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Pakistan’s unfinished business of Partition
---------- Post added at 05:03 PM ---------- Previous post was at 05:02 PM ----------
Pakistans unfinished business of Partition
---------- Post added at 05:03 PM ---------- Previous post was at 05:03 PM ----------
Water war with India?
India-Pakistan relations took another knock last month with Yusuf Gilani’s remark to US defence secretary Robert Gates that his government could not guarantee against another 26/11 attack on India. He argued that if Pakistan could not defend itself against routine terrorist attacks by non-state actors at home it could not prevent them striking India.
The argument wears thin because these non-state actors are Pakistan’s own creation and some of them continue to be patronised by sections of the establishment. On being banned some time ago, the LeT under Hafiz Saeed was renamed Jamat-ud Dawa (JuD), This has now under pressure morphed into yet another ‘charity’ in Lahore called Al Noor University Trust. These aliases do not change the nature of the beast. The statements of Headley and Rana, both non-resident Pakistanis, now under trial in Chicago, chart their movements and actions over the past several years in training, planning and reconnoitering the ground for the 26/11 Mumbai attack under the direction of Pakistani handlers. The trial of Lakhvi and eight other Pakistani LeT operatives in Rawalpindi for the 26/11 terror attack has also come up with clear evidence of their complicity.
Further evidence from the Headley-Rana interrogation points to LeT training a group of Indian-origin jihadis in Karachi for further terrorist strikes against India. Such adventures cannot be planned, let alone launched, without the support and connivance of the ISI. It is in these circumstances Gilani’s bland statement disavowing responsibility for any further 26/11 attacks on India must be seen. The failure to act against JuD and other jihadi elements that appear to be able to move freely in Pakistan is indefensible. Some Pakistani interlocutors privately admit that Hafiz Saeed is too popular and powerful a figure with such influential contacts in high places that none dare touch him for fear of a backlash.
Many in Pakistan are known to be deeply worried by the drift they see in their weak and divided structure of governance with several power centres in which non-state actors have a niche. There is no alternative to dialogue as stated by the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers at Sharm el-Sheikh last summer. The Indian position is that the Sharm el-Sheikh theorem was posited on Pakistan taking credible steps to dismantle its terror outfits and bring the guilty men of 26/11 to justice.
A hard pressed President Zardari, now very much on the back foot, told the J&K Council in Muzaffarabad a week into the new year that regional peace is linked to a resolution of the Kashmir dispute. He referred to the state as Pakistan’s ‘jugular vein’, demanded ‘self-determination’ for it and promised to wage a ‘thousand year war’ for its ‘liberation’ — not through war (as his father-in-law Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto ranted) but through an ‘ideological war’ to complete what is often to this day described as ‘the unfinished business of Partition’. And what is that ideology other than the disastrous and discredited two-nation theory, which Jinnah in his moment of triumph sought to jettison before its logic destroyed his new state.
The reference to Jinnah follows several recent statements by Pakistanis recalling the Qaid-e-Azam’s stirring call to the new Pakistan constituent assembly on August 11, 1947 to divorce religion from affairs of state and treat it purely as a personal matter. Jinnah was ignored, even censored subsequently, and himself retracted five months later, calling for a constitution based on the Sharia that would ensure Pakistan’s future as a great Islamic state. This was the beginning of the radical Islamisation of and, now, talibanisation of Pakistan beginning with the expulsion of the Ahmediyas from the fold. The humanist Sufi Islam of what is now Pakistan was steadily replaced by the hardline Wahabi Islam imported from Saudi Arabia through madrasas that sprouted with Gulf oil money seeking the restoration of lost glory through jihad. Afghanistan became the cauldron from which emerged al-Qaeda and the Taliban to take revenge. Kashmir was over time sought to be portrayed by some as yet another symbol of the larger ‘cause’.
It is by such logic that J&K is a ‘dispute’ for some in the OIC and even in the west, which has long embraced Pakistan as a ‘front line state’ and bastion against the spread of communism and a useful ally in stabilising and protecting its west Asian oil empire. The lack of ‘self-determination’ in PAK and the Gilgit-Baltistan area and the deep discontent in Balochistan is well-known and was narrated in graphic detail by representatives from those areas at a seminar in Delhi last month.
Many other myths are repeated, as at that seminar and elsewhere, by even liberal elements from Pakistan. One is about India encircling Pakistan through its activities and consulates in Afghanistan. The other is that India is somehow stealing Pakistan’s share of waters under the ‘unjust’ Indus Treaty that was heavily loaded against Pakistan. This has become a constant refrain of late though the assertions (rather than arguments) made are by and large trivial, political and emotional. The hard fact is that India has yet to utilise fully its prescribed share of storage and irrigation from the three Western rivers in J&K and is also letting down water to Pakistan from the eastern rivers that have been exclusively allocated to it under the Indus Treaty.
Refusal (or delayed) visas to Pakistani publishers wishing to attend the Delhi book fair was another avoidable snub. People-to-people contact must be encouraged and Pakistanis invited for talks on matters like trade and other CBMs even pending the composite dialogue. Meanwhile, the internal dialogue in J&K that has been re-initiated cannot be allowed to flag and should be carried forward. While no one in J&K or Delhi must be allowed a veto, every effort must be made to educate all sections of opinion at home, countrywide, on the issues and stakes involved.
---------- Post added at 05:03 PM ---------- Previous post was at 05:02 PM ----------
Pakistans unfinished business of Partition
India-Pakistan relations took another knock last month with Yusuf Gilanis remark to US defence secretary Robert Gates that his government could not guarantee against another 26/11 attack on India. He argued that if Pakistan could not defend itself against routine terrorist attacks by non-state actors at home it could not prevent them striking India.
The argument wears thin because these non-state actors are Pakistans own creation and some of them continue to be patronised by sections of the establishment. On being banned some time ago, the LeT under Hafiz Saeed was renamed Jamat-ud Dawa (JuD), This has now under pressure morphed into yet another charity in Lahore called Al Noor University Trust. These aliases do not change the nature of the beast. The statements of Headley and Rana, both non-resident Pakistanis, now under trial in Chicago, chart their movements and actions over the past several years in training, planning and reconnoitering the ground for the 26/11 Mumbai attack under the direction of Pakistani handlers. The trial of Lakhvi and eight other Pakistani LeT operatives in Rawalpindi for the 26/11 terror attack has also come up with clear evidence of their complicity.
Further evidence from the Headley-Rana interrogation points to LeT training a group of Indian-origin jihadis in Karachi for further terrorist strikes against India. Such adventures cannot be planned, let alone launched, without the support and connivance of the ISI. It is in these circumstances Gilanis bland statement disavowing responsibility for any further 26/11 attacks on India must be seen. The failure to act against JuD and other jihadi elements that appear to be able to move freely in Pakistan is indefensible. Some Pakistani interlocutors privately admit that Hafiz Saeed is too popular and powerful a figure with such influential contacts in high places that none dare touch him for fear of a backlash.
Many in Pakistan are known to be deeply worried by the drift they see in their weak and divided structure of governance with several power centres in which non-state actors have a niche. There is no alternative to dialogue as stated by the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers at Sharm el-Sheikh last summer. The Indian position is that the Sharm el-Sheikh theorem was posited on Pakistan taking credible steps to dismantle its terror outfits and bring the guilty men of 26/11 to justice.
A hard pressed President Zardari, now very much on the back foot, told the J&K Council in Muzaffarabad a week into the new year that regional peace is linked to a resolution of the Kashmir dispute. He referred to the state as Pakistans jugular vein, demanded self-determination for it and promised to wage a thousand year war for its liberation not through war (as his father-in-law Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto ranted) but through an ideological war to complete what is often to this day described as the unfinished business of Partition. And what is that ideology other than the disastrous and discredited two-nation theory, which Jinnah in his moment of triumph sought to jettison before its logic destroyed his new state.
The reference to Jinnah follows several recent statements by Pakistanis recalling the Qaid-e-Azams stirring call to the new Pakistan constituent assembly on August 11, 1947 to divorce religion from affairs of state and treat it purely as a personal matter. Jinnah was ignored, even censored subsequently, and himself retracted five months later, calling for a constitution based on the Sharia that would ensure Pakistans future as a great Islamic state. This was the beginning of the radical Islamisation of and, now, talibanisation of Pakistan beginning with the expulsion of the Ahmediyas from the fold. The humanist Sufi Islam of what is now Pakistan was steadily replaced by the hardline Wahabi Islam imported from Saudi Arabia through madrasas that sprouted with Gulf oil money seeking the restoration of lost glory through jihad. Afghanistan became the cauldron from which emerged al-Qaeda and the Taliban to take revenge. Kashmir was over time sought to be portrayed by some as yet another symbol of the larger cause.
It is by such logic that J&K is a dispute for some in the OIC and even in the west, which has long embraced Pakistan as a front line state and bastion against the spread of communism and a useful ally in stabilising and protecting its west Asian oil empire. The lack of self-determination in PAK and the Gilgit-Baltistan area and the deep discontent in Balochistan is well-known and was narrated in graphic detail by representatives from those areas at a seminar in Delhi last month.
Many other myths are repeated, as at that seminar and elsewhere, by even liberal elements from Pakistan. One is about India encircling Pakistan through its activities and consulates in Afghanistan. The other is that India is somehow stealing Pakistans share of waters under the unjust Indus Treaty that was heavily loaded against Pakistan. This has become a constant refrain of late though the assertions (rather than arguments) made are by and large trivial, political and emotional. The hard fact is that India has yet to utilise fully its prescribed share of storage and irrigation from the three Western rivers in J&K and is also letting down water to Pakistan from the eastern rivers that have been exclusively allocated to it under the Indus Treaty.
Refusal (or delayed) visas to Pakistani publishers wishing to attend the Delhi book fair was another avoidable snub. People-to-people contact must be encouraged and Pakistanis invited for talks on matters like trade and other CBMs even pending the composite dialogue. Meanwhile, the internal dialogue in J&K that has been re-initiated cannot be allowed to flag and should be carried forward. While no one in J&K or Delhi must be allowed a veto, every effort must be made to educate all sections of opinion at home, countrywide, on the issues and stakes involved.
---------- Post added at 05:03 PM ---------- Previous post was at 05:03 PM ----------
Water war with India?
At the moment, India and Pakistan lack a legal forum to sort out issues of water scarcity. The tension relating to water resources held by India has heated up again and Pakistan has complained that India is holding back the waters of rivers flowing from Indian-administered Kashmir. Some analysts have termed this as a clear violation of the Indus Water Treaty.
In a sense, the availability of less water from the rivers is a security issue for Pakistan as it could put the country�s very survival at stake. The media in Pakistan and the general public, too, appear convinced that India is withholding the waters in violation of the Indus Water Treaty. Pakistan's Prime Minister also wanted for dialogues not for war with their archival rivals. On the other hand, the Indian perception is that Pakistan is assuming that India had restricted the flow, and that this assumption was incorrect as the water level was low the previous year as well.
Pakistan has unlimited amount of river & rainwater, except that they do not know how to exploit it. Yearly water flow in Indus alone is about 170 MAF. Rivers Jhelum & Chenab carry about a quarter of that amount. Hence Pakistan has about 300 MAF of water flowing down the rivers. This does not include tremendous amount of water, which comes down with Monsoon downpour. Indus has about ten times more water than Colorado River in US and three times more water than Nile in Egypt. Anybody with that amount of water in the rivers should be awash with water. What is missing is will to do anything worthwhile to manage water resources. Successive military governments are to be blamed. Most monies are appropriated to build up the military. Monies for economic projects are always in short supply. Hence these projects are lower on priority. For example, with looming water shortage, the Kalabagh Dam is still stuck in a controversy. The missing element is the unfair water distribution policy. Leaders favor Pakistani Punjab as it has more muscle in the military and at the central government. This leaves other provinces angry, annoyed and ready to revolt. For the military rulers it is easy to raise the bogey of India stealing water to incense the public. India�s plan to build hydroelectric projects on rivers allocated to Pakistan in Kashmir is big news in Pakistan. The leaders know fully well that the Indus Water Treaty clearly gives India right to use the Rivers Indus, Jhelum & Chenab to generate electricity and draw water for personal use. They ignore that part. They also know that every electricity generation project requires significant water storage so that electricity generation could continue uninterrupted during the lean months. The same right is given to Pakistan. It is that right that has become of dispute.
From a legal point of view, this argument is interesting as it actually raises the issue of jurisdiction and the scope of the Indus Water Treaty itself. The Indus Water Treaty does not deal directly with the issue of water scarcity. In fact, when the treaty (signed in 1960) was being negotiated, a future possibility of water scarcity was not a priority or a leading concern for the negotiators.
Hence, we find that there is no provision perse that provides a mechanism to both the countries if climate-based water scarcity occurs. The critical provisions of the Indus Water Treaty simply say that India and Pakistan were obliged to �let flow� the river waters without interfering.
Hence any obstruction by India would be seen as an outright breach of the treaty by Pakistan.
Despite speculations by the Pakistani side there is no specific evidence brought forth so far that India is actually obstructing the flow or is diverting the waters. The Indian argument remains that reservoirs such as the Wullar Barrage and others are built within the regulatory framework of the treaty itself. Pakistan, naturally, has a different view and in one case Pakistan was seeking third-party resolution through a neutral expert who did not support fully the Pakistani version.
If the Indian version is correct then the issue cannot be addressed within the framework of the Indus Water Treaty and, in that case, Pakistan is pursuing a remedy in the wrong direction.The question remains as to who determines whether the reduced amount of water flowing into the rivers of Pakistan from the Indian side is because of obstructions or on account of climatic water scarcity. For that both countries would need to agree on an independent and a separate framework or neutral experts� assessment. The determination by such a panel would make matters clearer for Pakistani and Indian policymakers who could then follow a bilateral remedial course of action.
The argument is also advanced that even if the water flowing into Pakistani rivers is less due to genuine climatic water scarcity, India cannot escape responsibility as a state to maintain and manage the water resources that it exercises control over. India�s responsibility comes under the general framework of international law that calls on the upper riparian state to take the necessary measures to minimise water scarcity.
In Europe and elsewhere, water scarcity has promoted trans-boundary water cooperation instead of inciting war over this issue. The UN Convention on Uses of International Water Courses 1997 obliges states to conserve, manage and protect international water courses. Pakistan and India are not party to the said convention but the latter nevertheless offers a comprehensive framework for trans boundary water cooperation.
If this issue is not handled technically without a legal mechanism, then it has the potential to further aggravate tensions between India and Pakistan as it will be clubbed with the Kashmir dispute. Further, a reduced water flow could be perceived as India�s ploy to put additional pressure on Pakistan and, in that event, the response would be equally unmeasured and misdirected.
Finally, whether India is actually blocking the water or the decrease in water flow is due to scarcity and climatic change, needs objective and transparent determination by experts. This determination of the real reason should be agreed to beforehand through a bilateral agreement confined to fact-finding. If the finding is that the reduced flow of water is due to obstructions, then Pakistan could take action under the provisions of the Indus Water Treaty immediately.
On the other hand, if it is determined that there is genuine water scarcity then the issue is outside the jurisdiction of the Indus Water Treaty and needs to be sorted out by both states on a bilateral basis. India, in that case, should undertake its obligations under international law for proper water conservation and management and share the details with Pakistan through a mutually agreed mechanism.