Korea: The First War We Lost

[jhungary]

This is the second half of my sentence, you forgot, either intentionally or recklessly, the first part of my sentence before the comma. My last sentence was: "China's only goal was no American boots/ military bases near her boarder threading her security, so China is the winner for achieving this objective." You surely know the basic grammar rules,right?

The basic Grammar dictate you "ACHIEVE" an goal, not "winning" a goal

That means you have used a wrong choice of word. Blame yourselves for you rudimentary level grammar, don't blame me for misreading your post.

What did China win? let me reiterate:China is the winner for achieving the objective, which was no American boots/military bases near her boarder threatening her security.


Even i don't write books, nor will I intend to, I know a good author will lead the readers to his conclusion, instead of simply spelling it out for them. What does this review on The New York Times Book Review mean to you?
-ALA Booklist "Bevin Alexander...argues in this well-researched and readable book that the United States fought two wars in Korea, winning one against North Korea and losing the other to Communist China." -The New York Times Book Review

Then the author itself DID not come to the conclusion of what you said, it's the New York Times.

By the way, it wasn't NYT that said that, it's ALA Booklist (American Library Association). New York Time is simply quoting what ALA Booklist call the books. The same quote appear on Amazon and Barns and Noble too.

http://www.amazon.com/Korea-The-First-War-Lost/dp/0870521357

Irrelevant. What is relevant here is that if you could read,speak, write Chinese(btw, not just speaking Cantonese) and have lived in China for a period of time, then you would be able to know the interpretation of both sides who were fighting the war. Any school kids here know if they write an essay only covering one side of the argument, they will only get 50% of the scores at most because it ought to cover the views of both sides, e.g., pros & cons.

lol, it's irrelevant because you want it to be irrelevant, I wrote professional article, as I said I help wrote the manual for US intelligence activities and the version I wrote is still being used by NSA and CIA (Of course I did not wrote the whole thing but a part of it)

When you are talking about technical aspect of something, it's not 50% or any % you can give, you either know it 100% or you don't. For example. How Satellite not being able to track a target in real time, you either don't know the whole process, or you know it inside and out.

And I do know people who fought the American in that war. We talked about it a lot on different kind of aspect during that war In fact, he is now Living in Sydney, I forgot his number, but I am gladly point you to where he lives.

You said you are not telepathic, yet you were tying to read my mind again. I love debating with people of different views and background. If you knew the Chinese word for crisis(also means challenge), you would understand it meas threat/opportunity in unity.

I did not debate anything, as you have not yet answer any of my post. The answer I got is

"NYT said this " Which wasn't true
"I believe the author more than you"

You still have yet to tell me how the 3 offensive south that cost China over 1 million manpower have anything to do with simply rolling back the American to the south? The 3 offensive are launched in Dec 1950, Jan 1951 and April 1951. When the US had already been rolled back late November 1950? And no UN/US force anywhere in North Korea after Battle of Ch'ongch'on River concluded on Nov 28, 1950

 

[Tiqiu]

The basic Grammar dictate you "ACHIEVE" an goal, not "winning" a goal

So now you want twisting my word from "China is the winner for achieving this objective" to "winning a goal". Tell us what the difference between
"China is the winner for achieving this objective" and
"China is the winner (of the Korean War)for achieving this objective"?

That means you have used a wrong choice of word. Blame yourselves for you rudimentary level grammar, don't blame me for misreading your post.

So you are showing off your mastery of the English language now. LOL, just look back at what you wrote in this very post, man.

Then the author itself DID not come to the conclusion of what you said, it's the New York Times.

By the way, it wasn't NYT that said that, it's ALA Booklist (American Library Association). New York Time is simply quoting what ALA Booklist call the books. The same quote appear on Amazon and Barns and Noble too.

Korea: The First War We Lost: Bevin Alexander: 9780870521355: Amazon.com: Books

Of course I was aware of that, that is why I posted it up at outset. All I was trying to say is I agree with it.

And I do know people who fought the American in that war. We talked about it a lot on different kind of aspect during that war In fact, he is now Living in Sydney, I forgot his number, but I am gladly point you to where he lives.

I wouldn't mind of a visit if invited, but let me return the favor to you this time, did you actually mean he fought for the Americans? not fought the Americans?

lol, it's irrelevant because you want it to be irrelevant, I wrote professional article, as I said I help wrote the manual for US intelligence activities and the version I wrote is still being used by NSA and CIA (Of course I did not wrote the whole thing but a part of it)

It is Irrelevant because we are talking about the Korean War here. That said, I am happy about your achievement and we will only be benefit from it, for stronger opponent will make your stronger in any game, be it chess, football,or poker.

You still have yet to tell me how the 3 offensive south that cost China over 1 million manpower have anything to do with simply rolling back the American to the south? The 3 offensive are launched in Dec 1950, Jan 1951 and April 1951. When the US had already been rolled back late November 1950? And no UN/US force anywhere in North Korea after Battle of Ch'ongch'on River concluded on Nov 28, 1950

I haven't had the chances to read this book, so I just answer this question in short by my knowledge on this matter gained from my time spent in China. I think China was reluctant to join the war due to the big gap to America, and certainly had no interest to fight for Kim's unification ambition, so when VPA reached the 38th parallel, they were satisfied as the old status quo had been replenished. But in order to bring the US to the negotiation table to make it solidified, China needed to carry on offensive attacks for the sake of being defensive.

And this attitude was the main reason why the communist party of Vietnam and NK didn't regard China was their true ally even China helped them fighting in both wars.

 

[jhungary]

So now you want twisting my word from "China is the winner for achieving this objective" to "winning a goal". Tell us what the difference between
"China is the winner for achieving this objective" and
"China is the winner (of the Korean War)for achieving this objective"?

Do you actually know what you are talking about?? Win what? So you achieved a goal and you are a winner?

So you are showing off your mastery of the English language now. LOL, just look back at what you wrote in this very post, man.

My post? There are nothing wrong with my post man. Again, you are confused on what I said and I believe you are confused as to what you said.

Of course I was aware of that, that is why I posted it up at outset. All I was trying to say is I agree with it.

Nope, you don't even know the quote is not from New York Times (otherwise you would not claim this is where it came from) And again, what you agree on is not the case here, what the author wrote is, and in this case, what you agree on is someone else's review.

I wouldn't mind of a visit if invited, but let me return the favor to you this time, did you actually mean he fought for the Americans? not fought the Americans?

He was in the PLA in the 1950s. Don't forget, many Chinese war vet got prosecuted and purged during the cultural revolution. Many of them escaped to Hong Kong, Australia and the US.

It is Irrelevant because we are talking about the Korean War here. That said, I am happy about your achievement and we will only be benefit from it, for stronger opponent will make your stronger in any game, be it chess, football,or poker.

We are NOT talking about Korean War here, we are talking about the TECHNICAL ASPECT of the Korean War. The author account is not solely recounting the event during Korean War. Instead of what they do, the author is talking about Why they do what they do. That's different.

I haven't had the chances to read this book, so I just answer this question in short by my knowledge on this matter gained from my time spent in China. I think China was reluctant to join the war due to the big gap to America, and certainly had no interest to fight for Kim's unification ambition, so when VPA reached the 38th parallel, they were satisfied as the old status quo had been replenished. But in order to bring the US to the negotiation table to make it solidified, China needed to carry on offensive attacks for the sake of being defensive.

And this attitude was the main reason why the communist party of Vietnam and NK didn't regard China was their true ally even China helped them fighting in both wars.

What you are saying does not make sense. If what China want is to bring UN/US back to negotiation table, they would have been doing so immediately after their military routed the UN/US force in December 1950, not after the UN/US Force settled and consolidated their position. You have more bargaining power immediately after your foe is defeated than say 6 months after they are defeated.

That is why I said, it would make sense if China want a better negotiating position commence an offensive (or coutner offensive) immediately after the US/UN force was routed, that would justified the Wawon and remotely the second occupation of Seoul. Which they can use the gain to barter the freshly defeated UN/US army. It does not make sense why the Chinese launch an offensive 6 months down the road just because they want to draw US back to the negotiation table??.

Another thing is, if China indeed satisified the old status quo, then why go south in the first place? And kept the war open for 3 more years??

There are absolutely no point to continue the war at that point, if what the China do is simply try to draw the UN back to negotiation table. They are already on that table when the war got drag on during 1951, 1952 and 1953. You don't need to draw anything.

That's like saying the UN force cross the 38th in the first place just to bring NK back to Negotiation table. With UN/US force have no intention to indulge the South Korean to try to unified the whole country under their banner.

 

[3Kingdoms]

Again, I don't see any way to glorify this because if China was to fight a war back then with the US, with the technological gap back then, if they don't fight by number, what else can they do?

I think it should be glorified,up to the 2nd campaign against insurmountable odds CPV achieved it's objective goal, utilizing strategy. This showing China's strategic culture, those men in the North didn't die in vain. Its the odds weighted against them I think amazing; would any other nation succeed as the CPV? Probably only the Viet's! Nah, maybe a few others as well, human spirit an all that.

You need to understand, the US had always been fighting conventional warfare up to that point, where even Mexico fight a laid-out heads-up battle with the US, this type of warfare are new (apart from the Marine whom experience something like that from the Japanese during WW2.)

Evans Carlson effectively used guerrillas tactics learned from his time with the communist in his 'Guadalcanal Campaign' against the Japanese in WW2.

700 US/UK vs 2,500 Japanese

US/UK - 16 killed; Japan - 488 killed

The problem is, however, the way that China fought in this war is not "Sustainable" and in fact, by engaging in Korean war, which lead to a generation of people being killed and wounded, they have effectively write themselves off in any future engagement, the Chinese have to abandon the aim to recapture Taiwan, and also they were subverted by the Russian until late 1960s
While it is admirable for these men to die for their countries aim like that, to rush in the artillery net just to swamp your enemy, it does not actually do much to the war or what happened after.

Of course you're right about sustainable, a lot of hardened vets and ex nationalist died. And like you said, of CPV disposition, what else can they do? They had to follow orders, post war Peng wanted a modernized professional force over Mao's ideological force, he was few who defied Mao.

Are you familiar with Hundred Year Tide by Qing Shi (not read myself). Reads, Mao wanted unification with Taiwan his top priority and Stalin persuaded Mao to intervene with Kim's ambitions to unify Korea.

Excerpt;

The author writes how Stalin gave Mao a supposed power of veto over the war, that senior Chinese generals and Politburo members had serious misgivings about the whole venture, and that Mao disregarded the advice of his senior military commander in North Korea.

April 1949, Mao had requested 200 aircraft and pilot-training from the Soviet Union in support of his plan to take Taiwan from the Nationalist Kuomintang. The Soviet response was "ambiguous". Soon afterwards, North Korea asked Stalin for military support for its plans to invade South Korea, and the Soviet Union chose to back Pyongyang.
May 1950, Kim Il Sung, the North Korea ruler, arrived secretly in Peking, after being told by Stalin to secure Mao's go-ahead for his plan to unify Korea. Kim told Mao that he already had Stalin's backing, but that the final approval must be China's. Mao was "very annoyed that he had been kept in the dark" about this pact, but agreed to the invasion plan. China promised to send troops if American soldiers entered the war. In June 1950, Mao saw his Taiwan ambitions collapse when the US Seventh Fleet sailed into the Taiwan Strait.

"After the death of Stalin, Mao repeatedly complained about Stalin's wrong decision on the Korean War. He called it a big mistake, 100 per cent wrong. Maybe Mao was thinking, without this mistake, the Taiwan problem would not have been stuck in such a dilemma and the Chinese Communist Party would have liberated Taiwan at half the cost it spent on the Korean War,"

Rejecting the official Chinese view that the war was started by a South Korean invasion, the articles state that it was North Korean forces which crossed the border in June 1950 in a successful aggressive assault. Stalin encouraged China to gather its "volunteer" forces along its border with North Korea. When the United Nations troops turned the tide and forced back the North Korea soldiers, "Mao still thought, with Soviet air protection and Soviet military equipment, it was not difficult to defeat the Americans, and if the Chinese troops won in North Korea, the US would not dare to attack China."
Mao's most senior officials and generals thought otherwise. They opposed sending troops and military leaders expressed "lack of confidence in confronting the US," reveals Mr Qing. The role of the Soviet Union as described by these articles is not one usually aired in China. "The Korean War was basically good for Soviet interests in Far East Asia, and that was why Stalin encouraged China to help North Korea ..."

Moscow, still refusing to put its own troops in North Korea, promised to back China if Washington subsequently declared war against Peking. Zhou Enlai was sent to negotiate in Moscow, where Stalin warned: "If your decision is not to send in troops, then socialism in North Korea will soon collapse." That would mean an exiled North Korean government in north- east China, which would put Chinese soil under threat from the US.
Mao gave the go-ahead and in October 1950 Chinese troops swept into North Korea, driving back the UN forces. Mao quickly became over-confident, setting hopelessly ambitious conditions for a ceasefire including Taiwan's expulsion from the UN.

General Peng Dehuai advised Mao to let the Chinese troops halt at the 38th parallel, and recover their strength to fight the following spring. He refused, and the battle recommenced. By 1951, China was suffering serious reverses and heavy casualties. Still Stalin told Mao: "... the Korean War should not be quickened, because Chinese troops can learn about modern war in a lengthy one".

By the July 1953 truce, Peking had won none of its demands and any chance to retake Taiwan had evaporated. The historical reminder on offer from the authors would seem to be that hopes for reunification with Taiwan are ill-served by bad Sino-US relations - then and now.

China has second thoughts on Mao's `great' triumph | World | News | The Independent

 

[Tiqiu]

My post? There are nothing wrong with my post man. Again, you are confused on what I said and I believe you are confused as to what you said.

Who was confused here? Just look at the underlying part of your sentences you wrote blaming me for wrong choice of words:

The basic Grammar dictate you "ACHIEVE" an goal, not "winning" a goal

That means you have used a wrong choice of word. Blame yourselves for you rudimentary level grammar, don't blame me for misreading your post.

I think, anyone, even not a native English speaker, can spot these but you. Should they be: basic Grammar dictates,a goal, wrong choice of words, Blame yourself, your rudimentary level grammar by the rules of English grammar?

I know this is a forum and everyone, including me made mistakes. That is why I tend not to nitpick others' grammar skills, and don't intend to write even restaurant menus, let alone writing senior theses, professional articles and manuals(of CIA or NSA).

Nope, you don't even know the quote is not from New York Times (otherwise you would not claim this is where it came from) And again, what you agree on is not the case here, what the author wrote is, and in this case, what you agree on is someone else's review.

Mind you I am the one who put the following at the second graph of my first post starting this thread. Again you showed your over-confidence about yourself - no body can understand the meaning of the word "Praise" better but you. Talking about word, do you understand what does "endorsement" mean? Or "holding out"?

Praise for Korea: The First War We Lost
"This.fast-moving study is the first to be written by a professional army historian.superb.capably challenges many of the traditional interpretations." -Library Journal

"The best overview of the Korean conflict since Fehrenbach's This Kind of War...a balanced, perceptive accounting..." -Kirkus Review "A desirable acquisition for most military collections." -ALA Booklist

"Bevin Alexander...argues in this well-researched and readable book that the United States fought two wars in Korea, winning one against North Korea and losing the other to Communist China." -The New York Times

Do you actually know what you are talking about?? Win what? So you achieved a goal and you are a winner?

Yes I do. Based on his book, what others have said about his book, the generalization of the 63 chapters, and my past knowledge, even without reading this book, I agreed the line quoted in the Praise "Bevin Alexander...argues in this well-researched and readable book that the United States fought two wars in Korea, winning one against North Korea and losing the other to Communist China."

Therefore, I will say my conclusion once again: "China's only goal was no American boots/ military bases near her boarder threatening her security, so China is the winner for achieving this objective."

What you are saying does not make sense. If what China want is to bring UN/US back to negotiation table, they would have been doing so immediately after their military routed the UN/US force in December 1950, not after the UN/US Force settled and consolidated their position. You have more bargaining power immediately after your foe is defeated than say 6 months after they are defeated.

That is why I said, it would make sense if China want a better negotiating position commence an offensive (or coutner offensive) immediately after the US/UN force was routed, that would justified the Wawon and remotely the second occupation of Seoul. Which they can use the gain to barter the freshly defeated UN/US army. It does not make sense why the Chinese launch an offensive 6 months down the road just because they want to draw US back to the negotiation table??.

Another thing is, if China indeed satisified the old status quo, then why go south in the first place? And kept the war open for 3 more years??

There are absolutely no point to continue the war at that point, if what the China do is simply try to draw the UN back to negotiation table. They are already on that table when the war got drag on during 1951, 1952 and 1953. You don't need to draw anything.

That's like saying the UN force cross the 38th in the first place just to bring NK back to Negotiation table. With UN/US force have no intention to indulge the South Korean to try to unified the whole country under their banner.

How could/would you know that for sure that peace talks could have been even conducted 6 months earlier should China stop advancing to the South? We can all make assumptions about history event in hindsight. But remember, as it is said, "Maybe you can start a war in the way you wanted, but you can not dictate how it is going to be ended".

Devil is in the details, perhaps these chapter 55,56 will give some insight about the complexity of reaching peace talks, the complexity you neglected from all your arguments so far.

Chapter 55: The Spring Offensive

The Chinese launch a massive offensive on April 22, 1951. UN forces fall back to the No Name Line, running from just north of Seoul roughly eastward to the Sea of Japan. This line holds. New Eighth Army commander James A. Van Fleet orders a counteroffensive. By June 13, 1951, the Chinese are back to about the 38th parallel, centering their defense on the Iron Triangle. All along the front they establish heavily dug-in emplacements laced with bunkers. Positional war comes to Korea.


Chapter 56: Talking Peace and Practicing War

Andrei Gromyko, deputy Soviet foreign minister, advises Americans on June 23, 1951, to seek a military armistice, not a political settlement, in Korea. On June 30, 1951, Ridgway offers an armistice. Next day the Chinese agree to suspend military operations and hold peace talks at Kaesong on the 38th parallel. The Americans agree to peace talks, but refuse to accept a cease-fire. This is a great mistake, rejecting Gromyko’s advice, and leads to two more years of deadly war.

If you still want to argue further, I suggest you, like I did before, read this Book.

I think it should be glorified,up to the 2nd campaign against insurmountable odds CPV achieved it's objective goal, utilizing strategy. This showing China's strategic culture, those men in the North didn't die in vain. Its the odds weighted against them I think amazing; would any other nation succeed as the CPV? Probably only the Viet's! Nah, maybe a few others as well, human spirit an all that.


Evans Carlson effectively used guerrillas tactics learned from his time with the communist in his 'Guadalcanal Campaign' against the Japanese in WW2.

700 US/UK vs 2,500 Japanese

US/UK - 16 killed; Japan - 488 killed



Of course you're right about sustainable, a lot of hardened vets and ex nationalist died. And like you said, of CPV disposition, what else can they do? They had to follow orders, post war Peng wanted a modernized professional force over Mao's ideological force, he was few who defied Mao.

Are you familiar with Hundred Year Tide by Qing Shi (not read myself). Reads, Mao wanted unification with Taiwan his top priority and Stalin persuaded Mao to intervene with Kim's ambitions to unify Korea.

Excerpt;

The author writes how Stalin gave Mao a supposed power of veto over the war, that senior Chinese generals and Politburo members had serious misgivings about the whole venture, and that Mao disregarded the advice of his senior military commander in North Korea.

April 1949, Mao had requested 200 aircraft and pilot-training from the Soviet Union in support of his plan to take Taiwan from the Nationalist Kuomintang. The Soviet response was "ambiguous". Soon afterwards, North Korea asked Stalin for military support for its plans to invade South Korea, and the Soviet Union chose to back Pyongyang.
May 1950, Kim Il Sung, the North Korea ruler, arrived secretly in Peking, after being told by Stalin to secure Mao's go-ahead for his plan to unify Korea. Kim told Mao that he already had Stalin's backing, but that the final approval must be China's. Mao was "very annoyed that he had been kept in the dark" about this pact, but agreed to the invasion plan. China promised to send troops if American soldiers entered the war. In June 1950, Mao saw his Taiwan ambitions collapse when the US Seventh Fleet sailed into the Taiwan Strait.

"After the death of Stalin, Mao repeatedly complained about Stalin's wrong decision on the Korean War. He called it a big mistake, 100 per cent wrong. Maybe Mao was thinking, without this mistake, the Taiwan problem would not have been stuck in such a dilemma and the Chinese Communist Party would have liberated Taiwan at half the cost it spent on the Korean War,"

Rejecting the official Chinese view that the war was started by a South Korean invasion, the articles state that it was North Korean forces which crossed the border in June 1950 in a successful aggressive assault. Stalin encouraged China to gather its "volunteer" forces along its border with North Korea. When the United Nations troops turned the tide and forced back the North Korea soldiers, "Mao still thought, with Soviet air protection and Soviet military equipment, it was not difficult to defeat the Americans, and if the Chinese troops won in North Korea, the US would not dare to attack China."
Mao's most senior officials and generals thought otherwise. They opposed sending troops and military leaders expressed "lack of confidence in confronting the US," reveals Mr Qing. The role of the Soviet Union as described by these articles is not one usually aired in China. "The Korean War was basically good for Soviet interests in Far East Asia, and that was why Stalin encouraged China to help North Korea ..."

Moscow, still refusing to put its own troops in North Korea, promised to back China if Washington subsequently declared war against Peking. Zhou Enlai was sent to negotiate in Moscow, where Stalin warned: "If your decision is not to send in troops, then socialism in North Korea will soon collapse." That would mean an exiled North Korean government in north- east China, which would put Chinese soil under threat from the US.
Mao gave the go-ahead and in October 1950 Chinese troops swept into North Korea, driving back the UN forces. Mao quickly became over-confident, setting hopelessly ambitious conditions for a ceasefire including Taiwan's expulsion from the UN.

General Peng Dehuai advised Mao to let the Chinese troops halt at the 38th parallel, and recover their strength to fight the following spring. He refused, and the battle recommenced. By 1951, China was suffering serious reverses and heavy casualties. Still Stalin told Mao: "... the Korean War should not be quickened, because Chinese troops can learn about modern war in a lengthy one".

By the July 1953 truce, Peking had won none of its demands and any chance to retake Taiwan had evaporated. The historical reminder on offer from the authors would seem to be that hopes for reunification with Taiwan are ill-served by bad Sino-US relations - then and now.

China has second thoughts on Mao's `great' triumph | World | News | The Independent

I appreciate your input personally because it gives me some perspectives from the other side of the aisle. It appeared you have read this book. I am going to get one myself soon.

 

[jhungary]

Who was confused here? Just look at the underlying part of your sentences you wrote blaming me for wrong choice of words:

The basic Grammar dictate you "ACHIEVE" an goal, not "winning" a goal

That means you have used a wrong choice of word. Blame yourselves for you rudimentary level grammar, don't blame me for misreading your post.

I think, anyone, even not a native English speaker, can spot these but you. Should they be: basic Grammar dictates,a goal, wrong choice of words, Blame yourself, your rudimentary level grammar by the rules of English grammar?

lol

1.) I was thinking about an "Objective" but you were talking about goal, then I change the word to "goal", but I forgot to go back and change the proposition.

2.) Word, not words, I was talking about the word "WINNING", not your word choice in general. that's one word, not plurals. Same as "Word Choice" or unless you are accusing of the thesaurus dictionary of bad grammar too.

Choice of word Synonyms, Choice of word Antonyms | Thesaurus.com

3.) Yourself = Yourselves when you use it on emphasising a point Like this one

Yourselves - definition of yourselves by The Free Dictionary

You better look out for yourselves

4.) lol a typo.......

I know this is a forum and everyone, including me made mistakes. That is why I tend not to nitpick others' grammar skills, and don't intend to write even restaurant menus, let alone writing senior theses, professional articles and manuals(of CIA or NSA).

lol, as if. You were attacking my grammar long before I went on yours, remember you said this on post #75?

This is the second half of my sentence, you forgot, either intentionally or recklessly, the first part of my sentence before the comma. My last sentence was: "China's only goal was no American boots/ military bases near her boarder threading her security, so China is the winner for achieving this objective." You surely know the basic grammar rules,right?

I talk to you on the phone, remember? With whom their oral English sounded broken?? You or me?

I don't proof read cause I see no need to, you heard how my English is, I was educated in the west, my English is fluent, my grammar can be error proof if I wanted to. But, what is the need or point to do that?

NSA have something called an "EDITOR" I provided the point, they make it into the manual. In fact, I have posted the sanitized version of that manual here, you can go take a look.

Understanding Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Part 2 - Conducting HUMINT OPs

Mind you I am the one who put the following at the second graph of my first post starting this thread. Again you showed your over-confidence about yourself - no body can understand the meaning of the word "Praise" better but you. Talking about word, do you understand what does "endorsement" mean? Or "holding out"?

I seriously have problem understanding what you are trying to say here.......

Yes I do. Based on his book, what others have said about his book, the generalization of the 63 chapters, and my past knowledge, even without reading this book, I agreed the line quoted in the Praise "Bevin Alexander...argues in this well-researched and readable book that the United States fought two wars in Korea, winning one against North Korea and losing the other to Communist China."

Therefore, I will say my conclusion once again: "China's only goal was no American boots/ military bases near her boarder threatening her security, so China is the winner for achieving this objective."

You do what? I was asking what did China win. You have to win something and that something cannot be abstract. No American boots/ military bases near her boarder threatening her security is an OBJECTIVE, not a thing you can win. So, I ask again, what did China win?

How could/would you know that for sure that peace talks could have been even conducted 6 months earlier should China stop advancing to the South? We can all make assumptions about history event in hindsight. But remember, as it is said, "Maybe you can start a war in the way you wanted, but you can not dictate how it is going to be ended".

Devil is in the details, perhaps these chapter 55,56 will give some insight about the complexity of reaching peace talks, the complexity you neglected from all your arguments so far.

Chapter 55: The Spring Offensive

The Chinese launch a massive offensive on April 22, 1951. UN forces fall back to the No Name Line, running from just north of Seoul roughly eastward to the Sea of Japan. This line holds. New Eighth Army commander James A. Van Fleet orders a counteroffensive. By June 13, 1951, the Chinese are back to about the 38th parallel, centering their defense on the Iron Triangle. All along the front they establish heavily dug-in emplacements laced with bunkers. Positional war comes to Korea.


Chapter 56: Talking Peace and Practicing War

Andrei Gromyko, deputy Soviet foreign minister, advises Americans on June 23, 1951, to seek a military armistice, not a political settlement, in Korea. On June 30, 1951, Ridgway offers an armistice. Next day the Chinese agree to suspend military operations and hold peace talks at Kaesong on the 38th parallel. The Americans agree to peace talks, but refuse to accept a cease-fire. This is a great mistake, rejecting Gromyko’s advice, and leads to two more years of deadly war.

If you still want to argue further, I suggest you, like I did before, read this Book.

I read the book, and you are not saying the point the author want to express.

You still don't understand.

With Hindsight, I would have suggested that the best time for China to negotiation is January 1951.

Chinese were at their greatest (Watershed) point in January 1951, any point after January 1951 is not as good a position as China ever going to get. They would have stopped at that point, if they were indeed trying to negotiate. But the fact is, they didn't.

It's not the point of negotiation that we are talking about, but rather the "lack of" In fact, without the benefit of the hindsight, the best time to negotiate with UN is between February and March 1951, that is when the UN second counter offensive commenced. Which basically push the Chinese back at 38th. That is when they still have time and their maximum gain when they would have come to the negotiation table immediately after. If negotiation was on their mind.

Launching an offensive negate the effectiveness of any negotiation. Because you cannot know in advance if your offensive is going to be successful or not (In this case, it failed). Hence it sounded extremely stupid if what China want is negotiation and their way to achieve that is by launching an offensive.

What equally stupid is that if negotiation is the reason for an offensive, then why the war drag on for 3 more years which in these 3 years, nothing has changed? You could have got in the first year, or second year, the negotiation would still be the same as there are ABSOUTELY NO TERRITORIAL CHANGE IN THAT 3 YEARS.

Launching an offensive that far from original victories only means one thing, that China have a mind to push UN force out of Korea Entirely.

The author suggested that the US campaign to liberate the whole Korea failed. That does not equate to China has won. Nor was he actually mention if China have won. The war ended in an antebellum. We all know this, but to say China won, lol, even your compatriot did not agree with you, that's the reason why you are the only one still arguing about this.

And let me use what you say to me to get back at you. According to the SCMP, the Professor at East China Normal University said so

East China Normal University history professor Shen Zhihua said Mao certainly wanted to help North Korean leader Kim Il-sung "liberate the South", but also wanted to win the trust of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Doing so helped him consolidate power in his fledgling republic.

China's Korean war veterans still waiting for answers, 60 years on | South China Morning Post

And if I have to pick one to believe, I will believe Professor Shen more than you, now happy?

I appreciate your input personally because it gives me some perspectives from the other side of the aisle. It appeared you have read this book. I am going to get one myself soon

I don't know if he read the book or not, but he is saying a different thing you said.

He is actually echoing on what I said, you can see so in his last 2 paragraph

General Peng Dehuai advised Mao to let the Chinese troops halt at the 38th parallel, and recover their strength to fight the following spring. He refused, and the battle recommenced. By 1951, China was suffering serious reverses and heavy casualties. Still Stalin told Mao: "... the Korean War should not be quickened, because Chinese troops can learn about modern war in a lengthy one".

By the July 1953 truce, Peking had won none of its demands and any chance to retake Taiwan had evaporated. The historical reminder on offer from the authors would seem to be that hopes for reunification with Taiwan are ill-served by bad Sino-US relations - then and now.

 

[jhungary]

I think it should be glorified,up to the 2nd campaign against insurmountable odds CPV achieved it's objective goal, utilizing strategy. This showing China's strategic culture, those men in the North didn't die in vain. Its the odds weighted against them I think amazing; would any other nation succeed as the CPV? Probably only the Viet's! Nah, maybe a few others as well, human spirit an all that.

I would not call CPV a success in any case. Yes, they do overwhelm their enemy and achieve their objective, but the point to win a war is to so that you would be at a better point than the other side. With a war that have no change, does that justified the people who died in the war?

Problem is, for you, this may be a story, an account which you can relate to, for the people that were there, friends or foes, this means something for them, The Chinese have lost way too many men to be anything to reckon with for the next 30 years, that is not a prize appropriate for the cost.

Evans Carlson effectively used guerrillas tactics learned from his time with the communist in his 'Guadalcanal Campaign' against the Japanese in WW2.

700 US/UK vs 2,500 Japanese

US/UK - 16 killed; Japan - 488 killed

I said receiving end, not giving end, if you want to dig up example, US uses Guerrillas to fight the Mexican during the Spanish-American war. Guerrillas is not an invention of the communist, they existed during Roman period......

Of course you're right about sustainable, a lot of hardened vets and ex nationalist died. And like you said, of CPV disposition, what else can they do? They had to follow orders, post war Peng wanted a modernized professional force over Mao's ideological force, he was few who defied Mao.

Are you familiar with Hundred Year Tide by Qing Shi (not read myself). Reads, Mao wanted unification with Taiwan his top priority and Stalin persuaded Mao to intervene with Kim's ambitions to unify Korea.

Excerpt;

The author writes how Stalin gave Mao a supposed power of veto over the war, that senior Chinese generals and Politburo members had serious misgivings about the whole venture, and that Mao disregarded the advice of his senior military commander in North Korea.

April 1949, Mao had requested 200 aircraft and pilot-training from the Soviet Union in support of his plan to take Taiwan from the Nationalist Kuomintang. The Soviet response was "ambiguous". Soon afterwards, North Korea asked Stalin for military support for its plans to invade South Korea, and the Soviet Union chose to back Pyongyang.
May 1950, Kim Il Sung, the North Korea ruler, arrived secretly in Peking, after being told by Stalin to secure Mao's go-ahead for his plan to unify Korea. Kim told Mao that he already had Stalin's backing, but that the final approval must be China's. Mao was "very annoyed that he had been kept in the dark" about this pact, but agreed to the invasion plan. China promised to send troops if American soldiers entered the war. In June 1950, Mao saw his Taiwan ambitions collapse when the US Seventh Fleet sailed into the Taiwan Strait.

"After the death of Stalin, Mao repeatedly complained about Stalin's wrong decision on the Korean War. He called it a big mistake, 100 per cent wrong. Maybe Mao was thinking, without this mistake, the Taiwan problem would not have been stuck in such a dilemma and the Chinese Communist Party would have liberated Taiwan at half the cost it spent on the Korean War,"

Rejecting the official Chinese view that the war was started by a South Korean invasion, the articles state that it was North Korean forces which crossed the border in June 1950 in a successful aggressive assault. Stalin encouraged China to gather its "volunteer" forces along its border with North Korea. When the United Nations troops turned the tide and forced back the North Korea soldiers, "Mao still thought, with Soviet air protection and Soviet military equipment, it was not difficult to defeat the Americans, and if the Chinese troops won in North Korea, the US would not dare to attack China."
Mao's most senior officials and generals thought otherwise. They opposed sending troops and military leaders expressed "lack of confidence in confronting the US," reveals Mr Qing. The role of the Soviet Union as described by these articles is not one usually aired in China. "The Korean War was basically good for Soviet interests in Far East Asia, and that was why Stalin encouraged China to help North Korea ..."

Moscow, still refusing to put its own troops in North Korea, promised to back China if Washington subsequently declared war against Peking. Zhou Enlai was sent to negotiate in Moscow, where Stalin warned: "If your decision is not to send in troops, then socialism in North Korea will soon collapse." That would mean an exiled North Korean government in north- east China, which would put Chinese soil under threat from the US.
Mao gave the go-ahead and in October 1950 Chinese troops swept into North Korea, driving back the UN forces. Mao quickly became over-confident, setting hopelessly ambitious conditions for a ceasefire including Taiwan's expulsion from the UN.

General Peng Dehuai advised Mao to let the Chinese troops halt at the 38th parallel, and recover their strength to fight the following spring. He refused, and the battle recommenced. By 1951, China was suffering serious reverses and heavy casualties. Still Stalin told Mao: "... the Korean War should not be quickened, because Chinese troops can learn about modern war in a lengthy one".

By the July 1953 truce, Peking had won none of its demands and any chance to retake Taiwan had evaporated. The historical reminder on offer from the authors would seem to be that hopes for reunification with Taiwan are ill-served by bad Sino-US relations - then and now.

China has second thoughts on Mao's `great' triumph | World | News | The Independent

The point of the war, I would think it's have more to do with Mao's personal glory than the actual tactical and strategic need. The war went on too long and cost too much for the Chinese. Stalin may have say a long war may be good for China to learn how to fight a modern war, but it won't help if the Chinese are still using primitive equipment and tactics.

That grown on the insecurity of China too, as the country was just established under the communist banner. Any sort of indecision would seems like a weakness for the then new government.

US did the same thing after they freshly got independent. You know what they do? They pick a fight with Britain in Canada.

 

[gambit]

You do what? I was asking what did China win. You have to win something and that something cannot be abstract. No American boots/ military bases near her boarder threatening her security is an OBJECTIVE, not a thing you can win. So, I ask again, what did China win?

Let me I put it this way...

Team A have been defeating all challengers throughout the season.

Team B have had a mixed record of wins and losses.

Team A's attitude is that if there is a winner then there is a loser. It is a binary condition. On/Off. Positive/Negative. Black/White. And so on...

So what Team B did was to refuse to subscribe to the popular conception of winning vs losing. Team B decided that if A beat them by less than 10 pts, Team B would declare that is a 'win' for B. Does not matter what the referee and spectators says. Does not matter the game stats. Does not matter if B players got more injuries or penalized for fouls and violations of the rules. As long as the final score have B within a 10 points deficit to A, Team B will declare itself the 'winner'.

Our man insisted that: "China's only goal was no American boots/ military bases near her boarder threading her security, so China is the winner for achieving this objective."

The problem for his argument is that in a war, the criteria for a victory is applicable to everyone. You win the war by having the enemy submit to you, not to anyone else. You win by wreaking such physical havoc on the enemy that either he plead for peace or you impose a peace. It does not matter if the era is the Spartans vs the Persians or the Iraqi Army vs the US military. If you are in a shooting competition, you win by hitting the center, not by almost center.

So for the Korean War, was the common criteria for victory that there are no US military presence at the China-Korea border ? Of course NOT.

From a geographical perspective, the fact that there is a military presence in South Korea means China lost by her own criteria. The flight time from Seoul to Shenyang is about 1.5 hr. From the military planning perspective, that is 'next door'. In my F-16, I would need only the centerline fuel tank and use the wings for ordnance for either air-air or bombs for use against North Korean artillery. So yes, there is a US military presence at China's Korea door.

 

[BuddhaPalm]

They lost the war of 1812 as well.

 

[Tiqiu]

lol

1.) I was thinking about an "Objective" but you were talking about goal, then I change the word to "goal", but I forgot to go back and change the proposition.

2.) Word, not words, I was talking about the word "WINNING", not your word choice in general. that's one word, not plurals. Same as "Word Choice" or unless you are accusing of the thesaurus dictionary of bad grammar too.

Choice of word Synonyms, Choice of word Antonyms | Thesaurus.com

3.) Yourself = Yourselves when you use it on emphasising a point Like this one

Yourselves - definition of yourselves by The Free Dictionary

You better look out for yourselves

4.) lol a typo.......

Fair enough.

ol, as if. You were attacking my grammar long before I went on yours, remember you said this on post #75?

C'mon, I brought grammar rules up because you had broken up my whole sentence and quoted my second half sentence as the whole sentence.

I talk to you on the phone, remember? With whom their oral English sounded broken?? You or me?
I don't proof read cause I see no need to, you heard how my English is, I was educated in the west, my English is fluent, my grammar can be error proof if I wanted to. But, what is the need or point to do that?

That I don't disagree with you, though first time I was at my office working and second time driving on the road. But thanks for pointing it out, for It should be better. But man, your mandarin sucks big time compared to my not so broken- broken English.

seriously have problem understanding what you are trying to say here.......

If you mean the words "endorsement " or "holding out", then my argument was because The NYT published the ALA booklist praise for the book on their paper, It meant they were to endorse that view. Even that wasn't the intention of the NYT, readers might still regard as it was because it was holding out as it was.

You do what? I was asking what did China win. You have to win something and that something cannot be abstract. No American boots/ military bases near her boarder threatening her security is an OBJECTIVE, not a thing you can win. So, I ask again, what did China win?

You question was Do you actually know what you are talking about?? Win what? So you achieved a goal and you are a winner? So my answer was I do, meaning I know what I mean. Win what? What American lost was what China won.Simple.

"Bevin Alexander...argues in this well-researched and readable book that the United States fought two wars in Korea, winning one against North Korea and losing the other to Communist China.

They lost the war of 1812 as well.

Maybe Americans don't regard losing to the British as loss.