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Kerry-Lugar Bill or an attempt to further pressurize Pakistan

I don't believe the opposition is gunning for the government to fall, at least not publicly so, with the PML-N leadership stating during the parliamentary debate that it did not want to destabilize the government.

Both the PML-N and PML-Q have in fact stated that they are willing to openly accept the bill if some of the controversial conditions are removed, which is really what the opposition boils down to.

Barring accountability on how aid is utilized and a 'no military coups' condition, there is absolutely no need for any of the other language.

Also, I disagree on your point about how military aid was in the past diverted - that issue has been extensively discussed here: http://www.defence.pk/forums/pakistans-war/30821-where-did-10-billion-us-aid-pakistan-go.html

Good to know there is perhaps heat infront of the camera and light in the discussion behind it.

It was actually that thread and the post by Fatman that was the basis for the coment,

General Mahmud Durrani, whose thesis is that Pakistan has disadvantaged itself politically and economically by pursuing India-centric strategies, says money went into buying equipment better suited to fighting India in Afghanistan than to fighting terrorists. It bought armour-piercing TOW missiles, sophisticated surveillance equipment, air-to-air missiles, maritime patrol aircraft, anti-ship missiles and F-16 fighter aircraft.

time perhaps for me to reread the thread.
 
Obama briefed on Pak political situation
Updated at: 0635 PST, Thursday, October 08, 2009


WASHINGTON: A key meeting was held to brief US President Barrack Obama on Pakistan’s Political situations.

According to sources, US President were given briefing on Pakistan’s political situation regarding Kerry-Lugar (KL) Bill in the meeting held in White House.

Top level military, intelligence and political official attended the meeting.

Obama is considering to increase cooperation to counter Al Qaida.

Meanwhile current situation in Afghanistan was also discussed in the meeting

Obama briefed on Pak political situation
 
President, PM discuss Army’s concern
Thursday, October 08, 2009
By our correspondent

ISLAMABAD: Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani is likely to convene a meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) soon to discuss the strategic issues related to the Kerry-Lugar Bill.

The decision was taken during a meeting between President Asif Ali Zardari and Gilani at the Presidency on Wednesday night. The meeting was held in the backdrop of the Army’s announcement that it had “serious concerns” over some clauses of the bill.

Gilani just after his speech in the National Assembly went to meet the president. They discussed in detail the Army’s reaction over the Kerry-Lugar Bill, the sources said. They said it was decided that to remove the concerns of the Army, talks would be held with them.

On the advice of Zardari, the PM would convene a meeting of the DCC in which the Army chief, the chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee and services chiefs will also participate.

President, PM discuss Army’s concern
 
White House assessing reaction in Pakistan
Thursday, October 08, 2009
By Sami Abraham

WASHINGTON: Top-level behind the scene deliberations began in the White House here on Wednesday to re-evaluate the progress in the war on terror with particular emphasis on the situation in Pakistan. In the first meeting held between Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, National Security Adviser James Jones and Defence Secretary Robert Gates the Pakistani reaction over the Kerry-Lugar Bill also reportedly came under discussion.

Sources in the White House revealed the situation evolving in Pakistan on the Kerry-Lugar Bill has put the Obama administration in an awkward position and a number of key conservative hawks have asked to reassess the US efforts to find enduring partnership with Pakistan. “It is not a good picture. It has put all types of aid in jeopardy,” said a foreign relations committee top official on condition of anonymity.

The White House officials confirmed a meeting of the National Security Council with President Obama in the chair was scheduled to be held later in the afternoon. Among those who were expected to attend included Vice-President Joe Biden; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Defence Secretary Robert Gates, permanent US representative to the United Nations Ambassador Susan Rice, US special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen, Commander of the US Central Command General David Petraeus, National Security Adviser General James Jones, Director National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair, CIA Director Leon Panetta, Deputy National Security Adviser Tom Donilon and Assistant to the president for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security John Brennan.

US commander in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal, US Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry and US Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson will take part in the discussions via video-conference.

A White House official confirmed to The News President Obama is not expected to sign the Kerry-Lugar Bill right away. “In fact we are trying to assess what is transpiring in Pakistan,” he added. Senator John Kerry, who took part in the White House consultations on Tuesday, told reporters at the Capitol Hill that the situation was very complicated in Afghanistan. The current strategy was not working well over there, and it did not have a military solution either, so the Obama administration was having a very careful look before deciding what should be the next step.

Senator Kerry said the biggest question is to carefully analyse what could be the impact on Pakistan if military surge was to happen in Afghanistan. He said the government in Afghanistan was dysfunctional either because of corruption or due to lack of political support, which was needed to resolve the problem.

“I think a lot of Senators and Congressmen need to ask themselves how much money they are willing to put on the table, for how long and for what strategy,” said Senator Kerry. “This is a tough set of inter-related questions. And I think there have been some unfortunate straw men set up.” he added.

The White House sources say most of the participants of the meeting were of the view that the momentum of success in Swat and Malakand operation must continue and dialogue with those Taliban who were willing to surrender and dissociate from al-Qaeda must be encouraged.

White House assessing reaction in Pakistan
 
Rawalpindi - October 7, 2009:

122 Corps Commanders Conference was held at General Headquarters today. The Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani chaired the day long meeting. The participants were given a comprehensive briefing on the current security situation in the country and the region.

COAS in his opening remarks dilated upon various issues related to national security and impending challenges faced by the country. COAS reiterated that Pakistan is a sovereign state and has all the rights to analyse and respond to the threat in accordance with her own national interests.

Kerry Lugar bill also came under discussion during the conference. The forum expressed serious concern regarding clauses impacting on National Security. A formal input is being provided to the Government. However, in the considered view of the forum, it is the Parliament, that represents the will of the people of Pakistan, which would deliberate on the issue, enabling the Government to develop a National response.

COAS in his concluding remarks reiterated that Pakistan stands committed to global and regional peace, and wishes to live in harmony with her neighbours.





Why is Chief so angry???:what::what::what:

KIT Out
 
It is very much obvious that Pakistan is economically weak and we need aid to strengthen our declining economy. Kerry Lugar bill is a best source of oxygen for our fragile economy. It is great achievement by president Zardari.

On the other hand new wave of anti-American sentiment in Pakistan has slowed the arrival of hundreds of U.S. civilian and military officials charged with implementing assistance programs,
undermined cooperation in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and put American lives at risk, according to officials from both countries.”

Those who have leaked the story have deliberately chosen to do so at a time when the Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FoDP) summit is going on.

Stories like these have been leaked by people who think they can harm President Asif Ali Zardari and Ambassador Husain Haqqani. However,what they fail to understand is that President Zardari and Ambassador Haqqani represent Pakistan and that in spreading such stories they are hurting Pakistan.

The international community is on the side of Pakistan and Pakistanis and wants to help them. We need trade, aid and assistance from our allies like the United States. The Kerry-Lugar bill which was just passed has increased American aid to Pakistan to $1.5 billion every year for the next five years. This is time to strengthen Pakistan’s relations with the United States and not to attack the relationship.

And for 1.5 billion$ which are not even 10% of Pakistans current budget we should trade our soveriegniety?Dont u think tht in this bill kill usa clearly indicates tht it doesnt trust Pakistan army or any of its security concerned organization?AFTER LOSING 1900 SOLDIERS,I SAY TO HELL WITH THIS BILL OR KILL BILL.WE CAN SURVIVE EVEN WITHOUT 1.5 BILLION:hitwall::pakistan:
 
Powered by pride, Pakistan set to reject Kerry-Lugar Bill
PM favours civil-military scrutiny of US terms
Tuesday October 06, 2009 (1144 PST)





ISLAMABAD: The government is gently moving in a direction where it may reject the Kerry-Lugar Bill in its present shape.

The rejection will be accompanied by a request to the US Congress and the Obama administration for an understanding of Pakistan’s sovereignty and its right to decide issues of national security and foreign policy, according to several senior Pakistani officials and an important federal cabinet minister. The sources spoke to this correspondent on condition of anonymity.

“I’ll be very very surprised if Pakistan accepts the Kerry-Lugar Bill with its present formulations because the nation wouldn’t allow a trade-off between sovereignty and US aid,” said an important federal cabinet member, reflecting the prevailing sense in government circles on the issue.

Less than a week after the passage of the Kerry-Lugar Bill by the American Congress, the civil and military leadership in Pakistan is sharing strong concerns with opposition politicians, the media, intellectuals and clerics over certain provisions in the bill where the US government has sought to oversee the key components of Pakistan’s foreign policy and national security. A public outrage was witnessed in the country as the content of the Kerry-Lugar Bill became public last week.

Renowned columnist and MNA Ayaz Amir wrote in his weekly column in our sources: “This is less an assistance programme than a treaty of surrender.” “Thank God, Kerry and Lugar did not think of getting the name of Pakistan changed!” wrote renowned columnist Anees Jillani in an op-ed article in Dawn.

Amid growing concerns across the country that an increasingly controversial Kerry-Lugar Bill has also prejudged Pakistan as a state allowing bases for terrorist operations in the tribal areas and cities, Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani has ordered a hold-back of an official response from the government on the bill until it is fully examined by parliament and the country’s military leadership, senior officials said.

As a result of this decision that will entail several actions over the next two weeks, these sources said, the premier also sent an urgent message on Sunday to Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi, now in Washington, not to make any comment on the bill during his public engagements there.

In the backdrop of an upheaval in the media and political circles soon after the passage of the Kerry-Lugar Bill, laced with somewhat insulting clauses, Gilani held an important review of the bill with Chief of Army Staff Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani in an unpublicised meeting on Sunday.

An informed official said an initial review of the Kerry-Lugar Bill by military strategists also shares a negative perception on various clauses of the bill and it is being shared with US security and military officials at various levels.

A federal cabinet minister said the prime minister has devised a multi-tier transparent review of the bill. Parliament and the prime minister want to carry out a threadbare examination of the bill followed by a similar scrutiny by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC). Officials said the military- and security-related elements of the Kerry-Lugar Bill would soon be placed before the corps commanders of the Pakistan Army as well as the three services at the Joint Staff Headquarters level to assist the prime minister in drafting Pakistan’s official response.

A suspicion is gaining strength in the civil and military leadership that some elements of the Kerry-Lugar Bill aim specifically at creating a deep wedge between the civilian authority and the General Headquarters (GHQ) by raising well-settled issues and linking them with the US aid to Pakistan. The most provocative clause of the bill on this issue states: “An assessment of the extent to which the government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration.” The clause clearly dictates an upside down approach to turn the way the military and civilian authorities function in their well defined domains in Pakistan, an important official source observed.

“I think this is mischief to create a huge civil-military conflict but this will not happen. The prime minister fully understands the game,” the minister said.

Pakistani officials are unanimous in their opinion that the bill was a humiliating document for the country that has been offered to the government in exchange for Pakistan’s critical support in the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. In post-Kerry-Lugar Bill discussions held quietly by the prime minister, some officials favour a transit treaty for Pakistan with Nato and American forces for a smooth flow of military and non-military supplies from the port of Karachi to Afghanistan. Some 5,000 containers of military and non-military supplies for the US and Nato forces are cleared through the port of Karachi for various destinations in Afghanistan every month, an official informed.

As controversial elements and critical strings attached to the Kerry-Lugar Bill continue to unfold, there is a growing impression in the opposition circles and the security establishment that Pakistan’s diplomatic corps, particularly its embassy in Washington, failed to convince the US lawmakers on matters of mutual security interest, thus clauses were added in the bill that may compromise Pakistan’s sovereignty over issues of critical national interest. Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington Husain Haqqani consistently maintains that neither the United States nor the government of Pakistan had a sway over content of the bill and Indian lobbying power far outweighs Pakistan’s meagre resources to lobby the US Congress.

The bill determines that major Pakistani cities such as Quetta and Muridke near Lahore were serving as bases for terrorist operations and Pakistan would have to mount operations in these cities to ensure flow of financial assistance under the Kerry-Lugar Bill.

The bill also carries a damning declaration that Pakistani military and its intelligence services support extremist and terrorist groups and desires that this perceived support is “ceased” for continued flow of funds to Pakistan.

The bill has so far not divided the Pakistani political spectrum along party lines. Condemnation of controversial clauses of the bill has been heard both from the leaders of the PPP, including Mian Raza Rabbani, and whole range of PML-N leaders besides more aggressive protests from the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Tehrik-e-Insaf.

Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly Ch Nisar Ali Khan set the ball rolling for an anti-Kerry-Lugar Bill campaign in Pakistan on Monday when he stood up on the floor of the Lower House to declare that the bill only protects the rights and objectives of the American government while for Pakistan it has mortgaged even the future of Pakistani children.

End.

Pakistan News PakTribune.Com
 
Kerry-Lugar Bill is an insult, Army tells US military
Wednesday October 07, 2009 (1120 PST)






KARACHI: As anger mounts over the degrading language and observations in the Kerry-Lugar Bill on Pakistan’s military services and intelligence agencies, the Army conveyed its part of protest to the US when Commander of International Forces in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal met Army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani at the GHQ on Tuesday.


These officials said that General Kayani told General McChrystal that like the Pakistani people, the military and intelligence services were furious at the observations made on Pakistan’s security establishment in the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Kayani also protested over the controversial statements made by some US officials in recent days.

“General McChrystal returned from the GHQ with an unambiguous message that the terms set in the Kerry-Lugar Bill on the national security interests of Pakistan are insulting and are unacceptable in their present formulation,” according to an official familiar with the content of the meeting.

Informed official sources said that the Army’s strong reaction to the Kerry-Lugar Bill was shared in detail with the government when General Kayani met Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani on Sunday.

In a related development, also on Tuesday, Gilani asked Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi to convey Pakistan’s reservations in his meetings with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Obama’s Special Envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke and key members of the US Congress.

While Tuesday’s meeting with General McChrystal provided General Kayani with an opportunity to convey the Army’s serious objection to the controversial sections of the bill in detail, he had lodged an initial protest during his meeting with General McChrystal in Kabul, where he had gone last week toattend the tripartite military conference.

The Kerry-Lugar Bill and its impact on national security interests of Pakistan will be a key subject of discussion when the corps commanders and principal staff officers of the Army meet under General Kayani on Wednesday.

While the nation’s response is currently focused at the controversial content of the Kerry-Lugar Bill, the government is also concerned about a growing unregulated arrival and stay of American citizens in Pakistan.

Concerns grew when Pakistanís security agencies recorded various cases of illegal acquisition of weapons by security firms connected with the US Embassy in Pakistan. Prime Minister Gilani, sources said, has already ordered a complete record with specific details and pre-clearance of US citizens entering Pakistan on US government business.

End.
Pakistan News PakTribune.Com
 
Obama delays signing Kerry-Lugar bill


WASHINGTON (October 07, 2009): President Obama has delayed signing Kerry-Lugar bill due to reports of criticism on the bill in Pakistan, Aaj news reported Wednesday.

According to the channel sources, the decision came following reports in regard to reservations and questions raised by different sectors in Pakistan over the bill.

It is pertinent to mention that Kerry-Lugar bill is being debated in the national assembly as PML-N Tuesday tabled the adjournment motion to debate on Kerry-Lugar bill in the Lower House which speaker Fehmida Mirza accepted for debate.
 
Charity or a right?

Ikram Sehgal

The sacrifice rendered by this country since 1979 because of Afghanistan is a matter of record. Gen Zia-ul-Haq dismissed the initial figure of $300 million offered by President Carter as "peanuts." Though this figure went up substantially with Reagan as US president, what we have received since then from the US in aids and grants, barring a decade-plus of sanctions during the 90s (because of the Pressler Amendment and the nuclear explosion in 1998). Since 2001, US financial and material support has been substantial, but never enough to compensate the nation.

While being grateful to Senators Kerry and Lugar for the intent, purpose (and efforts thereof) to bring necessary succour through the passage of the bill in the US Congress, the whole exercise will likely become counter-productive in terms of fostering goodwill among Pakistanis for the US. This is not only unfortunate but tragic. The economic side (Title I), $1.5 billion every year for five years, benchmarks notwithstanding, is most generous and welcome to an impoverished and almost bankrupt country, the conditionalities attached to the Security Assistance portion (Title II), of which the figure is not known but is believed to be cumulatively close to $1 billion per year, It is downright insulting, and would be unacceptable to any self-respecting nation. Acquiescence would mean Pakistan tacitly accepting being actively engaged in "cross-border terrorism." The sequence of the conditionalities spelt out is coincidentally strikingly similar to the charge-sheet against us by Indian leaders. This is not the language of the US government, the hand of the Indian lobby was certainly manifest in the drafting of the bill.

The building of the Aswan Dam by the Russians got them undying love from the Egyptians because it impacted positively on their lives and destiny. Similarly, the US should have focussed on a couple of huge dams and power projects--e.g., the Mangla Dam. Cheap electricity and available water is badly required by the people of Pakistan. Allocating funds for purchase of aircraft for a black hole like PIA, instead of dams and power projects, is mind-boggling! As for the unacceptable conditionalities in the Security Assistance portion, we should politely say "thanks, but no thanks," and consign it to the dustbin.

There must be a paradigm shift in our thinking. Pragmatic policies must adopt international practices. One thing is clear, we cannot afford a Taliban-jihadist success in Afghanistan, we have a vested interest in the US succeeding. The Afghanistan war is possible because US and NATO logistics are mostly transiting through Pakistan. Certainly there are other routes to landlocked Afghanistan by road but the distances to be covered are fairly large, logistically difficult and far more costly in comparison to the Karachi-Kandahar and Karachi-Kabul routes. Russia's gas pipelines to Europe are subject to service fees for the transportation of gas from the source through to the various countries consumer, Russia and Ukraine had a very public spat about "service charges" when Ukraine asked for an increase in the charges for the right of way. Our roads and bridges are being subjected to heavy and constant wear and tear. Charging fees for the transit of supplies is our right. The quantum of fees maybe negotiable, the right is not. Locally, transportation charges for Pakistani exporters and importers have gone up substantially because in the US pays fairly high freight charges to the transporters. This increases our import bill, our exports have become costlier and thus less competitive, overall affecting our balance of trade adversely.

One can always depend upon the reliable Dr Farrukh Saleem for correct statistics; he is impeccable about the figures he quotes. His best estimates about US money being pumped into Afghanistan, about $6 billion per month on US and NATO forces and about $1.5 billion per month ($18 billion annually) in support of the Karzai government and the Afghan army. If we take $72 billion annually (for US forces alone), the conservative estimate is that about $50 billion (65 percent) is meant for supplies, like ammunition, fuel and rations. International practices for transit fees range from 15 to 20 percent--i.e., other the actual freight charges within Pakistan. Taking the lower figure of 15 percent, this comes to about $7.5 billion annually. Without resorting to ultimatums, we should negotiate a figure of about $ 6-7 billion annual "transit fees" per year from the US for a period of three years, and renegotiate again if the requirement is still there after three years. In relative terms this would still be about 30 percent of funds doled out to Afghanistan directly and only 6-7 percent of the total outlay annually, in population terms 18-20 times more for each Afghan than for every Pakistani despite Pakistan suffering three to four times more military and civilian casualties and far more material damage than all of Afghanistan annually. Pakistan should rightfully earn "transit fees," and not hold out a beggar's bowl, prosecuting its own "war against terrorism" and fighting counter-insurgency at its own will "on an as-required" basis. Morally speaking, why risk a developing country like Pakistan for the quagmire that is Afghanistan?

The Musharraf regime did negotiate reimbursement for use of our air bases, direct military costs, etc., but its failure to drive a hard bargain stemmed mainly from fear for Musharraf's own survival. This set the stage for the economic predicament we are in, frittering away the funds to keep the population happy (feel-good environment) by supporting a consumer-oriented economy instead of using the money wisely by investing in socio-economic projects of substance. Funds meant for the military were diverted to supporting consumer imports, all adding to our deficit fuel and electricity.

Dr Farrukh Saleem holds that perhaps we could perhaps have succeeded earlier. We lack the strength (and the political courage) to negotiate such an arrangement now. Despite being in desperate economic straits, our political leadership must stand up and be counted as the leaders of any sovereign nation should. Or stand aside and let this nation get on with its existence.
 
we should negotiate a figure of about $ 6-7 billion annual "transit fees" per year from the US
I disagree to this point and in my calculation, it should be minimum 20 billion dollars.
Reasons because it should not be calculated as percentage of US spending on its logistics.
It should be calculated based on US prestige and image and other alternatives available to US.
 
If you people come out on the roads and ask EACH AND EVERY PERSON about k-Bill... are u people intrested to accept this BS K-Bill im 101% bet surety everyone say "NO WAY NO CHANCE WE DONT NEED THIS"

Today i reached my office in the morning and this bill under discussion in my office collegz everyone happy and said "Zabadast ub tu military aagye hey beec hmay ye accept nahi hoga hamko nahhi chhaye"

including female collegz also happy about this now WHAT ZARDARI WANT.. and WANT PAKISTANI PEOPLE WANT!!!


WE REALLY DONT NEED THIS K-BILL!!

My trust on this....

"Once we reject this AID from US forever we will learn how to live longer with pride and we will!" We really dont need this kind of billz aids etc..
 
Kerry Lugar Bill as promoted by the current regime installed by a Coup Detta backed by a so called will is not acceptable to the people of Pakistan. :pakistan:

Any political party that supports this fraud piece of legislation will be a traitor to the nation.

Mr sharif come back to pakistan and speak against this bill but you cant because you have been compromised too for saving your own skin.

We the people of Pakistan stand shoulder to shoulder with the COAS in opposition to this bill.

Mr Zardari Mr Haqqani Mr Asfand Yar Mr Sharif Mr Altaf we do not doubt that you are not working hard enough but who are you working for?..

There is no place for KLB in Pakistan.:pakistan:
 
Following is the CONTENT of the KL BILL. I have highlighted the MASHKOOK parts in red. Let us read and then comment further.



S 962 ES

111th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 962

AN ACT

To authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 to promote an enhanced strategic partnership with Pakistan and its people, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ‘Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009’.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The people of Pakistan and the United States have a long history of friendship and comity, and the interests of both nations are well-served by strengthening and deepening this friendship.

(2) In February 2008, the people of Pakistan elected a civilian government, reversing years of political tension and mounting popular concern over governance and their own democratic reform and political development.

(3) A democratic, moderate, modernizing Pakistan would represent the wishes of the Pakistani people and serve as a model to other countries around the world.

(4) Economic growth is a fundamental foundation for human security and national stability in Pakistan, a country with over 175,000,000 people, an annual population growth rate of 2 percent, and a ranking of 136 out of 177 countries in the United Nations Human Development Index.

(5) Pakistan is a major non-NATO ally of the United States and has been a valuable partner in the battle against al Qaeda and the Taliban, but much more remains to be accomplished by both nations.

(6) The struggle against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and affiliated terrorist groups has led to the deaths of several thousand Pakistani civilians and members of the security forces of Pakistan over the past 7 years.

(7) Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, more al Qaeda terrorist suspects have been apprehended in Pakistan than in any other country, including Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Abu Faraj al-Libi.

(8) Despite the sacrifices and cooperation of the security forces of Pakistan, the top leadership of al Qaeda, as well as the leadership and rank-and-file of affiliated terrorist groups, are believed to be using Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan as a haven and a base from which to organize terrorist actions in Pakistan and globally, including–

(A) attacks outside of Pakistan that have been attributed to groups with Pakistani connections, including–

(i) the suicide car bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, which killed 58 people on June 7, 2008; and
(ii) the massacre of approximately 165 people in Mumbai, India, including 6 United States citizens, in late November 2008; and

(B) attacks within Pakistan, including–

(i) an attack on the visiting Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore on March 3, 2009;
(ii) an attack at the Marriott hotel in Islamabad on September 9, 2008;
(iii) the bombing of a political rally in Karachi on October 18, 2007;
(iv) the targeting and killing of dozens of tribal, provincial, and national holders of political office;
(v) an attack by gunfire on the U.S. Principal Officer in Peshawar in August 2008; and
(vi) the brazen assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007.

(9) In the 12-month period ending on the date of the enactment of this Act, Pakistan’s security forces have struggled to contain a Taliban-backed insurgency that has spread from FATA into settled areas, including the Swat Valley and other parts of NWFP and Balochistan. This struggle has taken the lives of more than 1,500 police and military personnel and left more than 3,000 wounded.

(10) On March 27, 2009, President Obama noted, ‘Multiple intelligence estimates have warned that al Qaeda is actively planning attacks on the U.S. homeland from its safe-haven in Pakistan.’.

(11) According to a Government Accountability Office Report (GAO-08-622), ‘since 2003, the administration’s national security strategies and Congress have recognized that a comprehensive plan that includes all elements of national power–diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support–was needed to address the terrorist threat emanating from the FATA’ and that such a strategy was also mandated by section 7102(b)(3) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 22 U.S.C. 2656f note) and section 2042(b)(2) of the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-53; 22 U.S.C. 2375 note).

(12) In the past year, the people of Pakistan have been especially hard hit by rising food and commodity prices and severe energy shortages, with two-thirds of the population living on less than $2 a day and one-fifth of the population living below the poverty line according to the United Nations Development Program.

(13) The people of Pakistan and the United States share many compatible goals, including–

(A) combating terrorism and violent radicalism, both inside Pakistan and elsewhere;

(B) solidifying democracy and the rule of law in Pakistan;

(C) promoting the economic development of Pakistan, both through the building of infrastructure and the facilitation of increased trade;

(D) promoting the social and material well-being of Pakistani citizens, particularly through development of such basic services as public education, access to potable water, and medical treatment; and

(E) safeguarding the peace and security of South Asia, including by facilitating peaceful relations between Pakistan and its neighbors.

(14) According to consistent opinion research, including that of the Pew Global Attitudes Survey (December 28, 2007) and the International Republican Institute (January 29, 2008), many people in Pakistan have historically viewed the relationship between the United States and Pakistan as a transactional one, characterized by a heavy emphasis on security issues with little attention to other matters of great interest to citizens of Pakistan.

(15) The election of a civilian government in Pakistan in February 2008 provides an opportunity, after nearly a decade of military-dominated rule, to place relations between Pakistan and the United States on a new and more stable foundation.

(16) Both the Government of Pakistan and the United States Government should seek to enhance the bilateral relationship through additional multi-faceted engagement in order to strengthen the foundation for a consistent and reliable long-term partnership between the two countries.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES- The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) COUNTERINSURGENCY- The term ‘counterinsurgency’ means efforts to defeat organized movements that seek to overthrow the duly constituted Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan through violent means.

(3) COUNTERTERRORISM- The term ‘counterterrorism’ means efforts to combat al Qaeda and other foreign terrorist organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), or other individuals and entities engaged in terrorist activity or support for such activity.

(4) FATA- The term ‘FATA’ means the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.

(5) NWFP- The term ‘NWFP’ means the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, which has Peshawar as its provincial capital.

(6) PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN BORDER AREAS- The term ‘Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas’ includes the Pakistan regions known as NWFP, FATA, and parts of Balochistan in which the Taliban or Al Qaeda have traditionally found refuge.

(7) SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE- The term ‘security-related assistance’ means–

(A) grant assistance to carry out section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763);

(B) assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2311 et seq.);

(C) assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.);

(D) any equipment, supplies, and training provided pursuant to section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat. 3456); and

(E) any equipment, supplies, and training provided pursuant to section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181; 122 Stat. 368).

(8) SECURITY FORCES OF PAKISTAN- The term ‘security forces of Pakistan’ means the military and intelligence services of the Government of Pakistan, including the Armed Forces, Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, Intelligence Bureau, police forces, levies, Frontier Corps, and Frontier Constabulary.

(9) MAJOR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT- The term ‘major defense equipment’ has the meaning given in section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794(6)).

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States–

(1) to support the consolidation of democracy, good governance, and rule of law in Pakistan;

(2) to support economic growth and development in order to promote stability and security across Pakistan;

(3) to affirm and build a sustained, long-term, multifaceted relationship with Pakistan;

(4) to further the sustainable economic development of Pakistan and the improvement of the living conditions of its citizens, including in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, by expanding United States bilateral engagement with the Government of Pakistan, especially in areas of direct interest and importance to the daily lives of the people of Pakistan;

(5) to work with Pakistan and the countries bordering Pakistan to facilitate peace in the region and harmonious relations between the countries of the region;

(6) to work with the Government of Pakistan to prevent any Pakistani territory from being used as a base or conduit for terrorist attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, or elsewhere in the world;

(7) to work in close cooperation with the Government of Pakistan to coordinate military, paramilitary, and police action against terrorist targets;

(8) to work with the Government of Pakistan to help bring peace, stability, and development to all regions of Pakistan, especially those in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas, including support for an effective counterinsurgency strategy;

(9) to expand people-to-people engagement between the United States and Pakistan, through increased educational, technical, and cultural exchanges and other methods;

(10) to encourage and promote public-private partnerships in Pakistan in order to bolster ongoing development efforts and strengthen economic prospects, especially with respect to opportunities to build civic responsibility and professional skills of the people of Pakistan; and

(11) to encourage the development of local analytical capacity to measure progress on an integrated basis across the areas of donor country expenditure in Pakistan, and better hold the Government of Pakistan accountable for how the funds are being spent.

SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF FUNDS.

(a) Authorization- There are authorized to be appropriated to the President, for the purposes of providing assistance to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), the following amounts:

(1) For fiscal year 2009, up to $1,500,000,000.

(2) For fiscal year 2010, up to $1,500,000,000.

(3) For fiscal year 2011, up to $1,500,000,000.

(4) For fiscal year 2012, up to $1,500,000,000.

(5) For fiscal year 2013, up to $1,500,000,000.

(b) Availability of Funds-

(1) IN GENERAL- Of the funds appropriated in each fiscal year pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in subsection (a)–

(A) none of the amounts appropriated may be made available after the date of the enactment of this Act for assistance to Pakistan unless the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report has been submitted to the appropriate congressional committees in accordance with subsection (j); and

(B) not more than $750,000,000 may be made available for assistance to Pakistan in any fiscal year after 2009 unless the President’s Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan submits to the appropriate congressional committees during that fiscal year–

(i) a certification that assistance provided to Pakistan under this Act to date has made or is making substantial progress toward achieving the principal objectives of United States assistance to Pakistan contained in the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to subsection (j)(1); and
(ii) a memorandum explaining the reasons justifying the certification described in clause (i).

(2) MAKER OF CERTIFICATION- In the event of a vacancy in, or the termination of, the position of the President’s Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the certification described under paragraph (1)(B) may be made by the Secretary of State.

(c) Waiver- The Secretary of State may waive the limitations in subsection (b) if the Secretary determines, and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees, that it is in the national security interests of the United States to provide such waiver.

(d) Sense of Congress on Foreign Assistance Funds- It is the sense of Congress that, subject to an improving political and economic climate in Pakistan, there should be authorized to be appropriated up to $1,500,000,000 per year for fiscal years 2014 through 2018 for the purpose of providing assistance to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

(e) Sense of Congress on Security-related Assistance- It is the sense of Congress that security-related assistance to the Government of Pakistan–

(1) should be provided in close coordination with the Government of Pakistan, designed to improve the Government’s capabilities in areas of mutual concern, and maintained at a level that will bring significant gains in pursuing the policies set forth in paragraphs (6), (7), and (8) of section 4; and

(2) should be geared primarily toward bolstering the counter-insurgency capabilities of the Government to effectively defeat the Taliban-backed insurgency and deny popular support to al Qaeda and other foreign terrorist organizations that are based in Pakistan.

(f) Use of Funds-

(1) IN GENERAL- Funds appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) shall be used for projects intended to benefit the people of Pakistan, including projects that promote–

(A) just and democratic governance, including–

(i) police reform, equipping, and training;
(ii) independent, efficient, and effective judicial systems;
(iii) political pluralism, equality, and the rule of law;
(iv) respect for human and civil rights and the promotion of an independent media;
(v) transparency and accountability of all branches of government and judicial proceedings;
(vi) anticorruption efforts among bureaucrats, elected officials, and public servants at all levels of military and civilian government administration;
(vii) countering the narcotics trade; and
(viii) the implementation of legal and political reforms in the FATA;

(B) economic freedom, including–

(i) sustainable economic growth, including in rural areas, and the sustainable management of natural resources;
(ii) investments in energy and water, including energy generation and cross-border infrastructure projects with Afghanistan;
(iii) employment generation, including essential basic infrastructure projects such as roads and irrigation projects and other physical infrastructure; and
(iv) worker rights, including the right to form labor unions and legally enforce provisions safeguarding the rights of workers and local community stakeholders;

(C) investments in people, particularly women and children, including–

(i) broad-based public primary and secondary education and vocational training for both boys and girls;
(ii) food security and agricultural development to ensure food staples and other crops that provide economic growth and income opportunities in times of severe shortage;
(iii) quality public health, including medical clinics with well trained staff serving rural and urban communities;
(iv) vocational training for women and access to microfinance for small business establishment and income generation for women; and
(v) higher education to ensure a breadth and consistency of Pakistani graduates to prepare citizens to help strengthen the foundation for improved governance and economic vitality, including through public-private partnerships; and

(D) long-term development in regions of Pakistan where internal conflict has caused large-scale displacement.

(2) FUNDING FOR POLICE REFORM, EQUIPPING, AND TRAINING- Up to $100,000,000 of the funds appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) should be used for police reform, equipping, and training.

(g) Preference for Building Local Capacity- The President is encouraged, as appropriate, to utilize Pakistani firms and community and local nongovernmental organizations in Pakistan, including through host country contacts, and to work with local leaders to provide assistance under this section.

(h) Authority To Use Funds for Operational and Audit Expenses-

(1) IN GENERAL- Of the amounts appropriated for a fiscal year pursuant to subsection (a)–

(A) up to $10,000,000 may be used for administrative expenses of Federal departments and agencies in connection with the provision of assistance authorized by this section;

(B) up to $30,000,000 may be made available to the Inspectors General of the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, and other relevant Executive branch agencies in order to provide audits and program reviews of projects funded pursuant to this section; and

(C) up to $5,000,000 may be used by the Secretary to establish a Chief of Mission Fund for use by the Chief of Mission in Pakistan to provide assistance to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) to address urgent needs or opportunities, consistent with the purposes outlined in subsection (f) or for purposes of humanitarian relief.

(2) AUTHORITY IN ADDITION TO EXISTING AMOUNTS- The amounts authorized under subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) to be used for the purposes described in such subparagraphs are in addition to other amounts that are available for such purposes.

(i) Use of Funds- Amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to carry out this section shall be utilized to the maximum extent possible as direct expenditures for projects and programs, subject to existing reporting and notification requirements.

(j) Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report- Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, or September 15, 2009, whichever date comes later, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing United States policy and strategy with respect to assistance to Pakistan. The report shall include–

(1) a description of the principal objectives of United States assistance to Pakistan to be provided under this Act;

(2) the amounts of funds authorized to be appropriated under subsection (a) proposed to be allocated to programs or projects designed to achieve each of the purposes of assistance listed in subsection (f);

(3) a description of the specific projects and programs for which amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) are proposed to be allocated;

(4) a list of criteria and benchmarks to be used to measure the effectiveness of projects described under subsection (f), including a systematic, qualitative, and where possible, quantitative basis for assessing whether desired outcomes are achieved and a timeline for completion of each project and program;

(5) a description of the role to be played by Pakistani national, regional, and local officials and members of Pakistani civil society and local private sector, civic, religious, and tribal leaders in helping to identify and implement programs and projects for which assistance is to be provided under this Act, and of consultations with such representatives in developing the strategy;

(6) a description of all amounts made available for assistance to Pakistan during fiscal year 2009 prior to submission of the report, including a description of each project or program for which funds were made available and the amounts allocated to each such program or project;

(7) a description of the steps taken, or to be taken, to ensure assistance provided under this Act is not awarded to individuals or entities affiliated with terrorist organizations; and

(8) a projection of the levels of assistance to be provided to Pakistan under this Act, broken down into the following categories as described in the annual ‘Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Determining the Eligibility of Candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account Assistance’:

(A) Civil liberties.
(B) Political rights.
(C) Voice and accountability.
(D) Government effectiveness.
(E) Rule of law.
(F) Control of corruption.
(G) Immunization rates.
(H) Public expenditure on health.
(I) Girls’ primary education completion rate.
(J) Public expenditure on primary education.
(K) Natural resource management.
(L) Business start-up.
(M) Land rights and access.
(N) Trade policy.
(O) Regulatory quality.
(P) Inflation control.
(Q) Fiscal policy.

(k) Notification Requirements-

(1) NOTICE OF ASSISTANCE FOR BUDGET SUPPORT- The President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees not later than 15 days before obligating any assistance under this section as budgetary support to the Government of Pakistan or any element of such Government and shall describe the purpose and conditions attached to any such budgetary support.

(2) SEMIANNUAL REPORT- Not later than 90 days after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to subsection (j), and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes the assistance provided under this section. The report shall include–

(A) a description of all assistance provided pursuant to this Act since the submission of the last report, including each program or project for which assistance was provided and the amount of assistance provided for each program or project;
(B) a description of all assistance provided pursuant to this Act, including–

(i) the total amount of assistance provided for each of the purposes described in subsection (f); and
(ii) the total amount of assistance allocated to programs or projects in each region in Pakistan;

(C) a list of persons or entities from the United States or other countries that have received funds in excess of $100,000 to conduct projects under this section during the period covered by the report, which may be included in a classified annex, if necessary to avoid a security risk, and a justification for the classification;

(D) an assessment of the effectiveness of assistance provided pursuant to this Act during the period covered by the report in achieving desired objectives and outcomes, measured on the basis of the criteria contained in the Pakistan Assistant Strategy Report pursuant to subsection (j)(4);

(E) a description of–

(i) the programs and projects for which amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) are proposed to be allocated during the 180-day period after the submission of the report;
(ii) the relationship of such programs and projects to the purposes of assistance described in subsection (f); and
(iii) the amounts proposed to be allocated to each such program or project;

(F) a description of any shortfall in United States financial, physical, technical, or human resources that hinder the effective use and monitoring of such funds;

(G) a description of any negative impact, including the absorptive capacity of the region for which the resources are intended, of United States bilateral or multilateral assistance and recommendations for modification of funding, if any;

(H) any incidents or reports of waste, fraud, and abuse of expenditures under this section;

(I) the amount of funds appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) that were used during the reporting period for administrative expenses or for audits and program reviews pursuant to the authority under subsection (h);

(J) a description of the expenditures made from any Chief of Mission Fund established pursuant to subsection (h)(3) during the period covered by the report, the purposes for which such expenditures were made, and a list of the recipients of any expenditures from the Chief of Mission Fund in excess of $10,000; and

(K) an accounting of assistance provided to Pakistan under this Act, broken down into the categories set forth in subsection (j)(8).

(l) Government Accountability Office Report- Not later than one year after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report under subsection (j), and annually thereafter, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains–

(1) a review of, and comments addressing, the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report; and

(2) recommendations relating to any additional actions the Comptroller General believes could help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of United States efforts to meet the objectives of this Act.

(m) Sense of Congress on Funding of Priorities- It is the sense of Congress that, as a general principle, the Government of Pakistan should allocate a greater portion of its budget to the recurrent costs associated with education, health, and other priorities described in this section.

(n) Consultation Requirement- The President shall consult the appropriate congressional committees on the strategy in subsection (j), including criteria and benchmarks developed under paragraph (4) of such subsection, not later than 15 days before obligating any assistance under this section.

SEC. 6. LIMITATION ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE.

(a) Limitation on Certain Military Assistance- Beginning in fiscal year 2010, no grant assistance to carry out section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) and no assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2311 et seq.) may be provided to Pakistan in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State makes the certification required under subsection (c).

(b) Limitation on Arms Transfers- Beginning in fiscal year 2012, no letter of offer to sell major defense equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) and no license to export major defense equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to such Act in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State makes the certification required under subsection (c).

(c) Certification- The certification required by this subsection is a certification to the appropriate congressional committees by the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, that the security forces of Pakistan–

(1) are making concerted efforts to prevent al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan;

(2) are making concerted efforts to prevent the Taliban and associated militant groups from using the territory of Pakistan as a sanctuary from which to launch attacks within Afghanistan; and

(3) are not materially interfering in the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.

(d) Waiver- The Secretary of State may waive the limitations in subsections (a) and (b) if the Secretary determines it is important to the national security interests of the United States to provide such waiver.

(e) Prior Notice of Waiver- A waiver pursuant to subsection (d) may not be exercised until 15 days after the Secretary of State provides to the appropriate congressional committees written notice of the intent to issue such waiver and the reasons therefor. The notice may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

(f) Annual Report- The Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an annual report on the progress of the security forces of Pakistan in satisfying the requirements enumerated in subsection (c). The Secretary of State shall establish detailed, specific requirements and metrics for evaluating the progress in satisfying these requirements and apply these requirements and metrics consistently in each annual report. This report may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.


SEC. 7. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COALITION SUPPORT FUNDS.

It is the sense of Congress that–

(1) Coalition Support Funds are critical components of the global fight against terrorism, and in Pakistan provide essential support for–

(A) military operations of the Government of Pakistan to destroy the terrorist threat and close the terrorist safe haven, known or suspected, in the FATA, the NWFP, and other regions of Pakistan; and

(B) military operations of the Government of Pakistan to protect United States and allied logistic operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan;

(2) despite the broad discretion Congress granted the Secretary of Defense in terms of managing Coalition Support Funds, the Pakistan reimbursement claims process for Coalition Support Funds requires increased oversight and accountability, consistent with the conclusions of the June 2008 report of the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO-08-806);

(3) in order to ensure that this significant United States effort in support of countering terrorism in Pakistan effectively ensures the intended use of Coalition Support Funds, and to avoid redundancy in other security assistance programs, such as Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Military Sales, more specific guidance should be generated, and accountability delineated, for officials associated with oversight of this program within the United States Embassy in Pakistan, the United States Central Command, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Office of Management and Budget; and

(4) the Secretary of Defense should submit to the appropriate congressional committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a semiannual report on the use of Coalition Support Funds, which may be submitted in classified or unclassified form as necessary.

SEC. 8. PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN BORDER AREAS STRATEGY.

(a) Development of Comprehensive Strategy- The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and such other government officials as may be appropriate, shall develop a comprehensive, cross-border strategy that includes all elements of national power–diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, humanitarian, law enforcement support, and strategic communications and information technology–for working with the Government of Pakistan, the Government of Afghanistan, NATO, and other like-minded allies to best implement effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency measurers in and near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas.

(b) Report- Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed description of a comprehensive strategy for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas containing the elements specified in subsection (a) and proposed timelines and budgets for implementing the strategy.

SEC. 9. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that the United States should–

(1) recognize the bold political steps the Pakistan electorate has taken during a time of heightened sensitivity and tension in 2007 and 2008 to elect a new civilian government, as well as the continued quest for good governance and the rule of law under the elected government in 2008 and 2009;

(2) seize this strategic opportunity in the interests of Pakistan as well as in the national security interests of the United States to expand its engagement with the Government and people of Pakistan in areas of particular interest and importance to the people of Pakistan;

(3) continue to build a responsible and reciprocal security relationship taking into account the national security interests of the United States as well as regional and national dynamics in Pakistan to further strengthen and enable the position of Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally;

(4) seek ways to strengthen our countries’ mutual understanding and promote greater insight and knowledge of each other’s social, cultural and historical diversity through personnel exchanges and support for the establishment of institutions of higher learning with international accreditation; and

(5) explore means to consult with and utilize the relevant expertise and skills of the Pakistani-American community.

SEC. 10. TERM OF YEARS.

With the exception of subsections (b)(1)(B), (j), (k), and (l) of section 5, this Act shall remain in force after September 30, 2013.

Passed the Senate June 24, 2009.

(By the way, this site will also allow you to compare the final version of the Bill with earlier versions, including the original version submitted).
 
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