Kerry-Lugar Bill or an attempt to further pressurize Pakistan

[Iron_Eagle_17]

My dear,
First of all it is not petty cash it is 7.5bn USD.

Second you have forgotten very basic rule of diplomecy it is the interest that is permanent not the friendship and who knows better about this other than Pak - US friendship. What would your army/ govt do or gain by withdrawing from Western border except for global isolation and then giving more excuse to US to bomb your country. trust me no body would side with you in that condition as it was you who refused to cooperate (read K-L bill)

Third you must acknowledge that your main weaponary comes from US and any arm twisting there would hurt you badly.

Fourth as it has been said umpteen times that TTP and likes are US cornies so US can then support them more (by far less than 1.5bn USD) to create havoc inside your country.

Saudi Arabia can easily be influenced by US to do some more arm twisting. Also everybody believes in Pak that RAW and Mossad are planning against you under US umbrella and so US would turn a complete blind eye towards that front.

US can earn more gains by giving few concessions to your neighbour (read russia) which would then prove big pain in the neck for pakistan.

Now tell me my dear friend how are you going to survive with US+NATO, Russia, India, Israel, Afghanistan with their armies and intelligence tightning the noose around your neck.

I fully understand and support your reaction to KL bill but please think rationally.

Well done my friend a very good point you have mentioned there.
US+NATO rely on the transit of THEIR Stuff through my country..
It is us who can tighten the noose orund their neck.
All we need is some one with BALLS to do the JOB.
I tell you ONE DAY OUR DAY WILL COME.
All you can do then is wet ur pants, your trade your economy will depend on my country and any bad of my country will be bad for your country.
It is in your long term interest to have and sustain a good relation with us...Or else your children and grandchildren will bear the fruits of your sowing.
Take care....

 

[Iron_Eagle_17]

This is none of your damn business Sprint.Let Pakistanis talk here and avoid trolling.1.5b/year is peanuts.Hell, PIA used to loose more then 1 bil/year.

sir i am not a statistician..(Mind my spellings).
But how much can we save if everyone in pakistan pays Rs 100. Every month I am sure it would be enough to challenge the mere 1.5 billion by the US. If we consider that the 16 Milll of our people are adults.

 

[graphican]

My dear,
First of all it is not petty cash it is 7.5bn USD.

Second you have forgotten very basic rule of diplomacy it is the interest that is permanent not the friendship and who knows better about this other than Pak - US friendship. What would your army/ govt do or gain by withdrawing from Western border except for global isolation and then giving more excuse to US to bomb your country. trust me no body would side with you in that condition as it was you who refused to cooperate (read K-L bill)

Third you must acknowledge that your main weaponary comes from US and any arm twisting there would hurt you badly.

Fourth as it has been said umpteen times that TTP and likes are US cornies so US can then support them more (by far less than 1.5bn USD) to create havoc inside your country.

Saudi Arabia can easily be influenced by US to do some more arm twisting. Also everybody believes in Pak that RAW and Mossad are planning against you under US umbrella and so US would turn a complete blind eye towards that front.

US can earn more gains by giving few concessions to your neighbour (read russia) which would then prove big pain in the neck for pakistan.

Now tell me my dear friend how are you going to survive with US+NATO, Russia, India, Israel, Afghanistan with their armies and intelligence tightning the noose around your neck.

I fully understand and support your reaction to KL bill but please think rationally.

This is a similar kind of "threat" that the world had tried to show us and did everything that they could to stop Pakistan from doing Nuclear Blasts. But unfortunately, we did! So we are not "as wise" as much India or the world wants us to be.

Why do you think USA is dying to prepare an AID package for Pakistan at the time when its own economy and war expense are getting out of control? Millions of Americans are homeless, jobless and looking for its government to support them and even then, inspite of all those do-ables, USA is EAGER to offer Pakistan a 7.5 Billions AID? If you have some common-sense, you would conclude who is in need of who.

Gone are the day when Pakistan could have been brought to knees by blocking our Military Supplies. Guess why? Ever heard of China?

Third, USA is begging for forces, resources and International support over Afghanistan and you like it or not, my country controls important strings of it. So that is not even a possibility that USA would like to twist our arm. It can being so much powerful but not under the circumstances it has stuck in.

 

[omerkhan200940]

dear sirs, i wonder are we that afraid kerry bill well lets say we agree and take thier dollars and enjoy. Atleast we know how to play poker.

 

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

Before derailing this K-L bill we should have considered its effects . The consequences should be studied thorughly along with Risk assesment . However its the right move in favouring National Interests .
I am truely stunned that how the US has lost its power of influence once their DIPLOMATS ruthelessly excercized . It came all the way rolling down from the top of the steep HILL over these Eight years. Thanks MR BUSH2 .

 

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

Pakistan army anger over $1.5bn US aid deal

By Saeed Shah in Islamabad

Pakistan's army has raised "serious concern" over a US aid package worth $1.5 billion a year which it fears will result in Washington being allowed to interfere in government policy.

Pakistan army soldiers patrol on a road in in Matta Photo: AP

The row pits the Pakistan's powerful armed forces against the fragile civilian government of the Pakistan Peoples Party, which championed the US assistance deal.

The military is about to begin a Western-backed offensive against the Taliban and al-Qaida in Waziristan, the epicentre of Pakistani extremism and an important refuge for Afghan insurgents.

Conditions that come with the Kerry-Lugar Bill, passed by Congress late last month, have caused a political storm in Pakistan, with the military now joining the parliamentary opposition in hostility to the aid package.

The Bill, which was supposed to symbolise US commitment to Pakistan, requires monitoring and certification of Pakistan's action against terrorism. It also requires the country to work to prevent nuclear proliferation and show that the military is not interfering in the political process.

According to critics of the legislation, the conditions imply that Pakistan sponsors terrorism and nuclear proliferation, and they resent the intrusion into affairs of the military.

The army's top brass met on Wednesday to consider the Kerry-Lugar legislation at corp commanders' conference at the military headquarters at Rawalpindi.

A statement issued after the corp commanders meeting said: "Chief of army staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, reiterated that Pakistan is a sovereign state and has all the rights to analyse and respond to the threat in accordance with her own national interests.

"The forum expressed serious concern regarding clauses impacting on National Security."

Separately, there was a heated debate in parliament on the US aid Bill, with opposition political parties united against the contentious clauses.

Marvi Memon, an opposition member of parliament, said: "Everyone wants aid, the problem is the conditions, which are tantamount to holding Pakistan hostage to US designs.

"This is a complete affront to national sovereignty."

Farahnaz Ispahani, a member of parliament for the ruling PPP, said that the Bill was being misconstrued.

"This Bill is an attempt by the American taxpayer to give socio-economic aid to the poorest sections of Pakistani society," said Mrs Ispahani. "It is an act of affirmation of a major democracy for another democracy."

The Kerry-Lugar legislation says Pakistan must prevent "al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, from operation in the territory of Pakistan".

It also demands the "dismantling of bases of operations in parts of the country, naming Quetta and Muridke".

Lashkar-e-Taiba is the Pakistani-based group blamed for the carnage in Mumbai last year, which has its headquarters at Muridke, a town just outside Lahore. Quetta is thought to house Mullah Omar, the founder and leader of the Afghan Taliban, from where he runs the so-called "Quetta shura" or leader council of the Taliban.

Hasan Askari Rizvi, a political analyst, said that the army's public statement was surprising and "it amounts to putting pressure on the government".

With the army and opposition united, he said that, under a "worst-case" scenario, given the wave of anti-Americanism sweeping Pakistan, the government could even fall over this issue.

Pakistan army anger over $1.5bn US aid deal - Telegraph

 

[omerkhan200940]

gentlmen; lets not panic we neeed the money.So lets get it. and do whatever we wish be confident

 

[omerkhan200940]

well u all are pessimists

 

[DANGER-ZONE]

we just once have to kik the hell of USA butt,stop their weapon transportation,free taliban to go in afganistan and just reject all the aids from USA.
then USA will crush its fingurs under its teeths.

 

[batmannow]

we just once have to kik the hell of USA butt,stop their weapon transportation,free taliban to go in afganistan and just reject all the aids from USA.
then USA will crush its fingurs under its teeths.

sory for correction!
but ammericans, thy dont like to put thier fingers undr its teeths, thy like the hard way, behind & below!

 

[bigmoneymaker]

please see thru the true color of usa instead of their booasting on wot to gain regional control by killings of terrorists and also far more innocent civilians...all my pakistanis

 

[BATMAN]

Kerry-Lugar bill -- a critique

Nasim Zehra

Jus days before the US President Barack Hussain Obama will be signing the Kerry-Lugar bill thus turning it into law, Pakistan's political parties have woken up to the problems that it may pose -- a late awakening to say the least. For the past one year, the controversial contents of the Kerry-Lugar bill have been widely known. Equally, in the recent months, it was clear that the House and Senate were not quite biting into Pakistani criticism of the bill. Throughout this period, the government seems to have made no transparent attempt to force a change in the text of the bill. The issues that the text of the bill raised and ones that were to negatively affect the Pakistan-US bilateral relationship were neither discussed in any cabinet meeting, defence committee of the cabinet nor in the parliament. Even the opposition, other than making rhetorical statements regarding the bill never brought up the issue properly.

Government attempts were made at an individual level – for example, Pakistan's Ambassador to Washington, Hussain Haqqani -- to lobby for change in the bill. However, such attempts did not really help. The government argues that the removal of the words 'India' and 'A Q Khan', through Pakistan's lobbying, from the text must be appreciated. Other relative 'pluses' in the bill , government representatives argue, include the bringing down of the level of certification, on the conditionalities clause, from the president to secretary of state. From Pakistan's perspective, this is an inconsequential change as long as the certification clauses remain. Also we are told that the waiver clause means that the US President can waive conditions. Yes, but those conditions will be waived in US's national interest, and not when Pakistan needs it, as was done in the case of the Pressler Amendment.

On the removal of the demand that the US government has "direct access" to A Q Khan, the fact is that it has been replaced by a wider net of "direct access to Pakistani national associated with such networks." Significantly, the bill goes beyond supplier networks and factors in involved in "networks relating to acquisition of nuclear weapons related materials." This could include those working to acquire nuclear technology for Pakistan's own nuclear programme.

Similarly, the conditionality on combating terrorism goes into intrusive details of what Pakistan is required to do. Pakistan's battle against terrorism cannot be designed according to Washington, New Delhi and Kabul's threat perception. The bill essentially declares Pakistan the hub of terrorism that has hit the entire region and puts the onus of fighting terrorism on Pakistan.

The strategic plan mentioned in the bill highlights Pakistan as the hub of terrorism in the region by stating that US President Obama will, along with Delhi and Kabul, side with Islamabad on its counter-terrorism policy. Clearly instead of dealing with the problem and the causes simultaneously to make headway in regional cooperation and fighting terrorism, the bill essentially pampers the Indian position on terrorism. Such a bill encourages India to continue with its rejectionist approach to bilateral dialogue.

As for democracy, if the bill had stated aid cut-off in case of a coup, it would have been an acceptable clause but to assign to Washington the role of monitoring if the Pakistan army is interfering in the country's judicial and democratic process is unacceptable. The issue is genuine but the mandate illegitimate.

Another interesting defence for the bill came from the deputy chief of the US embassy who said that the conditionalities only apply to military aid. Whatever the internal power dynamics, Pakistan should be one unit as it engages with external powers. Hence, the opposition to such extreme conditionalities is unacceptable whether applied to military or economic aid. The bill can also trigger a new round of potentially destabilising power dynamics within Pakistan. Ultimately viewed from Pakistan's internal power dynamics, the bill also reflects the civil-military trust deficit. The widely held view among opposition parties and security institutions is that a section of the ruling political leadership went along with, if not actually encouraged, the inclusion of the conditionalities that target Pakistan's security institutions and policies.

There are indeed lingering problems within Pakistan's internal power structure -- its security policy faces road bumps and the chronic problem of often unaccountable and non-transparent exercise of executive and bureaucratic authority aggravates the crisis of governance. However, the message to all of Pakistan's foreign friends during the 2007 Peoples' Movement was that a home-grown movement for democracy was the only legitimate way to rid the country of the curse of military rule. Indeed, in 2007 Washington's view of General Pervez Musharraf's indispensability in leading the Pakistan front on the war on terror had trumped its concerns for its democracy; as had been the case in the 60s and 80s when Washington supported two military dictators. In 2007, the people of Pakistan charted their own democratic journey. Aid bills cannot do that.

Similarly, in the security arena, external diktat mostly works. Only local players can legitimately contest over competing threat perceptions. External players at best can share their wisdom on security matters. The arm twisting delivers results only when a blundering state becomes vulnerable, as Pakistan did during Kargil. Threat perceptions, often grounded in a potpourri of historical facts, myths and fears are not susceptible to arm-twisting or counter-threats. Hard work on bilateral relationships which yields increased cooperation, progress towards resolution of outstanding problems and trust building, can alter threat perceptions.

Aid bills also can't dictate the direction and development of Pakistan's critical military security asset, that is, its nuclear programme. That will be determined by strategic developments in the region. The attempt to curtail Pakistan's nuclear programme by disallowing it to use its own funds that may be untied from projects that US aid may fund is a non-starter way of influencing a state's security policies.

The onus now is on Pakistan's legislature, the national assembly and senate. As custodians of the national interest of a sovereign state, these elected representatives must pass a unanimous resolution on the bill. While appreciating the objectives laid out, the resolution must firmly yet calmly enumerate the unacceptable portions of the bill.

The operative aspect of the resolution should be that in keeping with the demands of Pakistan's national interests and with the requirements of a responsible member of the international community, the parliament and Government of Pakistan will remain committed to four national goals as reflected in Pakistan's policies and laws. One to parliamentary democracy, two to fighting terrorism, three to non-proliferation and four to establishing good relations on the basis of mutual interest and respect with its neighbours, especially Afghanistan and with India.

The resolution must also reiterate the basic principles of sustainable bilateral relations including non-interference, sovereignty, autonomy and mutual respect. The resolution must recognise the United States as an important friend and ally, acknowledge the help it has given in the past and acknowledge its desire, as reflected in the Kerry-Lugar bill, to help Pakistan in future. Finally, the resolution must state that while Pakistan values its relationship with the US, its parliament will be constrained to advise the government to decline US support given the existing conditions.

The ball is now in the court of Pakistan's elected legislators. As they formulate a response they must recognise that if Pakistan faces a financial crunch, the United States faces a strategic one. For the US to walk away from Pakistan is a virtual impossibility at this juncture. It is far more unaffordable for them since Pakistan occupies more than 50 per cent of the space in their strategic calculation. Meanwhile $1.5 billion accounts for roughly three per cent of Pakistan's federal and provincial annual budgets.

If Pakistan's legislators are able to rise to the occasion and craft a consensus response to the Kerry-Lugar bill, they will have proved their worth as men and women who are capable of promoting and protecting the interests and dignity of the citizens of the country. Otherwise, whether democracy or dictatorship, Pakistan's parliament is merely a rubber stamp which follows the will of a handful of individuals who exercise their authority overlooking constitutionally defined institutional mechanisms like the Cabinet, defence committee the parliament.

 

[omerkhan200940]

hey kerry. we need german lugggers not just talk

 

[Vassnti]

I must have missed some thing in the conditions those i have seen basically boil down to dont sell nuke technology to places like north Korea or Iran and dont support terrorists, hardly the sort of conditions that would cause the outrage being expressed.

Could some one kindly list the conditions that are so unnaceptable?

 

[Student]

I must have missed some thing in the conditions those i have seen basically boil down to dont sell nuke technology to places like north Korea or Iran and dont support terrorists, hardly the sort of conditions that would cause the outrage being expressed.

Could some one kindly list the conditions that are so unnaceptable?

Please dont just read it try to understand it too.

Source: http://www.ibitians.com/2009/10/03/f...ls-conditions/
S.1707

Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by Senate)

SEC. 203. LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE.

(a) Limitation on Security-related Assistance: For fiscal years 2011 through 2014, no security-related assistance may be provided to Pakistan in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.

(b) Limitation on Arms Transfers: For fiscal years 2012 through 2014, no letter of offer to sell major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC 2751 et seq.) and no license to export major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to such Act in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.

(c) Certification: The certification required by this subsection is a certification by the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, to the appropriate congressional committees that: (1) the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks;

(2) the Government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups, consistent with the purposes of assistance described in section 201, including taking into account the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has made progress on matters such as (A) ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighbouring countries; (B) preventing al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighbouring countries, closing terrorist camps in the Fata, dismantling terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; and (C) strengthening counterterrorism and anti-money laundering laws; and (3) the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.

(d) Certain Payments: (1) IN GENERAL- Subject to paragraph (2), none of the funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, or any amounts appropriated to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), may be obligated or expended to make payments relating to (A) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-YAD signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006; (B) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-NAP signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006; and C) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-SAF signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006.

(2) EXCEPTION: Funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 may be used for construction and related activities carried out pursuant to the Letters of Offer and Acceptance described in paragraph (1).

(e) Waiver: (1) IN GENERAL – The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may waive the limitations contained in subsections (a), (b), and (d) for a fiscal year if the Secretary of State determines that is important to the national security interests of the United States to do so.

(2) PRIOR NOTICE OF WAIVER: The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may not exercise the authority of paragraph (1) until seven days after the Secretary of State provides to the appropriate congressional committees a written notice of the intent to issue to waiver and the reasons therefore. The notice may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

(f) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined: In this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

SEC. 204. PAKISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITY FUND.

(a) For Fiscal Year 2010: (1) IN GENERAL – For fiscal year 2010, the Department of State’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), hereinafter in this section referred to as the `Fund’, shall consist of the following: (A) Amounts appropriated to carry out this subsection (which may not include any amounts appropriated to carry out title I of this Act).

(B) Amounts otherwise available to the Secretary of State to carry out this subsection.

(2) PURPOSES OF FUND: Amounts in the Fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year are authorised to be used by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defence, to build and maintain the counterinsurgency capability of Pakistan under the same terms and conditions (except as otherwise provided in this subsection) that are applicable to amounts made available under the Fund for fiscal year 2009.

(3) TRANSFER AUTHORITY: (A) IN GENERAL – The Secretary of State is authorised to transfer amounts in the fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year to the Department of Defence’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32) and such amounts may be transferred back to the Fund if the Secretary of Defence, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determines that such amounts are not needed for the purposes for which initially transferred.

(B) TREATMENT OF TRANSFERRED FUNDS: Subject to subsections (d) and (e) of section 203, transfers from the Fund under the authority of subparagraph (A) shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes and for the same time period as amounts in the Department of Defence’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund.

(C) RELATION TO OTHER AUTHORITIES: The authority to provide assistance under this subsection is in addition to any other authority to provide assistance to foreign countries.

(D) NOTIFICATION: The Secretary of State shall, not less than 15 days prior to making transfers from the Fund under subparagraph (A), notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing of the details of any such transfer.

(b) Submission of Notifications: Any notification required by this section may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined: In this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

SEC. 205. REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVILIAN CONTROL OF CERTAIN ASSISTANCE

(a) Requirements: (1) IN GENERAL – For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, any direct cash security-related assistance or non-assistance payments by the United States to the Government of Pakistan may only be provided or made to civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan.

(2) DOCUMENTATION: For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defence, shall ensure that civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan have received a copy of final documentation provided to the United States related to non-assistance payments provided or made to the Government of Pakistan.

(b) Waiver: 1) SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE: The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defence, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to security-related assistance described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 150 (International Affairs) if the Secretary of State certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.

(2) NON-ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS: The Secretary of Defence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to non-assistance payments described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 050 (National Defence) if the Secretary of Defense certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.

(c) Application to Certain Activities- Nothing in this section shall apply with respect to (1) any activities subject to reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.); (2) any assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation in democratic processes; (3) any assistance or payments if the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that subsequent to the termination of assistance or payments a democratically elected government has taken office; (4) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 1208 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375; 118 Stat. 2086), as amended; (5) any payments made pursuant to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; and (6) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 943 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110-417; 122 Stat. 4578).

(d) Definitions- In this section (1) the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations of the Senate; and (2) the term ‘civilian government of Pakistan’ does not include any government of Pakistan whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.

TITLE III—STRATEGY, ACCOUNTABILITY, MONITORING, AND OTHER PROVISIONS SEC. 301. STRATEGY REPORTS.

(a) Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report- Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing United States policy and strategy with respect to assistance to Pakistan under this Act. The report shall include the following: (1) A description of the principal objectives of United States assistance to Pakistan to be provided under title I of this Act.

(2) A general description of the specific programs, projects, and activities designed to achieve the purposes of section 101 and the respective funding levels for such programs, projects, and activities for fiscal years 2010 through 2014.

(3) A plan for program monitoring, operations research, and impact evaluation research for assistance authorized under title I of this Act.

(4) A description of the role to be played by Pakistani national, regional, and local officials and members of Pakistani civil society and local private sector, civic, religious, and tribal leaders in helping to identify and implement programs and projects for which assistance is to be provided under this Act, and of consultations with such representatives in developing the strategy.

(5) A description of the steps taken, or to be taken, to ensure assistance provided under this Act is not awarded to individuals or entities affiliated with terrorist organizations.

(6) A projection of the levels of assistance to be provided to Pakistan under this Act, broken down into the following categories as described in the annual `Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Determining the Eligibility of Candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account Assistance’: (A) Civil liberties. (B) Political rights. (C) Voice and accountability. (D) Government effectiveness. (E) Rule of law. (F) Control of corruption. (G) Immunization rates. (H) Public expenditure on health. (I) Girls’ primary education completion rate. (J) Public expenditure on primary education. (K) Natural resource management. (L) Business start-up. (M) Land rights and access. (N) Trade policy. (O) Regulatory quality. (P) Inflation control. (Q) Fiscal policy.

(7) An analysis for the suitable replacement for existing Pakistani helicopters, including recommendations for sustainment and training.

(b) Comprehensive Regional Strategy Report: (1) SENSE OF CONGRESS: It is the sense of Congress that the achievement of United States national security goals to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan requires the development of a comprehensive plan that utilizes all elements of national power, including in coordination and cooperation with other concerned governments, and that it is critical to Pakistan’s long-term prosperity and security to strengthen regional relationships among India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

(2) COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: The President shall develop a comprehensive interagency regional security strategy to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan, including by working with the Government of Pakistan and other relevant governments and organizations in the region and elsewhere, as appropriate, to best implement effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts in and near the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the FATA, the NWFP, parts of Balochistan, and parts of Punjab.

(3) REPORT: (A) IN GENERAL- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the comprehensive regional security strategy required under paragraph (2).

(B) CONTENTS- The report shall include a copy of the comprehensive regional security strategy, including specifications of goals, and proposed timelines and budgets for implementation of the strategy.

(C) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED: In this paragraph, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (i) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (ii) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(c) Security-related Assistance Plan- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for the proposed use of amounts authorized for security-related assistance for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014. Such plan shall include an assessment of how the use of such amounts complements or otherwise is related to amounts described in section 204.

SEC. 302. MONITORING REPORTS.

(a) Semi-Annual Monitoring Report- Not later than 180 days after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), and every 180 days thereafter through September 30, 2014, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the assistance provided under this Act during the preceding 180-day period. The report shall include—

(1) a description of all assistance by program, project, and activity, as well as by geographic area, provided pursuant to title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, including the amount of assistance provided for each program or project, and with respect to the first report a description of all amounts made available for assistance to Pakistan during fiscal year 2009, including a description of each program, project, and activity for which funds were made available; (2) a list of persons or entities from the United States or other countries that have received funds in excess of $100,000 to conduct projects under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, which may be included in a classified annex, if necessary to avoid a security risk, and a justification for the classification; (3) with respect to the plan described in section 301(a)(3), updates to such plan and a description of best practices to improve the impact of the assistance authorized under title I of this Act; (4) an assessment of the effectiveness of assistance provided under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report in achieving desired objectives and outcomes as guided by the plan described in section 301(a)(3), and as updated pursuant to paragraph (3) of this subsection, including a systematic, qualitative, and where possible, quantitative basis for assessing whether desired outcomes are achieved and a timeline for completion of each project and program; (5) a description of any shortfall in United States financial, physical, technical, or human resources that hinder the effective use and monitoring of such funds; (6) a description of any negative impact, including the absorptive capacity of the region for which the resources are intended, of United States bilateral or multilateral assistance and recommendations for modification of funding, if any; (7) any incidents or reports of waste, fraud, and abuse of expenditures under title I of this Act; (8) the amount of funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to section 102 that were used during the reporting period for administrative expenses or for audits and program reviews pursuant to the authority under sections 101(c)(2) and 103; (9) a description of the expenditures made from any Chief of Mission Fund established pursuant to section 101(c)(5) during the period covered by the report, the purposes for which such expenditures were made, and a list of the recipients of any expenditures from the Chief of Mission Fund in excess of $100,000; (10) an accounting of assistance provided to Pakistan under title I of this Act, broken down into the categories set forth in section 301(a)(6); (11) an evaluation of efforts undertaken by the Government of Pakistan to (A) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist and terrorist groups in the FATA and settled areas; (B) eliminate the safe havens of such forces in Pakistan; (C) close terrorist camps, including those of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed; (D) cease all support for extremist and terrorist groups; (E) prevent attacks into neighbouring countries; (F) increase oversight over curriculum in Madrassas, including closing Madrassas with direct links to the Taliban or other extremist and terrorist groups; and (G) improve counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering laws, apply for observer status for the Financial Action Task Force, and take steps to adhere to the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism; (12) a detailed description of Pakistan’s efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise; (13) an assessment of whether assistance provided to Pakistan has directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, whether by the diversion of United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan’s financial resources that would otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons program; (14) a detailed description of the extent to which funds obligated and expended pursuant to section 202(b) meet the requirements of such section; and (15) an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration.

(b) Government Accountability Office Reports:

(1) PAKISTAN ASSISTANCE STRATEGY REPORT: Not later than one year after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains (A) a review of, and comments addressing, the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report; (B) recommendations relating to any additional actions the Comptroller General believes could help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of United States efforts to meet the objectives of this Act; (C) a detailed description of the expenditures made by Pakistan pursuant to grant assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC.

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