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Mechanised Divisions Pakistan Army

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More than 80% of PA's armored corps are equipped with night vision devices, most of those are locally manufactured.
Wish we soon setup thermal imaging capability too.Last year trying to import thermal imaging cameras for car ( esp for foggy areas like punjab in winter) amazing thing.Imagine using it as in winter punjab and sindh grounds is lot cooler so performance will be at peak of these cameras
 
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Nice shot

5c9639fe82e14.jpg
 
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is PA really capable of division-level armoured maneuvers? I have serious doubts about this.
 
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is PA really capable of division-level armoured maneuvers? I have serious doubts about this.
Why so ? We perfected this in zarb e momin, learning from the failures of first armoured div in 65 and 71 , and recently in the Azm e Nau, rad al barq, however zarb e momin was the turning point , we've come a long way from the army of 65,
However in nowadays limited war IAB's manuvers with overwhelming concentrated fire support will be more important, with armoured and mech div pouring in the exploitation made by them
 
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Why so ? We perfected this in zarb e momin, learning from the failures of first armoured div in 65 and 71 , and recently in the Azm e Nau, rad al barq, however zarb e momin was the turning point , we've come a long way from the army of 65,
However in nowadays limited war IAB's manuvers with overwhelming concentrated fire support will be more important, with armoured and mech div pouring in the exploitation made by them

Hi,

Why is the poster asking that question---? Think about it---.
 
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Hi,

Why is the poster asking that question---? Think about it---.
is PA really capable of division-level armoured maneuvers? I have serious doubts about this.

Why so ? We perfected this in zarb e momin, learning from the failures of first armoured div in 65 and 71 , and recently in the Azm e Nau, rad al barq, however zarb e momin was the turning point , we've come a long way from the army of 65,
However in nowadays limited war IAB's manuvers with overwhelming concentrated fire support will be more important, with armoured and mech div pouring in the exploitation made by them

In today's warfare, armored movement is venerable without air superiority/air support. Same goes for PA, which lacks area air defence for armored formations. So without PAF giving cover, PA won't be able to undertake formation sized thrust. The same applies for IA/IAF.
 
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In today's warfare, armored movement is venerable without air superiority/air support. Same goes for PA, which lacks area air defence for armored formations. So without PAF giving cover, PA won't be able to undertake formation sized thrust. The same applies for IA/IAF.

Hi,

Oh---Jee---thanks---!!!!
 
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In today's warfare, armored movement is venerable without air superiority/air support. Same goes for PA, which lacks area air defence for armored formations. So without PAF giving cover, PA won't be able to undertake formation sized thrust. The same applies for IA/IAF.
PA has the AD cover and it can make even a Corps sized thrust if needed be.
 
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I disagree, bcoz publicly ly-80 is the best sam of Pa that wont be effective against long range stand off weapons, alcms, srbm and brahmos as well.
Good luck firing these weapons on Indian Army and Indian population.
Its not about the best weapon, but the best tactic and strategy. so you can keep disagreeing all you want throughout the day, week,month and years.
PA's armor will cross into India and ensure to make contact with IA armor/infantry, capture land and keep majorly hanging around populated/developed areas for resources and roads to discourage the use of above mentioned weapons. This is why PA's armor is deployed close to the borders.

have a look at IA armor deployments now

It will then make sense to you why Cold start and IBG's were created by IA.
 
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To date, in all previous wars, PA armored divisions have fought largely as single divisions. They have never to date managed a serious maneuver warfare strategy.

The current strategy goes something like this:
1. A railway based backbone going north to south.
2. A ditch like a great wall of china running north to south
3. Aim has been to fight India on Pakistani ground in the desert between Punjab and impassable Sindh.
This has been the "strategy" since 1970s I believe.

PA is woefully ill-prepared for any kind of meaningful maneuver warfare but the Indians are equally as bad, so neither side will majorly embarrass the other.

Pak because of the above strategy can be ready for war within 24 hours, much faster than India. Cold Start is an attempt to improve this reaction time but I don't know how effective Cold Start will be in real life.

Maneuver warfare is an industrial scale war. Unfortunately, neither India nor Pakistan has a culture of understanding industrial scale military operations. They buy military equipment from abroad like people buy clothes for marrying their girls.

They have yet to appreciate the importance of local large scale production capabilities. Some semi-retired fat chap will use organizations like KSEW or HIT thinking these are some kind of personal fiefdoms. But because this kind of capacity and way of thinking was never developed, such industrial capacities will remain unbuilt, unused and ineffective.

Certain "favored" divisions will be given the job in a future war to attack the enemy while others will play a supporting role / defensive role. That is the extent of strategy one can expect from the PA, if past performance is anything to go by.

To understand the multi-division, massive, choreographed military maneuvers, done with thousands of tanks, and many more personnel, in coordination with effective artillery, and other arms. This has never truly happened in the Indian subcontinent.

We have had some basic, raw, tank battles, that happened. But these were barely planned effectively and didn't have much meaning in the overall scheme of things. They happened along very predictable lines and without meaningful combined arms, surprise, or even any original maneuver.
 
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