing fleet of Russian Kilo-class and German Type 209 submarines that were almost three decades old and often confined to port with technical problems.

The DCNS Scorpene, however, was ordered in 2005 to spearhead India’s submarine fleet because, it boasted, in the words of the Indian Express: “Stealth features (which) give it invulnerability, unmatched by many submarines.”

But as Parrikar woke, the invulnerability of his pet project was in doubt. He ordered his chief of navy to launch an urgent investigation into the leak and what damage it had potentially caused.

At 6.30am in Australia, Pyne had read The Australian’s report and was soon on the phone to Richardson to discuss how to respond.

Sources say Richardson was of the view that Australia’s own security arrangements surrounding the new submarine project were already robust and there was no need to reinvent the wheel on security just because of the leak.

Pyne agreed, but also wanted to give a gentle message to the French. He asked Richardson to convey “a reminder” to DCNS that Australia expects the security of classified information on the future submarine project to be as tight as Australia’s handling of security information with its closest ally, the US. The subtext was, this is serious, don’t let this happen again.

But Pyne also knew the story would run strongly in Australia unless he tried to kill it quickly, so at about 8.30am he issued a press release claiming — without having access to the 22,400 leaked documents — that Defence had advised that the leak would have “no bearing” on Australia’s submarine program.

It was a public statement at odds with his private instruction to Richardson, but in Pyne’s view the quicker he could wash Australia’s hands of what he knew would be a nasty international furore the better.

India woke on Wednesday to the report that its submarine fleet had been potentially compromised by the leak of thousands of secret documents. Within hours it was the biggest story in the country. Under pressure to provide a quick answer, Parrikar said the leak appeared to be a case of hacking but he offered nothing to support this theory, which he later backed away from.

In Paris, DCNS realised it had a public relations and security disaster on its hands, with the story being reported on the front page of the newspaper Le Monde, followed the next day by a front-page cartoon lampooning the French security services.

DCNS backed away from the claim that India had caused the leak and the French government stepped in to announce that its defence security officials would investigate.

The Indian government also announced an investigation, but with every major Indian newspaper reporting the story on its front page, the government urged patience until its navy could assess the leak and the damage caused.

But it seems that the story behind this leak may be more incompetence than espionage — more Austin Powers than James Bond. The Weekend Australian has been told by sources that the data was removed from DCNS in Paris in 2011 by a former French Navy officer who quit the service in the early 1970s and worked for French defence companies for more than 30 years before becoming a subcontractor to DCNS.

Sources say they believe this subcontractor somehow copied the sensitive data from DCNS in France and, along with a French colleague, took it to a Southeast Asian country. If so, he broke the law and may face prosecution.

The two men worked in that Southeast Asian country carrying out unclassified naval defence work.

The speculation is that the data on the Scorpene was removed to serve as a reference guide for the former naval officer’s new job, but it is unclear why anyone would risk breaking the law by taking classified data for such a purpose.

The two men are then said to have the fallen out with their employer, a private company run by a Western businessman. They were sacked and refused re-entry to their building. At least one of the men asked to retrieve the data on the Scorpene but they were refused and the company — possibly not knowing the significance of the data — held on to it.

The secret data was then sent to the company’s head office in Singapore, where the company’s IT chief — again probably not knowing its significance — tried to load it on an internet server for the person in Sydney who was slated to replace the two sacked French workers.

The data was placed on a server on April 18, 2013, and it was then that it was dangerously vulnerable to hacking or interception by a foreign intelligence service. It is not known whether the data stayed on this server for a few days or for a year. It is not known if any foreign intelligence service obtained it during this time.

Unable to send such a large file over the net and not knowing the significance of the data, the Singapore company sent it on a data disk by regular post to Sydney.

When the recipient, who was experienced in defence issues, opened the file on his home computer he was stunned. He was expecting to read notes on a low-level naval program, but before him lay the secret capabilities of the new Indian submarine fleet.

The data was not encrypted so he transferred it to an encrypted disk. That evening the man wiped the old disk with special software, grabbed a hammer and smashed it to pieces in his backyard.

He placed the new encrypted disk in a locked filing cabinet in his office and there it remained for more than two years.



In the back room of Cafe Loco, in the Melbourne suburb of Elsternwick, the man arrives, sits down and pulls out a data disk from his pocket. He orders a hamburger then slips the disk into his laptop. He says he has something to show me, but not give to me.

Why are you doing this I ask?

He replies: “In the wake of the recent future submarine decision (in Australia) this matter went from one of a very serious breach for both France and India to a matter of national security significance to Australia and the US.”

In other words, he wants Australia to know that its future submarine partner, France, has already lost control of secret data on India’s new submarines. His hope is that this will spur the Turnbull government and DCNS to step up security to ensure Australia’s $50 billion submarine project does not suffer the same fate.

He says he is a whistleblower and maintains that revealing to the world, via The Australian, that this classified data exists in a dangerously uncontrolled form is worthwhile because it will serve Australia’s interests even if it causes an international furore.

He presses a button on his computer and his screen flickers to life.

Here in a Melbourne cafe, amid the clatter of plates, laughter and the smell of coffee, he scrolls through the secrets of India’s submarine fleet. He has not broken any laws and the authorities know who he is. He plans to surrender the disk to the government on Monday.

Furthermore,


So, just to give a wake-up call, it is serious and a plain denial is not something that might work here and none is pulling leg but everyone is with opinion that how it is going to effect and beneficial for others.
 
.
There is not much left to reveal. The 90B is essentially an upgraded 70 and information on the 70 is widely available. Also, there was a massive mole at PN for a while anyway. The 90B is a good sub, but the scorpene is better.
But
what about self exploding subs
INS Sindhurakshak......:lol:
 
.
Just a bit for your knowledge and be civilized before calling anyone's opinion as BS as it is an insult that may result in an insult in return. Just go through the read in detail, take it for information and don't read it only to reply.

Indeed there is detail enough about these Subs hence desperation and observations over security breach. The man who allegedly leaked data was posted at India (obviously French) during the project and was fired though it was pressed that the leak is not by the French officials but an Ex.

upload_2016-8-26_19-40-33-png.329210

upload_2016-8-26_19-48-42-png.329215




It’s in the mail: how submarine secrets surfaced in Australia

d707e02491fe98e4a8c61e564596a0e0

Secrets surfaced

In late April 2013 a Sydney postman reached into his satchel and pulled out a small envelope containing the secrets of India’s new submarine fleet.

He dropped the letter, with a Singapore stamp on it, in a private post office box and moved on.

The envelope, containing a small data disc, remained there for days, along with a Telstra bill and junk mail, before being picked up on April 24, 2013, by a man who took it home and pushed the disk into his computer.

This week the contents of that disk have become front-page news in Australia, India and France as each country grapples with the ramifications of an Edward Snowden-style leak of confidential documents disclosing the entire secret combat capability of India’s new Scorpene-class submarine fleet.

The leak is of more than passing interest to Australia because the documents come from the same French shipbuilder, DCNS, that will design 12 submarines for the Royal Australian Navy in the country’s largest and most expensive defence project.

But it is of far greater urgency to India, which fears that if a foreign spy service has acquired the data its six Scorpene submarines, costing a total of $US3 billion ($3.93bn), could be dead in the water before they sail. France is also in damage control as it tries to understand and explain how 22,400 of its secret documents on India’s submarines crossed the world to be delivered by a Sydney postie.

None of these three countries was aware of the leak until this week, when The Australian asked DCNS Australia on Monday afternoon to comment on an astonishing data file it had seen, marked “Restricted Scorpene India”, which laid bare almost every secret capability of India’s new submarines. These included the contracted parameters and capabilities of the submarine’s stealth features, its noise signatures at different speeds, its range, endurance, diving depths, magnetic and infra-red data. In other words, the full suite of submarine capability spread over 22,400 documents that any navy would consider to be classified and highly sensitive.

The news set off a remarkable chain of events, which says much about the high stakes involved for each country. On receiving questions about the leak from The Australian on Monday, the Canberra office of France’s DCNS immediately deferred to its head office in Paris.

The ramifications of a news story revealing the mega-data dump on such a sensitive project were immediately obvious. India would be furious, but so too would Malaysia, Chile and Brazil, which also have, or will soon have, DCNS Scorpene submarines. And Australia was also likely to be concerned about the security of its own new partnership with the French defence giant.

DCNS officials in Paris urgently checked their files, looking for signs of espionage.

On Tuesday morning, DCNS officials in Paris came back to their Canberra DCNS colleagues with the news that they could find no immediate evidence of a security breach that would explain such a massive data leak.

The DCNS team in Canberra met to workshop the problem. It was a sobering moment for them. The tight-knit group led by Sean Costello, former chief of staff to former defence minister David Johnston, were considered heroes by DCNS in Paris for pulling off an unlikely victory against the more heavily favoured Germans and Japanese to win the lucrative contract to design Australia’s future submarines. The leak was not their fault, but they would be saddled with its legacy, which would be that their commercial rivals would exploit every opportunity to say the French can never be trusted with Australia’s secrets.

The group reasoned that the most likely scenario was that a commercial competitor was seeking to sabotage the company and had somehow obtained and then leaked the data. The obvious suspects were the losers in the submarine bid, Germany and Japan, but why would they wait for four months after the decision to strike?

If the leak was a global attack on DCNS then Norway, rather than Australia, would have been the obvious place to strike given that DCNS is now trying to pitch its Scorpene submarine to the Norwegian Navy, whereas the Australian deal was already stitched up.

DCNS had no answers and so it was assumed the most likely source of the leak was from the Indian side. The company wrote a carefully worded statement that implied — but did not state — that the leak came from India.

By late Tuesday afternoon DCNS realised it had to tell the Australian government that some very bad news was to be published the next day. The company called the head of Defence’s Future Submarine Project, Rear Admiral Greg Sammut, who then called Defence Department secretary Dennis Richardson. Defence Industry Minister Christopher Pyne was also briefed.

In New Delhi, India’s Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar was asleep when an aide woke him at midnight and showed him the report on The Australian’s website.

For Parrikar the news was devastating. He had a strong personal investment in India’s Scorpene submarines. Just over a year earlier, on April 6, 2015, he had watched the “undocking” ceremony in Mumbai as the first of India’s six Scorpene submarines, Kalvari, meaning Tiger Shark, was celebrated. The new submarine, decked in garlands and Indian flags, represented the pinnacle of the Indian Navy. A prayer ceremony was held to bless the boat.

The Scorpenes were a badly needed replacement for India’s ageing fleet of Russian Kilo-class and German Type 209 submarines that were almost three decades old and often confined to port with technical problems.

The DCNS Scorpene, however, was ordered in 2005 to spearhead India’s submarine fleet because, it boasted, in the words of the Indian Express: “Stealth features (which) give it invulnerability, unmatched by many submarines.”

But as Parrikar woke, the invulnerability of his pet project was in doubt. He ordered his chief of navy to launch an urgent investigation into the leak and what damage it had potentially caused.

At 6.30am in Australia, Pyne had read The Australian’s report and was soon on the phone to Richardson to discuss how to respond.

Sources say Richardson was of the view that Australia’s own security arrangements surrounding the new submarine project were already robust and there was no need to reinvent the wheel on security just because of the leak.

Pyne agreed, but also wanted to give a gentle message to the French. He asked Richardson to convey “a reminder” to DCNS that Australia expects the security of classified information on the future submarine project to be as tight as Australia’s handling of security information with its closest ally, the US. The subtext was, this is serious, don’t let this happen again.

But Pyne also knew the story would run strongly in Australia unless he tried to kill it quickly, so at about 8.30am he issued a press release claiming — without having access to the 22,400 leaked documents — that Defence had advised that the leak would have “no bearing” on Australia’s submarine program.

It was a public statement at odds with his private instruction to Richardson, but in Pyne’s view the quicker he could wash Australia’s hands of what he knew would be a nasty international furore the better.

India woke on Wednesday to the report that its submarine fleet had been potentially compromised by the leak of thousands of secret documents. Within hours it was the biggest story in the country. Under pressure to provide a quick answer, Parrikar said the leak appeared to be a case of hacking but he offered nothing to support this theory, which he later backed away from.

In Paris, DCNS realised it had a public relations and security disaster on its hands, with the story being reported on the front page of the newspaper Le Monde, followed the next day by a front-page cartoon lampooning the French security services.

DCNS backed away from the claim that India had caused the leak and the French government stepped in to announce that its defence security officials would investigate.

The Indian government also announced an investigation, but with every major Indian newspaper reporting the story on its front page, the government urged patience until its navy could assess the leak and the damage caused.

But it seems that the story behind this leak may be more incompetence than espionage — more Austin Powers than James Bond. The Weekend Australian has been told by sources that the data was removed from DCNS in Paris in 2011 by a former French Navy officer who quit the service in the early 1970s and worked for French defence companies for more than 30 years before becoming a subcontractor to DCNS.

Sources say they believe this subcontractor somehow copied the sensitive data from DCNS in France and, along with a French colleague, took it to a Southeast Asian country. If so, he broke the law and may face prosecution.

The two men worked in that Southeast Asian country carrying out unclassified naval defence work.

The speculation is that the data on the Scorpene was removed to serve as a reference guide for the former naval officer’s new job, but it is unclear why anyone would risk breaking the law by taking classified data for such a purpose.

The two men are then said to have the fallen out with their employer, a private company run by a Western businessman. They were sacked and refused re-entry to their building. At least one of the men asked to retrieve the data on the Scorpene but they were refused and the company — possibly not knowing the significance of the data — held on to it.

The secret data was then sent to the company’s head office in Singapore, where the company’s IT chief — again probably not knowing its significance — tried to load it on an internet server for the person in Sydney who was slated to replace the two sacked French workers.

The data was placed on a server on April 18, 2013, and it was then that it was dangerously vulnerable to hacking or interception by a foreign intelligence service. It is not known whether the data stayed on this server for a few days or for a year. It is not known if any foreign intelligence service obtained it during this time.

Unable to send such a large file over the net and not knowing the significance of the data, the Singapore company sent it on a data disk by regular post to Sydney.

When the recipient, who was experienced in defence issues, opened the file on his home computer he was stunned. He was expecting to read notes on a low-level naval program, but before him lay the secret capabilities of the new Indian submarine fleet.

The data was not encrypted so he transferred it to an encrypted disk. That evening the man wiped the old disk with special software, grabbed a hammer and smashed it to pieces in his backyard.

He placed the new encrypted disk in a locked filing cabinet in his office and there it remained for more than two years.



In the back room of Cafe Loco, in the Melbourne suburb of Elsternwick, the man arrives, sits down and pulls out a data disk from his pocket. He orders a hamburger then slips the disk into his laptop. He says he has something to show me, but not give to me.

Why are you doing this I ask?

He replies: “In the wake of the recent future submarine decision (in Australia) this matter went from one of a very serious breach for both France and India to a matter of national security significance to Australia and the US.”

In other words, he wants Australia to know that its future submarine partner, France, has already lost control of secret data on India’s new submarines. His hope is that this will spur the Turnbull government and DCNS to step up security to ensure Australia’s $50 billion submarine project does not suffer the same fate.

He says he is a whistleblower and maintains that revealing to the world, via The Australian, that this classified data exists in a dangerously uncontrolled form is worthwhile because it will serve Australia’s interests even if it causes an international furore.

He presses a button on his computer and his screen flickers to life.

Here in a Melbourne cafe, amid the clatter of plates, laughter and the smell of coffee, he scrolls through the secrets of India’s submarine fleet. He has not broken any laws and the authorities know who he is. He plans to surrender the disk to the government on Monday.

Furthermore,


So, just to give a wake-up call, it is serious and a plain denial is not something that might work here and none is pulling leg but everyone is with opinion that how it is going to effect and beneficial for others.
You seriously suffers from comprehension problems, the guy who leaked was POSTED IN FRANCE and NOT India
However, The Australian has been told that the data on the Scorpene was written in France for India in 2011 and is suspected of being removed from France in that same year by a former French Navy officer who was at that time a DCNS subcontractor.
The data is then believed to have been taken to a company in Southeast Asia,

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/nat...k=759b67970c080dd9855c17bc8b0fff9d-1472281246
 
.
Initially it was unclear what was involved in the leak (it takes time to go through the releases)....so of course it had to be taken seriously....and still dealt with respect now since there could be further leaks potentially on top of what has now been shown to be regular riffraff stuff.

Apparently it has complete details about likes of CWC, Comm, weapon bays etc etc and to add to trouble it was even downloadable as I have seen in a post of a Chinese member. Nonetheless ofcourse both India and France would be hell bent upon going to the root of the issue.
 
.
Just a bit for your knowledge and be civilized before calling anyone's opinion as BS as it is an insult that may result in an insult in return. Just go through the read in detail, take it for information and don't read it only to reply.

Indeed there is detail enough about these Subs hence desperation and observations over security breach. The man who allegedly leaked data was posted at India (obviously French) during the project and was fired though it was pressed that the leak is not by the French officials but an Ex.

upload_2016-8-26_19-40-33-png.329210

upload_2016-8-26_19-48-42-png.329215




It’s in the mail: how submarine secrets surfaced in Australia

d707e02491fe98e4a8c61e564596a0e0

Secrets surfaced

In late April 2013 a Sydney postman reached into his satchel and pulled out a small envelope containing the secrets of India’s new submarine fleet.

He dropped the letter, with a Singapore stamp on it, in a private post office box and moved on.

The envelope, containing a small data disc, remained there for days, along with a Telstra bill and junk mail, before being picked up on April 24, 2013, by a man who took it home and pushed the disk into his computer.

This week the contents of that disk have become front-page news in Australia, India and France as each country grapples with the ramifications of an Edward Snowden-style leak of confidential documents disclosing the entire secret combat capability of India’s new Scorpene-class submarine fleet.

The leak is of more than passing interest to Australia because the documents come from the same French shipbuilder, DCNS, that will design 12 submarines for the Royal Australian Navy in the country’s largest and most expensive defence project.

But it is of far greater urgency to India, which fears that if a foreign spy service has acquired the data its six Scorpene submarines, costing a total of $US3 billion ($3.93bn), could be dead in the water before they sail. France is also in damage control as it tries to understand and explain how 22,400 of its secret documents on India’s submarines crossed the world to be delivered by a Sydney postie.

None of these three countries was aware of the leak until this week, when The Australian asked DCNS Australia on Monday afternoon to comment on an astonishing data file it had seen, marked “Restricted Scorpene India”, which laid bare almost every secret capability of India’s new submarines. These included the contracted parameters and capabilities of the submarine’s stealth features, its noise signatures at different speeds, its range, endurance, diving depths, magnetic and infra-red data. In other words, the full suite of submarine capability spread over 22,400 documents that any navy would consider to be classified and highly sensitive.

The news set off a remarkable chain of events, which says much about the high stakes involved for each country. On receiving questions about the leak from The Australian on Monday, the Canberra office of France’s DCNS immediately deferred to its head office in Paris.

The ramifications of a news story revealing the mega-data dump on such a sensitive project were immediately obvious. India would be furious, but so too would Malaysia, Chile and Brazil, which also have, or will soon have, DCNS Scorpene submarines. And Australia was also likely to be concerned about the security of its own new partnership with the French defence giant.

DCNS officials in Paris urgently checked their files, looking for signs of espionage.

On Tuesday morning, DCNS officials in Paris came back to their Canberra DCNS colleagues with the news that they could find no immediate evidence of a security breach that would explain such a massive data leak.

The DCNS team in Canberra met to workshop the problem. It was a sobering moment for them. The tight-knit group led by Sean Costello, former chief of staff to former defence minister David Johnston, were considered heroes by DCNS in Paris for pulling off an unlikely victory against the more heavily favoured Germans and Japanese to win the lucrative contract to design Australia’s future submarines. The leak was not their fault, but they would be saddled with its legacy, which would be that their commercial rivals would exploit every opportunity to say the French can never be trusted with Australia’s secrets.

The group reasoned that the most likely scenario was that a commercial competitor was seeking to sabotage the company and had somehow obtained and then leaked the data. The obvious suspects were the losers in the submarine bid, Germany and Japan, but why would they wait for four months after the decision to strike?

If the leak was a global attack on DCNS then Norway, rather than Australia, would have been the obvious place to strike given that DCNS is now trying to pitch its Scorpene submarine to the Norwegian Navy, whereas the Australian deal was already stitched up.

DCNS had no answers and so it was assumed the most likely source of the leak was from the Indian side. The company wrote a carefully worded statement that implied — but did not state — that the leak came from India.

By late Tuesday afternoon DCNS realised it had to tell the Australian government that some very bad news was to be published the next day. The company called the head of Defence’s Future Submarine Project, Rear Admiral Greg Sammut, who then called Defence Department secretary Dennis Richardson. Defence Industry Minister Christopher Pyne was also briefed.

In New Delhi, India’s Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar was asleep when an aide woke him at midnight and showed him the report on The Australian’s website.

For Parrikar the news was devastating. He had a strong personal investment in India’s Scorpene submarines. Just over a year earlier, on April 6, 2015, he had watched the “undocking” ceremony in Mumbai as the first of India’s six Scorpene submarines, Kalvari, meaning Tiger Shark, was celebrated. The new submarine, decked in garlands and Indian flags, represented the pinnacle of the Indian Navy. A prayer ceremony was held to bless the boat.

The Scorpenes were a badly needed replacement for India’s ageing fleet of Russian Kilo-class and German Type 209 submarines that were almost three decades old and often confined to port with technical problems.

The DCNS Scorpene, however, was ordered in 2005 to spearhead India’s submarine fleet because, it boasted, in the words of the Indian Express: “Stealth features (which) give it invulnerability, unmatched by many submarines.”

But as Parrikar woke, the invulnerability of his pet project was in doubt. He ordered his chief of navy to launch an urgent investigation into the leak and what damage it had potentially caused.

At 6.30am in Australia, Pyne had read The Australian’s report and was soon on the phone to Richardson to discuss how to respond.

Sources say Richardson was of the view that Australia’s own security arrangements surrounding the new submarine project were already robust and there was no need to reinvent the wheel on security just because of the leak.

Pyne agreed, but also wanted to give a gentle message to the French. He asked Richardson to convey “a reminder” to DCNS that Australia expects the security of classified information on the future submarine project to be as tight as Australia’s handling of security information with its closest ally, the US. The subtext was, this is serious, don’t let this happen again.

But Pyne also knew the story would run strongly in Australia unless he tried to kill it quickly, so at about 8.30am he issued a press release claiming — without having access to the 22,400 leaked documents — that Defence had advised that the leak would have “no bearing” on Australia’s submarine program.

It was a public statement at odds with his private instruction to Richardson, but in Pyne’s view the quicker he could wash Australia’s hands of what he knew would be a nasty international furore the better.

India woke on Wednesday to the report that its submarine fleet had been potentially compromised by the leak of thousands of secret documents. Within hours it was the biggest story in the country. Under pressure to provide a quick answer, Parrikar said the leak appeared to be a case of hacking but he offered nothing to support this theory, which he later backed away from.

In Paris, DCNS realised it had a public relations and security disaster on its hands, with the story being reported on the front page of the newspaper Le Monde, followed the next day by a front-page cartoon lampooning the French security services.

DCNS backed away from the claim that India had caused the leak and the French government stepped in to announce that its defence security officials would investigate.

The Indian government also announced an investigation, but with every major Indian newspaper reporting the story on its front page, the government urged patience until its navy could assess the leak and the damage caused.

But it seems that the story behind this leak may be more incompetence than espionage — more Austin Powers than James Bond. The Weekend Australian has been told by sources that the data was removed from DCNS in Paris in 2011 by a former French Navy officer who quit the service in the early 1970s and worked for French defence companies for more than 30 years before becoming a subcontractor to DCNS.

Sources say they believe this subcontractor somehow copied the sensitive data from DCNS in France and, along with a French colleague, took it to a Southeast Asian country. If so, he broke the law and may face prosecution.

The two men worked in that Southeast Asian country carrying out unclassified naval defence work.

The speculation is that the data on the Scorpene was removed to serve as a reference guide for the former naval officer’s new job, but it is unclear why anyone would risk breaking the law by taking classified data for such a purpose.

The two men are then said to have the fallen out with their employer, a private company run by a Western businessman. They were sacked and refused re-entry to their building. At least one of the men asked to retrieve the data on the Scorpene but they were refused and the company — possibly not knowing the significance of the data — held on to it.

The secret data was then sent to the company’s head office in Singapore, where the company’s IT chief — again probably not knowing its significance — tried to load it on an internet server for the person in Sydney who was slated to replace the two sacked French workers.

The data was placed on a server on April 18, 2013, and it was then that it was dangerously vulnerable to hacking or interception by a foreign intelligence service. It is not known whether the data stayed on this server for a few days or for a year. It is not known if any foreign intelligence service obtained it during this time.

Unable to send such a large file over the net and not knowing the significance of the data, the Singapore company sent it on a data disk by regular post to Sydney.

When the recipient, who was experienced in defence issues, opened the file on his home computer he was stunned. He was expecting to read notes on a low-level naval program, but before him lay the secret capabilities of the new Indian submarine fleet.

The data was not encrypted so he transferred it to an encrypted disk. That evening the man wiped the old disk with special software, grabbed a hammer and smashed it to pieces in his backyard.

He placed the new encrypted disk in a locked filing cabinet in his office and there it remained for more than two years.



In the back room of Cafe Loco, in the Melbourne suburb of Elsternwick, the man arrives, sits down and pulls out a data disk from his pocket. He orders a hamburger then slips the disk into his laptop. He says he has something to show me, but not give to me.

Why are you doing this I ask?

He replies: “In the wake of the recent future submarine decision (in Australia) this matter went from one of a very serious breach for both France and India to a matter of national security significance to Australia and the US.”

In other words, he wants Australia to know that its future submarine partner, France, has already lost control of secret data on India’s new submarines. His hope is that this will spur the Turnbull government and DCNS to step up security to ensure Australia’s $50 billion submarine project does not suffer the same fate.

He says he is a whistleblower and maintains that revealing to the world, via The Australian, that this classified data exists in a dangerously uncontrolled form is worthwhile because it will serve Australia’s interests even if it causes an international furore.

He presses a button on his computer and his screen flickers to life.

Here in a Melbourne cafe, amid the clatter of plates, laughter and the smell of coffee, he scrolls through the secrets of India’s submarine fleet. He has not broken any laws and the authorities know who he is. He plans to surrender the disk to the government on Monday.

Furthermore,


So, just to give a wake-up call, it is serious and a plain denial is not something that might work here and none is pulling leg but everyone is with opinion that how it is going to effect and beneficial for others.


See What Return It clearly Case of Technical Manual

As Of Know It Just Mountain of Out Mole hill

Not Real Restricted Stuff is out

I Will bet on Monday It Will Same basic Weapon Manual that to of 2011



"Guy Is just Journalist Who doesn't Know What Clearly Restricted And What is Classified Military Document And Detailed Studied his Last upload"

The Australian is doing What Media Always Adding masala for more Viewership

There Joint Investigation by Indian and france

http://www.hindustantimes.com/india...rders-probe/story-XUjub6bsMmlW0R46P3SiZJ.html


http://fortune.com/2016/08/25/france-india-submarine-data-theft/

We wait for monday


Read What Parrikar said

The minister also said that Scorpene submarine has not even fully completed the sea trials, which is important to understand how it will work under water.


If you Know anything about technical Matters of Subs you Know what he said
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...a-big-worry-Parrikar/articleshow/53874704.cms
 
.
Apparently it has complete details about likes of CWC, Comm, weapon bays etc etc and to add to trouble it was even downloadable as I have seen in a post of a Chinese member. Nonetheless ofcourse both India and France would be hell bent upon going to the root of the issue.
All the vital parts in downloadable docs uploaded by The Australia are blacked out.
Anyways France has confirmed that the most vital info i.e. how to detect the submarine has not been revealed.
 
.
Apparently it has complete details about likes of CWC, Comm, weapon bays etc etc and to add to trouble it was even downloadable as I have seen in a post of a Chinese member. Nonetheless ofcourse both India and France would be hell bent upon going to the root of the issue.

Yah but that stuff is found in any operating manual that any intelligence agency worth its beans already has.

The specific top secret data is not part of these leaks as far as I am aware, a large part have not even been finalised and calibrated by the specific model of Indian scorpene anyway.
 
.
All the vital parts in downloadable docs uploaded by The Australia are blacked out.
Anyways France has confirmed that the most vital info i.e. how to detect the submarine has not been revealed.

Should I call it damage control or what. A info which had been in the market since like 2011 and people are coming to know about it just now and that too a newspaper is reporting that, now tell me my friend if China can get the most sensitive info from US servers then how wudnt they have got their hands on it when it had been in market since like 5 years?

Yah but that stuff is found in any operating manual that any intelligence agency worth its beans already has.

I totally agree with U on that. We can not rule that out.
 
.

Pakistan Defence Latest Posts

Pakistan Affairs Latest Posts

Back
Top Bottom