One sentence from the UNSC resolutions is enough to debunk all that mumbo jumbo you posted for obfuscating the issue:
"Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their Representatives and the Commission."
A. (l) As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State. etc. etc. ....
Note the underlined portion and that all of the recommendations were contingent on tripartite negotiations between India, Pakistan and the UN representatives - the agreements worked out in those discussions would have then led to a presumably bilateral withdrawal.
This position is validated by subsequent UNSC resolutions:
UNSC Resolution 80 on Kashmir:
... Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to make immediate arrangements, without prejudice to their rights or claims and with due regard to the requirements of law and order, to prepare and execute within a period of five months from the date of this resolution a program of demilitarization on the basis of the principles of paragraph 2 of General McNaughton proposal or of such modifications of those principles as may be mutually agreed;
And what was the McNaughton proposal?
The McNaughton Proposal:
DEMILITARISATION PREPARATORY TO THE PLEBISCITE
... There should be an agreed program of progressive demilitarization, the basic principle of which should be the reduction of armed forces on either side of the Cease-Fire Line by withdrawal, disbandment and disarmament in such stages as not to cause fear at any point of time to the people on either side of the Cease-Fire Line. The aim should be to reduce the armed personnel in the State of Jammu and Kashmir on each side of the Cease-Fire Line to the minimum compatible with the maintenance of security and of local law and order, and to a level sufficiently low and with the forces so disposed that they will not constitute a restriction on the free expression of opinion for the purposes of the plebiscite.
1. The program of demilitarization should include the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of the regular forces of Pakistan; and the withdrawal of the regular forces of India not required for purposes of security or for the maintenance of local law and order on the Indian side of the Cease-Fire Line: also the reduction, by disbanding and disarming, of local forces, including on the one side the Armed Forces and Militia of the State of Kashmir and on the other, the Azad Forces.
As pointed out in the UNSC resolutions thread, in Sir Owen Dixit's own words, it was India that was being the obstructionist in implementing the McNaughton proposal in some form, despite maintaining significantly larger number of troops (in comparison to Pakistan) on its side of the disputed territory.