@Oscar, I have no doubts about the possible financial benefits this would accrue to Pakistan, and China. Everything fine about that; but that economic benefit was always a sideshow to the strategic entanglement that Pakistan sought with China against India. Is that a wise decision in the long run though? is it a good idea to push India this hard against the wall?
It's always been talked about the paranoia the relatively weak, small, insecure Pakistan has vis-a-vis India. Now Pakistan and China will have to bear the paranoia of a relatively, even if temporal, weak India scared to death of a combined, co-ordinated attack on India from two fronts.
There has already been a very visible response (facilitating change of regime) to Chinese moves in Sri Lanka by GOI after the submarine docking incident. And that was almost certainly the least aggressive move considered. In the same breath, you can be certain that barring a miracle, an intervention in one way or another is inevitable in the Maldives. What these moves mean is basically that India feels terrifyingly threatened.
This might be cause for celebration at GHQ Rawalpindi, and ISI HQ in the short run, but such fear will undoubtedly manifest itself physically in one way or another, in a way Pakistan's fears found manifested in its aggressive foreign policy. The difference is that with India, the scale and magnitude ratchets up dis-proportionally. And in this, First nuke policy of PA may actually serve India.
The financial benefits have to do more with the Chinese making one last attempt at Pakistan and trying to keep it a viable "investment". After all, the JF-17 program, the Chinese AEW program, the F-22P frigates and various other programs are on Chinese soft loans.
The paranoia from India however may also be deliberate rather than actual. As per one senior(and rather horse's mouth on the matter) gentleman I spoke to, both sides have an implicit understanding that the nukes essentially guarantee that total war is unaffordable for both. It was one of the reasons that prior to 26/11 there was a near deal on the backdoor channels on Kashmir and many other issues. Which left the hardliners on both sides perturbed that they might even be out of jobs and more importantly the various governmental and non-state actors(non-TTP LET types) under respective controls may decide that since their "infidel" threat is no longer a threat.. its time to implement Sharia with full force. Moreover, the military leadership on both sides would be hard pressed to find a threat so emerging as to specify their funding. Many hint to the 26/11 attacks as a desperate attempt to stave off being "laid off" as the backdoor negotiations were almost to fruition on certain key CBMs.
Coming to the corridor, there was another article here somewhere outlining how the corridor has LESS to do with India and more to do with China expanding its trade horizons and removing its "lock" to the pacific trade routes. It wants the old silk road reopened and is investing heavily throughout in road and rail infrastructure; those that cannot be blocked by an aggressor with a Navy.
India on the other hand is currently in a right wing capitalist government that needs to show cash flow and progress to justify its election rhetoric on all fronts. So whilst the justification of growing economically are really not required, the same cannot be said for the justification for military growth; that needs bogeyman, and India has all the bogeymen it needs.