silent hawk
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Dil go bahlaanay ke liay ye khial acha hai Ghalib.
PAF Vs IAF Command and Control Systems
- Thread starter silent hawk
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Dil go bahlaanay ke liay ye khial acha hai Ghalib.
silent hawk
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As I have already mentioned in my analysis, there is no doubt that the IAF is upgrading its C4I system. The main thing is that they are ten years behind us. We started after Kargil you after Mumbai. Nobody does upgrades without a reason.
rockstarIN
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I do not mind if ARMRAAM wins or R-77 wins, but this had been accepted by western itself.
paritosh
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If you check the Erieye video, you would realise that the Link 16 is a data link, which allows F16's to turn their radar off, and the AWAC uses its AESA radar to guide the AMRAAM in.
which is true for all the awacs...!
there is no awacs without a data-link!!!
do you seriously need a video to understand that bro?
while the link-16 DL is a western DL we have russian data link aborad our planes and AWACS...that is why we faced a problem trying to link with the american awacs during the red-flag...
whatever you posted is standard awacs operation...
if you choose to compare the erieye and the phalcon...I'd rate the phalcon to be better as it has a 360 degree azimuth scan area...compared to the erieye's 120 degree on both the sides...
..:: India Strategic ::.. Military Aviation: AWACS: Watchdogs of the Skies
paritosh
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ok again...that sense of optimism is out of place...
There is no source of comms better than fibre-optics for long range and laser for short range...we have them both...
there is no source of intel gathering and recon than satellites...we have 11 of them world renowned remote-sensing ones and at least two dedicated military ones...
radars are paramount...there has been an analysis done already on this thread and it was realized by all that you did not hold any advantage what so ever...
so if there'd be any advantage it'd be ours to hold.
while you talk of imported chinese and american BMS...
we have already made our own indigenous ones...for arjun and t-90...
read...
Shri. S. Sundaresh, is appointed as the Chief Controller R&D (ACE - Armament and Combat Engineering) with effect from 01 Nov 2009. He was leading the Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT) programme as Director, Combat Vehicles Research & Development Establishment (CVRDE), from 01 Sep 2005 till 24 March 2010. He has a rich experience in Project management and Technology management in the domain of Combat vehicles
After his graduation in Electrical Engineering from Madras University in 1971 and post graduation in Control Systems from Indian Institute of Technology Madras in 1973, he joined Naval Science and Technological Laboratory, Vishakapatnam in January 1974. During his tenure at NSTL from 1974 to 1986, he carried out the design and development of control and guidance systems for underwater weapons successfully. The roll and course control and guidance system of an anti-ship torpedo was productionised.
He moved to CVRDE, Avadi in 1986, where he was responsible for the Integrated Fire Control System (IFCS) for the Arjun MBT. He led the development of IFCS for Arjun MBT through successful weapon system trials and users acceptance. He received the DRDO Technology award for this contribution in 1996. He guided his team in the successful development of indigenous electro-hydraulic gun control system, gunnery training simulator and Battle Management System. He headed the LCA work centre at CVRDE since 1996 and successfully led his team in qualifying the Aircraft mounted Accessory gearbox and the hydraulic filters for the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA Tejas). He was nominated as the Chairman for the 'Soldier System Study Group' in 2002. He piloted a team of scientists from DRDO labs in this study and submitted a proposal for a multi lab DRDO Programme for the 'Soldier as a System'.
an excerpt from...
DRDO
official drdo website.
Here is something interesting.. rather old..a certain bloggers view of Pakistani Air defense modernization and status.
but of relevance here..although it might be a repost.
So I sat down this afternoon and decided to wrap my head around the whole Pakistani air defense issue in light of the FC-1 purchase.
The issue as I see it is that the Pakistani Air Forces (and I am including their SAM network as part of the air forces, I don't think they all report to the PAF but it makes it simpler for the sake of talking about the overall air defense picture) currently lack a robust air defense capability.
Now, we're not talking about pilot skill, PAF vs. IAF inventories, or anything of that nature here. What I mean by that statement is that the current PAF lacks a serious long-range air defense network. Pakistan does possess a number of EW radar systems from various sources, and their EW picture is, for the most part, adequate. There is a concern that the radar picture could be muddled in some areas due to the uneven terrain found throughout the nation, but this can easily be rectified by employing an AEW&C aircraft, such as the Saab platform currently being purchased for the PAF. Personally, I would've preferred a larger platform with the ability to remain on station longer, perhaps one of the new Chinese Y-8 models, but the Saab platform is certainly not going to fall short in the radar performance category, so it should still be perfectly suitable for the needs of the PAF.
The real problem currently lies in the business end of the IADS network, the shooters. Let's examine the air picture first.
The PAF currently has to rely on relatively short-legged, older technology aircraft for the most part (the F-16A does enjoy a bit of a range benefit over the F-7s), and they lack a BVR weapon. That means that any intruder with a BVR weapon will put the PAF interceptor pilot at a disadvantage. This is currently being rectified through the purchase and co-production of the FC-1, which will employ the Chinese SD-10 BVR AAM. An upgrade for the PAF F-16 fleet is also being sought, as well as at least 18 new Block 50/52 jets, complete with AIM-120 BVR AAM capability. So, the airborne intercept portion of the equation is being addressed.
The real problem lies with the ground-based SAM network. Pakistan currently relies on the Chinese HQ-2 for strategic air defense purposes. The problem is that there only appears to be one active HQ-2 site near Islamabad, located at 33°32'40.80"N 73°16'04.44"E. There have been claims of a second HQ-2 unit near Karachi, but there is currently no evidence suggesting that this unit is still active, as the site is not visible in overhead imagery. Given the fact that Karachi is not the capital, the equipment could be being held in storage or active reserve for deployment if needed, but for the sake of argument we will proceed with the assumption that only the northern site is active, as it is the only site that can be verified at this time.
Here is an image of the active HQ-2 site near Islamabad:
The next image depicts the maximum range of the HQ-2, 35 kilometers. 35 kilometers is the range of the farthest-reaching HQ-2 variant, I am operating on the assumption that PAF missiles may have been upgraded or replaced over their service lives.
Take note that the mountanous terrain to the east and southeast will affect radar performance and the system's effectiveness will be hampered to some degree in those areas, particularly at low altitudes.
The rest of the Pakistani SAM inventory consists of short-range tactical SAM systems best suited for a point defense or ground unit support role. Clearly, the SAM side of the Pakistani IADS needs to be addressed. Pakistan has shown interest in acquiring advanced Chinese-made SAM systems, including the FT-2000, which is a rather interesting passive homing weapon. Modern Chinese SAM systems should be just as effective as some of their Russian counterparts, as China has been importing some of the best SAM systems in the world from the Russians for years now and has likely taken the opportunity, as they are so often wont to do, to check things out and figure out just what makes them tick. S-300P technology no doubt aided in the development of the very similar HQ-9 strategic SAM system.
Before one sets about redesigning the Pakistani strategic SAM network, one must first consider the goals of the IADS. The goal of the Pakistani IADS should not be to turn Pakistan into a wholly denied parcel of airspace; that would require far too many SAM systems to effectively pull off. Rather, a strategic SAM network should be positioned to protect key infrastructure elements and the government, as well as key military facilities.
In order to defend these key sites, they must be identified. For the sake of this discussion, here is a preliminary list:
-Islamabad
-Khusab reactor complex
-Hyderabad
-Karachi
This list is by no means all inclusive, and is meant simply to illustrate the next point. Additionally, mobile missile facilities have been discounted as they would likely disperse in the event of a large scale conflict.
Alright, primary facilities have been identified. The next step is to identify a potential SAM system for use. The ideal choice, given the nature of their relationship at the present time, would be for Pakistan to procure the 100 kilometer range HQ-9 system from China. As can be seen by the following image, the placement of four HQ-9 units at the aforementioned locations would represent a substantial increase in the Pakistani strategic air defense capability:
Any further strategic facilities or important locations could be defended by additional HQ-9 batteries, but two batteries at each site organized into two regiments, one north and one south, could provide the basis for a robust strategic SAM network.
That leaves the matter of point defense. While Pakistan may choose to procure a European system as they already have experience operating the short-range Crotale and RBS-70 systems, there is another option I would like to present.
Surface-launched AMRAAMs are being used by a few select nations as short/intermediate-range SAM systems. Pakistan has the opportunity here to develop a similar system in cooperation with the Chinese. The SD-10 could potentially form the basis of a very effective point defense system, as well as a system that could be placed covertly along potential threat aircraft ingress routes, particularly in the mountanous regions of the nation.
The SD-10 is an active radar weapon, ostensibly needing no off-board targeting sensors provided the target can be locked on by the seeker head prior to launch. The way to get around that limitation is to provide a passive detection system based on the FT-2000's EW kit. This would allow for hostile target identification to be performed, and a few sensors positioned at the right locations could provide triangulation so as to enable the system to generate accurate target track data. Target altitudes could be generated by measuring the strength of an identified emission, or perhaps by an accurate EO or IR system. Once a track and an altitude have been identified, the parameters for a launch have been established. An SD-10 could be fired and even updated mid-course using continued examination of the track and altitude data, before going active at point-blank range to allow for the maximum amount of suprise (mid-course signals could, of course, be detected by a sensitive RWR kit, but it'd have to know what it was to classify it as hostile).
The passive/active SD-10 system would be a cheap, effective option for short-range and point defense and would also be able to serve as a gap filler in areas where terrain precludes engagement by longer-range HQ-9s positioned in the area to defend their assigned locations. All Pakistan needs to do is take the initiative and embrace this concept, and with the induction of an HQ-9 class system the overall strategic air defense network will become much more effective.
Again, a network such as this is not intended to turn the entire nation into denied airspace. That's just not possible, or even economically feasible at any rate. But with a few key adjustments and acquisitions, Pakistan could greatly increase it's defensive capabilities insofar as intruding aircraft are concerned. A more robust SAM network would also free up more aircraft from point defense or CAP duties, allowing them to be retasked for other roles.
The bold parts are those in current procurement pipelines..
The rest are all taken care of.
but of relevance here..although it might be a repost.
So I sat down this afternoon and decided to wrap my head around the whole Pakistani air defense issue in light of the FC-1 purchase.
The issue as I see it is that the Pakistani Air Forces (and I am including their SAM network as part of the air forces, I don't think they all report to the PAF but it makes it simpler for the sake of talking about the overall air defense picture) currently lack a robust air defense capability.
Now, we're not talking about pilot skill, PAF vs. IAF inventories, or anything of that nature here. What I mean by that statement is that the current PAF lacks a serious long-range air defense network. Pakistan does possess a number of EW radar systems from various sources, and their EW picture is, for the most part, adequate. There is a concern that the radar picture could be muddled in some areas due to the uneven terrain found throughout the nation, but this can easily be rectified by employing an AEW&C aircraft, such as the Saab platform currently being purchased for the PAF. Personally, I would've preferred a larger platform with the ability to remain on station longer, perhaps one of the new Chinese Y-8 models, but the Saab platform is certainly not going to fall short in the radar performance category, so it should still be perfectly suitable for the needs of the PAF.
The real problem currently lies in the business end of the IADS network, the shooters. Let's examine the air picture first.
The PAF currently has to rely on relatively short-legged, older technology aircraft for the most part (the F-16A does enjoy a bit of a range benefit over the F-7s), and they lack a BVR weapon. That means that any intruder with a BVR weapon will put the PAF interceptor pilot at a disadvantage. This is currently being rectified through the purchase and co-production of the FC-1, which will employ the Chinese SD-10 BVR AAM. An upgrade for the PAF F-16 fleet is also being sought, as well as at least 18 new Block 50/52 jets, complete with AIM-120 BVR AAM capability. So, the airborne intercept portion of the equation is being addressed.
The real problem lies with the ground-based SAM network. Pakistan currently relies on the Chinese HQ-2 for strategic air defense purposes. The problem is that there only appears to be one active HQ-2 site near Islamabad, located at 33°32'40.80"N 73°16'04.44"E. There have been claims of a second HQ-2 unit near Karachi, but there is currently no evidence suggesting that this unit is still active, as the site is not visible in overhead imagery. Given the fact that Karachi is not the capital, the equipment could be being held in storage or active reserve for deployment if needed, but for the sake of argument we will proceed with the assumption that only the northern site is active, as it is the only site that can be verified at this time.
Here is an image of the active HQ-2 site near Islamabad:
The next image depicts the maximum range of the HQ-2, 35 kilometers. 35 kilometers is the range of the farthest-reaching HQ-2 variant, I am operating on the assumption that PAF missiles may have been upgraded or replaced over their service lives.
Take note that the mountanous terrain to the east and southeast will affect radar performance and the system's effectiveness will be hampered to some degree in those areas, particularly at low altitudes.
The rest of the Pakistani SAM inventory consists of short-range tactical SAM systems best suited for a point defense or ground unit support role. Clearly, the SAM side of the Pakistani IADS needs to be addressed. Pakistan has shown interest in acquiring advanced Chinese-made SAM systems, including the FT-2000, which is a rather interesting passive homing weapon. Modern Chinese SAM systems should be just as effective as some of their Russian counterparts, as China has been importing some of the best SAM systems in the world from the Russians for years now and has likely taken the opportunity, as they are so often wont to do, to check things out and figure out just what makes them tick. S-300P technology no doubt aided in the development of the very similar HQ-9 strategic SAM system.
Before one sets about redesigning the Pakistani strategic SAM network, one must first consider the goals of the IADS. The goal of the Pakistani IADS should not be to turn Pakistan into a wholly denied parcel of airspace; that would require far too many SAM systems to effectively pull off. Rather, a strategic SAM network should be positioned to protect key infrastructure elements and the government, as well as key military facilities.
In order to defend these key sites, they must be identified. For the sake of this discussion, here is a preliminary list:
-Islamabad
-Khusab reactor complex
-Hyderabad
-Karachi
This list is by no means all inclusive, and is meant simply to illustrate the next point. Additionally, mobile missile facilities have been discounted as they would likely disperse in the event of a large scale conflict.
Alright, primary facilities have been identified. The next step is to identify a potential SAM system for use. The ideal choice, given the nature of their relationship at the present time, would be for Pakistan to procure the 100 kilometer range HQ-9 system from China. As can be seen by the following image, the placement of four HQ-9 units at the aforementioned locations would represent a substantial increase in the Pakistani strategic air defense capability:
Any further strategic facilities or important locations could be defended by additional HQ-9 batteries, but two batteries at each site organized into two regiments, one north and one south, could provide the basis for a robust strategic SAM network.
That leaves the matter of point defense. While Pakistan may choose to procure a European system as they already have experience operating the short-range Crotale and RBS-70 systems, there is another option I would like to present.
Surface-launched AMRAAMs are being used by a few select nations as short/intermediate-range SAM systems. Pakistan has the opportunity here to develop a similar system in cooperation with the Chinese. The SD-10 could potentially form the basis of a very effective point defense system, as well as a system that could be placed covertly along potential threat aircraft ingress routes, particularly in the mountanous regions of the nation.
The SD-10 is an active radar weapon, ostensibly needing no off-board targeting sensors provided the target can be locked on by the seeker head prior to launch. The way to get around that limitation is to provide a passive detection system based on the FT-2000's EW kit. This would allow for hostile target identification to be performed, and a few sensors positioned at the right locations could provide triangulation so as to enable the system to generate accurate target track data. Target altitudes could be generated by measuring the strength of an identified emission, or perhaps by an accurate EO or IR system. Once a track and an altitude have been identified, the parameters for a launch have been established. An SD-10 could be fired and even updated mid-course using continued examination of the track and altitude data, before going active at point-blank range to allow for the maximum amount of suprise (mid-course signals could, of course, be detected by a sensitive RWR kit, but it'd have to know what it was to classify it as hostile).
The passive/active SD-10 system would be a cheap, effective option for short-range and point defense and would also be able to serve as a gap filler in areas where terrain precludes engagement by longer-range HQ-9s positioned in the area to defend their assigned locations. All Pakistan needs to do is take the initiative and embrace this concept, and with the induction of an HQ-9 class system the overall strategic air defense network will become much more effective.
Again, a network such as this is not intended to turn the entire nation into denied airspace. That's just not possible, or even economically feasible at any rate. But with a few key adjustments and acquisitions, Pakistan could greatly increase it's defensive capabilities insofar as intruding aircraft are concerned. A more robust SAM network would also free up more aircraft from point defense or CAP duties, allowing them to be retasked for other roles.
The bold parts are those in current procurement pipelines..
The rest are all taken care of.
rockstarIN
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HQ-2 is very old system, PA/PAF needed to modify their system long back...
Rafi
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The Sakb and the Al Khalid and Al Zarrar main battle tanks are all being equipped with the Integrated Battlefield Management System (IBMS), a system to track friendly and enemy positions similar to the US Army's Blue Force Tracking.
Trichy
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Indian Air Force C4I South...
Any other pic?(i dont doubt its operational.. just wanna see it working)
Seems to be booting up.. or installing..
Maybe a diagnostic..
Or a presentation.. since there only seem to be trivial things in that photo. Or is the IAF using command line inputs and readouts for data??
Is that third guy calling tech support ??
Kidding..
Trichy
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PAF C4I Centre - Apparently no equivalent for the indians exist, other than on the drawing board.
This too looks like a PS or CG, who cares???
Any other pic?(i dont doubt its operational.. just wanna see it working)
Seems to be booting up.. or installing..
Maybe a diagnostic..
Or a presentation.. since there only seem to be trivial things in that photo. Or is the IAF using command line inputs and readouts for data??
Is that third guy calling tech support ??
Kidding..
this C4I centers are not Outer parts of Fighter Jet to get more access or to get click... This is with Operational Under Southern Command i heard... they are working.. but in your still its Simply like a PS or a CG
Rafi
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Any other pic?(i dont doubt its operational.. just wanna see it working)
Seems to be booting up.. or installing..
Maybe a diagnostic..
Or a presentation.. since there only seem to be trivial things in that photo. Or is the IAF using command line inputs and readouts for data??
Is that third guy calling tech support ??
Kidding..
Yeah also no headphones, proves they are not talking to any pilots, whereas ours is a fully fledged C4I centre.
This too looks like a PS or CG, who cares???
this C4I centers are not Outer parts of Fighter Jet to get more access or to get click... This is with Operational Under Southern Command i heard... they are working.. but in your still its Simply like a PS or a CG
Right.. uhh.. this being the comedian who cracks a bad joke..and laughs alone hysterically while the audience stare at each other..
And .. we must have some really good CGI and PS folks to come up with the pictures in the last few posts..
All the IAF pics here have been presentations.. scans etc.
I dont doubt the existence..
just curious to see..specifically the interface, symbology etc??
any other serious fellow here who has got some??
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