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MiGs over Kargil: How the Fulcrum buzzed the Falcons

Not flustered over anything, a newer version of R-77 required so much care and handle. An old version of R-27's tolerance must be even less.


Only you are talking about them being experienced. How were they more experienced? In case you dont know, VVS follows the a rigid concept of training, and generally performs mass attacks. It relies more on quantity than quality. Also is the fact that the russian airforce couldn't even fly properly after their collapse of the S.U and these ex-russian pilots, would have gotten way less flying hours than the IAF for sure. They may be "experienced"(which is yet to be proved btw) compared to the EAF, but not the IAF.



And because of this humidity they are kept in climate controlled rooms. If humidity was your biggest concern, then a simple AC can remove your humidity.


Hold on, why are you proving my point? I never claimed they were 100% reliable. I already know the CAG report you quoted(yeah, CAG, not the government as you claim.) If IAF cannot maintain a 100% serviceability of these missiles, then how can a piss poor ethiopian AF can? And this is why all their 24 missiles failed to hit, because all their second hand missiles became unserviceable, while the IAF had maintained a figure from 10-40% from initial days to the time of life expiry. Do you really think IAF will deploy the 10-40% of unserviceable missiles during combat?

Then what were you all huffed up about anyway? Or was it just the idea of the IAF being mentioned that triggered an involuntary panic reaction to somehow "defend" it?

The piss-poor EtAF had only received those missiles recently which they used.
And your argument about the VVS seems to again contradict what is written of them in sites like ACIG or otherwise.. no claim of mine here.

The rest of your post is also defensive jibber jabber.. you are implying that missile reliability stems from those that you can use. Yet the R-27's used within that conflict did not work as advertized AT ALL.. Even with a 70% reliability rate(as claimed in your disdain for the EtAF and VVS technician) .. at least one would have gone and hit something..
Lets take your own argument then.. the VVS in its supposed complete rigidity would then be trained to use missiles within a very strict code.. and the evasive maneuvering by its pilots would also be very very strict.
Yet here, salvos upon salvos of R-27's from both Russian and Ukrainian stocks failed to hit.
They all did fire.. so if 20 were fired... your accusation of serviceability for the poor EtAF included.. 15 should have just gone haywire.. and the rest should have guided.. one should have passed close.
yet in this case.. nothing happened.

Russian missles manufactured between 1990-2002 is nothing short of a poorly manufactured piece of hardware.That is something the IAF is ACKNOWLEDGING that which you are hopelessly defending... just because some instinct triggered off in your brain that somehow the reputation of the IAF was under attack and you had to come up with something to defend this imaginary threat by all gibberish unnecessary.(including trying to get a one up by saying the the CAG is not the government...really?.. that desperate for brownie points? :cheesy:)
 
What the hell is this? Where did u get this from?
The CAG report clearly contradicts that and states only ONE type of missile X. Not X, Y and Z. That one type of missile is obviously the newly procured and developed R-77, not R-27.

Publicly available data.. ever heard of SIPRI
 
Oh, alright, now i get it. The "missile launchers" mentioned are R-77 missile launch racks. You confused missile launch rack with another type of missile. And i think the breakdown of missile procurement above is from SIPRI or whatever they are called. They are just analysts who make educated guesses. I'll take CAG's word over some analysts anyday.
 
Then what were you all huffed up about anyway? Or was it just the idea of the IAF being mentioned that triggered an involuntary panic reaction to somehow "defend" it?

The piss-poor EtAF had only received those missiles recently which they used.
And your argument about the VVS seems to again contradict what is written of them in sites like ACIG or otherwise.. no claim of mine here.

The rest of your post is also defensive jibber jabber.. you are implying that missile reliability stems from those that you can use. Yet the R-27's used within that conflict did not work as advertized AT ALL.. Even with a 70% reliability rate(as claimed in your disdain for the EtAF and VVS technician) .. at least one would have gone and hit something..
Lets take your own argument then.. the VVS in its supposed complete rigidity would then be trained to use missiles within a very strict code.. and the evasive maneuvering by its pilots would also be very very strict.
Yet here, salvos upon salvos of R-27's from both Russian and Ukrainian stocks failed to hit.
They all did fire.. so if 20 were fired... your accusation of serviceability for the poor EtAF included.. 15 should have just gone haywire.. and the rest should have guided.. one should have passed close.
yet in this case.. nothing happened.

Russian missles manufactured between 1990-2002 is nothing short of a poorly manufactured piece of hardware.That is something the IAF is ACKNOWLEDGING that which you are hopelessly defending... just because some instinct triggered off in your brain that somehow the reputation of the IAF was under attack and you had to come up with something to defend this imaginary threat by all gibberish unnecessary.(including trying to get a one up by saying the the CAG is not the government...really?.. that desperate for brownie points? :cheesy:)
You yourself quoted how easily such missiles break down. If IAF can only maintain a 14-40% reliability(super imposing the R-77 figure over the R-27) how can ethiopian AF can?
Plus the Second Hand Su-27s delivered Ethiopian airforce, would have come with second hand R-27s from storage. And god knows how they were stored in Russia and subsequently in the Ethiopia.
How can this be compared with the IAF's R-27s??
 
You yourself quoted how easily such missiles break down. If IAF can only maintain a 14-40% reliability(super imposing the R-77 figure over the R-27) how can ethiopian AF can?
Plus the Second Hand Su-27s delivered Ethiopian airforce, would have come with second hand R-27s from storage. And god knows how they were stored in Russia and subsequently in the Ethiopia. And can this be compared with the IAF's R-27s??

Because the same weapons were manufactured within the same factory.. in Russia and Ukraine.
Those missiles.. were without an iota of non-correllated data.. comparable with those Purchased by the IAF within the period from the induction of the Mig-29 to 2002.

And the problem remained till 2004 when finally strict QC measures were forced upon the manufacturer and upon themselves by the IAF. Infact.. a row had ensued when the Russians accused India of manufacturing sub-standard components after complaints by the IAF on their own hardware.

Alexander Manucharov, MAPO chief designer and the MiG-21-93 programme leader says that about half the planned test flights have been completed, while the development and evaluation programme is on schedule. Manucharov expresses concern about the low reliability of avionics components supplied by Indian industry.
 
And PS: These mercenaries were Russian pilots who after the collapse of the soviet union wouldn't have gotten much flying hours.

PPS: CAG is not part of the government. It is an independent body like the Judiciary.
 
Because the same weapons were manufactured within the same factory.. in Russia and Ukraine.
Those missiles.. were without an iota of non-correllated data.. comparable with those Purchased by the IAF within the period from the induction of the Mig-29 to 2002.

And the problem remained till 2004 when finally strict QC measures were forced upon the manufacturer and upon themselves by the IAF. Infact.. a row had ensued when the Russians accused India of manufacturing sub-standard components after complaints by the IAF on their own hardware.
Yes it comes from the same factory, but has a different history after that which plays a significant part in its lethality. The R-27s which the IAF had was procured from the Soviet Union(not second hand!!) and stored and maintained by the IAF, and operated by the IAF. The Missiles which Ethipopia bought for their second hand Su-27s, were most probably second hand armaments which after stored for a considerable time in Russia, found its way to the Ethiopian sheds, and which were flown by Russian pilots who after the collapse of their country didn't fly much at all. Very nice comparison.
 
Yup you acutely are up there with the Joneses ....it's your ridiculous assessment which can't absorb the fact that Pakistan had it's sources at hand that even with the absent of PAF, it still managed to neutralise the threat.

IAF was there to flush out Pakistani infiltrators.The Fulcrums were armed with air-to-air missiles in case the PAF joined the war.
 
As also in 2002 as mentioned in the article , Mirage bombed one Pak Post also in 2002. killing

a multi ship formation of Mirage-2000s from the 7 Sqn “Battleaxes” went airborne with precision guided munitions on board. Time on Target: 1315 hrs on july 2002 on Point 3260. This is also known as Kargil-II

As many as 8-12 Mirage-2000s were involved in the mission, which was led by the CO 7 Squadron - Wg Cdr Rajesh Kumar with four arriving on the target. Wg Cdr Kumar dropped the first 1000 pound bomb followed by other aircraft. The air attack was defended against by SAMs.

Pakistan losses added to 28 deaths in the operation.


Even IAF missile is not up to the mark, this should have been known by PAF also. They should have defended in 2002 Pt. 3260 and not let 28 Pak soldiers died rather flying in safe quarters.
 
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IAF officially acknowledges Kargil-II
TNN | Nov 14, 2002, 01.49AM IST
NEW DELHI: Apart from extensively practising high-altitude precision bombing during Operation Parakram along the Indo-Pak border, the IAF also sharpened its skills in conducting helicopter-borne operations with special forces of the Army.
IAF officials on Wednesday also for the first time publicly acknowledged their role in dislodging Pakistani intruders from an Indian post in the Gurez-Machal sector in J&K towards the end of July. This incident, as reported earlier, came to be known as the 'Kargil-II intrusion'.
Officials said that the 10-month-long forward deployment was also used to get a measure of the extent of coverage of the Pakistani radars. "Satellite imagery and UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) were extensively used to detect and pinpoint enemy radars," said an officer.
As for the 'Kargil-II' incident, the IAF had pressed into service four Mirage-2000 multi-role fighters to launch "pin-pointed ground attack operations" with laser-guided bombs to dislodge the Pakistani soldiers who had intruded into the Indian territory.
By the time the intruders were detected by Indian soldiers, they had occupied a strategic hill feature, the Loonda Post, overlooking the Neelam Valley. Both the countries suffered several casualties in the operation.
"We did what we had to... the Army had asked for our help and we went ahead and did what was required," said a senior official, responding to questions on the 'Kargil-II' incident.

IAF officials said that Pakistan, during the forward deployment, had mustered its almost total air force strength of 200 frontline fighters in the northern sector facing Punjab and J&K.
The Pakistan military high command, apart from their six 'main' air bases, had also activated 15 of their satellite bases during the period and boosted the fighter strength facing the IAF's Western Air Command from 12 to 16 squadrons.
"But we were fully prepared to overwhelm them if the directive was given. We had built up a comprehensive structure and also carried out extensive augmentation of our radars," said an officer.
Officials said that the IAF was now focussing on "greater reach and penetration capability", precision targetting, responsive intelligence and secure communications.

IAF officially acknowledges Kargil-II - The Times of India

The Kargil-II Incident


Introduction

The year 2002 was witness to a full mobilisation by the Indian Army post the high profile terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on 13th Dec 2001. Pakistan Army also mobilised in response. Amidst these tensions the two forces regularly attacked each at the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Most of these firings were minor skirmishes resulting in no loss of life; indeed artillery and small arms fire had been regular occurrence for several years. However, in one event the Indian Air Force (IAF) was called upon to bombard Pakistani troops. The battle leading to eviction of Pakistani intruders was euphemistically called “Kargil-II” in the popular media owing to the outward similarities of the operation to the Kargil War in 1999.

Pakistan Army Intrusion

The incident was covered in some detail by Praveen Swami of the “The Hindu” newspaper. According to Swami, Pakistan occupied four sangarhs (improvised bunkers made of stone) and forward trenches that had been built by Indian troops over the years at Loonda Post which is in the Machhal (or Macchil) Sector. Reportedly unexpected whiteout conditions due to rain and fog provided cover to the Pakistani troops.

The area was the responsibility of a battalion of the Sikh Light Infantry under the 53 Infantry Brigade. The overall command of the LoC in the area fell with the 15 Corps.

Loonda Post has strategic value because it overlooks Kel town in the Neelam Valley on the Pakistani side of the LoC. It is not known how long the Pakistani troops were occupying the feature.

However, the official statement by the Indian government released later denies that Loonda Post was captured by the Pakistan Army [A]:



“It is not factually correct that the Pakistan troops had occupied a strategic post on our side of the Line of Control which necessitated a massive attack by Indian troops & air force on Loonda post in Machal sector. However, in the last week of July 2002, there was minor Pakistan intrusion, approximately 800 meters on our side of the Line of Control in the area of Point 3260, which is 1800 meters East of Loonda post.”


As to why the feature was lost to Pakistani troops;

“Point 3260 is not considered tactically important and viable for physical occupation by our own troops. Being in close proximity of the Line of Control and the area not being physically occupied, Pakistan troops had intruded into this area. However, since the area is regularly patrolled by our own troops, they observed presence of some Pakistan troops in the area of Point 3260 on July 26, 2002”.

The Operation

The intrusion was detected on 26th July when a patrol by Sikh LI was ambushed leading to 3 deaths. Per other reports the intrusion was detected by a UAV. The Indian Army responded with 155 mm fire FH-77B ‘Bofors’ howitzers and mortars on the feature from three sides. Mi-17s flew in special forces. In the counter bombardment from Pakistani artillery 11 Indian soldiers belonging to Sikh LI and attached Ladakh Scouts troops lost their lives. Post the initial clashes the Army raised a request to the IAF for support. The IAF in turn sought prior approval from the Defence Minister.

On 2nd August [C], a multi ship formation of Mirage-2000s from the 7 Sqn “Battleaxes” went airborne with precision guided munitions on board. Time on Target: 1315 hrs.

As many as 8-12 Mirage-2000s were involved in the mission, which was led by the CO 7 Squadron - Wg Cdr Rajesh Kumar with four arriving on the target. Wg Cdr Kumar dropped the first 1000 pound bomb followed by other aircraft. The air attack was defended against by SAMs.

The Indian Army was able to recapture the post after the attack destroyed Pakistani positions. To recognition of his actions Wg Cdr Rajesh Kumar was awarded the Vayu Sena Medal (Gallantry) in 2003. The CO of the Sikh LI Bn, Colonel V.K. Malhotra was removed from command but was cleared of all charges in the following inquiry.

Pakistan losses added to 28 deaths in the operation.

Battle in Gultari?

In a press conference on 23rd August 2002, PA public relations officer Major General Rashid Quereshi, known for dishonest statements since the Kargil War, alledged that the IAF had attacked forward Pakistani posts in Gultari area in support of the Indian Army on night of 22nd/23rd. It was claimed that the PA had retaliated in defence leading to death of Indian troops. The Indian Army completely denied the whole affair and furnished that no casualties had occurred in that timeframe. The claim coincided with the visit of a senior American diplomat Richard Armitage to Pakistan, and hence is thought to be fabricated and not related to the Loonda post incident. Possibly the bogey was raised to pre-empt any such plans by the Indian armed forces?

It is not clear as to why there was no such claim from the Pakistani side during the actual battle in Machal. It can be speculated that since it would mean admission of defeat, Pakistani sources did not reveal it. Secondly, the Pakistani claim would have been untenable given the sanctity the marked LoC boundary enjoys since the Kargil War in international circles.​
 
IAF officially acknowledges Kargil-II
TNN | Nov 14, 2002, 01.49AM IST
NEW DELHI: Apart from extensively practising high-altitude precision bombing during Operation Parakram along the Indo-Pak border, the IAF also sharpened its skills in conducting helicopter-borne operations with special forces of the Army.
IAF officials on Wednesday also for the first time publicly acknowledged their role in dislodging Pakistani intruders from an Indian post in the Gurez-Machal sector in J&K towards the end of July. This incident, as reported earlier, came to be known as the 'Kargil-II intrusion'.
Officials said that the 10-month-long forward deployment was also used to get a measure of the extent of coverage of the Pakistani radars. "Satellite imagery and UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) were extensively used to detect and pinpoint enemy radars," said an officer.
As for the 'Kargil-II' incident, the IAF had pressed into service four Mirage-2000 multi-role fighters to launch "pin-pointed ground attack operations" with laser-guided bombs to dislodge the Pakistani soldiers who had intruded into the Indian territory.
By the time the intruders were detected by Indian soldiers, they had occupied a strategic hill feature, the Loonda Post, overlooking the Neelam Valley. Both the countries suffered several casualties in the operation.
"We did what we had to... the Army had asked for our help and we went ahead and did what was required," said a senior official, responding to questions on the 'Kargil-II' incident.

IAF officials said that Pakistan, during the forward deployment, had mustered its almost total air force strength of 200 frontline fighters in the northern sector facing Punjab and J&K.
The Pakistan military high command, apart from their six 'main' air bases, had also activated 15 of their satellite bases during the period and boosted the fighter strength facing the IAF's Western Air Command from 12 to 16 squadrons.
"But we were fully prepared to overwhelm them if the directive was given. We had built up a comprehensive structure and also carried out extensive augmentation of our radars," said an officer.
Officials said that the IAF was now focussing on "greater reach and penetration capability", precision targetting, responsive intelligence and secure communications.

IAF officially acknowledges Kargil-II - The Times of India

The Kargil-II Incident


Introduction

The year 2002 was witness to a full mobilisation by the Indian Army post the high profile terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on 13th Dec 2001. Pakistan Army also mobilised in response. Amidst these tensions the two forces regularly attacked each at the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Most of these firings were minor skirmishes resulting in no loss of life; indeed artillery and small arms fire had been regular occurrence for several years. However, in one event the Indian Air Force (IAF) was called upon to bombard Pakistani troops. The battle leading to eviction of Pakistani intruders was euphemistically called “Kargil-II” in the popular media owing to the outward similarities of the operation to the Kargil War in 1999.

Pakistan Army Intrusion

The incident was covered in some detail by Praveen Swami of the “The Hindu” newspaper. According to Swami, Pakistan occupied four sangarhs (improvised bunkers made of stone) and forward trenches that had been built by Indian troops over the years at Loonda Post which is in the Machhal (or Macchil) Sector. Reportedly unexpected whiteout conditions due to rain and fog provided cover to the Pakistani troops.

The area was the responsibility of a battalion of the Sikh Light Infantry under the 53 Infantry Brigade. The overall command of the LoC in the area fell with the 15 Corps.

Loonda Post has strategic value because it overlooks Kel town in the Neelam Valley on the Pakistani side of the LoC. It is not known how long the Pakistani troops were occupying the feature.

However, the official statement by the Indian government released later denies that Loonda Post was captured by the Pakistan Army [A]:



“It is not factually correct that the Pakistan troops had occupied a strategic post on our side of the Line of Control which necessitated a massive attack by Indian troops & air force on Loonda post in Machal sector. However, in the last week of July 2002, there was minor Pakistan intrusion, approximately 800 meters on our side of the Line of Control in the area of Point 3260, which is 1800 meters East of Loonda post.”


As to why the feature was lost to Pakistani troops;

“Point 3260 is not considered tactically important and viable for physical occupation by our own troops. Being in close proximity of the Line of Control and the area not being physically occupied, Pakistan troops had intruded into this area. However, since the area is regularly patrolled by our own troops, they observed presence of some Pakistan troops in the area of Point 3260 on July 26, 2002”.

The Operation

The intrusion was detected on 26th July when a patrol by Sikh LI was ambushed leading to 3 deaths. Per other reports the intrusion was detected by a UAV. The Indian Army responded with 155 mm fire FH-77B ‘Bofors’ howitzers and mortars on the feature from three sides. Mi-17s flew in special forces. In the counter bombardment from Pakistani artillery 11 Indian soldiers belonging to Sikh LI and attached Ladakh Scouts troops lost their lives. Post the initial clashes the Army raised a request to the IAF for support. The IAF in turn sought prior approval from the Defence Minister.

On 2nd August [C], a multi ship formation of Mirage-2000s from the 7 Sqn “Battleaxes” went airborne with precision guided munitions on board. Time on Target: 1315 hrs.

As many as 8-12 Mirage-2000s were involved in the mission, which was led by the CO 7 Squadron - Wg Cdr Rajesh Kumar with four arriving on the target. Wg Cdr Kumar dropped the first 1000 pound bomb followed by other aircraft. The air attack was defended against by SAMs.

The Indian Army was able to recapture the post after the attack destroyed Pakistani positions. To recognition of his actions Wg Cdr Rajesh Kumar was awarded the Vayu Sena Medal (Gallantry) in 2003. The CO of the Sikh LI Bn, Colonel V.K. Malhotra was removed from command but was cleared of all charges in the following inquiry.

Pakistan losses added to 28 deaths in the operation.

Battle in Gultari?

In a press conference on 23rd August 2002, PA public relations officer Major General Rashid Quereshi, known for dishonest statements since the Kargil War, alledged that the IAF had attacked forward Pakistani posts in Gultari area in support of the Indian Army on night of 22nd/23rd. It was claimed that the PA had retaliated in defence leading to death of Indian troops. The Indian Army completely denied the whole affair and furnished that no casualties had occurred in that timeframe. The claim coincided with the visit of a senior American diplomat Richard Armitage to Pakistan, and hence is thought to be fabricated and not related to the Loonda post incident. Possibly the bogey was raised to pre-empt any such plans by the Indian armed forces?

It is not clear as to why there was no such claim from the Pakistani side during the actual battle in Machal. It can be speculated that since it would mean admission of defeat, Pakistani sources did not reveal it. Secondly, the Pakistani claim would have been untenable given the sanctity the marked LoC boundary enjoys since the Kargil War in international circles.​


Either this is too confusing. Or I am suffering from lack of caffeine.

Oh Bhai sahib, a brief text would have done the job. Why so much cut n paste.
 
Ill be accused of being an Indian again.. by certain racist circles.

But here goes..

I was 15 then..so all I remember is of what other people said and conclusions to that I drew later, living in a posh hotel since my father worked there. In a hotel you meet everybody, and in that hotel you met everybody...and I mean everybody(including the current chief who was GoC Murree at the time and as I heard he was not too happy with it having his misgivings with the details of the operation).

I remember vividly the buildup MUCH before Kargil.. AAA and guns moving along the crossings... (there is a certain bridge at a spot called Kohala that joins into Azad Kashmir).. I remember all the army officer friends we knew talking bits and pieces about it.. about having India by the Jugular(and we did.. all propaganda to the contrary is just BS).
Initially, the PA had captured and held peaks that literally made Indian supply lines a duckshoot..
The LeT were just the initial cannon fodder, since they needed our more professional troops to back them up. So I believe the deeper hits were left to Let and "embedded" troops while the key positions were held by the more able ones.
but when the attacks began.. and the AF officers looked grimmer.. PN even more.. Musharraf plan fell upon itself.

It was brilliant short term tactics.. just really really short sighted. ..and could have been better used in an actual war scenario.. but our leaders have a tendency to not hold on to their aces in the deck because they get over-confident and cocky.

When the retreat happened.. I remember seeing the gardens of the MH and CMH in Murree with constant choppers flying in and out... Chopper pilots who bore testament to countless bloodied bodies.. of men being forced to run.

Kargil was nothing less than a crime against Pakistan, just as Operation Gibraltar was.. and the only people who paid for it were our troops who only said "Labbaik!" and jumped in.. and were abandoned.
Musharraf did not just butter up the NLI later on for no reason.. he knew he had sacrificed troops for no gain and only loss.
and he needed to compensate those troops by some hot airy words.

Kargil, like Op Gibraltar.. was a Pakistani attack on India.. and that I will stand by for all the accusations in the world.
Criminal not just that it brought Pakistan to the brink and pushed its progress back by years, and sacrificed our lions for the ego's of lambs who used it for their contrived gain.
But that these were in essence good ideas and tactical plans that could have stayed better off(or at least elements of them) under the carpet until needed for use.
Until Gibraltar and Kargil.. India was asleep.. it would not even have cared or acted..
Why then would you try to aim for its heart when its not attacked you and by doing so you could save yourself in that dire time.
You forced an oblivious dum-dum into arming itself to the teeth so that when it did exact its revenge you could do nothing(71,Kargil withdrawal).
You forced yourself back two steps so that when the enemy did build itself up you had so destroyed your reputation that no oe would sell you weapons to try and match them... (although the civilian governments that followed these dictators did the most damage in terms of economy.. that is the result of a feudal democracy and a democratic system that was not allowed to develop).

So in conclusion, Kargil was the most brilliant folly ever.. and goes everything against what is called the art of war.
It was a hurried move to try and kill the enemy's bishop without realizing that the move left your king exposed.

Wow ;Such eloquence

You are simply the BEST on this forum
 

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