Operation Rah-e-Nijat (South Waziristan)

[fatman17]

Pak realises need to go beyond S. Waziristan:

Hillary By Anwar Iqbal

Wednesday, 11 Nov, 2009

The militants has created a syndicate of interconnected terrorist groups and that’s why the Pakistanis needed to be vigilant.

Nine militants killed in South Waziristan clashes Nine militants killed in South Waziristan clashes

WASHINGTON: The United States believes that Pakistan understands the need to go beyond South Waziristan and maintain pressure on militants in other areas too, says US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

In four separate interviews to US and German media outlets, Secretary Clinton said that while the rulers in Islamabad might not know where the Al Qaeda leaders were hiding, people at lower levels did.

In her characteristic openness, Mrs Clinton also conceded America’s responsibility in creating the terrorist networks that came back to haunt it and acknowledged that the United States also had a share in creating the trust deficit that marred US-Pakistan relations.

‘Well, I don’t want to speak for them. They’ve got their hands full right now in South Waziristan,’ she said when asked if Pakistan was ready to launch a military offensive in North Waziristan as well.

‘But they understand too that you can’t just play Whack-A-Mole. You can’t just knock down the Taliban somewhere and expect you’re done.’

The militants, she said, had created a syndicate of interconnected terrorist groups and that’s why the Pakistanis needed to be vigilant.

Secretary Clinton also pointed to a positive change in Pakistan, noting that the people of Pakistan were much more in favour of what the army was doing now than at any point in the past.

During her recent visit to Pakistan, the secretary had said that she found it difficult to believe that nobody in the Pakistani government knew where Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders were.

When reminded of her statement in one of the interviews, Mrs Clinton repeated her claim but said that ‘there is no evidence that anybody in the government at the top levels knows’.

In another interview, she said the United States had ‘a good working relationship’ with the Pakistani intelligence at the highest levels.

But, she said, a government included thousands of lower-level people all of whom were not always loyal to the government.

‘Every so often, we (in the US) uncover somebody who’s a traitor. We uncover somebody who is selling classified information or giving it to an agency of another country,’ she said.

‘And there are thousands of people in that (Pakistani) government. And I would like to see a real effort made on the part of the top leadership to make sure that no one down the ranks is doing anything to give any kind of support or cover-up to the Al Qaeda leadership.’

The top US diplomat acknowledged that the Pakistanis had reasons for not trusting America’s commitment to the bilateral relationship.

‘We haven’t always been the most consistent or understanding partner and ally over the course of our relationship. And we do bear some of the responsibility, frankly, for helping to create the very terrorists that we’re now all threatened by,’ she said.

She said that during her visit she heard lots of complaints against the US, dispelled some of the myths and the stereotyping that went on.

 

[vsdoc]

^^^ I appreciate the candor and honesty of the US in accepting some of the responsibility as verbalized by Hillary Clinton.

I have yet to hear, read, see a SINGLE such high ranking statement of ownership from the Pakistani high command ..... not past, cause that seemingly goes with the territory in Pakistan politics, BUT by the ruling present.

Cheers, Doc

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

^^^ I appreciate the candor and honesty of the US in accepting some of the responsibility as verbalized by Hillary Clinton.

I have yet to hear, read, see a SINGLE such high ranking statement of ownership from the Pakistani high command ..... not past, cause that seemingly goes with the territory in Pakistan politics, BUT by the ruling present.

Cheers, Doc

IIRC, Zardari has made such statements a few times since coming to power, arguing that the terrorism Pakistan faces today is the result of past policies of supporting the Taliban.

 

[S-2]

"IIRC, Zardari has made such statements a few times since coming to power, arguing that the terrorism Pakistan faces today is the result of past policies of supporting the Taliban."

Probably doesn't really mean much from an embattled, isolated, and generally denigrated President of Pakistan, wouldn't you agree? I'd imagine most Pakistanis find it easy to dismiss this as the words of a fawning American tody despite his election at the hands of Pakistanis.

 

[kidwaibhai]

Probably doesn't really mean much from an embattled, isolated, and generally denigrated President of Pakistan, wouldn't you agree? I'd imagine most Pakistanis find it easy to dismiss this as the words of a fawning American tody despite his election at the hands of Pakistanis.

No if you look at Editorials of many pakistani dailies you will see that there is a growing realization to stop this good and bad taliban bullcrap and deal with the freaks once and for all.

 

[PAFAce]

Pak realises need to go beyond S. Waziristan

Sounds like "do more" to me. What would she like? shall we come into Afghanistan and fight them there as well?

Going beyond what we need would be a mistake. Just because the "alliance" seem to have overstretched themselves doesn't mean we should too. It would be impossible to kill every singly Taleban fighter that exists within Pakistani borders. If we continue to fight them once their capacity to conduct any operations inside Pakistan are destroyed, we must seek a surrender and political deals. If we don't, the Army's actions will lose all support from the masses, and the slogan of "this is America's war" become ever more popular.

I've said it a million times before, this is our fight, and we must fight it on our terms. Hillary Clinton would do better to inform her President of the fact that Pakistan has sacrificed most in this war, and so we shall fight it as long and as hard as we like, no more.

Probably doesn't really mean much from an embattled, isolated, and generally denigrated President of Pakistan, wouldn't you agree? I'd imagine most Pakistanis find it easy to dismiss this as the words of a fawning American tody despite his election at the hands of Pakistanis.

Nobody voted for Zardari as president. The Pakistan People's Party that ran for the elections was a different party, with a different face, different structure and different promises. Do not insult us.

Also, yes, coming from him it means little, but you should take what you get. Hillary Clinton's words, too, mean little to the average Pakistani, but we'll take them over the years of denial.

 

[kidwaibhai]

Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban: Military Considerations | Critical Threats​

By Frederick Kagan
November 10, 2009

Conventional wisdom holds that Pakistan’s leaders are unwilling to take effective action against the Haqqani Network (HQN), the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), and Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) for a variety of reasons including:

Hedging against an expected U.S. withdrawal from or failure in Afghanistan;

Fear of a U.S. success in Afghanistan that empowers India in Afghanistan;

Decades-old ties between elements in the Pakistani security establishment and these groups;

The desire to maintain valuable proxies for use in Afghanistan and also against India.

Significant evidence supports this wisdom, which no doubt explains much of Islamabad’s consistent refusal to acknowledge that some of these Afghan-focused insurgent groups have sanctuaries within Pakistan’s borders, much less conduct or support meaningful U.S. operations against them in Pakistan.

But these explanations are only part of the story. In truth, Pakistani security forces would face a major challenge if they broke the compact they now maintain with the QST and HQN. American policy and strategy discussions have not heeded the scale of that challenge, nor have they recognized the important implications it has for the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan that would be required to support any efforts taken by Pakistan against these groups.



THE ISLAMIST NETWORK UNDER STRAIN
From the 1970s until 2001, a network of Islamist groups developed in Pakistan, often with the active assistance of the Pakistani government and security forces. These groups included the anti-Soviet mujahideen, some of whom became today’s Afghan Taliban, as well as India-focused groups such as Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT). Although a handful of Islamist groups such as Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ), and Jaish-e Mohammad (JeM) pursued sectarian objectives within Pakistan, they did not identify the Pakistani government itself as the enemy. Even groups such as the Tehrik-e Nafaz-e Shariat-e Mohammadi (TNSM), which pursued objectives that put them at odds with the government from the outset, were easily distracted from their goals by events in Afghanistan prior to and immediately after 9/11 (when the group reportedly sent several thousand fighters across the border to participate in jihad against the American invaders).

President Pervez Musharraf’s decision to align formally with the U.S. after 9/11 and support, at least in a limited way, U.S. efforts against al Qaeda within Pakistan, generated a backlash among Pakistan-based Taliban groups, some of whom turned their guns toward Islamabad. The reaction was particularly strong in Waziristan, the base of the Haqqani Network, because the presence of al Qaeda leaders there made it a high-priority area for U.S. operations and, increasingly, for Pakistani operations. A similar phenomenon did not occur in Quetta because al Qaeda leadership did not take up residence there (or were prevented from doing so, possibly to protect the QST from American attacks), and the U.S. consistently prioritized the fight against al Qaeda over the anti-Taliban effort.

Over the last eight years, the Pakistani government has found itself drawn into a series of meeting engagements with Pakistani Taliban groups in Waziristan, Swat, Dir, Bajaur, Mohmand, and elsewhere. As Islamabad has increased its efforts against these groups, tensions have risen between them and the other Pakistan-based Islamist groups such as HQN and LeT. Those groups had been willing to fight together in Afghanistan, where the TTP and LeT provided support to HQN, for example, but were unwilling to take up arms against the Pakistani government because they did not wish to jeopardize the support and sanctuary Islamabad was providing them in return for their passivity in the internal Pakistani fight, among other things.

The tension has been manifested in a number of statements by Mullah Omar calling on the Pakistani Taliban to cease fighting Islamabad and focus on the American threat in Afghanistan first, and by the equivocal position LeT has taken—not supporting the TTP in its fight against Islamabad, but not breaking off ties with the TTP either.



OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The compact between Islamabad and the Afghan-focused Taliban has been a critical enabler for the current Pakistani operations in South Waziristan. Key lines of communication (LOC) supporting those operations run through North Waziristan, specifically the towns of Mir Ali and Miramshah. These areas are controlled by a Taliban and Waziri tribal leader named Gul Bahadur and by the Haqqani Network with which he is allied. Another key LOC runs through Wana in South Waziristan via territory controlled by Maulvi Nazir, another Taliban and Waziri tribal leader who is himself committed to the fight against the U.S. in Afghanistan, if on a more limited scale. The Pakistani military, in fact, appears to have delayed the start of its major offensive in South Waziristan until it had secured real commitments from Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir that they would not fight alongside the TTP and would permit the movement of Pakistani forces relatively unhindered through their areas. As a result, the Pakistani military was able to isolate the Mehsud tribal area before the start of operations and to conduct several weeks of major combat operations now with no significant enemy threat to its LOCs and no major distractions.

Should Islamabad break the compact with Haqqani either by going after the network directly or by permitting widespread U.S. strikes against it, it seems likely not only that the Haqqani Network itself would fight back, but that Gul Bahadur and possibly Maulvi Nazir as well could break with Pakistan again and open one or two new areas of conflict on the flanks of the current operation (something that has happened in previous Pakistani efforts to operate in the area).

Could the Pakistani military take on an additional such operation at this time or in the near future? It has already committed two regular divisions (the 37th Mechanized Infantry Division and the 19th Infantry Division) to ongoing operations in Swat and Malakand. Two more divisions (the 7th and 9th Infantry Divisions) are fully engaged in operations against the TTP in South Waziristan, and they may be supported by the 14th Infantry Division as well. It appears that Pakistan has already committed a considerable portion of its rotary-wing aviation to the struggle. Facing an uprising by either Gul Bahadur or Maulvi Nazir, let alone both, could well require additional commitments of the same close order as the current operation against the TTP. Put another way, it appears that Pakistan has already committed 4-5 of its 25-or-so combat divisions to current operations, including three (the 14th, 19th, and 37th) that were drawn from important positions on the Indian frontier. If Islamabad had to reinforce the operation in Waziristan significantly, it would have four options:

Pull the 19th and 37th out of Swat and hope that local security forces can handle the situation there (a dangerous options considering the failure of previous Pakistani operations resulting from the premature withdrawal of military forces from supposedly cleared areas);

Pull a significant proportion of the units now operating in South Waziristan to the north, potentially jeopardizing the long-term success of the operation against the TTP;

Move all or most of the force now based in Quetta into Waziristan (that could probably amount to around one division’s worth of combat power); or

Redeploy additional forces from the Indian frontier.

Most Pakistani corps are mixed infantry and armor formations with 2-3 divisions each. Without knowing the details of Pakistani military planning, it is likely that significant redeployments of forces from the remaining corps (the 14th, 17th, and 39th were all taken from corps that had three divisions; the remaining corps have two and occasionally an independent brigade) would seriously derange plans for defensive or counter-offensive operations against India. The U.S. is generally dismissive of the risks to Pakistan from India, but Pakistan’s military leaders are not. Considering that the two countries last fought in 1999 and came near to fighting again in 2002 and, perhaps, 2008 following the Mumbai bombing, Pakistan’s commanders would be wrong to dismiss the danger entirely. At all events, they take it most seriously, a fact that highlights the significance of the movement of three divisions away from the Indian border to fight Taliban.

It is far from clear how Islamabad would respond to such an emergency, to say nothing of the danger of a significant increase in domestic terror attacks if elements of the LeT joined in the fight. It is clear that any response would lead either to the failure of one or more ongoing Pakistani efforts against Islamist groups or to a major military evolution of the kind that the Pakistani military has shown no ability to conduct on short notice.



U.S. RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS
Assuming the Pakistani government decided to go after the Haqqani Network, or to allow the U.S. to do so seriously, the requirement for additional American forces in the P2K area of eastern Afghanistan (Paktia, Paktika, and Khost provinces) could rise significantly. HQN would have a number of moderately bad choices in response to a major operation in North Waziristan. It could:

Attempt to draw fighters from Afghanistan into the FATA to defend key sanctuaries;

Attempt to withdraw fighters and leaders from the FATA into P2K;

Attempt to go to ground in either or both areas in hopes of waiting out the offensive;

Combine all of the above—say by moving some key leaders out of exposed positions in the FATA to safer areas in South Paktika while sending fighters from Khost to resist Pakistani operations around Mir Ali and Miramshah, where still other fighters might attempt to wait the operation out.

The Pakistani government will be even more insistent that the U.S. stop cross-border movement in support of any operation in the FATA against HQN. The movement of fighters and leaders, moreover, presents a limited challenge, but a major opportunity. It would be highly desirable to be able to flood the zone in advance of any such operation in order to do as much damage as possible to a dangerous organization at its moment of maximum vulnerability. The forces now in P2K, however, are unlikely to be able to take full advantage of such an opportunity. Moving forces from elsewhere in the sparse Afghan theater would require accepting significant risk in some critical area. It might be necessary to accept risk for a long time, moreover—Pakistani operations tend to be preceded by long periods of rumors and preparations (including negotiations to secure the neutrality of local tribal leaders), and this operation would likely protract in execution.

If the U.S. does seriously mean to press Pakistan to take action against the HQN in the next year, it would be vital that we deploy sufficient forces into P2K, or as a real theater reserve that will not get permanently pinned-down elsewhere, to take maximum advantage of that action. Failure to deploy the necessary forces in advance not only reduces the chances of success, it also reduces the chances that the Pakistanis will conduct the operation in the first place (at least, if we think that there is a chance they might do so to begin with).



CONCLUSION
The U.S. simply cannot assume that the Pakistani government will go after the HQN seriously any time soon. Apart from the fact that the Pakistani leadership has shown no interest in doing so, attacking the Haqqani Network could pose a major military challenge that jeopardizes other ongoing operations against threats more vital to Pakistan’s survival. It is not clear, therefore, that the U.S. is well-advised even to press Islamabad to do so from an operational military perspective in the context of a regional strategy that recognizes the priority of Pakistani stability as well as the fight against al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. Nor does it seem that U.S. forces are now able to set the conditions on the Afghan side of the border to enable and support such a Pakistani operation if it occurred. That is why the emphasis in the COMISAF theater assessment on defeating HQN (and QST) within Afghanistan rather than relying on Pakistan to defeat them in its own territory is the only sound strategic assumption from which to proceed.

 

[vsdoc]

IIRC, Zardari has made such statements a few times since coming to power, arguing that the terrorism Pakistan faces today is the result of past policies of supporting the Taliban.

AM, this is EXACTLY what I intended to say when I said that there was no high level statement from the current Pakistani leadership accepting at least part of the blame attributable to PAKISTAN and NOT past policies or past regimes ..... as if to divorce one from the other and say that "ohhhh they were so bad while I am all milk and honey"!

And while we are at it, has the mother of all ironies perchance escaped you as to who and which regime to a great extent was responsible for spawning and nurturing these Taliban in the first place?

There is a BIG difference in saying Pakistan was responsible as against saying Pakistani past policies/regimes were responsible.

See what Hillary Clinton (as spokesperson for America and the current regime) says:

"In her characteristic openness, Mrs Clinton also conceded America’s responsibility in creating the terrorist networks that came back to haunt it and acknowledged that the United States also had a share in creating the trust deficit that marred US-Pakistan relations."

I hope you can appreciate that difference of having the balls (a figure of speech of course in Hillary's case) and the courage of conviction as a NATION to take responsibility, against the pathetic slimy passing the buck wiping one's personal arse clean type statements of Zardari you refer to above.

Cheers, Doc

 

[fatman17]

kidwaibhai - great find - good analysis which requires reading it very carefully.

 

[MZUBAIR]

مہمند ایجنسی : سکیورٹی فورسز پر حملے‘ 10 اہلکار جاں بحق‘ 32 لا


مہمند ایجنسی + وانا + راولپنڈی (مانیٹرنگ نیوز + نامہ نگاران + ایجنسیا&#1722 مہمند ایجنسی میں سکیورٹی فورسز کے قافلوں پر حملوں میں 10 سکیورٹی اہلکار اور ایک شہری جاں بحق اور 32 اہلکار لاپتہ ہو گئے۔ فورسز کی جوابی کارروائی میں 20 شدت پسند بھی مارے گئے۔ جنوبی وزیرستان میں جاری آپریشن راہ نجات کے دوران جھڑپوں میں مزید 7 شدت پسند جاں بحق ہو گئے۔ سکیورٹی فورسز کے جیٹ طیاروں نے اورکزئی ایجنسی کے علاقہ فیروزخیل پر بمباری کی ہے جس سے عسکریت پسندوں کے متعدد ٹھکانے تباہ ہو گئے۔ کرم ایجنسی کے علاقہ فوئیداد خیل باغ میں بھی عسکریت پسندوں کے ٹھکانوں پر شدید شیلنگ کی گئی جس میں ہلاکتوں کا خدشہ ہے۔ تفصیلات کے مطابق مہمند ایجنسی کی تحصیل صافی کے علاقے قندھارو میں دورہ جنگی کے مقام پر سکیورٹی فورسز کی گاڑی بارودی سرنگ سے ٹکرا گئی دھماکے سے گاڑی مکمل طور پر تباہ ہو گئی۔ سکیورٹی اہلکاروں میں سے آٹھ موقع پر جاں بحق ہو گئے جب کہ دو اہلکار شدید زخمی ہو گئے۔ ایک شہری بھی جاں بحق ہو گیا۔ تحصیل بائیزئی میں سکیورٹی فورسز کے قافلے پر عسکریت پسندوں نے حملہ کر دیا جس میں 2 سکیورٹی اہلکار جاں بحق اور4 زخمی ہو گئے حملے میں4 گاڑیاں بھی تباہ ہوئیں۔ سکیورٹی فورسز کے32 اہلکار لاپتہ ہو گئے ہیں بازیابی کے لئے علاقے میں سرچ اپریشن جاری ہے تاہم مقامی ذرائع کا کہنا ہے کہ سکیورٹی فورسز کے2 اہلکاروں کو ذبح کیا گیا۔ اس واقعہ کے بعد تحصیل بائیزئی کے علاقوں غنم شاہ‘سورانی درہ‘بیڈھنئی اور میٹئی کے مختلف علاقوں پر گن شپ ہیلی کاپٹروں نے شیلنگ کی جس کے نتیجے میں20 عسکریت پسند ہلاک جب کہ6 زخمی ہو گئے۔ سکیورٹی فورسز نے علاقہ کو گھیرے میں لے لیا ہے۔ جھڑپ کے بعد سکیورٹی فورسز کے52 اہلکار لاپتہ ہو گئے تھے جن میں سے شام تک 20 اہلکار واپس اپنے کیمپوں میں پہنچ گئے ہیں جب کہ مزید32 لاپتہ افراد کی بازیابی کے لئے سکیورٹی فورسز کی جانب سے سرچ آپریشن جاری ہے جب کہ سکیورٹی فورسز کے مزید تازہ دم دستے علاقے میں پہنچا دئیے گئے ہیں۔بنوں سے نامہ نگار کے مطابق تخریب کاری کا بڑا منصوبہ ناکام بنا دیا گیا دس کلو وزنی بم اندرون مہربان گیٹ سے برآمد کر لیا گیا۔ دیربالا سے اے پی پی کے مطابق دیر سلیم مارکیٹ میں نامعلوم افراد نے دھماکہ خیز مواد سے سی ڈیز دکان کو بم سے اڑا دیا۔دھماکے سے پانچ دکانیں مکمل جب کہ کل پندرہ دکانوں کو نقصان شدید پہنچا۔ایک شخص زخمی ہوا۔ ادھر جنوبی وزیرستان کے علاقہ لدھا‘مکین اور شکئی میں سکیورٹی فورسز نے شدت پسندوں کے خلاف کارروائی کی جس کے نتیجے میں مزید 7 شدت پسند جاں بحق اور متعدد زخمی ہو گئے۔ذرائع کے مطابق کارروائی میں شدت پسندوں کے5 ٹھکانے بھی تباہ ہو گئے جب کہ سکیورٹی فورسز کی مختلف علاقوں میں پیشقدمی جاری ہے۔ ادھر کوہاٹ کے علاقے بلی ٹنگ میں سکیورٹی فورسز کے سرچ آپریشن کے دوران13 مشتبہ افراد کو گرفتار کر کے تفتیش کے لئے نامعلوم مقام پر منتقل کر دیا ہے۔ ادھر مہمند ایجنسی میں بابی خیل قومی جرگے نے امن کمیٹی اور حکومت سے تعاون کا اعلان کیا ہے اور امن و امان کیلئے 128 رضاکار دینے کی پیشکش کی ہے۔

 

[MZUBAIR]

Gov shld sent more Army, I guess....
It seems there is strong resistance in Mahmand Agency.

 

[fatman17]

Gov shld sent more Army, I guess....
It seems there is strong resistance in Mahmand Agency.

what did u expect - a cakewalk!
52 FC troopers went missing during the assault - and 43 came back - 10 soldiers lost their lives.

 

[fatman17]

Editorial: The al Qaeda connection?

NWFP was hit by another terrorist attack on Tuesday afternoon when a suicide bomber blew up his car in Charsadda bazaar. More than 30 people were killed and nearly 100 others injured, including several women and children. It was the third suicide bombing since Saturday in the battle-ridden province. Suicide attacks have become a routine occurrence during the past few weeks all over Pakistan, especially in NWFP. A spate of terror attacks in recent days is obviously a backlash against the military operation in South Waziristan against the militants. According to a Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) spokesman, the militants have retreated from various areas in South Waziristan as part of their war strategy and its fighters will launch a guerrilla war once the Pakistani military enters deep into all areas of South Waziristan. If the Taliban have actually managed to retreat from South Waziristan, they have either gone to North Waziristan or crossed the border into Afghanistan. When the Pakistan army was deployed for the first time since independence in FATA in 2004, the US and Pakistan agreed upon a hammer and anvil strategy whereby the US-led NATO forces were playing the role of the hammer in Afghanistan while the Pakistani forces played the role of the anvil in our tribal areas. The roles have reversed now. Successive military operations against the local Taliban have crippled their organisation, which is why they could now be crossing the border to safeguard their interests. The alarming factor is that the ‘anvil’ is nowhere to be seen as the NATO forces have vacated more than half a dozen key security checkposts on the Afghan side of the Pak-Afghan border opposite South Waziristan. In these trying times when Pakistan is in the midst of a civil war, the international community needs to come forward and help it. Instead, the NATO forces are leaving the door open for the TTP to cross over to the Afghan side without any repercussions. This would obviously undermine the military operation.

The Afghan Taliban, on the other hand, have strongly denied any association with the TTP’s campaign, strategy or tactics. Afghan Taliban commander Abdul Mannan condemned suicide bombing and termed it un-Islamic and wrong to target innocent people in blasts. He said the Afghan Taliban leaders have not crossed the border and are not hiding in Pakistan, but are targeting coalition and NATO forces from Afghan soil. With these remarks coming from the Afghan Taliban, it seems as if there is some other force helping the local Taliban and from the pattern of suicide bombings, it could well be the al Qaeda network. It is quite apparent that the TTP is getting massive funding from some source and proper training to carry out successive terror attacks all over Pakistan. The al Qaeda leadership has on a number of occasions declared war against the state of Pakistan, which makes it all the more probable that this global terror network could be supporting the TTP in its fight against the state of Pakistan.



The military is trying to eliminate the militants from the tribal region but it seems as if the country does not have enough funds for the purpose. This can be gauged from Interior Minister Rehman Malik’s statement that the government is now using development funds for the capacity building of law-enforcement agencies in a bid to improve security. If al Qaeda is actually helping the local Taliban, it is not only alarming for our country but for the whole world. Fighting the militants on this scale requires heavy-duty finances; it is time the international community, especially the US, rises to the occasion and helps Pakistan in this common cause. Peace and stability in this region, once achieved, will translate into peace all over the world.

http://www.thedailytimes.com.pk

 

[waraich66]

Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban: Military Considerations | Critical Threats​

By Frederick Kagan
November 10, 2009

Conventional wisdom holds that Pakistan’s leaders are unwilling to take effective action against the Haqqani Network (HQN), the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), and Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) for a variety of reasons including:

Hedging against an expected U.S. withdrawal from or failure in Afghanistan;

Fear of a U.S. success in Afghanistan that empowers India in Afghanistan;

Decades-old ties between elements in the Pakistani security establishment and these groups;

The desire to maintain valuable proxies for use in Afghanistan and also against India.

Significant evidence supports this wisdom, which no doubt explains much of Islamabad’s consistent refusal to acknowledge that some of these Afghan-focused insurgent groups have sanctuaries within Pakistan’s borders, much less conduct or support meaningful U.S. operations against them in Pakistan.

But these explanations are only part of the story. In truth, Pakistani security forces would face a major challenge if they broke the compact they now maintain with the QST and HQN. American policy and strategy discussions have not heeded the scale of that challenge, nor have they recognized the important implications it has for the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan that would be required to support any efforts taken by Pakistan against these groups.



THE ISLAMIST NETWORK UNDER STRAIN
From the 1970s until 2001, a network of Islamist groups developed in Pakistan, often with the active assistance of the Pakistani government and security forces. These groups included the anti-Soviet mujahideen, some of whom became today’s Afghan Taliban, as well as India-focused groups such as Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT). Although a handful of Islamist groups such as Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ), and Jaish-e Mohammad (JeM) pursued sectarian objectives within Pakistan, they did not identify the Pakistani government itself as the enemy. Even groups such as the Tehrik-e Nafaz-e Shariat-e Mohammadi (TNSM), which pursued objectives that put them at odds with the government from the outset, were easily distracted from their goals by events in Afghanistan prior to and immediately after 9/11 (when the group reportedly sent several thousand fighters across the border to participate in jihad against the American invaders).

President Pervez Musharraf’s decision to align formally with the U.S. after 9/11 and support, at least in a limited way, U.S. efforts against al Qaeda within Pakistan, generated a backlash among Pakistan-based Taliban groups, some of whom turned their guns toward Islamabad. The reaction was particularly strong in Waziristan, the base of the Haqqani Network, because the presence of al Qaeda leaders there made it a high-priority area for U.S. operations and, increasingly, for Pakistani operations. A similar phenomenon did not occur in Quetta because al Qaeda leadership did not take up residence there (or were prevented from doing so, possibly to protect the QST from American attacks), and the U.S. consistently prioritized the fight against al Qaeda over the anti-Taliban effort.

Over the last eight years, the Pakistani government has found itself drawn into a series of meeting engagements with Pakistani Taliban groups in Waziristan, Swat, Dir, Bajaur, Mohmand, and elsewhere. As Islamabad has increased its efforts against these groups, tensions have risen between them and the other Pakistan-based Islamist groups such as HQN and LeT. Those groups had been willing to fight together in Afghanistan, where the TTP and LeT provided support to HQN, for example, but were unwilling to take up arms against the Pakistani government because they did not wish to jeopardize the support and sanctuary Islamabad was providing them in return for their passivity in the internal Pakistani fight, among other things.

The tension has been manifested in a number of statements by Mullah Omar calling on the Pakistani Taliban to cease fighting Islamabad and focus on the American threat in Afghanistan first, and by the equivocal position LeT has taken—not supporting the TTP in its fight against Islamabad, but not breaking off ties with the TTP either.



OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The compact between Islamabad and the Afghan-focused Taliban has been a critical enabler for the current Pakistani operations in South Waziristan. Key lines of communication (LOC) supporting those operations run through North Waziristan, specifically the towns of Mir Ali and Miramshah. These areas are controlled by a Taliban and Waziri tribal leader named Gul Bahadur and by the Haqqani Network with which he is allied. Another key LOC runs through Wana in South Waziristan via territory controlled by Maulvi Nazir, another Taliban and Waziri tribal leader who is himself committed to the fight against the U.S. in Afghanistan, if on a more limited scale. The Pakistani military, in fact, appears to have delayed the start of its major offensive in South Waziristan until it had secured real commitments from Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir that they would not fight alongside the TTP and would permit the movement of Pakistani forces relatively unhindered through their areas. As a result, the Pakistani military was able to isolate the Mehsud tribal area before the start of operations and to conduct several weeks of major combat operations now with no significant enemy threat to its LOCs and no major distractions.

Should Islamabad break the compact with Haqqani either by going after the network directly or by permitting widespread U.S. strikes against it, it seems likely not only that the Haqqani Network itself would fight back, but that Gul Bahadur and possibly Maulvi Nazir as well could break with Pakistan again and open one or two new areas of conflict on the flanks of the current operation (something that has happened in previous Pakistani efforts to operate in the area).

Could the Pakistani military take on an additional such operation at this time or in the near future? It has already committed two regular divisions (the 37th Mechanized Infantry Division and the 19th Infantry Division) to ongoing operations in Swat and Malakand. Two more divisions (the 7th and 9th Infantry Divisions) are fully engaged in operations against the TTP in South Waziristan, and they may be supported by the 14th Infantry Division as well. It appears that Pakistan has already committed a considerable portion of its rotary-wing aviation to the struggle. Facing an uprising by either Gul Bahadur or Maulvi Nazir, let alone both, could well require additional commitments of the same close order as the current operation against the TTP. Put another way, it appears that Pakistan has already committed 4-5 of its 25-or-so combat divisions to current operations, including three (the 14th, 19th, and 37th) that were drawn from important positions on the Indian frontier. If Islamabad had to reinforce the operation in Waziristan significantly, it would have four options:

Pull the 19th and 37th out of Swat and hope that local security forces can handle the situation there (a dangerous options considering the failure of previous Pakistani operations resulting from the premature withdrawal of military forces from supposedly cleared areas);

Pull a significant proportion of the units now operating in South Waziristan to the north, potentially jeopardizing the long-term success of the operation against the TTP;

Move all or most of the force now based in Quetta into Waziristan (that could probably amount to around one division’s worth of combat power); or

Redeploy additional forces from the Indian frontier.

Most Pakistani corps are mixed infantry and armor formations with 2-3 divisions each. Without knowing the details of Pakistani military planning, it is likely that significant redeployments of forces from the remaining corps (the 14th, 17th, and 39th were all taken from corps that had three divisions; the remaining corps have two and occasionally an independent brigade) would seriously derange plans for defensive or counter-offensive operations against India. The U.S. is generally dismissive of the risks to Pakistan from India, but Pakistan’s military leaders are not. Considering that the two countries last fought in 1999 and came near to fighting again in 2002 and, perhaps, 2008 following the Mumbai bombing, Pakistan’s commanders would be wrong to dismiss the danger entirely. At all events, they take it most seriously, a fact that highlights the significance of the movement of three divisions away from the Indian border to fight Taliban.

It is far from clear how Islamabad would respond to such an emergency, to say nothing of the danger of a significant increase in domestic terror attacks if elements of the LeT joined in the fight. It is clear that any response would lead either to the failure of one or more ongoing Pakistani efforts against Islamist groups or to a major military evolution of the kind that the Pakistani military has shown no ability to conduct on short notice.



U.S. RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS
Assuming the Pakistani government decided to go after the Haqqani Network, or to allow the U.S. to do so seriously, the requirement for additional American forces in the P2K area of eastern Afghanistan (Paktia, Paktika, and Khost provinces) could rise significantly. HQN would have a number of moderately bad choices in response to a major operation in North Waziristan. It could:

Attempt to draw fighters from Afghanistan into the FATA to defend key sanctuaries;

Attempt to withdraw fighters and leaders from the FATA into P2K;

Attempt to go to ground in either or both areas in hopes of waiting out the offensive;

Combine all of the above—say by moving some key leaders out of exposed positions in the FATA to safer areas in South Paktika while sending fighters from Khost to resist Pakistani operations around Mir Ali and Miramshah, where still other fighters might attempt to wait the operation out.

The Pakistani government will be even more insistent that the U.S. stop cross-border movement in support of any operation in the FATA against HQN. The movement of fighters and leaders, moreover, presents a limited challenge, but a major opportunity. It would be highly desirable to be able to flood the zone in advance of any such operation in order to do as much damage as possible to a dangerous organization at its moment of maximum vulnerability. The forces now in P2K, however, are unlikely to be able to take full advantage of such an opportunity. Moving forces from elsewhere in the sparse Afghan theater would require accepting significant risk in some critical area. It might be necessary to accept risk for a long time, moreover—Pakistani operations tend to be preceded by long periods of rumors and preparations (including negotiations to secure the neutrality of local tribal leaders), and this operation would likely protract in execution.

If the U.S. does seriously mean to press Pakistan to take action against the HQN in the next year, it would be vital that we deploy sufficient forces into P2K, or as a real theater reserve that will not get permanently pinned-down elsewhere, to take maximum advantage of that action. Failure to deploy the necessary forces in advance not only reduces the chances of success, it also reduces the chances that the Pakistanis will conduct the operation in the first place (at least, if we think that there is a chance they might do so to begin with).



CONCLUSION
The U.S. simply cannot assume that the Pakistani government will go after the HQN seriously any time soon. Apart from the fact that the Pakistani leadership has shown no interest in doing so, attacking the Haqqani Network could pose a major military challenge that jeopardizes other ongoing operations against threats more vital to Pakistan’s survival. It is not clear, therefore, that the U.S. is well-advised even to press Islamabad to do so from an operational military perspective in the context of a regional strategy that recognizes the priority of Pakistani stability as well as the fight against al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. Nor does it seem that U.S. forces are now able to set the conditions on the Afghan side of the border to enable and support such a Pakistani operation if it occurred. That is why the emphasis in the COMISAF theater assessment on defeating HQN (and QST) within Afghanistan rather than relying on Pakistan to defeat them in its own territory is the only sound strategic assumption from which to proceed.

Haqani,Gulbadin,Mullah omer network never targeted any Pakistan asset or citizen why should Pakistan fight with them nor US will advise Pakistan to open a new front with which US is currently under negotitation.

Our target should be Al Qaeda network and TTP and other group working in our soil.

 

[TaimiKhan]

No 480/2009-ISPR Dated: November 12, 2009
Rawalpindi - November 12, 2009:


1. South Waziristan - Operation Rah-e-Nijat. In last 24 hours, 22 terrorists have been killed while 5 soldiers embraced shahadat and 8 soldiers were injured. Details of the operations are as follows:-

a. On Jandola – Sararogha Axis. Security forces cleared Ghara Sar, during search operation, exchange of fire took place with terrorists, resultantly 1 soldier was injured and 5 terrorists were killed.

b. On Shakai – Kaniguram Axis.

(1) Security forces conducted search operation in area around Ladha, Satta, Mangora Sar, Narakai, Gulit Killi, Torwam, Shabi Khel and recovered huge cache of arms and ammunition.

(2) Security forces advanced further to secure the area of Langar Khel. Intense engagement took place. During clashes 14 terrorists were killed while 5 soldiers embraced shahadat and 7 were injured.

c. On Razmak- Makeen Axis.

(1) Security forces are expanding towards south of Makeen and consolidating their positions.

(2) Security forces have established check post at road Zahidullah-Ghariom and have started patrolling the road.

(3) Operation to secure Darra Alghad south of Makeen is underway.

(4) Village Rogha has been secured. During exchange of fire 3 terrorists have been killed.

2. Swat – Malakand – Operation Rah-e-Rast

a. Security forces conducted search operation at Qundil near Fatehpur, Shalpin, Bishbanr, Kuza Banda and Barikot and apprehended 8 suspects.

b. 2 terrorists voluntarily surrendered to security forces at Fazal Banda and Yakhtangi.

3. Relief Activities 10,621 Cash Cards have issued to displaced families of Waziristan.