Kargil war was a total disaster, claims Gen Majeed Malik

[EagleEyes]

Get back on topic and quit trolling.

 

[TheRafael00000]

Ask your Malaun Army to show you public the fatalities. You know that! Never bring in Pakistan's internal politics in this matter. That's why army keep bashing them!

 

[Bang Galore]

We are hardly complaining about the bofors on this end.

Didn't you just admit that the bofors made a difference?

Our guys were gunning down your jawans like shooting fish in barrel till the bofors came.

Forgot that so quickly?

 

[shuntmaster]

 

[tony singh]

Pakistan could have easily won Kargil with little more effort put in. Musharraf and Nawaz Sharif did not co-operate much, which resulted in the loss. However, there are brilliant soldier stories from Pakistani side, like the New Tanveer post where 6 Pakistani men took on 250 Indians or another position where 26 men fought with 3 Companies of Indian army, with armor and artillery, longer than expected. These kind of stories were present in 1965 and 1971 too, yet Kargil was a failure overall.

No war could of easily be won if the conflict escalated it would of been a much larger war with the Indian Navy playing a much greater role the fact is both countries suffered and there is stories of acts of heroism from both sides I guess it just depends which side u ask.

 

[tony singh]

Battle of Tiger Hill - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


Indian artillery started shelling Tiger Hill to keep the enemies head down, while the 18 Grenadiers, 2 Naga, and 8 Sikh Regiment of the Indian Army got ready to attack Tiger Hill. The assault team had 200 men, with some 2000 troops providing rear support. Such was the determination of the Indian soldiers that most of the Grenadiers eschewed their rations to carry extra ammunition. In the 36-hour operation, the first meal they had were the dates left behind by the retreating Pakistani defenders.

While the Alpha, Charlie, and Ghatak companies of the Grenadiers attacked from the rear, the Nagas were on the left flank, and the Sikhs on the right. The assault began at 5:15 pm on 3 July, with India shelling the Pakistani positions. The Pakistanis returned fire.[citation needed]

While this was happening, the Grenadiers had moved into position, and at 4 am, attacked. 10 Pakistani soldiers were killed, and 2 escaped; 5 Indian soldiers were also killed.

Yogendra Singh Yadav of 18th Grenadier was awarded the highest military honour of India, Param Vir Chakra, for bravery during the retaking of Tiger Hill

 

[TheRafael00000]

Clinton my ***.

shut up u idiot. log off and go to school.

Clinton is tera bap. Malaun. sale false news won't help you. Malaun

 

[shuntmaster]

 

[Windjammer]

From the memoirs of an NLI soldier quoted by a member elsewhere.

I recall the poor indian soldiers whimpering like little girls - crying out for their mothers - when we opened fire on their poorly planned frontal assaults. Some of our boys attempted to give them water, risking their own lives, the smell of a thousand latrines as the poor indians were systematically - eaten by dogs, and consumed by maggots.

The smell will never be forgotten, as the vast swarms of beetles and fly's that made it look like some sort of moving carpet, the indian officers - who's name tags could be clearly seen through the scope, who's brains were distributed over the mountain with a head shot.

We still control peaks that can shut down vital enemy highway's and we killed hundreds of soldiers.

 

[user1]

The shells for Bofors cost $1000 a piece and there was a shortage of spares due to embargo after the bribery scandal. Indian army had to cannibalise 100 Bofors from around the country just to keep the Kargil guns shelling. Pakistan had all the weaponry and ammo. home-made.

The laser-guided bombs were ineffective, Mi-25 has a ceiling of 12000 feet and Mi-17 had only 31 sorties for the fear of Pakistani SAMs.

There was a lack of protective clothing, surveillance equipment, night vision devices and high-altitude warfare gear; because most money was spent on big ticket items (e.g. Bofors guns and Mi-25 helicopters) which brings big kick-backs.

The 'Occupied' bunkers were small, well-guarded, with difficult approaches and were mined. There were brigade size attacks on bunkers holding only 8 - 10 NLI and Mujaheddins. To fight less than 5 batallions, Indian army brought more than 4 divisions of it's Jawans, with strike forces and heavy artillery . This deployment created a severe strategic imbalance in the offensive capabilities of Indian army anywhere else. Still it was able to re-capture only 14 outposts by force and other 120 had to be vacated because of that B*st*ard Nawaz.

None of the Indian army, UN military observers or US spy satellites were able to detect movements of NLI or Mujaheddins in advance; it was an intelligence fiasco.

Operation Vijay was so successful that after initial thrashings and downing of aircraft, Indian army had to scale back the operations just to keep the morale of Indian forces high.

In the end, Pakistan lost.

 

[SamantK]

From the memoirs of an NLI soldier quoted by a member elsewhere.

Of an unknown soldier, quoted as you have just done, we all believe you. Thanks for the enlightenment.

 

[GURU DUTT]

Indians are mad. Lolz

The shells for Bofors cost $1000 a piece and there was a shortage of spares due to embargo after the bribery scandal. Indian army had to cannibalise 100 Bofors from around the country just to keep the Kargil guns shelling. Pakistan had all the weaponry and ammo. home-made.

The laser-guided bombs were ineffective, Mi-25 has a ceiling of 12000 feet and Mi-17 had only 31 sorties for the fear of Pakistani SAMs.

There was a lack of protective clothing, surveillance equipment, night vision devices and high-altitude warfare gear; because most money was spent on big ticket items (e.g. Bofors guns and Mi-25 helicopters) which brings big kick-backs.

The 'Occupied' bunkers were small, well-guarded, with difficult approaches and were mined. There were brigade size attacks on bunkers holding only 8 - 10 NLI and Mujaheddins. To fight less than 5 batallions, Indian army brought more than 4 divisions of it's Jawans, with strike forces and heavy artillery . This deployment created a severe strategic imbalance in the offensive capabilities of Indian army anywhere else. Still it was able to re-capture only 14 outposts by force and other 120 had to be vacated because of that B*st*ard Nawaz.

None of the Indian army, UN military observers or US spy satellites were able to detect movements of NLI or Mujaheddins in advance; it was an intelligence fiasco.

Operation Vijay was so successful that after initial thrashings and downing of aircraft, Indian army had to scale back the operations just to keep the morale of Indian forces high.

In the end, Pakistan lost.t.

and thats what realli matters my pakistani friend as they say "jo jeeta whaee sikandar"

 

[tony singh]

9 - Militants in the Kargil conflict: myths, realities, and impacts - University Publishing Online


Neutral account on the Kargil war


In the spring of 1999, Pakistan executed a broad incursion across the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir using 3–4,000 men equipped primarily with small arms from the then-paramilitary organization the Northern Light Infantry (NLI). Ostensibly, the Pakistani forces sought to make small territorial gains at tactically significant locations near the Indian town of Kargil. Initially, Indian reports characterized these intruders as mujahideen, or ghusbhaitiyan. Indian authorities later believed that a composite force of militants and Pakistani regulars executed the incursion. After the fighting intensified, however, Indian officials learned that this infiltrating force was comprised not of civilian militants, but rather nearly entirely of NLI troops supported by civilian porters, or razakars.

Curiously, many popular accounts of Kargil still sustain the myth that the operation was executed by mujahideen either operating alone or in tandem with Pakistani troops. This misperception about the intruding force has persisted for a number of reasons. First, the initial reporting of the incursion characterized these forces as mujahideen or jehadi militants and those accounts formed the basis of most subsequent analyses of the conflict. Second, and related to the first, Pakistan did not deny for many years after the crisis the Indian reports that these intruders were irregular fighters. Third, the international community did not publicly discount these claims even when the NLI's involvement was discerned.

Pakistan has had difficulty learning from its past military failures, but the learning process from the Kargil conflict has been a particularly tortuous and private affair for the country's civilian and military leaders and national security institutions. The Pakistan government's ability to discuss the Kargil operation and ensuing military crisis was – and still is – constrained by its determination to maintain the mujahideen cover story. Several nongovernment analysts in Pakistan have questioned the army's official version. However, the official narrative still dominates Pakistani writings on the Kargil conflict. While more thoughtful, internal reviews reportedly have taken place within various organizations of the armed forces, they remain classified and have not been released to the public. For its part, the Nawaz Sharif government did not institute any official or semi-official inquiry of the Kargil operation largely because it feared opposition from the military.

The task of explaining what lessons Pakistan has learned as a result of the Kargil conflict is further complicated by the fact that the military operation and its aftermath became closely intertwined with the nation's civil–military political debate. In the months leading up to the October 1999 coup, and even in subsequent years, military officers and civilian officials from the Nawaz Sharif government have sought to pin the blame for the Kargil debacle on each other. These obstacles notwithstanding, this chapter analyzes if the Kargil operation was an isolated incident or instead conforms to a broader pattern of Pakistani strategic conduct. I argue the latter.

 

[Windjammer]

Of an unknown soldier, quoted as you have just done, we all believe you. Thanks for the enlightenment.

Quote..."you can't describe sun rise to a blind man."

Sir, Does it matter what you believe or not.....one obviously has the choice to either learn or resort to denial. !!

 

[SamantK]

Quote..."you can't describe sun rise to a blind man."

Sir, Does it matter what you believe or not.....one obviously has the choice to either learn or resort to denial. !!

Exactly, even after a complete defeat of NLI you guys will remain in denial. It has something to do with 'one Pakistani is equal to 10, 100... Hindustani' Mentality...

No one really cares what a anonymous soldier has written or said to another one, but alas the ones who on record say it are fools to contradict a unknown soldier. I see we do not have to worry about the rise of Pakistan for quite some time..