Pakistan And India-Water Disputes-News And Updates

[ajtr]

pertaining to the following article here is its counter.John Briscoe is just spreading pakistani propaganda in the guise of neutral expert on IWT.

Originally Posted by ajtr

War or peace on the Indus?

Saturday, April 03, 2010
John Briscoe

He wrote:

"This vulnerability was driven home when India chose to fill Baglihar exactly at the time when it would impose maximum harm on farmers in downstream Pakistan."

Best I can find, India filled Baglihar in August 2008.
E.g., The Dawn reports August 23, 2008, about the filling of the Baglihar.
http://www.dawn.com/2008/08/23/top15.htm[/B]]India filling Baglihar Dam in violation of treaty -DAWN - Top Stories; August 23, 2008

This is squarely in the middle of the monsoon season, which runs from June to September (e.g., as per Wiki)
Monsoon - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

As per the Hindu, the rains in Indian Punjab were mostly normal at that time.
http://www.thehindu.com/2008/08/17/stor ... 621000.htm

Quote:
In Uttar Pradesh, 34 out of the 64 districts have recorded excess rainfall, 20 normal and five deficient. In Punjab, 10 out of the 16 districts have recorded excess rainfall, four normal and two deficient.

---
The Pakistani growing seasons are:
Agriculture Problems in Pakistan And Their Solutions SAP-PK Blog ... solutions/

Crop | Sowing season | Harvesting season
Kharif | April – June | Oct – Dec
Rabi | Oct – Dec | April – May

----
I.e., India filled Baglihar in the middle of the monsoon.

Also in 2008, the monsoon rains were quite heavy in Pakistan.

http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Natura ... p?id=20333
Quote:

Unusually intense monsoon rains pounded Pakistan in late July and early August 2008.

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Therefore, he may be a very well-intentioned South African, but he has essentially shot his credibility with any concerned Indians - unless he can explain exactly what he meant by

""This vulnerability was driven home when India chose to fill Baglihar exactly at the time when it would impose maximum harm on farmers in downstream Pakistan."

-----

If he want to do any good for India and Pakistan whose people he claim to love, he had better stick strictly to telling the truth.


Moreover for the so called IWT expert this is what Annexure E, article 18 of IWT says

Quote:
India may carry out the filling as follows :
(a) if the site is on The Indus, between 1st July and 20th August ;
(b) if the site is on The Jhelum, between 21st June and 20th August ; and
(c) if the site is on The Chenab, between 21st June and 31st August at such rate as not to reduce, on account of this filling, the flow in the Chenab Main above Merala to less than 55,000 cusecs

---------- Post added at 04:15 AM ---------- Previous post was at 04:14 AM ----------

Baglihar was filled during august 2008 monsoon season.Moreover for the so called IWT expert this is what Annexure E, article 18 of IWT says

Quote:
India may carry out the filling as follows :
(a) if the site is on The Indus, between 1st July and 20th August ;
(b) if the site is on The Jhelum, between 21st June and 20th August ; and
(c) if the site is on The Chenab, between 21st June and 31st August at such rate as not to reduce, on account of this filling, the flow in the Chenab Main above Merala to less than 55,000 cusecs.

---------- Post added at 04:15 AM ---------- Previous post was at 04:15 AM ----------

The writer does not give enough credit to IWT which has worked despite enmity between treaty states. It says Pakistan is fearful that India would /might use its leverage if all dams are constructed. It doubts intention of India to inflict major damage on Pakistan through mechanism of IWT without showing any proof, except saying that Baghlihar was filled up when PaKistan needed water. It also blames Indian media for not objectively reporting official indian position and existential vulnerabilities of PaKistan . It overlooks what Pakistan is saying and doing vis-a-vis many Indian concerns. There is very little doubt in India that Pakistan actively encourages terrorist acts, even plans directs and executes which would not be possible if Pakistan state is not involved.

It then asks India to be magnanimous and reinterpret treaty in such a way that forgoes leverages which is available to it.
Unfortunately , the article does not say that official forum including IWT comm and Foreign Minister have duly acknowledged that India is not in violation of IWT. The problem faced by PK in irrigating its agri field is of its own making. The article expects that official Indian position should be that we deliberately violate IWT due to enmity with PK whereas media reports that India is in full compliance with IWT.

Upshot of this is
1. Be courageous for the existence of Pakistan
2. Give leadership to become truly great power and good neighbour
3.Invite Pakistan for IWT
4. Delink IWT from other issues.

Essential article asks India to take initiative to open pandora's box without any commensurate benefit except removing legal uncertainty ( pakistan not challenging any and all IWT projects of India, however he is not in a position to guarantee that).

In my view article fails to make any case for India to seek any of the four positions when it comes to Pakistan, especially when it is not yet proved that IWT has broken down.

Existential problems of pakistan and its bad neighbourly behaviour is of its own making and they should make amends and prove their credentials to the writer. WE don't need such lecturing.

---------- Post added at 04:15 AM ---------- Previous post was at 04:15 AM ----------

The writer has shied away from the real issue. He hinted but did not elaborate upon it in his solution.
Given that the Indian Press takes its lead from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs it does not follow that merely informing the Indian public of Pakistan’s fears would solve anything.
Also, so far as I am aware, Baglihar was not filled in the low season. It was filled in the monsoon season.
The writer is correct in saying that creating live storage on all those dams will cause a certain amount of water shortage, cumulatively, but this accumulated shortage is going to be spread over 30 years or more, the time it will take at the minimum, to build those dams. Remember, it has taken India 50 years to build the three relatively large projects on the Chenab, Dul Hasti, Baglihar and Salal. It has managed to put only one large project on the Jehlum in that period, the Uri project. Any threat of a water shortage to Pakistan on account of these proposed dams can be discounted for that reason alone.
Let us also further remember that the Indus Waters Treaty allots 80% of the combined Indus waters to Pakistan. India gets only 20% and even that is not yet fully exploited either for irrigation, drinking or power.
The solution at which the author hinted (and I wish he had devoted more space to it) is to develop dead storage on the rivers allotted to Pakistan, not just live storage. This would benefit India and Pakistan. India would increase its capacity to generate power and Pakistan would gain by more lean season flows when they are needed and less flooding at the wrong time. India has been suggesting such a solution to Pakistan but to no effect. The opportunity to build upstream regulation will be lost forever once all the dams planned in India are built. The time is now. It will be impossible to tear down the structures and rebuild new ones in some idyllic future where India and Pakistan are friends, or where Pakistan has defeated India and won Jammu and Kashmir for itself. Already the sites of Salal, Baglihar, Dul Hasti and Uri have been lost, but upstream regulation of water is still possible, if India and Pakistan can come to an agreement.
And this where the question of trust arises. Does threatening India with war over water help anyone?
Kashmir is one permanent casus belli, now we have a second one in the making.
The goodwill that Professor Briscoe talks about, which is so essential to resolving the waters issue let alone Kashmir, cannot be conjured out of thin air. Those confidence building measures were proposed nearly a decade now and we haven’t moved one inch. How does Professor Briscoe expect the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to react to the threats from the likes of Hafiz Saeed, or the references to India as Pakistan’s main enemy by the PA Chief except with anger. It is naive of the Professor to expect the Indian government to sympathize with Pakistan’s water shortage, or, in the face of the unremitting hostility to coach its citizens to be sensitive to Pakistan’s needs. Why would it do that? It has an active political opposition to counter, and eventually, voters to face. Besides Indian sensitivity by itself solves nothing.
India’s states are at each others throats over water, including its own share of Indus waters. Pakistan can help itself and India by modifying its attitudes over the Indus waters, if not over Kashmir. In friendship and trust all sorts of things become possible. In the case of the Indus Waters though, it wont always be so. The window is now.

---------- Post added at 04:15 AM ---------- Previous post was at 04:15 AM ----------

There is one more issue- almost all of Pak’s three western rivers get much of their water from glacier melt unlike Gangetic rivers which also get a lot of their hydrology from rainfalls and not just snowmelt. Thus Indus rivers will be more vulnerable to receding glaciers- most of Indus and Jhelum glaicers will be gone in another generation of so, if I understand correct. My impression as a Delhi-ite for almost 30 years is that it rains a lot less in winter and there is far less frequent snowfall in Western Himalayas. Even if we co-operate on dams there may not be much water to capture anyways.

---------- Post added at 04:16 AM ---------- Previous post was at 04:15 AM ----------

The moot point is that actually India has never been found guilty of any breach of treaty on IWT. It was merely asked to reduce its dam height by a couple of meters in Baglihar (???)As far as timing issue is concerned, I believe IWT has a 24 hour deadline- i.e whatever water enters the dam must leave within the same day, so if water is being used for hydel generation, I dont see how it can be used for delaying Pak requirements beyond a few hours.

Btw, didnt some Pak minister too say recently that the water thing was more about Pak mismanagement than Indian kanjoosi.

---------- Post added at 04:16 AM ---------- Previous post was at 04:16 AM ----------

India did not fill Baglihar in the low season. The professor is quite wrong. Nor did Pakistan object when India filled Salal or Uri. There was no need to because it was all perfectly legal. But by the time Baglihar came up the discourse of cheating by India had begun to take hold in Pakistan.
Take the case of Salal. The dam is silting up, but Pakistan will not allow silt ejection gates to be built in any project. The Tulbal navigation project in Kashmir on the Wular would raise the lake by about three metres and enable better flood control in the valley as in Pakistan, plus raise the power potential of down stream dams without taking any water away from Pakistan. Yet it is stuck for the last 30 years.
The point is that Professor Briscoe does not elaborate the real solution that he hinted at in the very beginning. He merely castigates India for not being friendly with Pakistan, and the MEA, not for being untruthful or cheating but for being insensitive about Pakistan. Given the state of relations between our two countries that is nothing startling or immoral. If India and Pakistan were friends they could help each other in many ways-as enemies they both lose something.
Where there are interstate water disputes in India the states concerned don’t have sympathy for each other, nor does Delhi; it looks on neutrally or intervenes in favour of one state or the other depending on which party is in power. To expect the Indian government to build up sympathy for Pakistan is unrealistic, and what would it serve-the solution won’t come through sympathy. The last 13 years have seen not only reduced snowfall but also reduced monsoons in the North. The wettest months in Kashmir used to be March and April, but now it seems to get only a few showers in that period.
Thought the Himalyan glaciers are not melting as fast as feared they are retreating. Underground water levels in the Punjab and Haryana have dropped by 50 feet and more. Underground water reservoirs are no longer being charged at the same rate, and water is being mined from deeper aquifers by submersible pumps in both states.
It is not possible to siphon off water through underground channels that harvest water. What comes into the rivers is the run off after ground absorption. The rivers are the harvest. Besides the water that does go underground into aquifers need not end up in a desired area. With the present state of technology who can say what aquifer is fed by which run off. The bore wells along the Indo- Pak border probably tap into the same aquifers.

---------- Post added at 04:17 AM ---------- Previous post was at 04:16 AM ----------

Politicians and Islamic outfits in Pakistan accuse India of stealing upstream Indus system waters, threatening Pakistan’s very existence. More sober Pakistanis complain that numerous new Indian projects on the Jhelum and Chenab will create substantial live storage even in run-of-the-river hydel dams. This will enable India to drastically reduce flows to Pakistan during the crucial sowing season, something that actually happened for a couple of days when the Baglihar reservoir was filled by India after dam completion. What this debate misses is that dam-based canal irrigation is an obsolete, wasteful 19th century technology that cannot meet 21st century needs. It must be replaced by sprinkler and drip irrigation, distributed through pressurised plastic pipes. This approach has enabled Israel to irrigate the desert. It can enable India and Pakistan to triple the irrigated area with their existing water resources, escaping water scarcity. Drip and sprinkler irrigation systems are expensive. They use a lot of power for pumping. But they greatly improve yields too. Israel’s agriculture is highly competitive.

Canals are hugely wasteful of both land and water, something well-captured in Tushaar Shah’s book ‘Taming the Anarchy’. Up to 7 per cent of the command area of a conventional irrigation project is taken up by canals, and this no longer makes sense when land is worth lakhs per acre. In the Narmada command area, farmers have refused to give up their land to build distributaries from the main Narmada canal, so only a small portion of the irrigation potential is actually used today.

Instead of canals, we can transport water through underground pipes that leave the land above free for cultivation. Indeed, the downhill flow of water through massive pipes can run turbines, generating electricity for pumping the water to the surface where required.

Gujarat has shown the way out of this water crisis. It has gone in a big way for drip and sprinkler irrigation. It has been rewarded with an astounding agricultural growth rate of 9 per cent despite being a semi-arid state. Jain Irrigation has become one of the biggest producers of drip and sprinkler equipment in the world, and other corporate rivals are coming up fast.

Like Gujarat, India and Pakistan need to replace canal-based irrigation with pipe-based irrigation. India has world-class technology and equipment that it can share with Pakistan. Such co-operation cannot end controversies over Indus water sharing. But it can take the sting out of them.

---------- Post added at 04:17 AM ---------- Previous post was at 04:17 AM ----------

Therefore the treaty must consider only the waters of the five rivers of the Punjab-Kashmir and not Indus itself. How much water flows down Indus at all points above Panjnad is not any business of Hindustan. But in the Indus Basin Treaty it is the accumulative flow of the Indus plus the five rivers of Punjab-Kashmir which was considered as basis in developing the water sharing formula. A clear act of theft on part of Hindustan. In reality Hindustani Punjab only deserves waters of Satluj and Beas while Pakistani Punjab must have Ravi, Chenab and Jhelum. But by wrongly including Indus in the calculations the ‘Treaty’ awards waters of Ravi to Hindustan as well. Not fair. Now Hindustan is blocking the flow in Chenab, Jhelum and their tributaries. Not an act of a peace loving neighbor.”
The Indus arises in the Tibetan plateau and flows through Ladakh and Baltistan where various rivers join it such as the Shyok and Zanskar rivers before flowing into Pakistan controlled territory. The Chenab and the Ravi arise in Himachal Pradesh. It is only the Jehlum which arises in Kashmir. Your premise that Pakistan is entitled to all the waters originating in Kashmir is in any case a mistaken one. Because regardless of the status of Jammu and Kashmir, that state is entitled to the waters of the rivers that flow through it. The Indus Waters Treaty has deprived the people of that state of their full potential. Punjab, Haryana , Delhi and Rajasthan are not entitled to the water of the Indus, Jehlum, and do not get any of it, but nor does J&K because of the treaty. J&K’s power potential is also limited because it cannot store water. Your assumption that Pakistani Punjab and Sindh have an automatic right to all the water of these rivers is mistaken ab initio. Its right arises from the IWT. That treaty discriminates against J&K, not Pakistan.
The Indus Waters Treaty is a negotiated one under the auspices of the World Bank. To call India’s share theft is to undermine the treaty. In these water stressed times there are too many voices in this part of the world who would be happy to call it off altogether.
India has never blocked water to Pakistan even in 1965 and 1971.
The Ravi is the border between J&K and Punjab, flowing down from Himachal. Pakistan claims all the waters of Indus including the Hindu Kush tributaries. This is not contested, nor has Pakistan been deprived of the waters of the Chenab and the Jehlum. Your argument therefore does not stand. India has not blocked the flow of the Chenab and the Jehlum. Let us argue on facts not assumptions.
Theft implies criminality. It is an inappropriate word to describe the terms of a treaty fifty years after it was signed by your country. The Upper Bari Doab Canal taking off from the Ravi and irrigating Gurdaspur and Amritsar districts now used earlier to flow into Pakistan. Its diversion to Indian North Punjab was part of the IWT under which Pakistan received World Bank aid to build its own dams and canals. It was perfectly legitimate and equitable.

 

[ajtr]

This article shreds most of the pakistan myths wrt baglihar and kishanganga projects

Building on a Treaty​

A water treaty has been keeping India and Pakistan on some level ground since 1960, at least as far as the water systems are concerned

In 1960, India and Pakistan signed the Indus Water Treaty, with the World Bank’s mediation, to end controversies relating to water sharing between the 2 countries. Although geography and terrain makes it difficult to harness the Indus Water on the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan frequently made an issue over small scale use of waters of the tributaries as per the treaty. The Treaty proved its effectiveness as it survived recurrent wars and recrimination from the Pakistani side.
It also helped set up an Indus Commission, headed by empowered engineers, for conflict management and as a resolution mechanism. There was only one occasion where Pakistan referred the matter to a neutral expert for a court of arbitration over Baghlihar Dam. The expert cleared the project with minor technical modifications on the height two years ago. Pakistan raised propaganda frenzy over Baghlihar but the neutral expert ruling rubbished the objections.
The Treaty allocated 3 Western rivers, namely Indus, Jhelum and Chenab wholly to Pakistan, which together account for an average water flow of 135 million acre feet. Out of this, India is allowed to irrigate 1.3 million acres and 3.60 million acre feet of water for storage projects, including for conservation and flood control etc. Despite these allocations, India could only use waters to irrigate less than 0.8 million acres as against 1.3 million acres allowed. Under the treaty, India renounced its right to block or divert the flows of the Western rivers and agreed to confine itself to run-off-the-river hydro electric projects and drawing of irrigation water for specific acreage of farmland. Even that was not fully utilised as mentioned above.
With regard to 3 Eastern rivers, namely Sutlej, Beas and Ravi, the entire flows of these rivers were allocated to India. India had provided £ 62 million to Pakistan under the treaty to compensate for construction of new canals in Pakistan after being allowed unrestricted use of waters from Eastern rivers. The total flow of these 3 rivers is 33 million acre feet only and India has not been able to harness the entire potential leaving 3 million acre feet of water flowing into Pakistan.
As the above shows, out of the combined net flow of waters of these six rivers, Pakistan got 80 % of the overall flows and India 20%.
The Treaty provided for exchange of data on flow of water, and proposed hydro power projects as allowed. As the treaty mandates broad Pakistan approval for Indian works on the Western rivers, they used the opportunity to raise number of objections leading to considerable delays in implementation of the projects. The Sallal, Yuri, Dul Hasti and Baghlihar all run-off-river hydro-power schemes without any storage requirements were delayed with Pakistan questioning every aspect of the schemes like technical specifications, data on water flows etc.
In all the cases of objections, the Pakistani argument has been that sudden pondage and release of such waters could be used by India to dry up lower course of Chenab or cause floods that would render Pakistan economically and strategically vulnerable. The argument has no basis and those who know the geography and terrain of Valley would know that such a measure would damage India before it causes any hardship to Pakistan which is 110 Kms down the river course.
Disputes over water sharing among various provinces was a fact of life in united India much before 1947. In-flows of waters are declining over a long period as they depend not just on rain fall and snow melt, but also on the health of tributaries, streams, nullahs as well as ground water, soil and water management practices.
The latest objections of Pakistan relate to the Kishanganga Project on a tributary of Jhelum which is also a run-off-the-river hydro electric project. The project involves channelling of waters of the Kishanganga tributary, which is known in Pakistan as Neelam, to feed the hydro-power project and the waters later re-join the Jhelum river in Pakistan. Total quantum of flow of water will not be affected. This is as permissible by the treaty and the project was initially proposed in the period during 1991-93. However, Pak-sponsored terrorism prevented its construction. It was proposed again in 2003 and again delayed due to terrorist activities. Pakistan was notified yet again last year about the taking up the project. Pakistan, therefore, is hurriedly putting up, with Chinese assistance, its own power project on the Neelam, north of Muzafferabad, to pre-empt the Kishanganga Project.
Pakistani objections to Kishanganga hydro-power project are based on claims that there will be 27% of water shortage in the tributary in the Neelam valley affecting irrigational use. Indian side provided data showing that flow reductions in the tributary during specific periods will only be 15-16% and this would not affect current pattern of use in the valley. Pakistan also claimed that 1.3 lakh hectares are under irrigation under the tributary, but was not able to show it when Indian experts visited the area, three times in 1991, 1996 and 2008. As Pakistan did not have a strong case to force the halting of Kishanganga project, it is creating a frenzy of orchestrated propaganda involving even terrorist groups with threats of launching suicide bombings and even nuclear attacks on Indian projects. Instead, it serves them better if they provide required data on their claims to Indian side for mutually beneficial negotiations or refer to a neutral expert for a ruling if they strongly feel of having a reasonable case.
Many of the problems that Pakistan is attributing to alleged water diversions by India are actually rooted in their domestic politics. Although, India had provided £ 62 million to Pakistan for building new canals in Pakistan for better water management, Pakistan has not constructed any such water management schemes for storage and regulated utilisation of water.
Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi said in a statement last month that while people say that all of Pakistan’s problems are as a result of their neighbouring country, it is important for people to look within themselves. He said that the dispute with India was not new, and that the Sindh Water Treaty had come into existence to resolve the water issues and act as a mechanism for talks. He said that the Sindh Water platform had been used in the past and would continue to be used in the future. Furthermore, he said that 34 million acre feet of water was being wasted in Pakistan, and that no one was concerned.

Sam Burgess is an senior fellow at the Asian Foundation

 

[ajtr]

Pak Army, ISI reject new lawyer

Islamabad , May 9: The Pakistan Army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) have rejected the appointment of Professor Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad as head of the legal team of Pakistan in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against India on Kishenganga hydropower project, officials here said.
“The appointment was show down by the Pakistan Army, ISI and others,” a senior government official said. He added that the previous Pakistan team headed by Professor James Crawford that had fought the legal battle against India on Baglihar Hydropower project will fight the case on Kishenganga hydropower project. “The authorities think that Pakistan cannot afford to try a new team headed by an unproven new man like Kaikobad who has not fought a single case in the international arbitration court while James Crawford is a well-known expert in international water law,” he said. Sources revealed that Kamal Majidullah, reputed close friend of President Asif Ali Zardari, who had been the driving force behind Kaikobad’s inexplicable catapulting, was virtually isolated in the a recent meeting and his viewpoint was not entertained seriously. Pakistan on April 19 has forwarded two names to India for the constitution of the arbitration court. India would also propose their names and then both the countries would agree upon on the name of chief of the arbitration court. The constitution of the court will take place within another five to eight months.
Some independent experts are of the view that Pakistan has delayed to move the international court as India has already managed to substantially construct Kishenganga project. According to some reports, India has completed 80 per cent construction on the project which was initiated by mid 1990s.

Shafqat Ali

Pak Army, ISI reject new lawyer

As per the above report in thenews on appointment representative on kishanganga case some might like to think that if India abides by the treaty provisions, Pakistan may not raise dispute. That is only wishful thinking. Pakistan has raised objections on each and every project of India and that includes Eastern Rivers as well to which India has exclusive rights.

There are set procedures laid down in IWT by which differences and disputes get addressed. Court of Arbitration is provided under IWT under Article IX(5) read with Annexure G.

Article IX(2)(b) reads that if a difference does not come within para (2)(a) or if NE informs the Indus commission in accordance with para 7 of Annexure F that the difference should be treated as dispute , a dispute shall deemed to have arisen to be settled as per para (3)(4)(5/ of Article IX....Provided further that any difference can be dealt with in any other way agreed upon by the Commission besides by NE and Court of Arbitration(COA).

(3) if a dispute has arisen the commission shall report the fact , at the request of either commissioner, to the two govt. as early as practicable with the following detailsoints on which commission is in agreement, the disputes, views of the each commissioner and his reasons.

(4) Either Govt , upon receipt of the report or if it feels report being unduly delayed, invite the other govt to settle the dispute by agreement.It will communicate names of negotiators and readiness to meet negotiators of the other govt at time and place indicated by the other govt and also enlist services of one or two mediators as may be acceptable.

(5)COA would be setup in the manner provided in Annexure G, upon mutual agreement by both parties to do so;at the request of either party , after negotiations have begun, if it is of the opinion that negotiations or mediators are unlikely to resolve the dispute; or at the request of either party after the expiry of one month of receipt of invitation by the other govt if that party comes to the conclusion that the other govt is unduly delaying the negotiation.


So if Pakistan thinks that there is a dispute then there is a dispute within the meaning of IWT. I am quite sure that Pakistan would not go to NE , having tasted failure there, and would try COA route. Now one may notice that if one party is determined to raise dispute then there are set procedures and requires strict adherence to it before mechanism gets invoked.

Despite all the rhetoric by Pakistan in public it is quietly following that procedure and are fully aware that it would take at least 8 months before COA gets constituted.

One redeeming point in IWT is that it does not have provision for status quo though one party may decide to stop the work as done by India in case of Tulbul Navigation project . On the Kishenganga project. there are many under a wrong impression that India must complete its works before the Pakistanis. That is completely wrong. The IWT is very clear. It says that any existing Pakistani hydroelectric project should not be adversely affected.

Pakistan did not have an 'existing' project when India made its intentions known about the Kishenganga project. Secondly, even if there is such a project, India, must ensure that the Pakistani project is not adversely affected;if existing means at the time of starting the project and not at the time of completion of the priject. Indian experts had visited the Neelum valley to ascertain agricultural usage by PK on invitation of PPIC and they had failed to substantiate their claim of agricultural usage.This was after preliminary work had started on KG . Pakistan has to prove that it had pre-existing usage , power , irrigation etc. Onus is on Pakistan. There is none as proved by report by Sam Burgess, "Building on Treaty",except may be for some irrigation works in Neelum Valley claimed by Pakistan and yet to be shown on the ground to IN experts. Kisheganga Dam is going to flood Gurez valley which may be a boon for IN as it is a major staging area for infiltration.

One more point is diversion is permitted on Jhelum subject to the conditions preceding and succeeding the highlighted part.

But such is the nature of dispute settlement mechanism that Pakistan would raise it if it wants to and India has to go by it if it does not abrogate the treaty, which is not needed as India may continue to work on the project.

Why Pakistan feels confident that it would have a better outcome in COA.

COA will consist of two arbitrators each by either party.
Three umpires 1. Person qualified by status and reputation to be chairman, 2. highly qualified engineers and 3. person well versed i international law. Chairman shall be from 1 above. Parties shall nominate and maintain a standing panel consisting of four umpires in each of the category. by mutual agreement and consent of umpires being nominated and in the order in which they would be invited to serve on COA ( by mutual agreement or by lots)If panel is not nominated by procedures underlined in Ann G (some procedures not mentioned here, please refer to Ann G) then under para 7(b) remaining vacancies in umpires will be filled up by lot from
a. for Chairman:- Secy Gen UN and President WB
b.for engineersresident MIT and Rector Imperial College of Sc & Tech London.
c.for legal members:-Chief Justice of USA and Lord Chief Justice of England

If USA is in Pakistan favour it would have 4 members in its favour. Decisions are by majority present and voting with each having one vote and chairman casting vote. This is just a conjecture and I have no reason to cast doubt on these eminent persons integrity.But International Diplomacy is such that one needs to be wary of pitfalls. Pakistan would certainly delay and not agree to anything reasonable under the sun and see that Umpires are nominated from this list. Paranoia may be.



Hopefully IN continues its work apace despite COA proceedings and completes the work for it to become fait accompli.

 

[ajtr]

The current move by the pakistanis seems aimed at two fronts:
1. The age old - get a stay order from a court. In the interim, build their own Neelum-Jhelum project.
2. Give an impression to the common citizens in Pakistan that the Army and the ISI is looking after the interests of Pakistan.
The idea being that any concession that the arbitration court will grant to Pakistan will be hailed as a major victory for Pakistan and the Army there will be at the forefront to accept credit.

On both counts this is wishful thinking. India has already delayed the Kishenganga-Tulbul Navigation-Wullar Barrage project for many years when the paksitanis were showing India a rudimentary tunnel at Nauseri as proof that they were working on the Neelum Jhelum Project. Fact was that they neither have the money nor the expertise to complete such a project of this magnitude. Recently they had to bring in chinese engineers to help build the tunnel linking Nauseri to Zaminabad to bypass the Kishenganga (Neelum) water into the Jhelum.

 

[ajtr]

Annual Renewable Water Supply Per Person by Basin for 1995 and Projections for 2025
Watersheds of the World : Global Maps​

Map Description

Water, used by households, agriculture, and industry, is clearly the most important good provided by freshwater systems. Humans now withdraw about one fifth of the world’s rivers’ base flow (the dry-weather flow or the amount of available water in rivers most of the time), but in river basins in arid or populous regions the proportion can be much higher. This has implications for the species living in or dependent on these systems, as well as for human water supplies. Between 1900 and 1995, withdrawals increased by a factor of more than six, which is greater than twice the rate of population growth (WMO 1997).

Water supplies are distributed unevenly around the world, with some areas containing abundant water and others a much more limited supply. In water basins with high water demand relative to the available runoff, water scarcity is a growing problem. Many experts, governments, and international organizations are predicting that water availability will be one of the major challenges facing human society in the 21st century and that the lack of water will be one of the key factors limiting development (WMO 1997).

These maps show water supply per person for individual river basins as of 1995 and projections for 2025. Water experts define areas where per capita water supply drops below 1,700 m3/year as experiencing “water stress”—a situation in which disruptive water shortages can frequently occur. In areas where annual water supplies drop below 1,000 m3 per person per year, the consequences can be more severe and lead to problems with food production and economic development unless the region is wealthy enough to apply new technologies for water use, conservation, or reuse. This map is based on the analysis carried out by WRI for the Pilot Analysis of Global Ecosystems: Freshwater Systems (PAGE). The first map shows that as of 1995, some 41 percent of the world’s population, or 2.3 billion people, live in river basins under water stress, with per capita water supply below 1,700 m3/year. Of these, some 1.7 billion people reside in highly stressed river basins where water supply falls below 1,000 m3/year

In the second map we see water scarcity projections for 2025. The analysis shows that by 2025, assuming current consumption patterns continue, at least 3.5 billion people— or 48 percent of the world’s projected population —will live in water-stressed river basins. Of these, 2.4 billion will live under high water stress conditions. This per capita water supply calculation, however, does not take into account the coping capabilities of different countries to deal with water shortages. For example, high-income countries that are water scarce may be able to cope to some degree with water shortages by investing in desalination or reclaimed wastewater. The study also discounts the use of fossil water sources because such use is unsustainable in the long term.

In the second map, a selected number of basins have been outlined. These watersheds represent basins that are in or approaching water scarcity and where the projected population for 2025 is expected to be higher than 10 million. Six of these basins including, the Volta, Nile, Tigris and Euphrates, Narmada, and the Colorado River basin in the United States, will go from having more than 1,700 m3 to less than 1,700 m3 of water per capita per year. Another 29 basins will descend further into scarcity by 2025, including the Jubba, Godavari, Indus, Tapti, Syr Darya, Orange, Limpopo, Huang He, Seine, Balsas, and the Rio Grande.

Mapping Details

These maps were developed by combining a global population database for 1995 that uses census data for over 120,000 administrative units (CIESIN et al. 2000) and a global runoff database developed by the University of New Hampshire and the WMO/Global Runoff Data Centre (Fekete et al. 1999). The runoff database combines observed discharge data from monitoring stations with a water balance model driven by climate variables such as temperature and precipitation combined with variables on land cover, and soil information. For those regions where discharged data were available, the modeled runoff was adjusted to match the observed values; for regions with no observed data, the modeled estimates of runoff were used. The 2025 estimates are considered conservative because they are based on the United Nations’ low-range projections for population growth, which has population peaking at 7.2 billion in 2025. In addition, a slight mismatch between the water runoff and population data sets leaves 4 percent of the global population unaccounted for in this analysis.

Map Projection

Geographic

Sources

Revenga, C., J. Brunner, N. Henninger, K. Kassem, and R. Payne. 2000. Pilot Analysis of Global Ecosystems: Freshwater Systems. Washington DC: World Resources Institute. Based on CIESIN (Center for International Earth Science Information Network), International Food Policy Research Institute, and World Resources Institute. 2000. Gridded Population of the World, Version 2. Palisades, New York: CIESIN and Columbia University, and Fekete, B., C. J. Vörösmarty, and W. Grabs. 1999. Global, Composite Runoff Fields Based on Observed River Discharge and Simulated Water Balance. World Meteorological Organization Global Runoff Data Center Report No. 22. Koblenz, Germany: WMO-GRDC.

WMO (World Meteorological Organization). 1997. Comprehensive Assessment of the Freshwater Resources of the World. Stockholm, Sweden: WMO and Stockholm Environment Institute.

 

[ajtr]

Work apace on 330 MW K’ganga project​

Srinagar, May 15: Rejecting Pakistan’s claims that Kishenganga power project in North Kashmir was violating the Indus Water Treaty (IWT), the State government Saturday said the work on the 330-MW project would continue as it did not violate IWT provisions.


The government also said that it was seriously pursing to seek transfer of Dulhasti and Salal power project to the State to overcome power crisis in Jammu and Kashmir.

“The work on Kishenganga power project is going on under the provisions of IWT,” Principal Secretary Power, B R Sharma told Rising Kashmir.

He said there has been no violation of IWT and the work on the project will not be stopped. “The Indian Commissioner for IWT has made it clear that the work on Kishengana project by NHPC was being carried out within the provisions of IWT.”

Sources said the Government of India had sought a detailed report from NHPC, Commissioner IWT and JK government about the present status of Kishenganga project. “GoI sought the report after Pakistan threatened to move the International Court of Arbitration to stop the work on the power project. After the report cleared that Kishenganga project did not violate IWT provisions, the GoI asked the constructing agency (NHPC) to go ahead with the project,” they said.

As per IWT, brokered by World Bank in 1960, Pakistan was empowered to monitor the usage of three rivers — Jhelum, Chenab and Indus — that flow from JK to Pakistan. The treaty also wrested full powers to India to use three Punjab rivers — Ravi, Sutlej and Bias.

Sharma said the State government was strongly following the recommendations of Rangarajan committee constituted by Prime Minister Mahmohan Singh. “The committee has strongly recommended that Dulhasti and Salal power projects be returned to Jammu and Kashmir,” he said.

In the first phase, Sharma said, the government will try to get back 390 MW Dulhasti project on river Chenab in Kisthwar district. “Later, we will try to seek the return of Salal also,” he said.

He said Dulhasti, if returned to State, will help the government in overcoming power crisis in Jammu and Kashmir.

 

[ajtr]

Water Woes​

The Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan addresses the ' apprehensions, misconceptions, misinformation and allegations pertaining to India that characterize the debate on water scarcity in Pakistan.'

Speech by High Commissioner of India at the function organized by the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations and Pakistan-India Citizens Friendship Forum

Global water resources, taken for granted by mankind, are getting increasingly scarce and coming under added stress because of growing population. Water supplies are getting adversely affected by factors such as climate change. Because water is a precious resource, its depletion is a matter of serious concern and arouses public anxiety. But precisely because water is precious, public discourse on its growing scarcity ought to be well informed, so that it leads us to the right approach in ensuring the water security of our own and coming generations.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the issue of water sharing that arose between our countries in 1947, was settled with the coming into force of The Indus Waters Treaty in 1960. This treaty was the result of 8 years of painstaking negotiations carried out by India and Pakistan with the good offices of the World Bank. The Treaty was voluntarily accepted by the two sides as fair and equitable. The thoroughness with which it deals with various aspects of water sharing is a testimony to the hard work put in by the negotiators of both sides to produce an enduring framework. It laid down the rights and obligations of both sides in relation to the use of waters of the Indus system of rivers. It also laid down a framework for resolution, in a co-operative spirit, of the questions, differences or disputes that might arise in implementation of the Treaty, through bilateral means or use, if necessary, of the services of a neutral expert or a Court of Arbitration.

Those who question the fairness of the Indus Waters Treaty to Pakistan need to note that it assigned 80% share of water of the Indus system of rivers to Pakistan. The Treaty gave the use of Eastern Rivers (Sutlej, Beas and Ravi) - with a mean flow of 33 MAF - - to India, while giving the use of the Western Rivers, viz. Indus, Jhelum and Chenab -- with a mean flow of 136 MAF -- to Pakistan. Since Pakistan was dependent on water supplies from the Eastern Rivers until the 15th of August 1947, India also agreed to pay a sum of 62 million Pounds Sterling to Pakistan to build replacement canals from the Western Rivers and other sources. These were clearly not the gestures of an upper riparian bent upon depriving the lower riparian of water, as is alleged by some today. The Treaty also permitted limited use of water of Western Rivers by India as follows: -

Domestic use: - This includes use for drinking, washing, bathing and sanitation etc.
Non consumptive use: - This covers any control or use of water for navigation, floating of timber or other property, flood control and fishing etc.
Agricultural use: - India can draw water from the Western Rivers in terms of maximum permissible Irrigated Crop Area. The total area permitted to be irrigated by India is 1.34 million acres.
Generation of Hydroelectric Power :- India can use water from the Western Rivers for run -of- the river hydroelectric projects as well as for hydroelectric projects incorporated in a storage work, but only to the extent permitted in the provisions regulating storage of water by India from the Western Rivers.
Storage of water by India on the Western Rivers: - The Indus Waters Treaty allows India storage capacity on Western Rivers to the tune of 3.6 MAF, in addition to the storage that already existed on these rivers before the coming into force of the Treaty. Out of this, 1.25 MAF is general storage. The remaining quantity is split between 1.6 MAF for generation of hydroelectricity and 0.75 MAF for flood control. In terms of rivers, 0.4 MAF storage is allowed on the Indus, 1.5 on Jhelum and 1.7 on Chenab.
This limited use of water from Western Rivers by India is subject to the conditions laid down in the Treaty to protect the interests of both countries. However, India is yet to use fully its entitlement to the waters of Western Rivers. As against its storage entitlement of 3.6 MAF, India has built no storage so far. Out of the area of 1.34 million acres, permitted for irrigation, we are currently irrigating only 0.792 million acres. We have exploited only a fraction of the hydroelectric potential available to us on these rivers. Out of a total potential of 18,653 MW, projects worth 2324 MW have been commissioned and those for 659 MW are under construction. In any case, even after India starts using its full entitlement of water from the Western Rivers under the Treaty, it will amount to no more than 3% of the mean flow in these rivers.

In order to ensure that implementation of the Treaty received constant attention, a Permanent Indus Commission was created, with a senior and widely experienced Commissioner for Indus Waters from each side. The Commission is charged with the responsibility to establish and maintain co-operative arrangements for implementation of the Treaty, to promote co-operation between the Parties in the development of the waters of the Rivers and to settle promptly any questions arising between the Parties. Each Commissioner for Indus Waters serves as a regular channel of communication in all matters relating to implementation of the Treaty. The Commission undertakes a general tour of inspection of the rivers once in five years and special tours in the interim. The Commission meets regularly at least once a year and in the interim as required. It has so far undertaken a total of 111 tours, both in India and Pakistan, and has held 104 meetings. The Commission has shown tremendous potential in ensuring smooth functioning of the Treaty. In the 50 years of the Treaty, only once was an issue, viz. Baglihar, referred to a neutral expert. We believe that the potential of the Permanent Indus Commission can and ought to be used more effectively. In fact, we could even have the Commission sit in the nature of a consultative dispute avoidance body and take the views of experts – national and international – with a view to bringing up-to - date technology to the notice of the Commission to help it reach correct and acceptable solutions.

Ladies and Gentlemen, public discourse in Pakistan has of late increasingly focused on certain alleged acts of omission and commission on the part of India as being responsible for water scarcity in Pakistan. “Water issue” between India and Pakistan is spoken of as an issue whose resolution is essential to build peace between our two countries. Preposterous and completely unwarranted allegations of “stealing water” and waging a “water war” are being made against India. It is alleged that we are hindering water flows into Pakistan and developing the infrastructure to stop and divert these flows to serve our own needs. Such accusations bear no relation whatsoever to the reality on the ground. The fact is that India has been scrupulously providing Pakistan its share of water in keeping with the Indus Waters Treaty. We have never hindered water flows to which Pakistan is entitled, not even during the wars of 1965 and 1971 as well as other periods of tense relations and we have no intention of doing so. Those, who allege that India is acquiring the capacity to withhold Pakistan’s share of water, completely ignore the fact that this would require a storage and diversion canals network on a large scale. Such a network simply does not exist and figures nowhere in our plans.

I shall now deal with the apprehensions, misconceptions, misinformation and allegations pertaining to India that characterize the debate on water scarcity in Pakistan.
The Indus Waters Treaty does not require India to deliver any stipulated quantities of water to Pakistan in the Western Rivers. Instead, it requires us to let flow to Pakistan the water available in these rivers, excluding the limited use permitted to India by the Treaty, for which we do not need prior agreement of
Pakistan. Reduced flows into Pakistan from time to time are not the result of violation of Indus Waters Treaty by India or any action on our part to divert such flows or to use more than our assigned share of water from Western Rivers. Water flows in rivers depend, inter alia, on melting of snow and quantum of rainfall. India itself suffered serious draught conditions in 2009, with around 250 districts bearing the brunt of draught. Rainfall during the monsoon season was 20% less than normal countrywide, with many states in the North experiencing a much higher percentage of shortfall. Even winter rains have fallen far short of normal. The quantum of water flow in Western Rivers, as indeed in any other river, varies from year to year, dipping in certain years and recovering in some subsequent years. Permit me to illustrate this point by using the flows data in respect of the three rivers.

Let us start with the river Chenab by using the average flows data for the month of September over a period of ten years since 1999 at six recording points, beginning deep on the Indian side at Udaipur and moving westwards to Marala, where Chenab enters Pakistan. The flows (Discharge in Cusecs) are as follows:-

It will be seen from the above table that increase or decrease of flows at Marala is reflected in the flows at all the points on the Indian side. This shows that when Pakistan receives reduced flows, it is because of reduced flows available on the Indian side and not because of any diversion of water by India. Increased or reduced flows at Udaipur get reflected at all the subsequent points. This point is also illustrated by the following table of the annual flow in Chenab (MAF) from 1997-98 to 2008-09:-

The above table shows that decrease of flow entering Pakistan is accompanied by corresponding shortage in India. The following table illustrates flows in Jhelum (MAF) at Uri during the period 1997 to 2009:-

The annual flow in Jhelum at Uri, which was 8.29 MAF in 1997, dipped to as low as 3.07 MAF in 1999, but has subsequently recovered to register figures of 6.37 MAF in 2002, 6.31 MAF in 2005 and 5.67 MAF in 2008. The June to December flow in Jhelum at Uri shows the same pattern.
Combined annual flows (MAF) for January-December period in Indus at Nimoo and Chutak for the years 2001 to 2009 are no exception to the above trend as will be seen in the following table:-

It will be seen from the above table that the combined flows rose from 6 MAF in 2001 to 11.30 MAF in 2003, only to dip to 6.51 MAF in 2004. The flows have been steadier in recent years, registering 9.41 MAF in 2005, 10.58 MAF in 2006, 8.41 in 2007, 9.95 in 2008 and 9.93 MAF in 2009.

The data that I have provided in respect of flows in all the three Western Rivers clearly demonstrates that these flows have followed a curve moving up and down, depending upon climatic factors from year to year, rather than showing progressive decline, which would be the case if there were any truth in the allegations of India building infrastructure to progressively deprive Pakistan of its share of water.

A complaint has often been made that India has not been providing data of water flows regularly. In accordance with the Indus Waters Treaty, India and Pakistan exchange daily data on about 600 Gauge and Discharge sites on a monthly basis. India has been fulfilling its obligation in providing this data. However, if for some reason, data for particular points is not available, it is so indicated and such information, when received, is provided as supplementary data. I am told that this practice is followed by both sides. India has also supplied in the past, as a gesture of goodwill, data on floods to enable Pakistan take timely action for preventing damage as a result of floods.

One also hears the accusation that India is building hundreds of dams/ hydroelectric projects to deny Pakistan its share of water. This does not correspond to the reality on the ground. There are no quantitative limits on the hydroelectricity that India can produce using the Western Rivers. There is also no limit to the number of run-of- the river projects that India can build. However, India has so far undertaken a limited number of projects. We have provided information to Pakistan, as per the Treaty, in respect of 33 projects. Out of these, 14 are in operation, 13 are under construction, 2 are still at the proposal stage, 3 have been
dropped or deferred and work on one project stands suspended. Out of these 33 projects, as many as 20 have a capacity of 10 MW or less. Projects identified for implementation in the coming years number 22. This certainly does not make for hundreds of dams/ hydroelectric projects.

The Indus Waters Treaty requires India to provide certain specified technical information to Pakistan at least six months before the commencement of construction of river works for a hydroelectric or storage project (the period is two months for a Small Plant), in order to enable Pakistan to satisfy itself that the design of a plant conforms to the provisions of the Treaty. If Pakistan raises any objection, it has to be resolved in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. India has been meeting its obligation to provide the specified information as necessary. In all the cases in the past, India has responded to all queries from Pakistan about such projects, even if these were not strictly in keeping with the Treaty, in order to address Pakistan’s concerns. This has resulted in endless delays and cost overruns. The Tulbul Navigation project is a case in point. India provided information to Pakistan on this project as a matter of goodwill. As a further gesture of goodwill, works on the project were unilaterally stopped by India in October, 1986 and remain suspended to this day. However, infinite queries from Pakistan could amount to a virtual veto on Indian projects. This is not the intention of the Treaty in requiring India to provide information in advance of the river works. India is within its rights to proceed with the construction of a plant at the end of the period of advance notice, even if Pakistan raises objections, subject to any subsequent changes in design or any other consequences that may flow from resolution of the matter under Article IX of the Treaty.

India had communicated information concerning Baglihar project on Chenab to Pakistan as early as in 1992. Pakistan’s objections were referred to a neutral expert in 2005 at the request of Pakistan. The expert upheld India’s design approach and suggested only minor changes in the scope of construction. Pakistan subsequently objected to the initial filling of the Baglihar reservoir. However, this was done by us in keeping with the Treaty provisions. In fact, the Pakistan Indus Commissioner was invited to India at his request in July, 2008 to be briefed about the procedure of initial filling. The actual filling was done in August the same year within the time window specified in the Treaty.

The Kishanganga hydroelectric project on a tributary of river Jhelum has also been objected to by Pakistan, inter alia, on the ground that Pakistan has existing uses on the waters of Kishanganga (Neelum). The matter has been under discussion since 2004. However, details of the claimed existing uses are yet to be substantiated. We believe that the matter should be resolved at the Commission level, keeping in mind the provisions of the Treaty and the findings of the neutral expert in the Baglihar case. In August 2009, we also informed Pakistan that in case technical experts were unable to resolve the issue, efforts could be made to take it up at government level.

Ladies and Gentlemen, India has all along adhered to the provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty and will continue to do so. However, it is natural for questions and issues to arise in the course of implementation of any treaty. We believe that the Permanent Indus Commission is the best forum to resolve all such matters. However, for any issues that cannot be resolved in the Commission, Article IX of the Treaty provides a mechanism for settlement of differences and disputes, which can be resorted to by the aggrieved party. Since the Indus Waters Treaty provides an elaborate framework for distribution of water and resolving any questions, differences or disputes, we fail to understand attempts by some quarters in Pakistan to inflame public passions on the subject. Angry statements targeting India can neither increase the quantity of available water, nor can such statements become a substitute for the mechanism in the Treaty to resolve differences regarding its implementation.
Concerns have also been expressed about some Indian projects on Western Rivers from the environmental point of view. I would like to assure you that we have strict norms for such projects under our Environmental Protection Act and Forests Protection Act. These norms include Catchment Area Treatment Plans and Compensatory afforestation.

We have often heard the bizarre allegation that India wants to deprive Pakistan of water to dry up its canals and drains etc, which besides serving as irrigation channels, can also serve as defensive features in times of war. The Chenab Canal network is mentioned in particular in this connection. There is no truth in this allegation. It is clear from what I have mentioned so far that India has not taken any action to deprive Pakistan of its share of water and consequently to dry up its canals.

Another piece of misinformation being spread by certain circles is that a dam/hydroelectric project is being built by the Government of Afghanistan on the Kabul River with India’s assistance and this would adversely affect the flows of this river to Pakistan. I would like to inform you that there is no truth in this allegation. Those who make it ought to know that a dam or hydroelectric project is not something that can be built surreptitiously. It is highly undesirable to mislead people by making such baseless allegations on issues, which are easily verifiable on the ground.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the issue of water scarcity in Pakistan cannot be analysed fully without looking at the picture in the large part of the Indus basin – around 65% - that lies in Pakistan’s territory or territory controlled by Pakistan. A preponderant portion of the water of the Western Rivers flowing through Pakistan is generated in the catchment area within Pakistan or territory under Pakistan’s control. This share of water is completely controlled by Pakistan. Therefore, it is difficult to understand the excessive and, in many cases, exclusive focus of the public discourse on water scarcity in Pakistan on flows from India. Moreover, as water gets increasingly scarce, the issues of water management and avoidance of wastage of water assume greater significance.

The per capita availability of water in Pakistan is reported to be around 1400 cubic meters or even less. Speaking of the availability and use of water in Pakistan, the Pakistan Water Sector Strategy issued by the Ministry of Water and Power, Government of Pakistan, in 2002 stated the following: “The Indus River and its tributaries on average bring about 152 million acre feet of water annually. This includes 143 MAF from the three Western rivers and 8.4 MAF from the Eastern Rivers. Most of the inflow, about 104 MAF, is diverted for irrigation, with 38 MAF flowing to the sea and about 10 MAF consumed by system losses.” The same report stated that out of the 38 MAF flowing to the sea, 93.7% flow is during the Kharif season and for several months during winter, there is no flow to the sea. The report further stated that a part of this water could be effectively used for supplementing the irrigation water, hydropower generation and meeting the agreed environmental needs through storage in multipurpose reservoirs which could carry water over the winter season to ensure a good start to the Kharif cropping season. These statements do not signal shortage of water, but the urgent need for a closer look at the management of available water resources.

According to the report “Pakistan’s Water Economy” issued by the World Bank in 2005, salinity also remains a major problem in Pakistan. According to the same report, much of the water infrastructure in Pakistan is in a state of disrepair. Water loss between canal heads and farms is reported to be significant, as high as 30%. The report further states that Pakistan has only 150 cubic meters water storage capacity per capita as against 5000 cubic meters in the US and Australia and 2200 cubic meters in China. Pakistan can store barely 30 days of water in the Indus basin. The report points out that “Relative to other arid countries, Pakistan has very little storage capacity. If no new storage is built, canal diversions will remain stagnant at about 104 MAF and the shortfall will increase by about 12% over the next decade.” The Pakistan Water Strategy calculates that Pakistan needs to raise storage capacity by 18 MAF (6 MAF for replacement of storage lost to siltation and 12 MAF of new storage) by 2025 in order to meet the projected water requirements of 134 MAF. Water productivity in Pakistan also remains low. According to the above report, crop yields, both per hectare and per cubic meter of water, are much lower than international benchmarks. Improved irrigation efficiency, through techniques such as sprinkler irrigation and drip irrigation, is the answer to this problem. India has nothing to do with these issues of water management that are internal to Pakistan, but which nevertheless ought to be integral to any discourse on water scarcity. Only Pakistan can seek solutions to these matters.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the Indus Waters Treaty is an example of mutually beneficial co-operation between India and Pakistan for the last 50 years. It has withstood the test of time. Article VII of the Treaty, which deals with future co-operation, recognizes the common interest of both sides in the optimum development of the rivers and lists out the avenues of future co-operation. We need to adhere to the spirit of co-operation, inherent in the Treaty, in ensuring its implementation and to identify further areas of co-operation within its framework. Let me end with the hope that the Indus Waters Treaty, which has completed its first fifty years successfully, will continue to guide us on water sharing in the future.

 

[ajtr]

Assessment points pertaining to above report and IWT:

1. 80% of indus basin waters is allowed to Pakistan
2.India is allowed to use waters on three western rivers for permitted uses and also for storage(presently not utilised by India)
3.40% water entering Pakistan is wasted due to poor water management.(Qureshi and Pakistan's indus water commissioner themselves accepted this)
4. India is in full compliance of IWT, Neutral Expert has also decided in IN favour on baglihar
5.Not more than 3% of total waters on western rivers could be stored by dams , existing and proposed so In is not with-holding waters
Pakistani experts were seen squirming in the chair and almost conceded all points.
Although Pakistan had to provide for the cost of data since 2006 as demanded by India. Yet India has not stopped giving data.This point is often mentioned by PPIC in support of his claim that they do not know if India violated IWT since India do not provide timely data and hence everybody assumes that In is in violation of IWT. One would do well to go through the provisions of IWT and educate themselves as to what type of information /data are required to be provided and at what interval and in which format.


1. Appendix I to Annexure D ( paragraph 5) to be furnished not later than 31.2.1961 for existing structures

2. Appendix II to Annexure D ( paragraph 9) New run of the river plants, six months in advance of start of the work

3. Appendix III to Annexure D ( paragraph 19) Small plants located on a tributary of western rivers, two months in advance.


4. Appendix to Annexure E( paragraph 4 and 12) six months before beginning of construction of storage dams, if meant for flood control on jhelum main then 4 months (paragraph 9)


5. Appendix II to Annexure H ( forms of water accounts:- 1a,1b,1c and 2 to 9), one needs to see those forms to appreciate them.

6.Pakistan and India will notify to each other crop statistics for each kharif year not later than 30 Nov ( in the event of crop failure not later that 30 june , in case of punjab only) each district and tehsils irrigated from western rivers, irrigated crop area. (PK will provide similar info forr RAVI water as may be available for use , not amounting to any rights)

Exchange of data is governed by Article VI

1. Daily gauge and discharge data relating to the flow of rivers at observable points
2.Daily extractions or releases from reservoirs
3.Daily withdrawals at the Heads of all canals/Link canals
4.Daily escapages from canals/Link canals
5.DAily deliveries from Link canals

These data have to be transmitted to the other party as soon as data for a month is collected and tabulated, but not later than the three months after the month they relate to. Provided that either party can demand such data daily or at less frequent intervals as may be requested. Should the one party request supply of any of these data by telegram, telephone or wireless it shall reimburse the other party cost of transmission of such data.


Now collecting data and transmitting them to Pakistan at different intervals require investment and Pakistan will have to incur the cost.PPIC would like to clarify if India has failed to supply data for any reporting month not later than three months then there may be a case for violation of IWT. Asking Real Time data free of cost is not envisaged under the treaty and IN has provided such data upto 2006 and demanded payment only after 2006. Pakistan is yet to pay, still they get the data.

Now the whole misinformation game being played by Pakistan and their non astate henchmen needs to be squarely exposed, since exchange of data is the last point of their otherwise weak arguments on violation of IWT by India. Pakistan must inform the community what data were demanded by them and how those has not been supplied by IN in spite of their making payment to IN, for then only such action would constitute violation. Experts would know that RT data does not come cheap, though IN could afford it why should it give free of cost.

They have not said of any other violation of IWT by India so far.

 

[BJlaowai]

hmmm, interesting but time waisting arguments by the indians in this thread.

Whether china tell Pakistan or not is not a problem for us. The problem for us is India's intentions. Ofcourse, india has to feed its nation with water. But, my dear Indian friends, will you please dare to explaine that HOW COULD YOU TAKE THAT LARGE QUANTITY OF WATER TO REST OF INDIA? by aeroplane??? or by pipeline?

Dam construction has usualy two purposes. One is to store water for near future use and the other is to produce electricity. As in the case of Pakistan. We are affectivily using dams for both purposes. But neither India nor China could do that. Both of you could use electricity, generated by these dams and thats it. You can't divert water to the rest of China or India, instead of its natural flow to Pakistan through Kashmir.

Now let talk another thing. We, Pakistan, has to deal with China and India. OK. As far as China is concern. China is NOT "only" dependent on dams for its electricity production. and, at the top of it, China is very very close, trustable and time tested friend of Pakistan. You Indians could never be able to understand this that China will die first before not helping to Pakistan. We had established our friendship in times when both of us were in deep trouble. Keeping the past record of China and the history or friendship between both countries. We can safely say that Pakistan has no problem with dam building on river indus by China. By the way, for your poor knowledge, Indus river does not have only one starting point. Though, it flows from Tibet but it has hundreds of other entry points(or whatever it called) for water. Now the picture is this... Let's consider India first than we will make the overall picture.

India, on the other hand, is the one who was major cause of our deep troubles, when we shake hands with China. India and Indian leaders were those, who predicted quick fall of Pakistan. India running terrorists camp parallel to the whole international border, in afghanistan, providing arms and amunition to the terrorists in Paksitan, suppporting and fueling terrorists orgs in Balochistan and whats not. Keeping its past record in mind. One can not and must not trust this untrustable country. The only purpose India has in mind of all such dam construction is to stop water from flowing to Pakistan and when appropriate release all water at once to creat flood in Pakistan.

So the picture is, that we can always REQUEST Chinese to store or stop water, whenever needed. But we will never be able to do the same in the case of India.

THAT IS WHY WE TAKE NO NOTICE IN CASE OF CHINA AND WE TAKE FULL NOTICE IN CASE OF INDIA.

Any doubt?

how old are you boy???

Read the bolden sentence of your post. Exactly we also want to know how India runs away with stolen water....The force of water is used in Hydel-power projects ...But after that what happens to that water? Does it vanish????

Dam are constructed to check the flow of water temporarily but unless you have the reservoir you cant store it. Here you are claiming India is storing this water years after year (as if it has no cost). Is there such reservoir exists in world which has such capacity. Instead of writing such long crap you can use the time in google earth in search of such reservoir...

Instead of posting your own theory collect reliable data on how cultivation has been affected so far or drop in agricultural production etc. only then some logical discussion is possible.
About India supporting terrorists....Dono kan hi kata hua kya? Kuch to sharam koro....

Nice point Sab. When I was a student in primary school and the teacher introduced us to the different categories of dams Viz. irrigation, hydel, flood control, multi-purpose etc. I and majority of my classmates were under the impression that hydel dams had some kind of special machines that converted the water in the pipes into electricity in the wires. We were introduced much later about the concept of enery coversion from one form to another. Like in hydel dams how the potential energy of water is converted into kinetic energy and how the mechnical KE is convereted to electrical energy in the power plant. Only the energy in the water is used and no water is lost in the process..
Reading the comments of the Pakistani members on these forums, seems most Pakistanis as still in the primary school level.

 

[ajtr]

Indo-Pak Water Issues 101 – Tariq Tufail

http://www.globalpost.com/webblog/pakistan/indo-pak-water-issues-101-%E2%80%93-tariq-tufail

Last week, the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan met in New Delhi to end a “diplomatic freeze” between the two countries since the 2008 Mumbai attacks. According to Reuters’ Myra MacDonald, they did “what they were expected to do — laid out all the issues which divide the two countries and agreed to ‘keep in touch.’” However, the issue of water-sharing has been cause for contention between India and Pakistan over the years [it is also an internal issue in Pakistan among the provinces]. Below, Tariq Tufail, from Karachi, delves into the issues that stem from the 1960 Indus Water Treaty:

The Pakistan-India foreign secretary-level talks took place as scheduled. But curiously, apart from the usual rhetoric of “terrorism” from the Indian side and “Kashmir” from the Pakistani side in the run-up to the talks, water became the more prominent issue.

Though the water issue has been raised in the past, and is one of the sustaining factors behind Pakistan’s continued interest in Kashmir, the articulation of water as a core India-Pakistan dispute in such a distinct and clear manner is unprecedented. Within the space of two weeks, water was mentioned as one of the principal disputes between India and Pakistan by our Prime Minister, our foreign minister, our Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and curiously, even Hafeez Sayeed of LeT/JuD. In order to understand the issue better, it is important to first provide a background of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT).Broadly speaking, the IWT grants exclusive use of the three eastern tributaries of the Indus River – the Sutlej, Ravi and Beas Rivers - to India and the three western tributaries – Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab Rivers to Pakistan. India is entitled to use all of the 33 million acre feet (MAF) of water from the eastern tributaries, of which it currently uses 30 MAF. Of the three western tributaries, the Jhelum, Chenab and Indus itself, which carries a flow of 143 MAF, India is entitled to store 3.6 MAF and is allowed to irrigate 13,43,477 acres of land. India does not store any water as of now and irrigates 7,92,426 acres. In addition, India is entitled to build “run of the river” hydroelectric projects, which do not store water on the western tributaries. The rise in the country’s usage of the water allocated to India (which used to flow to Pakistan earlier) is stressing the water availability in Pakistan. In addition, reduced snowfall and shifting weather patterns is reducing the water inflow.

Cutting through the usual rhetoric of India “stealing” water, several possibilities have to be analyzed:

Pakistan is heightening the water issue to moderate the Indian negotiating tactic of focusing on terrorism
India is really stealing water and violating the treaty
India is not violating the “letter” of the treaty but the “spirit” of the treaty
India is neither violating the letter or the spirit of the treaty, but due to increased water requirements, Pakistan is laying the ground to re-negotiate the Indus Water Treaty
It will be fruitless to speculate on (1), so let us concentrate on (2), (3) and (4).

At this point in time, the Pakistani government has not proven that India has stolen water. The allegation of Indian water theft has not been substantiated by either telemetry readings submitted by India or by water monitoring by Pakistan and has not been raised during the meetings of water commissioners of India and Pakistan. Moreover, because water sharing between Pakistan’s provinces is a contentious issue, water monitoring in Pakistan is a murky issue. To prevent discord among the provinces, monitoring sensors installed by Siemens are frequently tampered with and some monitoring sensors are regularly lost due to theft and sabotage. Even our Indus water commissioner Jamaat Ali Shah and ex-finance minister, Dr. Mubashar Hasan agree that no provable water theft is being committed by India.

Therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that India is not violating the “letter” of the treaty, even if it may be maximizing its usage as accorded to India by the treaty. This is not enforceable in any court of law, and stirring domestic sentiment over such perceived “violations” reduces our policy options and creates disastrous consequences as the Baglihar episode showed, (for background on the Baglihar dam conflict, see this piece).

So what are the disadvantages of the massive construction spree by India?

The national security elements in Pakistan are concerned that even as India is not reducing the flow of water to Pakistan, it is rapidly acquiring the capability to do so by building dams. This is certainly an area of concern, but the IWT does not prevent India from being able to stop water flow into Pakistan at a future date. It only prevents India from stopping water flow. A positive aspect is that the IWT has stood the test of time, with no violations reported during the 1965, 1971, 1989, Kargil, Parakram and Mumbai standoffs.
Increasing India’s usage of the Indus is affecting Pakistan’s water supply and power projects. That is, the water that was allocated to India, which was previously un-utilized and subsequently flowed to Pakistan and was utilized by our farmers, is becoming increasingly scarce as India builds projects to exploit its share. Even though it causes massive problems in Pakistan, this point cannot be protested, since India is not in violation of the IWT. (For example, complaints about the Sutlej and the Ravi running dry are superfluous since India has exclusive rights to use the water of those rivers.)
So what can be done?

As pointed out beautifully by lawyer Ahmer Bilal Soofi, India cannot be compelled to give “concessions” to Pakistan as long as it complies with the letter of the IWT. Furthermore, any extraneous discussions about water sharing can be stymied by India, since water sharing according to the Indian stance is already settled by IWT. From their perspective, as long as India is not in violation of the treaty, there is nothing to discuss.

Of the remaining courses of action open to Pakistan, re-negotiation of the IWT has a very small chance of success (since both sides will try to get better terms than the current treaty even if India agrees to renegotiate). The right course of action is to massively modernize our irrigation infrastructure (it is estimated that up to 40% of water drawn from our head-works are lost due to seepage in unlined canals, theft and evaporation), stringently follow the inter-provincial water sharing accord of 1991, and gain the trust of the provinces so that new water projects such as Kalabagh can proceed without their objection while seeking unofficial concessions from India to tide over the interim 5-10 year period. However, seeking unofficial concessions might be a hard task, since it has to overcome the prevailing climate of suspicion between the two neighbors, as well as India’s own domestic interests like its own water requirements as well as the impact on public opinion and Indian farmers.

At the end of the day, the wrong course of action would be to stir public sentiment through half truths and lies and to involve non-state and Jihadi actors, which reduces the space for policy flexibility in Pakistan, and further hardens the Indian position.

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Water Pakistan's diversionary tactic?

NEW DELHI: Pakistan's zeal to insert the "water issue" in the bilateral talks is being seen here as an attempt to divert popular attention back home from the mismanagement of its water resources and the growing discontent in Sindh and Balochistan over the denial of their share of Indus waters.

Analysts here have been struck by the way Pakistan's political class and the jehadi establishment have teamed up to unleash a propaganda offensive against India's "machinations" to rob the neighbouring country of its legitimate share of Indus waters.

With leading jehadis Hafiz Saeed and his deputy Abdur Rahman Makki of Lashkar warning of serious repercussions, holding out the grim warning of "Muslims dying of thirst would drink blood of India", the official establishment has scarcely been subtle in upping the ante on the emotionally fraught issue where agriculture remains the mainstay of economy. A full spectrum of devices -- from statements from the PM downwards to official briefings and remarks of official spokespersons endorsing fears of theft of Pakistan's water by India -- have been used to elevate water to the level of "core issue" -- a description so far reserved for the dispute ove J&K.

The government-jehadi concert has raised suspicions here whether Pakistan is raising a bogey to thwart the construction of storage dams on western rivers at Bursar (J&K) and Gyspa (HP) by India in keeping with its entitlement under Indus Water Treaty. It is also suspected that the larger gameplan could be to seek arbitration outside the Permanent Indus Water Commission the two countries have.

The grievance narrative, however, suffers from serious infirmities. Analysts point out that Indus Water Treaty of 1960 -- an agreement which has so far endured despite conflicts -- allocated the three eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas and Ravi) of Indus system to India, whereas the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) were assigned to Pakistan. Importantly, western rivers are far more bountiful than eastern rivers -- mean flow of 136 million acre feet (MAF) against a mere 33 MAF in that order.

India, however, did not let the huge gap come in the way as it decided to pay Pakistan a compensation of 62 million pound sterling for construction of `replacement' canals as compensation for waters of eastern rivers. While this was a rare instance of upper riparian state (India) giving disproportionately, India also accepted severe restrictions on the use of waters of western rivers.

As it escalates its campaign against India over water issue, Islamabad, those familiar with the matter said, was concealing from its people such crucial facts that India is yet to avail of its entitlement to build storage for up to 3.6 MAF on western rivers. Or, for that matter, that of the crop area of 13,43,477 acres that India is allowed to irrigate using waters of western rivers, India has so far been irrigating only 7,92,426 acres.

At the root of the `misinformation campaign' lies a complex web of issues, including the "water greed" of northern part of Pakistan's Punjab which has seen not just Sindh and Balochistan but also, increasingly, southern Punjab in that country going without their legitimate share of Indus waters.

The mismanagement by Pakistan coupled with the fact that Indus waters carry more silt -- giving rise to real and ever-worsening problem of siltation -- has resulted in Indus waters not reaching the whole length of the canals in Pakistan. To compound matters, deforestation and rising temperatures mean a huge depletion in flow of water to Pakistan.

Islamabad recognises the problem is going to deepen with analysts projecting a water deficit of 30% by 2025. Like in the case of many of its other problems, it has decided to deflect the attention towards India.

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Not Kashmir but Kashmir’s water is the core issue for Pakistan

Soon after the promulgation of Martial Law in Pakistan in October 1958, Gen.Ayub Khan turned his attention to the rivers of Jammu and Kashmir which, he said, were indispensable for the economic survival of his country. He made a failed attempt in 1965 to capture this State.
After Ayub, Gen.Pervez Musharraf is the second military ruler for whom Kashmir is the core issue not because of any ideology but because of Pakistan’s water needs. While for Ayub Kashmir was indispensable for Pakistan’s economic survival, for Gen.Musharraf it is indispensable for both the country’s economic survival and for its national integrity. He has discarded Pakistan’s five decade-old stand on the United Nations resolutions on Kashmir and does not talk of accession as his country’s ideology. Both Ayub and Gen.Musharraf made water from Kashmir as a condition for peace with India. Like Ayub, Gen.Musharraf made an unsuccessful attempt to grab Kashmir in May 1999 by invading Kargil.

As a Brigadier at the Royal College of Defence Studies in London in 1990, he had presented a paper with an unusually long title: “The Arms Race in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent. Conflicts with the Pressing Requirements of Socio-economic Development. What are its Causes and Implications? Is there a Remedy?” The gist of this paper is a suggestion that the rivers of Kashmir hold the key to the future conflict between India and Pakistan. This month International Centre for Peace Initiatives published a book by name “The Final Settlement: Restructuring India-Pakistan Relations”. The book suggests that the search for a final settlement between the two countries must be predicted on the analysis of the three essential elements in the bilateral relationship - Fire (use of terrorism as state policy), Water (rivers of Kashmir) and Land (an agreed future status of Kashmir).

As the summer has arrived and annual water agitations have started in Sindh, the part of this book dealing with water is very timely. Shortage of water and its gross mismanagement in Pakistan have the potential of sabotaging the new-found bonhomie between the peoples of that country and India. The facts about the water situation in Pakistan, as mentioned in this book, are alarming. Still more alarming for the national integration of Pakistan is the fact that Generals want their land in Punjab to get uninterrupted water supply at the cost of Sindh by upstream division of water from Indus. During summer, Indus is almost dry on entering Sindh. As a result, there is massive sea intrusion destroying farm lands. On top of it, the Government plans to build the Kalabagh dam and Thal canal which, the Sindhis say, will further reduce the water flow to their province. The Kalabagh dam is opposed both by Sindhis and Pushtuns of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Sindhis have threatened to start a cessationist movement if the Government goes ahead with the construction of this dam. Baluchistan, too, opposes this dam. This province faces water draught in summer and devastating floods during monsoons. The Government's concern for this poor province was exposed this January when five small dams of inferior quality were washed away in rain and snow destroying human lives and property. The Thal canal is opposed because it is designed to supply additional water to areas in Punjab where Generals have their farms. Again at the cost of Sindh.

In order to avoid a conflict with Sindh, according to the book, Pakistan may feel it needs physical control over the Chenab catchment region in Jammu and Kashmir. “It needs sites to build dams, to store, divert and regulate water flows,” it says. Then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had opened a two-track channel with the Government of India soon after Gen.Musharraf became the Army Chief. Apparently this new diplomacy was started at Gen.Musharraf's instance. During this time a suggestion was floated that the Chenab river should become the border between the two countries. Pakistan wanted water security beyond the 1960 Indus Water Treaty. Gen.Musharraf's Dixon plan-like proposals in October last year suggested division of Jammu into sub-regions roughly along the Chenab river.

To meet Punjab's water needs, Pakistan has been exploiting Kashmir in two ways. One, the Mangla dam constructed on Jhelum in occupied Kashmir has revolutionised Punjab's agriculture at the cost of ***. The construction of this dam in 1960 had rendered lakhs of Mirpuris homeless. They hardly got any compensation. *** does not receive royalty for the power it supplies to Pakistan. Now to meet Punjab's increased water needs, Pakistan has decided to raise the height of the Mangla dam by 30 feet. This will make more than 40,000 people homeless in Mirpur. Hence bitter protests.

Pakistan is also toying with the idea of constructing a dam in Skardu in the Northern Areas. If this dam is constructed, Baltistan will ultimately disappear. Here too, there are protests.

Two, Pakistan has been using Kashmiri youths to secure its water interests. Syed Salahuddin, chairman of the ***-based United Jehad Council has often said the Kashmiri youths are actually fighting for Pakistan to gain control over Kashmir's rivers. *** President Mohammad Anwar Khan told Urdu newspapers in October 2002, “Kashmiris are fighting for the security, strength and prosperity of Pakistan ...Even peace between Punjab and Sindh depends on water, and, therefore, on Kashmir”. *** Prime Minister Sikandar Hayat told a seminar on March 6, 2003 “The freedom fighters of Kashmir are in reality fighting for Pakistan's water security and have prevented India from constructing a dam on the Wular Barrage.”

It is certain that Kashmiri youths will not keep on shedding their blood for Pakistan's water needs. On the contrary, there can be confrontations between Pakistan and Kashmris over water.

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Friday Times – Latest issue

Getting ready for a ‘water war’?

Getting ready for a ‘water war’?

Khaled Ahmed

For once Commissioner Jamaat Ali Shah is right. He sees no violation of the Treaty. And he has no jurisdiction over the new issue of scarcity of water because the Treaty doesn't deal with it

Pakistan may be getting ready to go to war with India, not over Kashmir, which it finds futile, but over the river water India is supposed to insist on stealing from it despite the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. Pakistan’s army chief has mentioned ‘water’ in his last challenging statement, followed by the Prime Minister, and there is a one-sided media war going on as the Indian side, still angry over the Mumbai attack, is poised to jump in, all guns blazing. One chief editor in Pakistan says Pakistan should nuke the Indian dams stealing Pakistani water – with him as human payload tied to a nuclear missile!

The world is waiting for this to happen. Water wars have been predicted by the UN, but statistics show that states continue to be sane over shared waters. The Economist wrote on May 1, 2008, ‘Researchers at Oregon State University say they have found that the world’s 263 trans-boundary rivers generate more co-operation than conflict. Over the past half-century, 400 treaties had been concluded over the use of rivers. Of the 37 incidents that involved violence, 30 occurred in the dry and bitterly contested region formed by Israel and its neighbours, where the upper end of the Jordan river was hotly disputed, and skirmished over, before Israel took control in the 1967 war’.

Alarmism of the Lower Riparian : The Economist ends by stating : ‘And some inter-state water treaties are very robust. The Indus river pact between India and Pakistan survived two wars and the deep crisis of 2002’. We may be about to prove the observation wrong. As we go for the next round of Indo-Pak talks – with the Indian army chief alleging cross-border infiltration in Kashmir – Pakistan’s lawyer Ahmer Bilal Soofi, writing in Dawn on February 20, 2010 focuses on the real issue : scarcity rather than theft of water, and recommends fresh talks to consider supplementing the 1960 Indus Water Treaty with a water regime during scarcity of water. The Treaty did not take into account the ecological change that would occur half a century later, depriving the subcontinent of rains and run-off from its mountain glaciers.

Today, water management is akin to conflict management. But India and Pakistan are busy conflict-creating: they started with Kashmir and have ended up with half a dozen more casus belli issues even as they talk peace. Water is the latest such issue. Before we as a lower riparian state raise the ante, let us consider some aspects of the developing confrontation. As a lower riparian, Pakistan is naturally alarmist. This is true of lower riparians anywhere in the world including lower riparian provinces in India and Pakistan. We don’t want water storage on our rivers in Kashmir; Sindh doesn’t want water storage on its rivers in Punjab. And Sindh is as alarmist and non-trusting vis-�-vis Punjab as Pakistan is vis-�-vis India.

Treaty good despite universal hatred of Treaty : In India everyone thinks signing the Indus Water Treaty was wrong. They know that not having a waters treaty is advantageous to the upper riparian if it is militarily strong. In Pakistan, even as Punjab and Sindh fight over waters, both sides denounce the 1960 Treaty. No one says how it would have benefited Pakistan if there was no treaty reserving certain rivers for Pakistan. In India those who hate the Treaty have a good reason for doing so : take all the water and make Pakistan suffer. One is astounded by the intensity of the warmongering in Pakistan over the waters, especially as one looks at the record of Pakistan’s past behaviour under the Treaty.

The Indus Treaty envisages three kinds of complications over waters. The first type is ‘questions’ which are resolved by the two sides through their water commissioners at the Indus Water Commission. The second is ‘differences’ for which the two sides approach the World Bank which appoints a neutral expert. The third type is ‘disputes’ which goes to a Court of Arbitration assembled by the World Bank for the purpose. Both sides fund the process; and the Court can also award costs. So far ‘questions’ have been many, but only one difference, over Baglihar Dam, which turned out to be not as grave as Pakistan had thought, which must have been chastening for our watchdog water commissioner, Jamaat Ali Shah. There has never been a ‘dispute’. It is on the basis of this record that the world thinks the Indus Treaty such a good bilateral arrangement. Have we learned anything from this record?

India allowed storage and some use of Western Rivers : Our bearded Water Commissioner Jamaat Ali Shah once symbolised our lower riparian alarmism, returning from his meetings in India with his dire warnings about the male fides of Indian intent. Today he is being castigated and even insulted on TV programmes because his accumulated knowledge prevents him from crossing the line on the jurisprudence of the 1960 Treaty. Discussants fall into red-faced paroxysms when he says India is not in violation even though it is in the process of building dozens of dams over our rivers – Indus, Chenab, Jhelum – and diverting water from Kishenganga.

As stated above, an upper riparian will not enter into a water treaty unless it sees advantage in it – an advantage over the lower riparian.Although Nehru is cursed in India for having signed the Indus Treaty, the truth is that he did extract from it the advantage of using some water from our three Western Rivers for consumptive use, that is, agriculture. Annexure C of the Treaty is about India diverting certain amount of water in certain months from the Western Rivers. Then, there is no bar on the building of water storage for electricity production or any other non-consumptive use on Western Rivers (Annexure E). If anyone complains in Pakistan about India building dams and taking some water out of our rivers, he speaks out of ignorance.

Water-management is conflict-management : For once Commissioner Jamaat Ali Shah is right. He sees no violation of the Treaty. And he has no jurisdiction over the new issue of scarcity of water because the Treaty doesn’t deal with it. He can only say he doesn’t believe what the Indians are saying; and he is saying that. India and Pakistan are facing a calamity they can’t quantify and that pertains to climatic change as never seen in human memory. This calamity is the ‘third party’ against which both should unite, taking along also the other states of South Asia. But this can only happen if India and Pakistan normalise their relations and become ‘sympathetic’ rather than ‘punitive’ in their view of each other. It has been observed in the context of riparian relations that water disputes can be resolved if relations are normal, that is, allowing interpenetration of interests through free bilateral trade and investment.

As a lower riparian Pakistan has no aggressive advantage, nuclear weapons or no nuclear weapons. All advantages lie in its median status and the potential it has as a trading corridor with regional states dependent on it for the movement of their goods and for the transit of their oil and gas pipelines. As stated above, 263 trans-boundary rivers in the world have caused the riparian states to cooperate rather than go to war. Many Pakistanis believe they have the advantage of leverage over America and can go on benefiting from America despite being anti-American. One has to look at Pakistan’s record with India to see how much leverage Pakistan has seen seep away as it follows its aggressive approach. Those who denounce the Indus Treaty in India want Pakistan to go on acting like this. We must remember that the Treaty can be set aside in the case of a hostile escalation; and the world will find itself siding with India if it thinks Pakistan is in the wrong.

Shahid Javed Burki’s advice for normalisation : Pakistan’s former finance minister and ex-vice president of the World Bank, Shahid Javed Burki, anticipating the Indo-Pak ministerial talks in late February 2010, wrote in Dawn (16 Feb 2010): ‘If thinking outside the box is to be encouraged, my suggestion would be that Islamabad base the dialogue on an entirely new consideration : how to bring about greater economic integration between the two countries.

‘The objective should be to develop a stake for India in the Pakistani economy and also in its stability. This would entail a number of things including unhindered flow of trade between the two countries, encouraging the private sectors on either side of the border to invest in each other’s economy, the opening up of the border that separates the two parts of Kashmir to trade and movement of people, and grant of transit rights to each other for trade with third countries. As the experience of Europe shows, economic integration among states with a history of hostility towards one another is a good way of easing tensions. Taking that approach would constitute real thinking outside the box’.

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There is a need to review the spirit of the Treaty"

Syed Jamaat Ali Shah, Indus Waters Commissioner
The News on Sunday: A lot is being written about in the press about the water controversy between India and Pakistan. What exactly is the dispute?

Syed Jamaat Ali Shah: It is quite unfortunate that the people of Pakistan, including the press, have woken up to the issue after the passage of half a century. We want the Indus Waters Treaty implemented, in letter as well as in spirit. We want the fulfillment of the rights of both sides, as acknowledged in the Treaty.

Secondly, if I say there is no hurdle from the Indian side, that wouldn't be true either. There are certain mechanisms and design parameters that have been defined in the 1960 Treaty, between the two countries. If the conditions are not met, ultimately the required flow of water to Pakistan will be affected.

Let me also say that India has not reduced the due share of water to Pakistan. For example, when India set up Baglihar Dam, in 2008, the cusecs of water from India to Marala was reduced from 55,000 to 38,000. It was then that the issue was raised. We want that India should provide all information to us according to the Treaty, before it starts any project on the said rivers. For example, India didn't provide us information at least six month prior to starting a project on Indus. This is against the rules in the Treaty.


TNS: Is it true that the Kishenganga hydropower project of India is in violation of the Treaty? Also, it is said that New Delhi has started preparations for building another big dam on Chenab river?

SJAS: We have repeatedly asked India to give us details of the proposed water storage and hydropower projects, including Bursar Dam. However, India's stance remains that it is aware of its legal obligations and will let Pakistan know of the project details six months ahead of the construction work.

We have also requested the government to quickly move the International Court of Arbitration in order to stop the construction of the controversial Kishenganga project. Pakistan has already nominated two members for the court. The procedure laid down in the Treaty requires the two nations to nominate two adjudicators, each of their choice, and then to jointly nominate three members to complete the composition of a seven-member court of arbitration.

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Punjab walks out of Irsa meeting

ISLAMABAD: A dispute among provinces over water share intensified on Thursday when a meeting of the advisory committee of the Indus River System Authority (Irsa) ended in deadlock and Punjab walked out in protest against opposition from Sindh, Balochistan and federal members to a proposal to allow it to draw more water during the remaining period of the current crop season.

This was perhaps the worst crisis of its kind faced by Irsa in its 18-year history, despite some improvement in water situation and an estimated decline in shortage from 34 per cent to 30 per cent after the recent rainy spell.

The meeting presided over by Irsa Chairman Aman Gul Khattak was presented with the revised water probability of 7.42 million acre feet (MAF), which Sindh claimed was a shift from all past traditions when water probabilities were worked out at the start and not in the middle of cropping seasons. The meeting was attended by all Irsa members, provincial irrigation and agriculture secretaries and representatives of the agencies concerned.

“The meeting was hit by the differences and now the authority will take a decision” about water probabilities and provincial shares, Irsa spokesman Khalid Rana told reporters.

The provinces were not only divided over the probable water availability calculated by Irsa for the next six weeks, but also took extreme positions on how to share whatever quantities were expected to be available from Feb 11 to March 31.

While the members from Sindh and Balochistan and the federal member (belonging to Sindh) opposed allowing Punjab to open the Chashma-Jhelum link canal to draw more water from the Indus zone, Punjab insisted on drawing more water from that as well as the Taunsa-Punjnad canal.

According to sources, Irsa’s revised estimates suggested 1.48MAF of additional water share for Punjab from the Indus zone, but the three members refused to accept the estimates. They claimed that Punjab had already consumed more than its share from the Indus and should now compensate Sindh and Balochistan for 400,000 acre feet of water it had drawn, under a Dec 15 decision of Irsa.

According to the revised estimates for Feb 11 to March 31, Irsa calculated Punjab’s total remaining share for the current season at 4.09MAF — 2.6MAF from Jhelum-Chenab and 1.48MAF from the Indus zone. Sindh’s share was estimated at 2.6MAF, NWFP’s at 270,000 acre feet and Balochistan’s 450,000 acre feet.

Irsa member for Punjab Shafqat Masud told reporters that Sindh and Balochistan were not ready to agree to the remaining water share from Indus that Punjab was entitled to draw from Chashma-Jhelum and the authority could not reach a decision. “We decided to walk out in protest.”

He said the water share of Punjab stood at 4.9MAF, part of which it had the right to draw from the Chashma-Jhelum canal.

But Sindh and Balochistan had a different view. “By working out water probabilities in the middle of the season, Irsa has set a new example in violation of traditions and, therefore, we don’t accept it,” Sindh’s representative Shuja Ahmed Juneju said.

He said Irsa had tried to establish Punjab’s additional share from the Indus zone “that we have contested and proved with facts that revised probabilities were not acceptable”.

He said Irsa had tried to confuse different issues that would add to the problems instead of solving them. He said Sindh had demanded closure of the Taunsa-Punjnad and Chashma-Jhelum canals because Punjab had already utilised its share from the Indus zone.

He claimed that Irsa’s federal and Sindh members had neither been consulted in preparation of the revised probabilities nor before their presentation to the committee.

An irrigation official from Balochistan said his province supported Sindh’s stand of not allowing more water for Punjab from the Indus and demanded that the two lower provinces should be compensated by Punjab for the 400,000 acre feet of water it had been allowed to draw in December. He said the Taunsa-Punjnad canal should also be closed.

When asked if Balochistan had taken up its complaint against Sindh for allegedly not providing its share, he said the matter had been taken up, but Sindh’s representatives said they themselves could not get their full share and hence Balochistan also had to suffer. He said the issue would be taken up again at an appropriate forum.

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1991 Water Accord must be followed: Taj Haider

KARACHI: Punjab government will not let go of "a single drop" of water, said Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah on Friday. Responding with Sindh's perspective on the water dispute, senior PPP leader Taj Haider told DawnNews that the 1991 Water accord must be followed to resolve the current crisis.

Taj Haider said that the construction of a power plant on Chashma canal is an unnecessary hindrance and should be removed immediately. He said there are 360 other canals in Punjab where such a power plant could be constructed.

He said that 8,000 cusecs of water that should be received by Sindh is stolen from Kotri barrage every year, adding that this transfer should be made through Guddu barrage instead.

He said that the lack of fresh water is harming agricultural land in Thatta and Badin districts.

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Militants try to cash in on Pakistani farmers’ water woes

CHISHTIAN SHARIF // A deteriorating supply of water to farms in the southern districts of Pakistan’s central Punjab province is causing concern among farmers and is being seized upon by militant groups looking to capitalise on discontent, locals say.

The decrease in irrigation water to the Roohi desert region – a place that since 1988 has been a recruiting ground for militant groups fighting Indian rule in Kashmir – was first noticed by residents five years ago.

“There was ample water until 2005 – more than enough to grow our crops. Then, suddenly, the number of days that water was available to each village started to drop off and has now reached the point where it has become a serious concern,” said Ansar Rasheed Sindhu, a farmer from the village of Chak 205, located on the Murad Canal near the market town of Chishtian Sharif, which is 700km south-east of the capital, Islamabad.

The effect of the water shortfall has been particularly severe on subsistence farmers, whose families depend on the harvests of wheat and sugarcane for much of their food and on the sale of cotton for cash income.

Mohammed Anwar, a father of three who lives off 1.2 hectares in Chak 205, said yields from the area’s three major cash crops had improved by 50 per cent over the past 20 years because of superior seed, fertilisers and pesticides, but were still 25 per cent lower than districts further north that were closer to the Chenab river, which feeds the canals of Punjab.


“You can see that the virgin soil on the periphery of our village, which was first farmed about 15 years back, is losing its fertility because we can’t irrigate it as regularly as it should be,” he said.

Mr Anwar said the effect was most keenly felt in villages at the tail of the canal chain, further east of Chak 205 and close to the nearby border with the Indian state of Rajasthan.

“They barely get any water, if at all. The fields are barren and being reclaimed by the desert. I’ve seen villagers filling pots with water from ponds used by livestock. Their situation is awful and scares me because it shows what could happen to this village,” he said in an interview at his farm, surrounded by young wheat stalks that were ringed by yellow sand dunes.

The growing alarm among farmers has not escaped the attention of militant groups still active in the area. They include the Jaish-i-Mohammed and Lashkar-i-Taiba (LiT), both of which are responsible for attacks in India over the past decade.

In the nearby village of Chak 206, Jamal Din “Afghani”, the local head of the Jama’at-ud-Dawah, the charitable front of the LiT, blamed the water shortages on India’s construction of the Baglihar dam upstream on the Chenab River.

The filling of the Baglihar dam, a process that would take several years, has substantially reduced water flows into Pakistan, the government has said. “India wants to destroy Pakistan by cutting off our water. Now it wants to build another dam on the Jhelum river [another Indus tributary] to turn Pakistan into a desert and starve us all to death,” said Mr Din, who is better know as “Afghani” because he fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s.

India contends the dam does not violate its accord with Pakistan in 1962 over the use of water from the Indus River and its tributaries, which flow through both countries from the Himalayas.

Under the accord, Pakistan had first right of dam construction on the Chenab, but failed to act within a stipulated time because of political indecision and a lack of funding.

After three years of unproductive talks, Pakistan decided last year to take the dispute to the World Bank, the guarantor of the 1962 accord, for arbitration.

However, farmers in the Roohi region, also known as the Cholistan Desert, dismissed the contention that the water shortages are a consequence of the Baglihar dam.

“The shortages started before India built the dam, shortly after the last local government elections [in 2005]. After big landlords won and gained control, they started stealing water to fill reservoirs on their farms,” said Mr Sindhu, from Chak 205. “Corruption within the irrigation department is now the issue that needs to be dealt with, but I can see how the poverty that it has caused could be twisted by the militants to meet their own agenda.”

The Roohi region was first irrigated in 1934, when British engineers completed the construction of Pakistan’s canal system, still the largest in the world.

Before that, the region had undergone a massive upheaval when, about a century ago, the Hakra river dried up, local historians said.

Mohammed Yasin Wattoo, a guide at the crumbling ruins of Manjgarh, a ghost town near Hasilpur, said that before the drying of the Hakra, it had been a bustling trade hub with daily trains of vegetable-laden bullock carts from fertile areas to the east in what is now India.

Pointing to the broken ramparts of the town’s still imposing fort, he said: “My elders told me that when the moisture left the soil, the mud-brick foundations lost their cohesion and collapsed. The same is happening again.”

 

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Pakistan's water problem is not only with india but also with Afghanistan.Or is it just that india is buildinding dam on kabul river for Afghanistan government so that afghan people reap its benifit in form of irrigation and electricity production.

Pakistan concerned over dam on Kabul River

Saturday, February 13, 2010
ISLAMABAD: A trilateral US-Pakistan-Afghanistan forum on agriculture has made a robust start in its first meeting held in Qatar with the United States making initial commitment of $100 million as first tranche out of a hefty fund it promised to bolster agriculture in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

“More money will flow as concrete projects get under way,” US deputy under-secretary agriculture Burnham Philbrook observed in the plenary session. According to a message received here on Friday, the meeting was organised in Doha by the US Embassy in Pakistan for security reasons and to avoid visa and other complications envisaged in holding it in the United States.

Working groups comprising experts from the three countries in their deliberations focused on areas of food security, trade corridors and water management. Malik announced that the next meeting of the forum will be held in Pakistan in April. Pakistan voiced its concerns on the dam being built on River Kabul with India’s assistance and suggested a profound engagement between Pakistan and Afghanistan to address these concerns.

following is the paper on kabul rive potential:
Water Resources Potential in Kabul River Basin:Case Study: Gambiri Irrigation Project

Introduction:
Limitations in available water resources are accounted as one of the main obstacles of
social development and growth. Whereas the main income of the inhabitants of Kabul
River basin is through agriculture and animal husbandry, development of resources
and proper management in water sector should be planned in a way to meet water
demands in present and future in a sustainable and appropriate manner.
Water resources development and power generation are two main key
development strategies in Afghanistan.
Provision of energy and safe and enough water for municipal, industrial and
agricultural use was felt during rehabilitation of Afghanistan. Demand growth water
and power is due to population growth, return of immigrants, thinking about
construction of large number of workshops and trade centers around the cities.
The present paper is demonstrates the pattern of water demands for social and
economical development and recognizes opportunities for water resources
development and hydro-energy potentialities within Kabul River basin.
Gambiri Irrigation network project is described as a typical of recommended projects
in Kabul river basin.
In this regard the basic challenges and obstacles faced will be discussed.
General characteristics of Afghanistan and Kabul River basin:
Afghanistan has an area of about 650,000 km2 and based on the latest
information
has 28 million population, out of which 20% are settled in the cities and 80% in the
rural areas.As the Kabul River basin area is more than 53000 km2, it occupies only 8% of the
total
Country’s area, more than 8 million people or 30% of the country’s population are
settled in the basin, especially in Kabul city and its perimeters. The ratio between
citizens and
Villagers differ in the basin with that of the whole country and 40% of the population
of the basin is settled in cities and 60% in rural areas. Mean population growth in the
cities of the Kabul basin during 1979 to 2003 was more than 4.5% per year, which
indicates ever increasing potable and safe water and energy demands especially in the
Kabul River basin.
The areas under irrigation and rain fed agriculture in the country are 2.8 and 1.1
million hectares respectively.
Whole they are 230,000 and 80,000 hectares in Kabul river basin respectively.
The potential irrigable lands for development lands in Afghanistan are estimated to be
about 4 million hectares, out of which only 90,000 hectares ( about 2% )of these
lands are located inside the basin area. This indicates the smaller shares of Kabul
River basin in future agricultural development.
Studies in industrial and mining sectors show that the basin has a very high potential
development in this sector due to the location of Kabul, the capital, concentration of
man power and availability of financial resources and also rich mines.Investments in
this sector are an indication of the fact.
Water resources of Afghanistan and Kabul River basin:
annual renewable waters resources in the country is 65 billion cubic meters.
Therefore, available water per capita at the present is estimated 2200 m3/year.This
figures shows that Afghanistan is in a good condition in respect of available per
capita water resources potential. However, investigations indicate that at the present
the water withdrawal in the country is about 27 billion cubic meters per year, out of
which 99% is allocated to the agriculture and only 1% is consumed in municipal and
other uses.
The major river basins in Afghanistan are as below;
• Northern basin includes AmuDarya River basin covering 24% of the
country’s area (about 156,000 km2).
• Morghab-Harirood basin, this basin covers about 12% of the country’s area
( about 78,000 km2 ). Its water flow is finally discharged into Qaraqum
desert in Turkmenistan through Harirood and Morghab rivers.
• South-East basin ( Farah-Helmand ), this basin covers 52% of the country’s
area ( about 338,000 km2 ). Its water flow is discharged into Sistan swamp
through Farah and Helmand rivers.
• Indus-Kabul basin, The basin totally covers 12% of the country’s area
( about 78,000 km2 ). Kabul River basin having 53,000 km2 of area is
discharged into Indus river in Pakistan
Kabul river basin has only 53,000 km2 of area ,this basin with only 8% of the whole
country area yields, the potential of surface water runoff more than 20 billion cubic
meters per year which is 30% of the total surface water potential of the country .

---------- Post added at 04:50 PM ---------- Previous post was at 04:50 PM ----------

Daily times editorial

One good signal came when our Indus Waters Commissioner Mr Jamaat Ali Shah left for India last week for talks with his counterpart. Reported in Nawa-e-Waqt (May 31, 2009), Indus Waters Treaty Commissioner Jamaat Ali Shah, while leaving for New Delhi to talk about waters shared by India and Pakistan, said that Pakistan was getting its share of waters under the Indus Treaty and that building a dam was the right of India. He said less water in Pakistani rivers was because of lack of rain, not because India had blocked it.

 

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Don’t blame us for water woes , India tells Pakistan

New Delhi, Feb 26 (Inditop.com) Rejecting “negative propaganda” over the Indus waters row, India has made it clear that Pakistan’s water woes arise from its internal domestic problems and called for adherence to the 1960 Indus Water Treaty, informed sources say.
Pakistan raised the issue of the alleged denial of Indus waters to it during the foreign secretary-level talks with India Thursday. But the Indian side stressed that the interests of the two countries were best served by sticking to the letter and spirit of the water treaty.
India also rejected Pakistan’s accusation that New Delhi was violating the treaty, government sources said Friday.
They have given us no evidence to buttress the charge, an official source said.
India’s stand is that Pakistan’s problems arise due to inter-provincial rivalry in that country.
Sindh and Balochistan have accused Pakistan’s western province of Punjab of denying them Indus water. There are also technical problems relating to lack of effective watershed management. Over the years, per capita availability of water in Pakistan has gone down drastically due to a host of factors.
After talks with his Indian counterpart Nirupama Rao Thursday, Pakistani Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir handed over a brief paper on the water row to India.
Speaking to reporters later, he struck a conciliatory note saying it was “important to abide by the provisions of the treaty”.
Rao made it clear that the Indus treaty had been “a very successful and useful mechanism” to resolve water-related disputes.
The accusation that India steals water has become an emotive issue in Pakistan. Groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba/Jamaat-ud-Dawa have tried to hype the issue by blaming India for growing scarcity of water in Pakistan.
Anti-India ideologues like Hafiz Saeed and his deputy Abdur Rahman Makki of Lashkar have warned that “Muslims dying of thirst would drink the blood of India”.
Under the 1960 treaty, India was given exclusive use of the waters of three eastern tributaries — Ravi, Beas and Sutlej — and the right to “non-consumptive” use of the western rivers — Indus, Jhelum and Chenab.
The western rivers have a flow of 136 million acre feet (MAF) against a mere 33 MAF in the eastern rivers.
India has allowed the flow of water to Pakistan from its eastern rivers as well, official sources pointed out.

 

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The Indus Water Treaty

Subrahmanyam Sridhar

Executive Summary

Recent stresses and strains in the observance of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) [1] have had many analysts including this author believe that water sharing will take a politically charged dynamic and may even replace Kashmir as the primary source of conflict between India and Pakistan. Therefore it is important to have comprehensive understanding of the overall issues of the Indus system of rivers and the IWT as this article attempts to provide. It is formatted introduce the Indus river system, a brief overview of the principles of water sharing, the historical background leading up to the water crisis between India and Pakistan and the mediation by the World Bank, various provisions of the IWT, current disputes in water projects on the Indus River System bilaterally between India and Pakistan, and a look into the state of affairs of the Indus River System within Pakistan today.

Introduction

The 3rd World Water Forum held at Kyoto , Japan in March 2003 sent simultaneous messages of hope and distress regarding the availability of water to meet surging worldwide demand in the coming decades. Its significance is especially serious in the Indian subcontinent, a region that is home to one-fourth of humanity and to three of the mightiest rivers of the world: the Indus , Ganges and Brahmaputra . Although these rivers have been subject to significant water sharing treaties among the various riparian states in the past, currently four major treaties govern them. These include the Indus Water Treaty (1960) between India and Pakistan , Sankosh Multipurpose Project treaty (1993) between India and Bhutan , the Ganges Water Sharing Agreement (1996) between India and Bangladesh , and the Mahakali Treaty (1996) between India and Nepal .

Recent stresses and strains in the observance of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) [1] have had many analysts including this author believe that water sharing will take a politically charged dynamic and may even replace Kashmir as the primary source of conflict between India and Pakistan. Therefore it is important to have comprehensive understanding of the overall issues of the Indus system of rivers and the IWT as this article attempts to provide. It is formatted introduce the Indus river system, a brief overview of the principles of water sharing, the historical background leading up to the water crisis between India and Pakistan and the mediation by the World Bank, various provisions of the IWT, current disputes in water projects on the Indus River System bilaterally between India and Pakistan, and a look into the state of affairs of the Indus River System within Pakistan today.

The Indus River System

The northwestern part of the Indian subcontinent is dominated by the Indus River and its system of upper tributaries (collectively referred to as Indus River System in this article.) Originating 17,000 feet (518 m) above sea level in a spring near Lake Manasarovar at Mt. Kailash , the Indus river along with the Brahmaputra [ii], Sutlej , and Karnali rivers are fed by massive Tibetan glacial waters to become a mighty river with further feeds from other glacial catchment areas in Karakoram and Zanskar ranges. The Indus then traverses a distance of 1800 miles (2900 km) through Tibet, India, Pakistan occupied Kashmir (***), and Pakistan before draining into the Arabian Sea south of Karachi. On its way, it is further enriched by the waters of several tributaries, the most important and discussed in this article are Beas , Sutlej , Ravi , Chenab and Jhelum rivers. The western tributaries of the Indus that include the Swat, Kurram, Gomal, Kohat, Zoab and Kabul are not discussed herein. The river has been variously known as the Sengge[2] or Lion River by the Tibetans[iii], Abbasseen or Father of Rivers by the Pathans of present NWFP Pakistan, and Mitho Dariyo or Sweet River by the denizens of the arid Sindh.

Figure 1: Indus river and its tributaries with in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) Courtesy of Panos Institute South Asia

Figure 2: Major tributaries and dams of the Indus river Courtesy of Indian Express

The Indus Tributaries

Sutlej : The longest of the five tributaries, the Sutlej originates near Mt. Kailash along with the Indus and runs a course of 964 miles (1550 km) through the Panjal and Siwalik mountain ranges and enters Pakistan through the plains of Indian Punjab. The Husseiniwala Headworks at Ferozepore is located downstream at the merger between of Beas and Sutlej , the closure of which on May 1, 1948 triggered the water crisis that prompted the IWT. These headworks supplied water to the then Princely State of Bikaner through a left-bank canal called Bikaner Canal and the state of Bahawalpur from the right-bank canal called Depalpur Canal . The huge 740 feet (225 m) high Bhakra Dam, which Nehru called �the new temple of resurgent India ,� [11] is also situated on this river. In addition another important headwork located on this Sutlej is Harike that feeds the Sirhind and Rajasthan canals. Within Pakistan , these eastern tributaries of the Indus known as Panjand combine at Mithan Kot.

Figure 3: Bhakra Dam Courtesy of Ministry of Irrigation, Govt. of Rajashtan

Chenab : This 675 mile (1086 km) long river originates in the Kulu and Kangra districts of Himachal Pradesh and is fed by the tributaries Chandra and Bagha as it enters J&K near Kishtwar. After cutting across the Pir Panjal range, it enters the Sialkot district in Pakistan that built the Marala barrage across the river in 1968 with a maximum discharge of 1.1 million cusecs.

Jhelum & Kishenganga (Neelum): The Kishenganga river rises in the mountain complex west of Dras and south of Deosai plateau and is fed by a number of tiny tributaries and merges with Jhelum near Muzaffarabad in ***. The Jhelum [iv] itself originates in the foothills of Pir Panjal near Verinag and flows through the four major cities of Anantnag, Srinagar , Sopore and Baramulla. Some important tributaries of the Jhelum are Lidar, Sind and Vishav.

Ravi : This 475 mile (764 km) long river rises in Himachal Pradesh and runs a course of 102 miles (164 km) before joining Chenab in Pakistan after flowing past Lahore . The Thien Dam (Ranjit Sagar Dam) is located on this river at the tri-section of Punjab , Himachal Pradesh and J&K States and feeds the Upper Bari Doab Canal (UBDC) which irrigates Northwestern Punjab .

Beas : This 290 mile (467 km) long river originates near Rohtang Pass in Himachal Pradesh and flows through Kulu Valley and the Siwalik Range . The Pandoh Dam is situated on this and diverts water to Sutlej through the Beas-Sutlej link.

The original infrastructure built by the British to harness and efficiently distribute the waters of these tributaries with a series of canals, barrages, and headworks has been augmented with construction of dams since independence by both India and Pakistan .

The Indus Water Treaty

The India Independence Act enacted in 1947 by British Parliament and the subsequent British withdrawal from India left the subcontinent partitioned between two independent states marred by demarcation problems along their international boundaries, the peculiar circumstances leading to the division, and the accession of a number of princely states especially that of Jammu & Kashmir straddling India and Pakistan as well as the complex riverine systems of Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra. Of these three rivers, the Indus presented a complicated set of issues stemming from thousands of kilometres of man-made irrigation canals and headworks that regulated the flow of its waters. While all the rivers, except Indus and Sutlej , originated within Kashmir , the headworks located mostly in the Eastern Punjab were awarded to India . Aside from the Punjab Boundary Commission suggestion that the canal-headworks system be treated as a joint venture, a proposition rejected by both countries, it had not deliberated water sharing of Indus River Basin due to a hasty partition that was completed in a mere 73 days. Water sharing issues of Indus River System would later take over a decade to resolve. Further complicating this issue, Pakistan covertly and later overtly sought to grab Jammu & Kashmir for various reasons including the desire to control the waters of these rivers that succeeded in instilling only distrust among Indian minds.

After the Partition, both the nations agreed to a �Standstill Agreement� on Dec. 30, 1947 freezing the existing water turn systems at the two headworks of Madhopur (on the Ravi ) and Ferozepur (on the Sutlej ) until March, 31, 1948 . Any dispute that could not be resolved by the Punjab Partition Committee was to be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal (AT) which had been setup under Section Nine of the Indian Independence Act by the Governor General to sort out difficulties arising over the division of assets. However, on the expiry of the arrangement and after not receiving an encouraging response to a reminder for talks issued by the East Punjab Government on 29th March 1948, and in the absence of a new agreement, the then Indian Punjab Government promptly stopped the water supply through Madhopur on April, 1, 1948. By a coincidence, the Arbitral Tribunal�s term also expired on the same day. In the meanwhile, the AT had accepted India �s claims regarding seigniorage charges for the waters and ordered payment of the same by Pakistan . At the invitation of East Punjab , the Engineers of the two divided-Punjab States met in Simla on Apr. 15, 1948 and signed two Standstill Agreements [5] regarding the Depalpur Canal and Central Bari Doab Canal to be in effect until Oct. 15, 1948 . The West Punjab Government agreed to pay: (1) seigniorage charges, (2) proportionate maintenance costs, and (3) interest on a proportionate amount of capital. In its defence, the GoI cited such charges levied by the Punjab on the Bikaner state under the British.

However, the West Punjab Govt. refused to ratify the Agreement and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, then Liaqat Ali Khan, called for a meeting. The Finance Minister of Pakistan , Ghulam Mohammed, along with the Pakistani Punjab ministers, Shaukat Hayat Khan and Mumtaz Daulatana visited Delhi to work out an agreement [4] in the Inter-Dominion Conference held on May, 3-4, 1948. India agreed to resume release of water from the headworks, but made it clear that Pakistan could not lay claim to these waters as a matter of right and would levy seigniorage charges specified by the Prime Minister of India to be deposited in Reserve Bank of India , establishing Indian sovereignty over these rivers. The Indian side also made assurances that the waters would be diminished slowly giving enough time for West Punjab to develop alternate sources. The West Punjab Government, for its part, also recognized �the natural anxiety of the East Punjab Government to discharge the obligations to develop areas where water is scarce and which were underdeveloped in relation to parts of West Punjab .� Soon the Pakistani Government falsely accused that they were coerced into signing this Agreement and made futile appeals to the Governor General Lord Mountbatten. However, due to the hostilities between India and Pakistan on account of Kashmir and in the general environment of distrust and animosity, no further talks took place. Pakistan �s suggestion in June 1949 to take the matter to the International Court of Justice at The Hague and widen the conflict across all rivers, was rejected by India . On November 1, 1949 , Pakistan unilaterally invalidated the Delhi Agreement and by July, 1950 stopped seigniorage payments into RBI. However, India continued to abide by the Agreement and supplied waters.

In 1951, David Lilienthal, former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and a former Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission, USA visited the two countries ostensibly to write a series of articles for the Colliers magazine (since defunct). Having had access to both the Governments at the highest level, Lilientahl wrote in one of his articles, �I proposed that India and Pakistan work out a program jointly to develop and jointly to operate the Indus Basin river system, upon which both nations were dependent for irrigation water. With new dams and irrigation canals, the Indus and its tributaries could be made to yield the additional water each country needed for increased food production. In the article I had suggested that the World Bank might use its good offices to bring the parties to agreement, and help in the financing of an Indus Development program.� Inspired by this idea, Eugene R. Black, then President of the World Bank visited the two countries and proposed a Working Party of Indian, Pakistani and World Bank engineers to tackle the �functional�, rather than the �political� aspects of water sharing. The two countries accepted this mediation [5] (which also had the backing of President Truman who wanted to remove the �kind of unfriendliness� that existed then between the US and India ) offer in March 1952 and sent their technical teams to Washington for further discussions. Subsequent meetings took place in Karachi in Nov., 1952 and New Delhi in Jan. 1953. The World Bank suggested that each side submit its own plans, which they did on Oct. 6, 1953 . The two plans, while concurring on the available supply of water, differed widely on allocations. [6] The table below, shows the initial, negotiated and final positions of both the countries.

Table 1: Indus River System Estimates and Allocations

However, despite all efforts, the wide gaps in the stands of the two countries could not be bridged, mainly due to the intransigence of the Pakistani side as the revised and final allocations show clearly above. The World Bank felt that an ideal approach to joint development of an integrated plan for Indus Basin as proposed by David Lilienthal was now impossible. In order to resolve the dispute, it finally stepped in with its own �settlement� proposals on Feb. 5, 1954 offering the three Eastern rivers to India and the three Western rivers to Pakistan . India accepted the proposal in toto on Mar. 25, 1954 while Pakistan gave only a �qualified acceptance� on July 28, 1954 . The settlement offered by the World Bank was closer to the Indian position as it repudiated the claims of Pakistan based on �historic usage�. An angered Pakistan threatened to withdraw from further negotiations. The World Bank proposal was then transformed from a �settlement� to a �basis for further negotiations� and the talks eventually continued for the next six years. [7, 8] In the meanwhile, the two countries signed an Interim Agreement on June 21, 1955 . As no conclusive agreement could be reached, the World Bank announced on Apr. 30, 1956 that the negotiation deadline has been indefinitely extended. [9] As is its wont, Pakistan , through its then Prime Minister H.S.Suhrawardy, issued a direct threat of war with India over waters, escalating tensions.

Under the World Bank plan, Pakistan was asked to construct barrages and canals to divert the Western river waters to compensate the loss of Eastern rivers on the Pakistani side. During the period needed to do this, called the Transition Period, India was required to maintain the �historic withdrawals� to Pakistan The World Bank then suggested a �financial liability� for India as replacement costs by Pakistan for the loss of the three Eastern rivers. In the 1958 meeting, the replacement works and the financial liability to India were considered. India rejected Pakistan �s proposal, known as the �London Plan�, for two large dams on the Jhelum and the Indus and three smaller ones on Ravi and Sutlej and several canals, all in all totaling USD 1.2 Billion. India �s alternate proposal, known as the �Marhu Tunnel Proposal�, was unacceptable to Pakistan as leaving too much leverage on water flows in Indian hands. In May, 1959, the Bank�s President visited both countries and suggested a way out which involved India paying a fixed amount of � 62.060 Million to be paid in ten years in equal installments and the Bank assisting Pakistan with help from donor countries. The international consortium of donors pledged USD 900 Million for Pakistan and the drafting of the IWT began in Aug., 1959.

The treaty was signed in Karachi by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Field Marshal Ayub Khan H.P., H.J. and Mr. W.A.B. Illif, President of the World Bank in a five-day summit meet starting Sep. 19, 1960 . However, it was deemed effective from Apr. 1, 1960 . The two governments ratified the same in January 1961 by exchanging documents in Delhi . Simultaneously an Indus Basin Development Fund was established with contributions from Australia , Canada , Germany , New Zealand , the UK and the US along with India �s share of the cost. The Eisenhower Administration contributed roughly half the cost of the Fund, while the World Bank provided US$ 250 Million and the other donor countries together provided a similar amount. The Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) of Pakistan was entrusted with the task of completing these tasks. The fund was subsequently extinguished after the completion of the projects as per Article XI of the IWT. The May 4, 1948 accord stood annulled after the signing of IWT. The Indus Basin Project involved construction of two large dams, five barrages, one siphon and seven link canals as detailed below in Tables 2, 3,& 4, to transfer 14 MAF of water from the Western rivers. [10] There are three systems of link canals. Two of the systems, the Rasul-Qadirabad-Balloki-Suleimanki System (R.Q.B.S.) and the Trimmu-Sidhnai-Mailsi-Bahawal System (T.S.M.B) connect the Jhelum River through to the Sutlej and the third system Chashma-Jhelum System (C.J) connects the Indus with the Jhelum

Table 2: Engineering Construction Work in Pakistan as part of IWT - Canals

Figure 4 Indus Basin Courtesy: Pakistan Water Gateway Portal

Figure 5 Nehru at Karachi to sign IWT Courtesy: Frontline

The IWT consists of a Preamble, twelve articles delineating the rights and obligations of both countries, including mechanisms to deal with disputes, and various Annexure.The treaty allocated the three Eastern rivers (Ravi-Beas, Sutlej ) to India and the three Western rivers Indus , Jhelum and Chenab largely to Pakistan . The Treaty permits India to draw water from the Western rivers for irrigation of 642,000 Acres that existed on the date of the treaty and in addition an entitlement to irrigate an Irrigated Cropped Area (ICA)[vi] of 701,000 acres. The break-up (in Acres) on the various Western rivers is as follows: These are as follows:

Of the above, Annexure H is no longer valid as the Transition Period, during which Pakistan was required to make alternate arrangements for the loss of waters of the Eastern rivers, has long since expired.


continued to next .......

 

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continued from previous post

Figure 6: Stamp issued by Pakistan to commemorate Mangla Dam Courtesy: World Bank

There are some caveats to the above storage allocations as follows:

� General storage means any purpose including generation of electricity

� Power storage water may also be used for non-consumptive or domestic use except flood control or protection

� The power storage capacity on Chenab may be increased by decreasing corresponding amounts in Jhelum , and/or Chenab Main.

The IWT also enunciated a mechanism to exchange regularly flow-data of rivers, canals and streams. A Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) was constituted, headed by two Commissioners, one from each country. The PIC is expected to meet at least once a year alternately in India and Pakistan and submit an annual report to their respective Governments before June, 30th every year. So far, the Commission has met 92 times. The IWT also sets out the procedures for settlement of differences and disputes both bilaterally and through International arbitration. Given below is an abridged version of the dispute settlement process that may be of interest in the present context:

A. Any question that might be a breach of IWT shall be first examined by the PIC.

B. A difference is deemed to have arisen if the PIC could not reach an agreement.

C. The difference shall be dealt with by a neutral expert who may opine if it is a dispute or not. If not, he shall resolve it. Such a neutral expert shall be a highly qualified engineer and appointed by the two Governments in consultation, or failing which, by the Bank. Such a neutral expert can deal with any of the questions mentioned in Part-I of Annexure-F. The expert�s decision is final and binding.

D. In case of a dispute, the Commissioners report to their respective Governments which shall then strive to resolve the dispute.

E. A Court of Arbitration shall be setup to resolve the dispute, if no decision is reached by the above process.

F. Such a Court will consist of seven members, two from each party and three including a Chairman from a panel to be chosen by the two Governments. If no consensus on names can be arrived at, the IWT has given a list of persons from whom to choose such as the Secretary General of the U.N. or International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) for the Chairmanship and the President of M.I.T., Cambridge, the Rector of Imperial College, London, the Chief Justice of the USA, or the Lord Chief Justice of England for panel membership.

Many Pakistanis feel that Pakistan surrendered to India the waters of the three Eastern rivers in 1960. Their argument is along the following lines. On the basis of over fifty years' record the mean flow in Indus River System (IRS) totalled 175 MAF on the eve of Partition of Punjab in 1947. This comprised of 93 MAF including 27 of Kabul for Indus, 23 for Jhelum, 26 for Chenab, 6 for Ravi, 13 for Beas and 14 for Sutlej annually. Out of this 175 MAF, 167 flowed into Pakistan at the time the boundaries of partitioned Punjab were fixed according to the Radcliffe Award . This means that the Indian East Punjab drew only 8 MAF of a total of 33 MAF of water that annually flowed in three eastern rivers Ravi , Beas and Sutlej . Under the Internationally agreed rights of lower riparian states and also Indian Independence Act 1947, the balance 25 MAF waters of three eastern rivers were to be shared between India and Pakistan . [12] The Pakistanis feel that those who negotiated the IWT on their behalf did not sufficiently press for the sharing of this quantum of water.

However, there are several fallacies in these arguments. First, leaving the claim on the quantum of waters aside, the arrangement entered into at Partition time was interim in nature until a final agreement could be reached and the provisions of such an interim arrangement were in no way binding on the parties concerned. Secondly, the Indus Agreement was reached eventually in 1960 during that time the utilization of the waters of these rivers had grown enormously in the states of East Punjab , Rajasthan, and Jammu & Kashmir. To claim the waters on the basis of the flow thirteen years before, when agriculture and economy had been dictated by different circumstances of a united India is patently unfair. In fact, the IWT itself treats water flows and usage based on the situation existing as on Apr. 1, 1960 , the effective date of the Treaty. Thirdly, as a lower riparian state, all the unused river waters would naturally flow to Pakistan . This, by itself, cannot bestow any rights on that country and again, a quantum of 80 MAF of water was reaching the Arabian Sea unutilized out of the total flow of the Indus River systems. [13, 14] All these are summarized by the following statement of N.D.Gulhati, the principal negotiator from the Indian side to the IWT, �After ten years of hard and devoted work, we had secured almost a world-wide recognition of our claim to use in India all the waters of the Eastern Rivers, including the 12 MAF which was actually being let down for use in Pakistan as at the time of partition... In India , we had already allocated all these waters, including the 12 MAF referred to above, between Punjab (including the present Haryana), Rajasthan and Jammu and Kashmir . The scope of the Bhakra-Nangal project had been considerably increased, the Madhopur-Beas Link and the Sirhind Feeder had been completed and opened for operation, several new channels had been built on the Upper Bari Doab Canal and the Rajasthan Canal was under construction." [15]

Figure 7:Indian Canals on the Indus River Tributaries Courtesy: Bhakra Beas Management Board

Current Issues on Indus Water Sharing

Issues External to Pakistan

There are a host of factors external to Pakistan that could also affect the Indus River System. One is the climatic changes leading to reduced flows on the Indus per se. Another exogenous factor is the growing demand within India, especially the state of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) where people feel that the IWT has wrongfully deprived them of water resulting retarding the growth of agriculture, power generation, and irrigation from rivers that originate and flow from their very state. There was also a widespread demand within India for abrogation of the IWT after the attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001 by terrorists supported directly by the Pakistani state apparatus.

The Tulbul Navigation Lock/Wullar Barrage Issue
The 74 Sq. Km. Wullar Lake (original size 202 Sq. Kms.) is the largest freshwater lake in India and is situated on the Jhelum and supplies 40% of J&K’s fish catch. The stretch of 22 Km between Sopore and Baramulla becomes non-navigable during the lean winter season with a water depth of only 2.5 ft. It is only in spring that rainfall causes the snow to melt at higher elevations on the surrounding mountains and causes floods. [16] In order to improve navigation, India started constructing in 1985, a barrage 439 feet long and with a lock, at the mouth of the lake to raise the flow of water in winter to 4000 cusecs with a depth of 4 ft with an added storage of 0.3 MAF. Pakistan objected to this project and construction was halted in 1987. Pakistan’s objection [17,18] stems from two issues, one India needs to get concurrence of the design from Pakistan and two, it cannot store waters as per IWT on the Jhelum Main anything in excess of 0.01 MAF as “incidental storage work” (Paragraph 8(h) in Annexure E of IWT). Pakistan ’s real objections may be due to its fear that such a barrage may damage its own Triple-Canal project linking Jhelum and Chenab with the Upper Bari Doab Canal . Pakistan also says that such a barrage would be a security risk enabling the Indian Army to make the crossing of the river either easy or difficult through controlled release of water. India ’s argument [19] is that such a barrage would not reduce the quantum of water flow and it would also be beneficial to Pakistan by regulating water flow to Mangla Dam by controlling floods and also improve the Pakistani Triple-canal irrigation system. The water flow would indeed double during the lean winter period from the current 2000 cusecs. Also, the project does not envisage building any new storage capacity as the Wullar lake already existed and the water is only for non-consumptive use (this term includes such usage as navigation, floating of timber, flood protection or control, and fishing with no diminution in volume of water returned to the river/tributaries after use) which is allowed by the IWT. The Wullar barrage is not a storage project but a control project permissible under the treaty. The two countries had indeed reached an agreement in October, 1991 but then Pakistan suddenly introduced an irrelevant element in February, 1992 by linking the termination of Kishenganga Hydroelectric project with further movements in the Tulbul Navigation Lock project and India ’s refusal stalled further work. The 1991 draft agreement stipulated that India would build a 40-feet wide lock but leave ungated 6.2 Metres of the lake at a crest level of 1574.9 Metres and would also forego 0.30MAF storage while Pakistan would allow the lake to fill to its full capacity at 1578 metres. When the agreement was reached in 1991, the only contention that remained was the timing of the filling up of the lake. The crucial period was between June 21 and August 20 every year. Between October, 1987, and August, 1992, experts from the two countries met eight times to settle the issue. The matter was taken up during the Foreign Secretary-level talks between 1990 and 1994 also. The ninth round was held in July, 2004.

The Salal Hydroelectric Project
This was the first major dispute successfully resolved bilaterally under IWT. On April 14, 1978 , the governments of India and Pakistan entered into a treaty on the Salal project. The Salal hydroelectric project on the Chenab in Jammu and Kashmir was negotiated by the Janata Party government in India and the Bhutto administration in Pakistan and has not been disputed by subsequent governments in Pakistan . The negotiations and discussions took place for a period of four years between 1974 and 1978 between the Indus Commissioners and the foreign offices. The project provides waters to Pakistan in a regulated manner but involves no diversion by India . However, Pakistan successfully objected to the building of the anti-siltation sluice gates, which were six low-level outlets normally used for controlling sedimentation, resulting in decreased power generation capacity of this project. India also agreed to reduce the heights of the spillway gates from 40 feet to 30 feet.

The Ranbir and Pratap Canals
The Ranbir Canal , built in 1870, was intended to feed the areas of Miran Sahib, Vijaypur and Madhopur. Poor maintenance has ensured that it can now carry just 300 cubic feet per second of water, rather than the 1,000 cusecs it was designed for when originally built. The Pratap Canal , meant to meet the needs of the Akhnoor-Sunderbani belt, has also silted up. [20] These canals off take from Chenab between Salal and Marala headworks. These two canals need urgent repair work to restore their earlier capacities. Under the treaty, India is allowed to take out a fixed quantity of water for these channels. Many restrictions, such as quantum and dates of withdrawal have been imposed on India by the IWT.

The Kishenganga Project [21]

India started the 330 MW Kishenganga hydroelectric projects across River Kishenganga after protracted negotiations between the Central Electricity Authority (CEA), the Defence Ministry, and the environmentalists who fear the loss of the serene Gurez valley. The project involves a 103 metre dam across the river before it crosses the Line of Control (LoC) and a channel and a 27 Km long tunnel through the North Kashmir ranges to bring the water to the Wullar lake where a hydroelectric power station will be built as part of an integrated project. The Kashmir Chief Minister Dr. Farooq Abdullah signed an MoU with the Union Power Minister in July, 2000 for the project. The National Hydroelectric Power Corp. (NHPC) was entrusted with this project on a Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) basis. The CEA cleared the project only in June, 2004.

Figure 8 Courtesy: K.E.W.A ( Kashmir Environmental Watch Association)

Pakistan objects to the Kishenganga project fearing an adverse impact on its envisaged 969-MW Neelum- Jhelum power plant to be constructed with Chinese assistance. This project was initially planned for 1994-1997 but lies dormant because of lack of funds. The Indian Kishenganga project is expected to lead to a shortfall of 21% loss of water flow in Neelum resulting in a 9% reduction in power for the Pakistani project. [22] The IWT allows India to store waters on Neelum for power generation and so Pakistan wants to start its project first in order to deny waters to India claiming the principle of “prior appropriation”, per Paragraph 15(iii), Part-3, Annexure-D which states “where a Plant is located on a Tributary of The Jhelum on which Pakistan has any Agricultural use or hydroelectric use, the water released below the Plant may be delivered, if necessary, into another Tributary but only to the extent existing Agricultural Use or hydroelectric use by Pakistan on the former Tributary would not be adversely affected”.

India also claims that the waters will ultimately reach Pakistan through Jhelum though not through Kishenganga (Neelum). In the meanwhile, Pakistan has felt the urgency to take up its USD 1.6 Billion Neelum –Jhelum Hydropower Project by appointing a private company, NESPAK, as consultants and complete the international bidding and evaluation by April 2005.

The Baglihar Project

Figure 9 Baglihar Project Courtesy: Lahmeyer International Gmbh

This project, currently under construction by the Jammu & Kashmir Power Development Corp. on the Chenab in Doda Distt , will generate 450 MW of power when commissioned by end-December, 2005. The contract was extended in 2002 to raise the capacity to 900 MW by Dec., 2007. Pakistan claims that this dam will result in a loss of 7000-8000 cusecs of water a day during the rabi season. India has assured Pakistan that the quantum of water will not be diminished in any way. Pakistan disputes India ’s contention that this is a run-of-river[vii] project and the site is unsuitable for an ungated spillway. The works involve the construction of a “Pondage” of 15 Million Cubic Metre (IWT allows for ‘Pondage’, a term meaning Live Storage, of only sufficient magnitude to meet fluctuations in the discharge of the turbines arising from variations in the daily and the weekly loads of the plant) capacity and an underground power station. Pakistan claims that the submerged gate spillways of this 429-feet high 1046-feet long dam, allow India to increase the reservoir’s storage capacity to 164,000 acre feet and the ability to stop water for about 26 days during December, January and February affecting canals taking off Marala headworks. The IWT specifies the following with respect to gated spillways, “If the conditions at the site of a plant make a gated spillway necessary, the bottom level of the gates in normal closed position shall be located at the highest level consistent with sound and economical design and satisfactory construction and operation of the works” (Part-3, Annexure-D of IWT). This project, Pakistan believes, could also lead to inundation of Bajwat Area above Marala headworks due to sudden synchronized releases from Dulhasti, Baglihar and Salal reservoirs on Chenab . Pakistan also claims that India adopted a stonewalling tactics by not allowing the Permanent Indus Commission members of Pakistan from visiting the dam site for four years after having been officially informed of the project in 1998, little recognizing that the 1999 Kargil conflict and the general mobilization of Indian troops as part of Op. Parakram following the Dec. 13, 2001 Parliament attack, both events of Pakistan’s own making, prevented such site visits. In fact, India suspended the site visit on Dec. 24, 2001 following the decision to mobilize troops. Pakistan also contests that it was informed only in 1998 about the Bagilhar project, though the GoI had informed Pakistan as early as 1992. The Pakistani Commissioner of the Permanent Indus Commission had recommended to his government to appoint a neutral expert in Feb. 2003 and accordingly Pakistan claims to have served two notices to GoI in May and November of the same year. Following the February meeting, India allowed a visit by Pakistani experts to the Baglihar project site in October. The Pakistani Commissioner is reported to have made the same recommendation to his Government in January 2004 after another round of PIC meeting. On December 15, 2004 , India supplied Pakistan with more data on the project as a goodwill gesture and rejected Pakistan ’s claims of violation of IWT. However, Pakistan rebuffed India ’s explanations, refused India one week time to study and reply, and decided to discontinue the talks-illustrating Pakistani leadership uncompromising attitude and intransigence. By mid January 2005, Pakistan requested the World Bank to appoint a neutral expert under Article 9(2)(A) of the IWT, claiming one week later that the World Bank chief Mr.Wolfensohn, honored with Pakistan’s highest award of Hilal-e-Pakistan during a visit to that country in early February 2005, had assured Gen. Musharraf that there would be no delay in appointing such an expert. While responding to enquiries from World Bank , India advised the Bank that rather it should allow the suspended bilateral course of action to resume rather than get involved at that stage especially as some convergence of views had appeared in the last round of talks in New Delhi . Meanwhile, Pakistan ’s Minister for Education and former head of the ISI, Javed Ashraf Qazi, warned the Pakistani National Senate that the nation might go to war with India over Baglihar “controversy.”

Embankment on Ravi

Pakistan claims [23] that India has built a 15-Km long embankment (also known as River Training Works, RTWs) on river Ravi in the Narowal sector in 2002, in front of Kot Naina, a village in Shakargarh Distt. Pakistan claims that such a construction “so close to the international border” is violative of both the IWT and the Border Ground Rules, 1961 and has caused flooding on its side. [24] By 2002, Pakistan had also decided to build a similar embankment on its side.

Issues Within Pakistan

The Indus River system, which accounts for 65% of water flow within an arid Pakistan , poses several major challenges to Pakistan today. Pakistan faces both political and non-political problems with respect to The Indus River System.

On the political front, there have been serious differences among the various provinces about sharing of the waters. In Sind, sea water has intruded as much as 54 miles into the estuary of the Indus river due to low or no flow.[25] On the basis of a series of meetings among provinces in March 1991, an agreement, Water Agreement Accord (WAA), [26] was reached on the sharing of the river waters. It stipulated the following allocations

* - Including requirements of Karachi

** - Ungauged Civil Canals above the rim stations where measurements can be made

It was also decided to set up in 1992, an “Indus River System Authority” (IRSA), as per provisions of the 1991 Accord, with representation from all four provinces. However, actual water allocations have been made on the basis of “historic use” rather than on the 1991 settlement leading to more resentment in Sindh.

The climatic changes due to global warming have led to depleting flow in all Indus River system of rivers, especially the Indus , which depends on glacial runoffs for 90% of its waters. Generally, the Himalayan rivers also carry a very heavy sediment load especially during summer and rainy season, which in turn leads to river shifting and silting of dams and barrages. The three largest dams in Pakistan , Tarbela, Mangla and Chashma have already lost ~ 25% of their capacity due to silting [27]. This is a serious problem in a country which depends on river irrigation, rather than the monsoon rains, for 74% of its total cultivated land. It is generally agreed that 40% of all the water drawn through the canals at barrage heads is lost because of seepage due to un-lined and porous beds and banks of the canals. [28] Such problems exacerbate the already poor yield of the crops [29, 30] In addition, there is excessive system-loss of water due to improper and antiquated agricultural techniques and heavy cropping of water-intensive varieties like sugarcane and rice. While reeling under increasing drought for the last six years, it is also predicted that Pakistan will have a certain level of drought conditions for the next 15 years [31, 32].. Since the dams mostly act as storage reservoirs during Kharif season and draw-down reservoirs during Rabi[viii], there is an acute need within Pakistan for more storage

Figure 10 Indus Basin and Crops Courtesy: National Geographic

There have been widespread protests against the proposed dams of Kalabagh at Mianwali, and Basha at Chilas, Gilgit area and the raising of the Mangla dam in Mirpur. Out of the four provinces of Pakistan , three viz. Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP are against these dams. Even the illegally occupied *** and Balawaristan oppose the dam projects of Mangla and Basha. The proposed raising of the height of Mangla Dam [33] in Mirpur, ***, by another 40 feet, will further submerge that district. It is also possible that if India exercises its rights to store 1.5 MAF on Jhelum , the raised Mangla Dam will not fill up. The crux of the matter is the lack of agreement among provinces on the total water availability within the country.

Meanwhile, the dwindling flows of water and siltation have led to reduced power generation from the hydroelectric plants that are part of the Indus River System.. There is a real possibility of shutting down power generation permanently at Tarbela, leaving it for irrigation purposes only. [34]

Figure 1 1 Courtesy: WAPDA

The dams, barrages and canals built to satisfy the increasing demands of water upstream have made water scarce in the Indus at the estuaries of the Arabian Sea causing the sea to push in and increase the salinity in 1.2 Million acres of farmlands.[36] The discharge of freshwater from the Indus into the Arabian Sea has declined steadily from 85 MAF in the 1940s to about 10 MAF in the 90s and probably less today. Pakistan also uses the waters of the Indus rivers for another purpose, fortification of its defences along Indian borders. It has built a series of “defence canals” at strategic locations which are flooded at times of wars and tensions to prevent crossing by Indian armour and artillery. In 2002, after India mobilized its forces as part of Operation Parakram , Pakistan diverted waters to these “defence canals” accentuating the then already severe water shortage of 50% to over 70%.[38] [39][40]

The Indus remains important to both India and Pakistan in another less visible way. The extension of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) beyond the 200 nautical mile (nm) limit from coastal baseline depends on the ability to prove the sedimentation of the Indus river into the sea and has to be claimed before May, 2009 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS-III) protocol [37] allows the EEZ to be extended under several conditions. In places like the sedimentary basin of the Indus river, the sediment thickness of the rivers beyond the foot of the continental slope can be used to establish the outer limit of the continental shelf of a claimant. This requires baseline and bathymetry survey data. A crucial part of the claim is the delineation of the Territorial Sea Baseline (TSB) which is the set of coordinate points that define the line from which the seaward boundaries are to be measured. The continuing Pakistani wrangle with regards to Sir Creek has delayed the compilation and validation of the TSB thereby delaying the computation of the zone boundaries. This is important for India in view of the potential it has for national security, energy prospecting, mining, laying pipelines etc.

Conclusions

Pakistan faces one of the severest water shortages in the world as seen in its’ per capita availability of water per annum fall from 5300 m3 in 1951 to less than 1100 m3 today. This figure is alarming given that it is below the internationally recommended level of 1500 m3 and precariously close to the critical 1000 m3 level. Compounded with the failure to fill the country’s two largest reservoirs to capacity, declining flows in the Indus River System, elusive and contentious the inter-provincial water accord due to mutual suspicions among provinces, and an unsustainable population growth rate of 2% do not bode well for Pakistan’s water situation. Disagreements on construction of new reservoirs, declining groundwater potential[ix], and growing number of disputes with India after a relatively uneventful period of 44 years of water sharing will further complicate matters. In summation, the water situation in Pakistan (a country whose landscape is largely arid to semi-arid) is truly disastrous in spite of the Indus , its tributaries, and a treaty with generous concessions that has been implemented faithfully by upper riparian India to date in spite of grave provocations. Pakistani farmers may be forced to change to higher yielding earlier maturating crops, modify their sowing patterns, and employ micro irrigation in coming years to mitigate shortages-all of which will entail higher costs. Its frivolous objections to Indian projects and a general unwillingness to engage India constructively are partly to force India to amend the IWT to accommodate the emerging patterns of water use in Pakistan , such as water sharing during periods of shortage-a situation not envisaged in the treaty.

 

[ajtr]

As far as the Indus agreement is considered it is pretty clear- Ravi, Beas and Satluj belong exclusively to India. So even if India reduces these rivers into sewers like Ahmedmadani sahib observes, that is kosher. Now as regards the three Western rivers is concerned- Indus, Chenab and Jhelum belong exclusively to Pak except that some amount of local irrigation in Kashmir Valley can be carried out with Jhelum waters.

What IWT does not prevent is India building run of the river hydel projects with limited pondage that is India can use the water for power generation without any restriction provided it does not build small dams of greater than certain height and size. This allows a limited amount of impoundment (not so much that it shud seriously disturb waterflow patterns downstream) but absolutely no diversion at all. If my understanding of the Baglihar judgement is correct, the arbitrator had merely suggested a minor reduction in height rather than the dam being illegal per se.

The claim that India is diverting the water of Western rivers illegally is hogwash. Yes, waterflows have fallen in these rivers but that is becuase rain and snow in Western Himalayas have been rather erratic lately plus the glaciers are receding.

The problem that Pakistan is two fold. First, weather changes plus disappearance of glaciers will result in longterm downward availability of waters in the Western rivers. This will also affect Indian-BD rivers but at least Central and Eastern Himalayas have substantial (although variable) monsoon rains so impact will be a bit less severe. Second, (again unlike India or BD) Pakistan does not have much rain in monsoon and is dependent on river waters to a much greater extent. So even stuff like rainwater harvesting will be irrelevant in Pak.

What Pakistan will have to do is to economise on water usage thru change in cropping patterns (less rice and no sugarcane, more pulses, oilseeds for eg) and thru more water efficient crops.

---------- Post added at 05:01 PM ---------- Previous post was at 05:00 PM ----------

Baglihar And Other Chestnuts

By Zafar Choudhary

26 February, 2007
Countercurrents.org

On February 12, the Indian Water Resource Minister Saif-ud-Din Soz (a Kashmiri) was exceptionally joyful as equally was his Pakistani counterpart Liaqat Ali Khan Jatoi. Soz said it is a �win-win� situation for India while Jatoi described it as victory for Pakistan when World Bank appointed Neutral Expert Prof Raymond Lifette delivered his verdict on Baglihar hydro-electric project �a bone of contention between both countries.

The 450 MW run of the river project coming up on river Chenab in Doda district of Jammu and Kashmir, Baglihar ran into troubled waters two years back when Pakistan accused India of violating the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. At the time of independence, the boundary line between the two newly created independent countries i.e. Pakistan and India was drawn right across the Indus Basin, leaving Pakistan as the lower riparian. Moreover, two important irrigation head works, one at Madhopur on Ravi River and the other at Ferozepur on Sutlej River, on which the irrigation canal supplies in Punjab (Pakistan) had been completely dependent, were left in the Indian Territory. A dispute thus arose between two countries regarding the utilization of irrigation water from existing facilities. Negotiations held under the good offices of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), culminated in the signing of Indus Waters Treaty in 1960. The Treaty was signed at Karachi by Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, the then President of Pakistan, Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Indian Prime Minister and. W.A.B. Ill if of the World Bank on 19th September, 1960. The Treaty however is effective from 1st April, 1960.

In 2004-05 Pakistan lodged severe protest against India for raising height of the dam, at Baglihar hydro-electric project, which it said violated the treaty that has weathered all storms between both countries over past 47 years. The matter came up for discussion at the Indus Water Commission (as provided under the treaty, India and Pakistan both have a special commission on Indus Water). During several rounds of meetings between the officials of Indus Water Commission from both countries in New Delhi, Islamabad and then site visit to Baglihar; Pakistan outrightly rejected what India had offered to resolve the dispute. Following, protests from Pakistan, which were already telling on the bilateral relations between both countries, India offered well thought out concessions which included: 1.5 meter reduction on the 4.5 meter freeboard �a safety device to prevent overtopping of the dam in event of surging of sudden storm. Pakistan did not agree. The matter was reported to the World Bank for arbitration. On January 15, 2005 Pakistan rushed to the World Bank with its Baglihar complaint. Subsequently after consulting the governments of India and Pakistan, the World Bank appointed Prof. Raymond Lafitte, Professor at the Federal Institute of Technology of Lausanne, Switzerland as the Neutral Expert (NE) on 10th May, 2005, to determine the claims.

Pakistan�s request made on 15th January, 2005 raised a number of Points of Difference for Expert Determination in respect of the design of the Project on the basis that certain features of the design did not confirm to criteria specified in the Treaty. Pakistan contended, inter alia, that conditions at the Baglihar site did not require a gated spillway; that the spillway gates were not at the highest level; Indian calculations of the design, flood and the height of the dam (Freeboard) were excessive; India�s calculation of the required Pondage of 37.5 Mm was also too high as the correct Pondage should be 6.22 Mm; and that the level of intakes for the Power Plant were not at the highest level as required by the Treaty�.

Third Party intervention

After two years of arbitration, meetings, spot survey, case studies and wastage of time, Prof Raymond Lifette has delivered almost nothing beyond what India had offered as concession to Pakistan. And interestingly, the Neutral Expert refused to entertain what Pakistan had demanded. India had offered Pakistan 1.5 meter reduction on the 4.5 meter freeboard �the only significant recommendation made by NE in his verdict. Pakistan had demanded reduction of Baglihar pondage from 37 million cu m to 6.22 million cu m to convert the project from peaking to constant load station �contention firmly rejected by Pakistan.

Both countries have agreed to a verdict which was already under discussion. Save for the mutual mistrust between India and Pakistan, the issue could have been resolved two years back when India had offered to Pakistan what now Prof Raymond Lafitte has suggested. Prof Raymond Lafitte was appointed as Neutral Expert by the World Bank which is a signatory to the Indus Water Treaty and not the guarantor. The settlement described by India and Pakistan in their battle term phraseology of �win-win and victory� has been arrived at by a third party intervention. The countries made their people think that they had little choice but to accept ruling made by a third party �though neutral.

Baglihar is not the only water dispute between India and Pakistan and also water is not the only point of conflict between two neighbours divided at birth for a mutual animosity ever after. There is politics, there is territorial conflict. The rejoice in New Delhi and Islamabad over the Baglihar verdict has made the peacenicks to think beyond the water disputes about the possibility of a third party brokering. The verdict has thrown some questions: is this unprecedented agreement between India and Pakistan to agree on a third party verdict an indication of a mutual will between both countries on moving from conflict management to conflict resolution. Does this change in approach points a way to setting a maritime boundary in Sir Creek by the international cut off date; Can India and Pakistan accept a UN monitored peace zone in Siachen glacier �the world�s coldest, highest, bloodiest and costliest battlefield. Though India has always been suspicious about motives of the West but has shown amenability to Baglihar; it has to be seen keenly if Pakistan uses Baglihar to make a way for third party intervention on Kashmir.

The Verdict

During the 18 months of study Prof Lafitte had five meetings-in Paris, Geneva, London, and Washington and a visit to the Baglihar site and its hydraulic model at Roorkee. The Parties made written and oral submissions during the course of the Expert Determination. The NE upheld the overall design of Baglihar Dam who also recognized India�s right to utilize waters of western rivers more effectively within ambit of Indus Water Treaty for Power generation.


The NE after a detailed analysis of a data base of about 13000 dams from the International Commission on Large Dams� world Register of Dams to analyse the type of spillway, gated or ungated, and a historical review of construction of large orifice outlets as well as a consideration of International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) guidelines, held that the site conditions at Baglihar require a gated spillway, and also held that in view of the high flood discharges and heavy silt loads, India�s design of gated spillways-both chute (surface) spillway and sluice spillways, as well as the number, size and location of their gates for the Baglihar dam complies with the design criteria set out in Annexure D of the Indus Water Treaty.


This important element in the NE�s Determination will deeply influence all future interpretations of the Indus Water Treaty. The NE has observed that the present day state of scientific and technical knowledge with advances in technology in dam design, not known or developed in 1960, can and should be utilized in dealing with problems such as those posed by heavy sediment which shorten the effective life of a plant. He is of the view that the reference in the Treaty to conceptual notions such as the need to ensure �satisfactory construction and operation�, �sound and economical design� and �customary and accepted practice of design� clearly not only permit but require use of latest technology. The NE has adopted the principle of effective interpretation which gives full effect to the rights and obligations provided by the Treaty, taking into account its object and purpose set out in the Preamble which is �attaining the most complete and satisfactory utilization of the waters of the Indus System of rivers�.
The NE accepts and regards as prudent India�s calculation of the design flood of 16,500 cumec (as against Pakistan�s figure of 14,900 cumec). After observing that for such possibilities India has developed all possible methods of analysis specially climatological and geo-morphological analysis.

The NE observes that the designer of a spillway is not only faced with the problem of flood control but also with that of sediment control and cites the �ICOLD� to note that the state of the art is today that �Bottom outlets may be used for under sluicing of floods, emptying of reservoirs, slucicing of sediments and preventing sediment from entering intakes etc�.
Accordingly, India�s design of sluice spillway at Baglihar with five outlets is regarded as appropriate and permissible under the Treaty for sediment control of the reservoir and evacuation of a large part of the design flood and being in conformity with the international practice and the state of the art. This decision will help India to deal more effectively with the problems of sedimentation in its future projects as the NE has confirmed India�s design of large bottom outlets (sluice spillway) as the most important technique to be employed in managing the high volumes of sediment which characterise the Himalayan Rivers. Incidentally, this had been an element of strenous objection and India, in the course of the Expert Determination, constantly maintained that India�s design to deal with sedimentation problems by modern methods does not in any way interfere with the flow of waters of Chenab River into Pakistan as required by the Treaty Based on the guidelines of ICOLD, the NE considers that the freeboard could be reduced by 1.5 metres. In this context, it is to be noted that India, in the spirit of good neighbourly relations, had offered possible reduction of freeboard to Pakistan even before the process of Expert Determination had started.

According to the NE, the first objective of �Pondage� is to regulate the flow of the river to meet the consumer demand. He considers that �Pondage� volume should be calculated taking into account only the variations in the load thus confirming the methodology adopted by India for calculation of Pondage. He disagrees with Pakistan�s method of determination of �Pondage� i.e. with the objective of operating the plant at constant power and regulating the fluctuations in the river flow. The NE has recognized the uncertainties in projecting future load variations. The NE has arrived at a slightly lower value of 32.56 Million Cubic Metre (MCM) of maximum permissible �Pondage� as against India�s design of 37.50 MCM. NE arrived at the lower value as he adopted a daily pattern of power generation which is slightly different from that adopted by India. As a result, there will be a minor change in the schedule of peak power generation. However, the number of hours of power generation per week would remain at about 49 hours as designed by India. According to Pakistan�s calculations, the maximum �Pondage� allowed was 6.22 MCM.

Another point of difference raised by Pakistan was regarding the elevation of Intakes for the Turbines for the Plant. The Treaty requires these to be located at the highest level, consistent with satisfactory and economical construction and operation of the Plant and with customary and accepted practice of design for the designated range of the Plant�s operation. Pakistan had suggested that provision of anti-vortex devices could raise the intake levels by about 7 metres from that designed by India. According to the NE, the normal practice is to go for an appropriate arrangement of the intake structure. In particular cases where this is not possible for technical or economic reasons, then resourse could be taken to anti-vortex devices. The NE has also observed that the intakes should be so located as to avoid asymmetrical flow of water towards them. From his application of well know semi-empirical formulae, the NE considers that it is necessary to raise the power intakes by 2 metres and an additional 1 metre to allow for the slight reduction in �Pondage�. While the Indian designers of the project do not agree with the NE�s approach, as it reduces the water seal by 2 metres, no difficulty is expected in incorporating this change in the design of the Baglihar Plant.

The three elements of design which require marginal changes, i.e. reductions in freeboard and Pondage and increase in the height of the intakes all arise from calculations and not from basic principles.

The NE�s Final Determination confirms that India�s design has been compliant with the basic principles of the Indus Waters Treaty.

The Project

One of the most prestigious hydro-electric projects coming up in Jammu and Kashmir, Baglihar�s problems run beyond the conflict with Pakistan which though have been sorted out. The 450 MW project conceived long back was contracted out in anticipation of financial closure to two contractors �Jayprakash Industries Limited and Siemens for Civil and Electro Mechanical works respectively in the year 1999. The initial deadline for project completion was set for 60 months �which means project should have been operational by ending December 2004.

Two years have already passed by; project has overrun its estimated cost by several hundred millions of rupees. It is still nowhere near completion. The Construction companied and the government both have announced another deadline of December 2007, but a cursory project assessment suggests that this deadline too is not realistic.

The project was appraised by IDBI led consortium at a cost of Rs.3810 crores, but the financial closure could not be achieved upto the year 2003. Owing to non achievement of financial closure, delay in land acquisition, difficult Geological strata and labour problems the project could not be completed by the due date, says Jammu and Kashmir�s Minister for Power Nawang Rigzin Jora. Meanwhile the expenditure on project in anticipation of the financial closure was met from Bonds of Rs.1054 crores raised from financial market and annual plan outlays of the state.
Another consortium, led by PFC, was approached in the year 2003 for the financial closure of the project and PFC appraised the project at a revised cost of Rs.4000 crores and financial closure was achieved in the year 2004. Revised date of completion of the project was fixed for December 2006. That too could not be achieved.

A loan amount of Rs.1131 crores has been lifted so far and an expenditure of Rs.3274 crores excluding financing costs of Bonds of Rs.508 crores have been spent till December 2006 on the project. In July-August 2005, heavy and sustained flood discharge in the River Chenab followed by sudden draw down triggered heavy slides on the up stream sloops of diversion tunnel inlet faces which blocked the diversion tunnels causing the river to over flow the dam blocks and eventually leading to scouring of the right bank on down stream of dam side and damaging the trail track.

Later, after series of deliberations between Jammu and Kashmir State Power Development Corporation, Foreign Consultants Lahmeir International, Contractor and CWC, the strategies to tackle these damages were decided and the new date of completion of the project was determined as December 2007.


The Other Chestnuts


Baglihar is not a case in isolation, there are at least 27 power projects being built or already operational on Indian side which have been objected to by Pakistan. Quite often, Pakistan uses its logic of objections on these projects, under the ambit of Indus Water Treaty, to halt progress on Kashmir issue resolution.

Pressing with its objects hard and linking up with the political issues, Pakistan has already made India suffer tremendously. Over two decades back, Pakistan made serious objections over the 480 MW Salal projects, on river Chenab in Jammu province. Pakistan contended that storage of water in dams on this project could dry the rivers and canals downstream and can also later be used for flooding of the lower riparian states. India budged to the pressure and made design change in the dam. The project now faces siltage.

Actually a flood retardation scheme, Tulbul Navigation Project too has been under severe resentment from Pakistan. This project is actually about retaining water of the river Jhelum, as a natural rise, and then releasing it after October in a regulated manner. This is used for impounding water from Uri hydro-electric project and for navigational purposes. But Pakistan insists that it is a dam �which actually is not. Following objections from Pakistan laced with too much of politics, construction on the project had to be stopped in 1987. No significant development after that.

Another serious bone of contention between India and Pakistan is the Kishanganga project �a tributary based project on river Jhelum.

The Kishanganga project has to dam the Kishanganga (Neelum) River. The proposed 103-metre high reservoir could submerge almost the entire Gurez valley. From this reservoir, water will flow through a channel and a 27-kilometre tunnel dug south through the North Kashmir mountain range. The channel will change the course of Neelum River by around 100 kilometres, which will finally join the Wullar Lake and Jhelum River near the northern township of Bandipur. Presently, the Neelam and Jhelum rivers join each other at Muzaffarabad (in Pakistan administered Kashmir) at a point called Domail. Through the proposed Wullar barrage project, India plans to maintain constant yearly flow in Jhelum. Pakistan has serious objections on this project. As a consequence of this 100- kilometre diversion of the Neelum River, Pakistan's Neelum Valley could dry up and become a desert.

India has made a significant headway on resolving dispute over Kishanganga project but Pakistan is yet to agree to the proposed design change. In a bid to end a long-standing dispute over the Kishanganga project, India has now proposed to Pakistan modifications in the 330 mw hydro-electric power plant to convert it into a run-of-the-river project instead of generating electricity from water stored in a dam.

The decision was taken by the Union Cabinet on April 18, 2006, to convert the project into a run-of-the-river scheme comes in the wake of Pakistan`s objection of storage of 220 million cubic metres of Indus River water in a reservoir and produce power.

This has been done to end objections raised by Pakistan that India could not store water (under annexure E of the Indus Water Treaty). Now the project is sought to be covered under Annexure D of the treaty. While New Delhi continues to contend that it has the right to construct reservoirs on tributaries of Indus and has not violated the treaty, the cabinet decision was actually aimed at ending the dispute over the project, which was originally proposed in 1994.


The author is Editor-in-Chief, Epilogue, monthly magazine and news portal Epilogue on Jammu and Kashmir. He can be reached at editor.epilogue@gmail.com