PAF locked on 9 shoot only two...PAF official....0n 27 Feb....

[Pakistani Fighter]

@airomerix
Million $ question

Do your friends & brothers in PAF see IAF coming soon?

Sincerely

It all depends on False Flag. Lets see

 

[MastanKhan]

Mastankhan, or maybe people in governments have a clearer idea of each others capabilities than people in internet chatrooms ?

Have you ever heard the name of Subotai Bahadur and who he was---?

@airomerix
Million $ question

Do your friends & brothers in PAF see IAF coming soon?

Sincerely

Hi,

Even if they see it coming---the illusion that they have now and had created in the past meant that they are not coming---.

If Pak air force truly believed the indians were coming---the funds available after 9/11---the Paf would have gone right ahead and procured fighter aircraft on the run---rather than giving it to the earthquake relief fund---.

 

[Myth_buster_1]

Hi,

Stop talking silly---. You pakistani kids have made it a habbit of yours---. Don't BS around just out of habit that you have to write an answer back

Read up on the story of that officer---before you start yapping your mouth off---.

If you can't find it---ask Billal Khan 777---he will tell you about it---.

You are not an intelligent person---even though you try to be very "Chalak".

Hi,

You are just getting mad that a troll like you is getting trolled
Just stop being an arm chair general and I will stop out chalaking you
Btw, stories are stories that can not be verified. He said she said can only be debunked with logic. just like i have busted all your myths about 26th and 27th feb.

 

[SQ8]

You gonna stay young?

Hoping to both physically and mentally - most Pakistanis tend to “desire” the label of being old

 

[crankthatskunk]

they need to re-train their staff, upgrade hardware, re-formulate response strategy, not happening any time soon.

Yeah, I have said it, it would be 2 years or more. Unless they have deliveries of Rafale completed, stock of long range BVR, jamming and other pods for EW capabilities, etc.etc. And probably S400 delivery.
But Pakistanis should be rest assured, it would happen, sooner or later.

Until the point of shooting 2 jets, Imran Khan and Modi believed superior IAF will sweep across the skies.
By the time two Indian jets were down, non of the India pilots were willing to fly any more.
Imran Khan helped Modi save his face, and that of his Air-force.

Imran Khan was the reason 27th happened. He promised after Pulwama that if Indian strike, Pakistan will have no other option but to strike. It is not if and buts, but that Pakistan will respond. So it did, at appropriate level.

Imran Khan was also the reason, the escalation didn't happened. By return of Abhi and other steps.
Otherwise Pakistan had ample reasons to down all 9 jets and hit the targets inside LOC.
If intrusion in to your airspace and bombing Pakistan proper is not declaration of war, what is!!

Indians did try to escalate the war. They tried to deploy their missiles to attack Pakistan. This is very clear.
To say that PAF strikes deterred India is incorrect. Those who put forward such analysis keep ignoring that the Missile attack was imminent until Pakistan passed on the message on the similar line like before, Pakistan will have no choice but to respond if attacked by missiles.
That threat and the fulfilment of the promise by Imran Khan deterred Indian to stop the stupidity of missiles strikes.
If that to had happened, the war was imminent and the things could have lead to any unseen scenario, including nuclear exchange.

It's very childish logic to say that 2 down jets forced to deploy missiles and 3 would forced them to load missile 4 would let them to initiate sequence... and so forth.
During Kargil, Indians didn't had bags enough to pack their dead bodies, no propaganda of Indian preparing for nuke were released from any quarters.

So many here are down that path. Indians would have been gobsmacked after 9 jets down.
They tried the missiles strikes already, but called them off, after same promise given. They knew they can end up with bloody nose again.
The only thing which would have changed is the level of humiliation and the fact there was no coming back for Indians after 9 jets down.
At the moment, they accept only one down and counter it with a F 16 shoot down. Trying to show to the world that they were at par with Pakistan in Feb. They had this chance due to our reluctance to hit their jets and their targets. The game would have been over not just for 2 years or more but for decade (s). When someone gets a bloody nose it thinks thousands times before carrying out such stupidity again.

 

[CriticalThought]

Yeah, I have said it, it would be 2 years or more. Unless they have deliveries of Rafale completed, stock of long range BVR, jamming and other pods for EW capabilities, etc.etc. And probably S400 delivery.
But Pakistanis should be rest assured, it would happen, sooner or later.



Imran Khan was the reason 27th happened. He promised after Pulwama that if Indian strike, Pakistan will have no other option but to strike. It is not if and buts, but that Pakistan will respond. So it did, at appropriate level.

Imran Khan was also the reason, the escalation didn't happened. By return of Abhi and other steps.
Otherwise Pakistan had ample reasons to down all 9 jets and hit the targets inside LOC.
If intrusion in to your airspace and bombing Pakistan proper is not declaration of war, what is!!

Indians did try to escalate the war. They tried to deploy their missiles to attack Pakistan. This is very clear.
To say that PAF strikes deterred India is incorrect. Those who put forward such analysis keep ignoring that the Missile attack was imminent until Pakistan passed on the message on the similar line like before, Pakistan will have no choice but to respond if attacked by missiles.
That threat and the fulfilment of the promise by Imran Khan deterred Indian to stop the stupidity of missiles strikes.
If that to had happened, the war was imminent and the things could have lead to any unseen scenario, including nuclear exchange.



So many here are down that path. Indians would have been gobsmacked after 9 jets down.
They tried the missiles strikes already, but called them off, after same promise given. They knew they can end up with bloody nose again.
The only thing which would have changed is the level of humiliation and the fact there was no coming back for Indians after 9 jets down.
At the moment, they accept only one down and counter it with a F 16 shoot down. Trying to show to the world that they were at par with Pakistan in Feb. They had this chance due to our reluctance to hit their jets and their targets. The game would have been over not just for 2 years or more but for decade (s). When someone gets a bloody nose it thinks thousands times before carrying out such stupidity again.

Thank you for raising some very important and interesting points. There is a lot of subtle messaging which is lost in a superficial overview.

Imran Khan only gave approval for attacks on Indian soil, away from any civilian or military targets. Per Indian allegations, after the attacks had been launched, PAF then provoked them by flying jets into their airspace. When Indian jets followed, they found themselves in a kill-box. PAF lured them into a kill-zone and dispatched two of their jets.

And so here is the reality of the situation. Imran Khan and Bajwa couldn't defend two downed jets on the international geo-political level. How could they defend nine?

Does anyone on this forum realize what we did to assuage the Indian missile threat? We gave up Abhinandan as a gesture of kindness, allowed inhuman Indian bombing of Azad Kashmir and a border skirmish in the Sialkot sector, allowed Indian submarines to go away unharmed, then accepted in front of the whole world we have terrorists in the form of Maulana Masood Azhar and Hafiz Saeed, backed India for membership in Security Council, accepted and continue to accept unyielding pressure in FATF for being a source of terrorist financing when America has been the biggest financier of terrorists in Syria, Afghan is to source of all terrorism in the world and is still in the whitelist, and India has financed terrorism in Pakistan for two decades. Then we stuck to verbal castigations when India repealed Article 360. On top of this, we allowed further inhuman bombing in Kashmir to such an extent that Wajahat A Khan called out the criminal silence of our leaders and Abid Andaleeb made a video of the plight of Kashmiris and how they felt completely alienated.

And then I ask the question, was that weakness really worth it?

There will be some who will try their level best to de-link everything from Feb 27 2019. These people either don't understand warfare, or knowingly avoid the facts. When you win a war or a conflict, you achieve a perceptual superiority over your enemy. This is especially true for an aerial conflict. Modern wars are won and lost through air power. Having established air superiority over Indian airforce, Pakistan was in a state of established military ascendancy. This was the time to force Indian leadership to the table and negotiate a peace agreement, force them to back off from blackmail in FATF, and hold off from further involvement in Afghanistan and Baluchistan. Instead, Imran Khan is publicly known to apologize for Modi's behavior as an election rhetoric. The Prime Minister of the country excused the enemy's behavior, and to add insult to injury, fully backed the enemy's membership to the Security Council as a further peace gesture. I mean one has to be completely devoid of shame, self-respect, and national pride to not term this as treason of the worst kind.

The trouble is that our loyal Pakistanis don't have the grasp of international affairs, military strategy, and geo-politics. Thus, these gullible people are easy led by sweet promises by demagogues. We have no one but ourselves to blame for this. We as a nation have been unable to hold our own leaders accountable for their actions. Until this changes, nothing else will change.

 

[TheTallGuy]

At the moment, they accept only one down and counter it with a F 16 shoot down. Trying to show to the world that they were at par with Pakistan in Feb. They had this chance due to our reluctance to hit their jets and their targets. The game would have been over not just for 2 years or more but for decade (s). When someone gets a bloody nose it thinks thousands times before carrying out such stupidity again.

They have very much learned the from there mistake and advise a better operational plan then last year. after they have gotten help from Technically advance & battle hardened forces from other countries.

This time around they will not initiate with IAF they will initiate with Brahmos SSCM and attempt to defend on there own turf from PAF retaliatory strikes...(because we are able to do just that..cant use ours) they will do it not on one place but two sectors...

i agree that 1st casualty of last year was our nuclear deterrent...now its just the vicious circle...our "Eco-Fools & Peace-Fools" are of opinion that India does not pose existential Threat...to Pakistan..

so marry go around and around...till retire..with perks.

Hi,

Even if they see it coming---the illusion that they have now and had created in the past meant that they are not coming---.

If Pak air force truly believed the Indians were coming---the funds available after 9/11---the Paf would have gone right ahead and procured fighter aircraft on the run---rather than giving it to the earthquake relief fund---.

What hurts the most "the causalities we shall suffer to get on top will be much higher" all because we were`t decisive when we had the opportunity which was once in a life time it went nearly bloodless. Mind you we will come on top but lot of blood will be spilled..on our side..this time around.

I am not a war monger! but i dread the day when i see PAF pilots captured by Indians...paraded on TV and lynched by MOB, i feel jitters when i think that i would be seeing Fighters of PAF lost in action.

we would have shut these monkeys up for good if we would have been decisive... too much pull back weight on our Nuclear deterrent which was up & gone in thin air..on 26th Feb...the people in helm knew this....so everybody save their seats...heck Gen.Bajwa was appointed for extension only after Pentagon/Washington Approval. (Isnt that a Shame?) we knew on 3rd March 2019 Mr.Modi was to do what he did on 5-Aug-19(Article 370 on Kashmir) (Isnt that a Shame?)

And People talk we make IAF cry! what about hindsight...We were played!

 

[diligence]

They would have done nothing. The shock of seeing the abilities of the JF17 would have resulted in total and utter confusion.

That little cockroach JF17 destroying / decimating the Mahabali—-the screams would have been heard the world over.

While it's not intended to hurt or insult anyone, I tend to agree with MK at least on this point. Blowing the sh!t out of IAF on 27/2 (by shooting down their 9 or whatever war planes) would have shell shocked Modi & his terrorist gang to such an extent that would have paralyzed their mind and shattered their will to face PAF and Pak for years if not decades. Just imagine a loss of just two planes had forced the IAF in general and MKIs in particular to stay well clear of the LOC and Modi and IAF Chief BS wishing for Rafales. Modi hysterically did try to raise the bar by resorting to threats of unleashing missile attacks on Pak cities but then was forced to cowed down by just a Pak threat of harsh retaliation. If Pak had brought down all nine IAF planes on that fateful day, Modi couldn't have done any more of a sh!t than what he tried after losing two IAF planes. The only problem for Pakistan I could see then was at the diplomatic front. But let me tell you one secret. This world worships powerful (individuals as well as nations) only. Pakistan would have earned much higher standing and respect at world stage after destroying Modi and his air force. I already see a clear change in world attitude (including Americans and many other air forces/governments) towards Pakistan after the PAF humiliated Modi and his gang.

 

[The Accountant]

While it's not intended to hurt or insult anyone, I tend to agree with MK at least on this point. Blowing the sh!t out of IAF on 27/2 (by shooting down their 9 or whatever war planes) would have shell shocked Modi & his terrorist gang to such an extent that would have paralyzed their mind and shattered their will to face PAF and Pak for years if not decades. Just imagine a loss of just two planes had forced the IAF in general and MKIs in particular to stay well clear of the LOC and Modi and IAF Chief BS wishing for Rafales. Modi hysterically did try to raise the bar by resorting to threats of unleashing missile attacks on Pak cities but then was forced to cowed down by just a Pak threat of harsh retaliation. If Pak had brought down all nine IAF planes on that fateful day, Modi couldn't have done any more of a sh!t than what he tried after losing two IAF planes. The only problem for Pakistan I could see then was at the diplomatic front. But let me tell you one secret. This world worships powerful (individuals as well as nations) only. Pakistan would have earned much higher standing and respect at world stage after destroying Modi and his air force. I already see a clear change in world attitude (including Americans and many other air forces/governments) towards Pakistan after the PAF humiliated Modi and his gang.

That was a theatre level engagement in we came out at top. Shooting 9 jets would have resulted in a full blown war which could have tilted in favor of any country.

 

[PakShaheen79]

Kargil again was a failure of Paf. Never ready. Excuse of sanctions given.

Though usually, your trolling is not worth replying but this particular one caught my attention.

"Kargil was a failure of Paf." What a load of crap! You want to know, what happened in Kargil and Why PAF didn't play any role? Read this Jacka$$...

Operational Planning in the PAF

Since an important portion of this write-up pertains to the PAF’s appreciation of the situation and the decision-making loop during the Kargil conflict, we will start with a brief primer on PAF’s hierarchy and how operational matters are handled at the Air Headquarters.

The policy-making elements at Air Headquarters consist of four-tiers of staff officers. The top-most tier is made up of the Deputy Chiefs of Air Staff (DCAS) who are the Principal Staff Officers (PSOs) of their respective branches and are nominally headed by the Vice Chief of Air Staff (VCAS). They (along with Air Officers Commanding, the senior representatives from field formations) are members of the Air Board, PAF’s ‘corporate’ decision-making body which is chaired by the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS). The next tier is made up of Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff (ACAS) who head various sub-branches, and along with the third-tier Directors, assist the PSOs in policy-making; they are not on the Air Board, but can be called for hearings and presentations in the Board meetings, as required. A fourth tier of Deputy Directors does most of the sundry staff work in this policy-making hierarchy.

The Operations & Plans branch is the key player in any war, conflict or contingency and is responsible for threat assessment and formulation of a suitable response. During peace-time, war plans are drawn up by the Plans sub-branch and are then war-gamed in operational exercises run by the sister Operations sub-branch. Operational training is accordingly restructured and administered by the latter, based on the lessons of various exercises. This essentially is the gist of PAF’s operational preparedness methodology, the efficiency of which is amply reflected in its readiness and telling response in various wars and skirmishes in the past.

In early 1999, Air Chief Marshal Parvaiz Mehdi Qureshi was at the helm of the PAF. An officer with an imposing personality, he had won the Sword of Honour at the Academy. During the 1971 Indo-Pak War, as a young Flight Lieutenant, he was on a close support mission in erstwhile East Pakistan when his Sabre was shot down and he was taken POW. He determinedly resumed his fighter pilot’s career after repatriation and rose to command PAF’s premier Sargodha Base. He was later appointed as the AOC, Southern Air Command, an appointment that affords considerable interaction amongst the three services, especially in operational exercises. He also held the vitally important post of DCAS (Ops) as well as the VCAS before taking over as CAS.

The post of DCAS (Ops) was held by the late Air Marshal Zahid Anis. A well-qualified fighter pilot, he had a distinguished career in the PAF, having held some of the most sought-after appointments. These included command of No 38 Tactical Wing (F-16s), the elite Combat Commanders’ School and PAF Base, Sargodha. He was the AOC, Southern Air Command before his appointment as the head of the Operations branch at the Air Headquarters. He had done his Air War Course at the PAF’s Air War College, another War Course at the French War College as well as the prestigious Defence Studies course at the Royal College of Defence Studies in UK.

The ACAS (Ops) was Air Cdre Abid Rao, who had recently completed command of PAF Base, Mianwali. He had earlier done his War Course from the French War College.

The ACAS (Plans) was the late Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz, a brilliant officer who had made his mark at the Staff College at Bracknell, UK and during the War Course at the National Defence College, Islamabad.

There is no gainsaying the fact that PAF’s hierarchy was highly qualified, and that each one of the players in the Operations branch had the requisite command and staff experience. The two top men had also fought in the 1971 Indo-Pak War, albeit as junior officers.

First Rumblings

As Director of Operations (in the rank of Gp Capt), my first opportunity to interact with the Army’s Director of Military Operations (DMO) was over a phone call, some time in March 1999. Brig Nadeem Ahmed called with great courtesy and requested some information that he needed for a paper exercise, as he told me. He wanted to know when had the PAF last carried out a deployment at Skardu, how many aircraft were deployed, etc. Rather impressed with the Army’s interest in PAF matters, I passed on the requisite details. The next day, Brig Nadeem called again, but this time his questions were more probing and he wanted some classified information including fuel storage capacity at Skardu, fighter sortie-generation capacity, radar coverage, etc. He insisted that he was preparing a briefing and wanted to get his facts and figures right, in front of his bosses. We got on a secure telephone line and I passed on the required information. Although he made it sound like routine contingency planning, I sensed that something unusual was brewing. In the event, I thought it prudent to inform the DCAS (Ops). Just to be sure, he checked up with his counterpart, the Director General Military Operations (DGMO), Maj Gen Tauqir Zia, who said the same thing as his DMO, and assured that it was just part of routine contingency planning

Not withstanding the DGMO’s assurance, a cautious Air Marshal Zahid decided to check things for himself and despatched Gp Capt Tariq Ashraf, Officer Commanding of No 33 Wing at PAF Base, Kamra, to look matters over at Skardu and make a report. Within a few days, Gp Capt Tariq (who was also the designated war-time commander of Skardu Base) had completed his visit, which included his own periodic war-readiness inspection. While he made a detailed report to the DCAS (Ops), he let me in on the Army’s mobilisation and other preparations that he had seen in Skardu. His analysis was that ‘something big is imminent.’ Helicopter flying activity was feverishly high as Army Aviation’s Mi-17s were busy moving artillery guns and ammunition to the mountain tops. Troops in battle gear were to be seen all over the city. Interestingly, Messes were abuzz with war chatter amongst young officers. In retrospect, one wonders how Indian intelligence agencies failed to read any such signs, many weeks before the operation unfolded.


After hearing Gp Capt Tariq’s report, Air Marshal Zahid again got in touch with Maj Gen Tauqir, and in a roundabout way, told him that if the Army’s ongoing ‘review of contingency plans’ required the PAF to be factored in, an Operations & Plans team would be available for discussion. Nothing was heard from the GHQ till 12 May, when Air Marshal Zahid was told to send a team for a briefing at HQ 10 Corps with regard to the ‘Kashmir Contingency’.

Air Cdre Abid Rao, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz and myself were directed by the DCAS (Ops) to attend a briefing on the ‘latest situation in Kashmir’ at HQ 10 Corps. We were welcomed by the Chief of Staff (COS) of the Corps, who led us to the briefing room. Shortly thereafter, the Corps Commander, Lt Gen Mahmood Ahmed entered, cutting an impressive figure clad in a bush-coat and his trademark camouflage scarf. After exchanging pleasantries, the COS started with the map orientation briefing. Thereafter, Lt Gen Mahmood took over and broke the news that a limited operation had started two days earlier. It was nothing more than a ‘protective manoeuvre’, he explained, and was meant to foreclose any further mischief by the enemy, who had been a nuisance in the Neelum Valley, specially on the road on our side of the Line of Control (LOC). He then elaborated that a few vacant Indian posts had been occupied on peaks across the LOC, overlooking the Dras-Kargil Road. These would, in effect, serve the purpose of Airborne Observation Posts (AOP) meant for directing artillery fire with accuracy. Artillery firepower would be provided by a few field guns that had been heli-lifted to the heights, piecemeal, and re-assembled over the previous few months when the Indians had been off-guard during the winter extremes. The target was a vulnerable section of Dras-Kargil Road, whose blocking would virtually cut off the crucial life-line which carried the bulk of supplies needed for daily consumption as well as annual winter-stocking in Leh-Siachen Sector. He was very hopeful that this stratagem could choke off the Indians in the vital sector for up to a month, after which the monsoons would prevent vehicular movement (due to landslides), and also suspend all airlift by the IAF. “Come October, we shall walk in to Siachen – to mop up the dead bodies of hundreds of Indians left hungry, out in the cold,” he succinctly summed up what appeared to be a new dimension to the Siachen dispute. It also seemed to serve, at least for the time being, the secondary aim of alleviating Indian military pressure on Pakistani lines of communications in the Neelum Valley that the Corps Commander had alluded to in his opening remarks. (The oft-heard strategic aim of ‘providing a fillip to the insurgency in Kashmir’ was never mentioned.)

When Lt Gen Mahmood asked for questions at the end of the rather crisp and to-the-point briefing, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz opened up by inquiring about the type of air support that might be needed for the operation. Lt Gen Mahmood assured us that air support was not envisaged and that his forces could take care of enemy aircraft, if they intervened. “I have Stingers on every peak,” he announced. Air Cdre Saleem tried to point out the limited envelope of these types of missiles, and said that nothing stopped the IAF from attacking the posts and artillery pieces from high altitude. To this, Lt Gen Mahmood’s reply was that his troops were well camouflaged and concealed, and that IAF pilots would not be able to pick out the posts from the air. As the discussion became more animated, I asked the Corps Commander if he was sure the Indians would not use their artillery to vacate our incursion, given the criticality of the situation from their standpoint. He replied that the Dras-Kargil stretch did not allow for positioning of the hundreds of guns that would be required, due to lack of depth; in any case, it would be suicidal for the Indians to denude artillery firepower from any other sector as defensive balance had to be maintained. He gave the example of the Kathua-Jammu Sector where the Indians had a compulsion to keep the bulk of their modern Bofors guns due to vulnerability of the vital road link to our offensive elements.

It seemed from the Corps Commander’s smug appreciation of the situation that the Indians had been tightly straitjacketed in Dras-Kargil Sector and had no option but to submit to our operational design. More significantly, an alternate action like a strategic riposte by the Indians in another sector had been rendered out of question, given the nuclear environment. Whether resort to an exterior manoeuvre (diplomatic offensive) by the beleaguered Indians had crossed the planners’ minds, it was not discernable in the Corps Commander’s elucidation.

Perhaps it was the incredulousness of the whole thing that led Air Cdre Abid Rao to famously quip, “After this operation, it’s going to be either a Court Martial or Martial Law!” as we walked out of the briefing room.

Back at the Air Headquarters, we briefed the DCAS(Ops) about what had transpired at the 10 Corps briefing. His surprise at the developments, as well as his concern about the possibility of events spiralling out of control, could not remain concealed behind his otherwise unflappable demeanour. We all were also piqued at being left out of the Army’s planning, though we were given to believe that it was a ‘limited tactical action’ in which the PAF would not be required – an issue that none of us agreed with. Presented with a fait accompli, we decided not to lose any more time, and while the DCAS (Ops) went to brief the CAS about the situation, we set about gearing up for a hectic routine. The operations room was quickly updated with the latest large-scale maps and air recce photos of the area; communications links with concerned agencies were also revamped in a short time. Deployment orders were issued, and within the next 48 hours, the bulk of combat elements were in-situ at their war locations.

http://kaiser-aeronaut.blogspot.com/2009/01/kargil-conflict-and-pakistan-air-force.html

Read that red lines. Rest is history. This one example is enough to put all your trolling against PAF in a bottomless gutter!
In kargil, your army was lying to air force about planning and then you have the audacity to call it failure of PAF!! This was a stupidly timed operation by Musharraf who wanted to avenge his failed frontal attacks on Indian positions in Siachen during 1995-96 when he was brigadier and CO of Siachen area.

 

[air marshal]

https://falcons.pk/photo/Chengdu-F-7PG/1454

 

[masterchief_mirza]

Though usually, your trolling is not worth replying but this particular one caught my attention.

"Kargil was a failure of Paf." What a load of crap! You want to know, what happened in Kargil and Why PAF didn't play any role? Read this Jacka$$...



http://kaiser-aeronaut.blogspot.com/2009/01/kargil-conflict-and-pakistan-air-force.html

Read that red lines. Rest is history. This one example is enough to put all your trolling against PAF in a bottomless gutter!
In kargil, your army was lying to air force about planning and then you have the audacity to call it failure of PAF!! This was a stupidly timed operation by Musharraf who wanted to avenge his failed frontal attacks on Indian positions in Siachen during 1995-96 when he was brigadier and CO of Siachen area.

You're right but this it would be erroneous to make this about "your army" against "my air force"... The needless blunders in the latter stages of Kargil hurt all Pakistanis.

 

[PakShaheen79]

You're right but this it would be erroneous to make this about "your army" against "my air force"... The needless blunders in the latter stages of Kargil hurt all Pakistanis.

Blunders were made right from the very conception of operations and not in the latter stages. Going for an offensive without calculating enemy's strength is suicidal especially in this time and age. It was only after Kargil, we saw army chiefs began to inspect fighter jets by setting in their cockpit regularly. I think after Mush, we saw every one COAS sitting in a PAF's fighter plane cockpit. As for your army and my air force impression; well i am sorry but that was never intentional though army added 1 more in its list of errors as far as strategic thinking is concerned. Like Op Gibraltar ... Kargil was a legitimate op provided its planning could have been more cohesive and inclusive rather than exclusive.

 

[Raider 21]

Hoping to both physically and mentally - most Pakistanis tend to “desire” the label of being old

Watch the diet, have an open mind and do plenty of workouts.

 

[SQ8]

Watch the diet, have an open mind and do plenty of workouts.

Im Traveling 4 days a week so its a little difficult - Gold statuses all around