If you're going to reply to me, at least make a comment worth replying to and not some hocus pocus.
An integrated ground based air defence can easily deal with the carrier groups and their "anti-missile" techs won't do much when you have thousands of air defence points scattered across a country 4 times the size of Texas with alot of tech designed to doop anti air systems such as use of long wavelength frequency hoping system, including mobile OTH radars, the Americans will not know where most these air defence points are till its too late and by the time they find out, the mobile system would have moved, hence the term mobile. And this is not even taking into account that their so called carrier groups will be sitting ducks within the range of Iranian offensive missile capabilities.
Airforce has its good uses obviously, but to claim it will provide that much of a better form of defence than a heavily integrated ground based AD unit is folly.
Do not think that just because you use the words 'integrated air defense' it means you know what you are talking about. Am saying this gently.
The concept of an integrated air defense is relatively new. It did not exist in WW II, not in the Korean War, and relatively experimental in the Vietnam War. Air defense have always existed to defend against aircrafts, but the responses were not coordinated and the individual units had poor communication with each other. To put it simply...What integration did was to put an area under the unified command of a single commander, from personnel to hardware.
By the time of Desert Storm, Iraq's integrated air defense system rivaled that of Moscow's. It was better than what North Viet Nam fielded under Chinese design and built in the Vietnam War. We blinded Iraq's integrated air defense commanders in the first hour, crippled it in the first day, and essentially rendered it impotent by the 4th. Yes, Iraq had mobile radars as well. Those crews learned that to transmit any longer than one second is to invite death.
https://defence.pk/threads/ten-propositions-for-modern-air-power.472753/
Just because Van Ripper did it, does not mean Iran can replicate what he did. For starter, Van Ripper knew US combat doctrines and was able to exploit weaknesses.
This is where you are wrong. Seriously wrong. The idea of a 'war game' or exercise is to stress everything related to the focus of the exercise. Stress to the point of breaking, if necessary.
For example...If the focus of the exercise is transporting heavy equipment to the front line, you stress the maintenance people. You virtually 'kills' them. Place them under cards, meaning they are now 'dead' and ineligible to contribute to their unit's operations. Now their trucks and/or aircrafts that have maintenance problems will go longer unrepaired and yet the goal of transporting X amount of tanks and ammunition still must be met.
Another example...If the focus of the exercise is to deal with numerical superiority, then you give permission to the 'bad guys' to regenerate as much tanks, ships, or fighter aircrafts as needed. When the defense, the 'good guys', finally failed, you now know where the weak points are.
What Van Ripper did was in no way indicative that we learned and changed nothing. Least of all, that Iran can count on US to be static so that what happened is available on the Internet for Iran to assuredly can defeat the US Navy. I have said it before that the US military is the most self critical organization in the world. We change while it is appearing that we do not. Then when the time comes, people get embarrassed real fast when they underestimated US. Like your Iran did for Desert Storm.