visom
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Because they don't want to deal with constant harassment from Chinese members. Also, I wonder why there are no Koreans either.
Japan and China’s Dispute Goes Nuclear
- Thread starter Krueger
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Gandhi G in da house
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It would be interesting to know their perspective
Viet
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same to the Koreans. They dislike Chinese more than the Japanese.
visom
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Really? I find it hard to believe that there is another race koreans dislike more than Japanese.
Viet
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Koreans think themselves superior to Chinese. They look down on Chinese. And the most funny thing is Koreans claim most of Chinese inventions and technology came from ancient Korea. LOL
Chinese hate them more than the Japanese. They think Korea is a garbage country and the people should be annihilated. Throughout 2,000 years, ancient China always wanted Vietnam to return to the Empire, but never showed interest for Korea.
cnleio
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Korean dislike Japanese more than Chinese, buddy. The Japan's brutal colonialism on the peninsula from 1910 to1945 hurt Korean ppl very much, right now Korean is seeking revenge to Japan. At the same time ppl inside Japan islands also hate Korean coz envy at Korea's economy develop overtake Japan like Samsung beat SONY.Koreans think themselves superior to Chinese. They look down on Chinese. And the most funny thing is Koreans claim most of Chinese inventions and technology came from ancient Korea. LOL
Chinese hate them more than the Japanese. They think Korea is a garb age country and the people should be annihilated. Throughout 2,000 years, ancient China always wanted Vietnam to return to the Empire, but never showed interest for Korea.
Both Korea and Japan have the same size lands and population, so they usually compared with each other it's easily lead to Jealousy and hatred, but for China Korean and Japaese all clearly know it's BIG.
KAL-EL
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There was one that posted here for a little while last summer. He was harassed by a few members. To be fair though, he was also treated fine by many others. I would really like to see some Japanese and Korean members.
BoQ77
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"A Plan To Deploy Nuclear Warheads in Japan"
by Nisohachi Hyodo, critic and author
Tokyo SHOKUN , Oct 96 pp 202-213
.......
"The 1985 Crisis"
Does anybody remember the "1985 crisis"? As the
shooting range of an SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic
missile) for the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear missile
submarine was extended to over 8,000 kilometers in the late
1970's, it became possible for the Soviet Union to attack
the heart of the United States from its inland sea or
harbor. To protect its nuclear missile submarines from the
U.S. Navy, the Soviet Union reinforced its "Back Fire" and
antisubmarine aircraft carriers. Knowing this, the United
States felt the need to push its "front yard" further
forward and began to publicize the threat of the Soviet
Union in Japan. The publicity department of the Soviet Union
countered this in earnest. Some people in Japan interpreted
all this as an opportune time to increase the defense
budget, saying, "Around 1985 the Soviet military forces will
land in Hokkaido to secure the Soya Strait."
All this happened just about the time when I was
studying acting and music in Tokyo after having graduated
from a high school in Nagano.
Thinking that "I may be able to get some interesting
experience," I quit the professional school and enlisted in
the Ground Self-Defense Force in Hokkaido.
However, when I was assigned to the Second Division (a
division in charge of defending the territory in northern
Hokkaido to the extent of total annihilation), which was
supposed to be a unit on the foremost frontline equivalent
to the Kanto Army that had guarded the former Manchurian-
Soviet border, I did not observe any sense of emergency that
is expected to prevail in a battlefield.
In particular, mobilization and communications training
exercises all ignored the hypothetical case of the
counterpart (the Soviet force) using super weapons (nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons). For example, when a
nuclear attack is expected, tanks should be quickly
dispersed to safety, and machineguns outside vehicles should
be stored for a while in anticipation of a bomb blast. Such
training exercises were never conducted.
As I was also a communications operator, I received in-
house training on telegram (the Morse code) and cryptogram
(secret code). However, although I was instructed to process
telegrams on super weapons as special emergency items, I
could not find any sample telegrams concerning super
weapons.
Everything else was just like the example cited above.
Being dumbfounded by the lack of a sense of emergency on the
frontline, I tried to think up some reasons for this. Then,
I came to a conclusion: "The government and the Self-Defense
Agency have a firm belief that there will be no war
involving Japan in the future. Therefore, they consider it
enough as long as they provide some formal appearance to
unit formation, personnel, and training exercises."
After completing one term (two years), I left the Self-
Defense Forces.
What Is the Biggest Threat to Japan?
For Japan, the threat from the Soviet Union is not
relating to Soya Point or sealanes. It has been a long time
since all of the seven seas became the front yard of the
United States. The U.S. Navy can detect all seafaring
submarines of the Soviet Union and follow them around very
closely. Also, as the U.S. military forces maintain a large
number of smart mines in their bases in Japan, without any
help from the Self-Defense Forces, they will be able to
blockade the three straits easily by spreading these mines
from their tanker planes. For them, blocking was not an
issue; instead, the issue was whether or not their military
forces could pass through these straits to attack the Soviet
Union.
Then, what is the threat from the Soviet Union to
Japan?
Quite obviously, it is none other than the vast number
of nuclear weapons in storage that can be dropped anytime on
Japanese cities. Likewise, the nuclear weapons owned by the
United States and China always remain as the biggest threat
to Japan.
As a former self-defense official, I became a college
student five years behind my classmates. Then, I began to be
utterly offended by Japan's military academism, which
considers my way of arguing odd, as well as by the poor
level of journalism. So, I tried more than once to publish
my articles in newspapers and magazines. When I was a
freshman or sophomore, I had already formed my idea on the
strategic principle of "direct approach against power,"
which will be mentioned later. Yet, all of my articles
submitted were rejected.
This reality made me obstinate. I spent two years at a
graduate school to prove that no other strategic theories in
the past and present could surpass my viewpoint. Then, with
some intended purpose, I joined the editorial department of
a monthly magazine called "SENSHA MAGAJIN [Tank Magazine]."
When I was writing articles with my byline (I used my
real name then), the Gulf war erupted. "SENSHA MAGAJIN" was
the only one that was able to point out the following before
the operation Desert Storm: "The U.S. Marine Corps' plan to
land in Kuwait is a diversionary tactic to mobilize the mass
media. The main strike force of the multinational troops
will take a long way around from the left to aim at Basrah."
My prediction came true a day after the publication of the
issue of the magazine that carried my article. Except for a
"commentator on military affairs" who quoted my view on TV
without permission, there was no other public response.
In Japan, no matter how insightful or meaningful an
article or an opinion is with regard to military affairs, it
will never make the Defense Agency reconsider its position
or change the public opinion. As soon as the Gulf war ended,
all the "commentators on military affairs" disappeared from
TV programs. I realized then that, with no realistic vision
of militarism or war in Japan, a career in military
journalism is a futile one.
As a script writer of original stories, I am now
writing scripts for an action comic featuring weathermen,
brain surgeons, and employees at the legal department of a
chemical manufacturer. In the meantime, I completed and
published four research-based books through Ginga Shuppan:
Infantry Weapons of the Japanese Army, The Army's
Mechanized Weapons, Reevaluation of Japan's Naval
Preparedness, and Reevaluation of Japan's Defense
Capability.
In the last book entitled Reevaluation of Japan's
Defense Capability, I attempted to construct a reasonable
foundation of military preparedness for nuclear deterrence
by eliminating all self-binding restrictions, including the
Constitution. The objective of this article is to expand
further the contents of this book.
"A Direct Approach Against Power"
I believe that, as long as we have six SLBM's with
nuclear warheads on alert on a 24-hour basis, we will be
able to deter nuclear attacks by superpowers on Japan. Why
do we need only six SLBM's?
In considering a nation's strategy for nuclear
deterrence, there is one thing that needs to be remembered.
That is a "difference in national character."
On this globe, there are countries where any citizen in
the middle class can influence national policies and
countries where only a limited number of privileged citizens
can influence national policies. This, I call a "difference
in national characters."
The Vietnam war was a war between two completely
opposite national characters--the United States and North
Vietnam.
Each one of the U.S. soldiers who were sent to
Indochina was able, through injury or death, to change the
national policy at the White House.
In North Vietnam, on the other hand, a very limited
number of people in leadership in the city of Hanoi were
able to influence the national policy. Average citizens on
the home front and soldiers in frontlines did not have such
power of influence to change their country's national policy
through injuries or deaths.
The people in the leadership class in the United States
had never considered this difference in national characters
before 1986 when they decided to bomb Libya to attack
Qadhdhafi. Therefore, they avoided bombing the center of
Hanoi during the Vietnam war; instead, they killed or
injured only common soldiers and farmers. Despite the series
of bombings on North Vietnam, as the people in power were
never physically threatened, the North Vietnamese policy
remained intact.
On the other hand, the communist side understood that
each one of the U.S. soldiers had the power to influence
Washington. Therefore, by killing or injuring these soldiers
little by little everyday, the communist forces were able to
effect a policy change in Washington.
It has been said that the United States has two
targeting-policy choices for its nuclear strategy--a
"counterforce" and a "countervalue" strategy. Simply stated,
the former is to use its own nuclear weapons to destroy the
enemy's nuclear weapons; and the latter is to use its own
nuclear weapons to kill or injure the enemy's people in
cities. And, if the countervalue strategy, or the ability to
destroy cities, could be assured of being operative after
the enemy's first attack, a "nuclear deterrence" was
considered to exist.
However, even without considering the fact that the
failure to kill Colonel Qaddafi in 1986 gave rise to a
reckless attempt by Sadam Hussein in 1990, if we review how
the Korean war and the Vietnam war proceeded, we can realize
that a "deterrence" cannot be achieved so easily.
When we are dealing with such nations as North Korea,
China, Libya, Iraq, and the former Soviet Union, we cannot
achieve a deterrence by killing or injuring soldiers. Even
by killing a large number of average citizens, we cannot
force changes in national policies of these countries.
In other words, to change national policies of these
countries, it is necessary to impose physical threats upon
the limited number of powerful individuals. This is a case
similar to the following: Although the former Japanese
Empire had no intention of surrendering even after receiving
carpet bombings from the U.S. forces, including one atomic
bomb, as soon as the Soviet Union made an advance toward
Manchuria, endangering members of the Imperial Household and
some leaders of the army so as to become hostages of the
Soviet forces, it convened an Imperial conference and
accepted the Potsdam Declaration.
I call this a "direct approach against power." If we
apply this iron rule, we will be able to establish a nuclear
deterrence with a surprisingly limited number of nuclear
weapons against any opponent, even if it is the United
States, Russia, or China.
On the other hand, nuclear armaments that go against
this iron rule will never become a "safe, inexpensive, or
effective" nuclear deterrence. For example, Mr. Hachiyo
Nakagawa and former high-ranking officials of the Self-
Defense Forces are emphatic about maintaining short-range
nuclear weapons that can reach only up to Beijing or
Siberia. But, with no matter how many of these weapons we
have, how will we be able to deter strategic nuclear attacks
from the two major nuclear powers, the United States and
Russia? If a deterrence could be possible with such weapons,
China would never have attempted to develop an ICBM
(intercontinental ballistic missile) with a shooting range
of 13,000 kilometers.
Nuclear Power With "12 Warheads and 12 Submarines"
To deter nuclear attacks from the two nuclear
superpowers, the United States and Russia, that maintain
large numbers of warheads and currently have the
capabilities of directing 20,000 warheads toward Japan at
any time, it is necessary to have ballistic missiles with a
shooting range of at least 12,000 kilometers each to
threaten New York and Moscow.
To deter a country like the United States from
resorting to a nuclear attack, it is not necessary to target
the White House or the Pentagon. It is sufficient to
establish a credibility (certainty and reliability) that we
are capable of blasting nuclear bombs in one or two cities
to be randomly selected from about 10 large cities. In other
words, when dealing with the United States, we can use the
elementary "countervalue" nuclear strategy as our "direct
approach against power."
The credibility can be established by having two SLBM's
that can be launched anytime from two conventionally powered
submarines roaming in separate sea zones. To maintain these
"two warheads and two submarines" always on alert, it is
necessary to build "four warheads and four submarines,"
assuming that the rate of operation is maintained at 50
percent as in the case of the U.S. military.
When dealing with Russia, as its leaders and
intellectuals are extremely concentrated in Moscow and St.
Petersburg, "four warheads and four submarines" will produce
enough credibility as a "direct approach against power."
Like Russia, China is also a country with a limited
number of people who have the power to change national
policies. However, it has no one "central" city like Moscow
in Russia where everything of national importance is
concentrated. In dealing with China, therefore, it is
necessary to keep constant track of the whereabouts of the
specified number of powerful leaders so that SLBM's can be
ready to be launched accurately at any time toward these
locations. As long as this vigilance can be accomplished,
"two warheads and two submarines" seem to be sufficient.
In addition to these country-by-country measures, if we
are to take into consideration the need to deter all of
these three countries--the United States, Russia, and China-
-at the same time, at least "six warheads and six
submarines" must always be on alert. Therefore, it is
necessary to build "12 warheads and 12 submarines."
How About the Hardware and Launching Methods?
Then, how are we going to quickly procure 12 SLBM's and
warheads as well as submarines for launching these warheads?
As Mr. Ikutaro Shimizu and other advocates for nuclear
armament in the postwar Japan were all unable to explain
their plans in concrete terms, they lacked the power of
persuasion enough to awaken the public with a deep sense of
defeatism toward the former Allied Powers. Now, I am going
to work out such a plan.
On 4 February 1994, the National Space Development
Agency (NASDA) launched an H-II rocket with all of its parts
made in Japan. At that time, some mass media, here and
abroad, reported their opinions that this would eventually
become Japan's ICBM.
Such speculation showed the lack of knowledge on the
part of the reporters on the "vertical air nuclear launch
system."
Russia's SS-18, the largest ICBM in the world at
present, is 36.5 meters long, and its launch weight is 211
tons. On the other hand, the H-II is 50 meters long, far
larger than the SS-18, and its launch weight is 260 tons. It
is too big to be an ICBM.
Also, the H-II's main engine fuel--liquid hydrogen and
oxygen--cannot be kept in the tank for many hours. Before
launching, about four hours are needed to go through the
procedure of gas replacement, preliminary cooling, and early
fueling to fill up 98 percent of the fuel. Then, the
remaining 2 percent of the fuel is filled automatically to a
countdown from 40 minutes before launching. As soon as 100
percent of the fuel is filled up, the launching begins.
Considering that an enemy's first ICBM attack, which is
launched from the other side of the globe, is capable of
hitting the impact point in 45 minutes, a system that
requires five hours to prepare for launching can never
become a deterrent.
The former Soviet Union had to supplement the low
credibility of its liquid-fueled SLBM's with quantity. As
Japan needs to avoid the stupidity of competing against
superpowers by the quantity of nuclear arms, it must procure
rockets that can be launched immediately and reliably with
solid propellant.
In 1971, the Education Ministry's Institute of Space
and Astronautical Science (ISAS, Tokyo University's former
Aerospace Institute) launched an M (mu)-4S rocket with four-
step solid motors that was 23.6 meters long with a diameter
of 1.4 meters and a total weight of 43.6 tons. Using a
drawing in his book, "Japan's Nuclear Armament" (1975), Mr.
Uchihiro Koyama pointed out that the rocket was medium in
size, somewhere between an ICBM and a strategic nuclear
missile.
With a single 450-kiloton warhead, SS-N-18--an SLBM
that was made by the former Soviet Union in the late 1970's-
-had a range of 8,000 kilometers. Russia has now converted
the fuselage into a space rocket for the private sector.
Reportedly, the rocket can launch a satellite weighing 130
kilograms into a low orbit at an altitude of 250 kilometers.
Once you determine the weight of a satellite (payload)
that can be launched into a low orbit, you can estimate the
weight of a projectile warhead (slow weight). The latter is
a little heavier than the satellite.
The M-4S had the power to launch a satellite weighing
180 kilograms into a low orbit at an altitude of 250
kilometers. In other words, it had a power larger than the
SS-N-18. Instead of launching into an orbit, if it is used
for a trajectory flight of about 12,000 kilometers (the
distance between Tokyo and New York), it can carry a slow
weight of more than 180 kilograms. (Incidentally, the
distance between Tokyo and Moscow is 7,500 kilometers.)
The question is whether Japan at that time was capable
of manufacturing an atomic warhead with less than 100
kilotons necessary for an elementary level of nuclear
deterrence for the M-4S with a fuselage having a 1.4-meter
diameter and a slow weight of about 180 kilograms.
Stating my conclusion first, I believe Japan was not
capable of doing so in the 1970's.
Warheads Becoming Lightweight
In 1960, the United States mass-produced "W47," a 600-
kiloton-level single warhead weighing 408 kilograms
(excluding the weight of a reentry body), for its Polaris,
the world's first SLBM. As an SLBM is launched underwater
from a submarine, requirements for missile design are
extremely restrictive. Therefore, warheads always
incorporate the most advanced technology to make them
lightweight.
On the other hand, an "A-11" aerial bomb (an implosive
using plutonium 239), which was deployed by France as its
first practical atomic bomb in 1963, weighed 1.5 tons,
although its explosive power was only 60 kilotons. Still,
this clearly showed the advantage of later development
because the 23-kiloton "Fatman," which the United States
dropped on Nagasaki in 1945, was a plutonium-based implosive
bomb and weighed 4.5 tons.
Three years later, France experimented with an "AN52,"
a 25-kiloton strategic nuclear bomb using plutonium 239.
This bomb had a diameter of 60 centimeters and weighed 455
kilogram.
Another experiment was conducted in 1967 with an "A22"
warhead, which became the first missile warhead to be
launched from a submarine by France in 1971. This "enriched
bomb," which was made of uranium 235, deuterium oxide, and
tritium, weighed 1.5 tons initially. But, the weight was
successfully reduced in half to 750 kilograms in 1973.
Probably, Japan in the 1970's was still incapable of
producing such an atomic warhead weighing 750 kilograms.
Therefore, the M-4S with a payload of 180 kilograms could
never be converted to a nuclear missile.
Then, how light can we make a warhead for a strategic
ballistic missile that needs to be thrust back to the
atmosphere? The United States developed a 100-kiloton
warhead called "W76" to be used with an MIRV (multiple
independently targeted reentry vehicle) for the SLBM
Poseidon C-3. This warhead weighs 164.5 kilograms, and this
seems to be the technological limit. (Trident D-5, the
latest SLBM, is a more powerful missile but uses a heavier
warhead.) The technological limit in weight reduction that
was achieved for the "W76" by the United States in 1970 was
attained by the Soviet Union in the late 1970's when it
produced its SS-N-18. I believe this is beyond the reach of
today's Japan because of the lack of experience.
It could be possible for Japan in the late 1990's to
produce a warhead with less than 100 kilotons, including a
reentry body, that weighs about 750 kilograms, which is
equivalent to the weight of "A22" developed by France in
1973.
The reason is that specific information on how to
design a nuclear warhead is now quite well disseminated. In
Japan, there is no difficulty in obtaining such specialized
items as heavy metals (uranium 238) to make an atomic bomb
shell, explosives (triamino, trinitro, benzene, etc.) for
implosion, and precise triggering devices. Furthermore,
using a supercomputer and computational software programs,
we can easily simulate implosions with different
combinations of specialized explosives. Therefore, it seems
possible to carry out critical experiments economically with
an amount of plutonium 239 far less than that used by the
United States, the Soviet Union, England, and France when
they manually computed and developed their plutonium-based
atomic bombs, and thereby to design a powerful atomic bomb
that is relatively small in size. Design techniques
pertaining to reentry bodies have also been obtained through
more than 10 recovered experimental rockets, including TT-
500A's since 1980, TR-1A's since 1991, and the "Ryusei," the
first H-II rocket in 1994.
M-3SII Rocket
Jerico-I, a medium-range ballistic missile that was
deployed by Israel in 1973 had a diameter of only 1 meter
and a slow weight of about 500 kilograms. However, it was
believed to be equipped with a 20-kiloton warhead.
Also, when seven Western nations called for a Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987, they targeted
"missiles with carrying warheads weighing more than 1,000
pounds (454 kilograms)." This is merely an official
acknowledgment in 1987 that, if a missile has a slow weight
of 500 kilograms, it can launch a warhead. As North Korea's
Nodon 1, which is currently attracting attention, has a slow
weight of 500 kilograms, it is reportedly capable of
carrying a 50-kiloton atomic bomb in its fuselage with a
diameter of 1.3 meters.
Considering all this, Japan today can quite certainly
produce its first operational atomic warhead, including a
reentry body weighing less than 750 kilograms.
The M-4S rocket in 1971 was not capable for long-range
launching of a slow weight of 500-750 kilograms. Therefore,
it could not be made into Japan's strategic ballistic
missile.
The first time Japan achieved a slow-weight ballistic
missile weighing more than 750 kilograms was when the
Institute of Space and Astronautical Science developed the M
(mu)-3SII in 1985.
The M-3SII is several generations newer than the M-4S
rocket. With a fewer number of stages than the M-4S, it had
a far stronger payload and was capable of launching a
satellite weighing 770 kilograms at a low altitude of 250
kilometer. When a satellite to observe Halley's comet was
launched, this rocket became the first one in the world to
thrust through the earth's gravitational boundary, using
only solid rocket propellant. Its total weight is 61 tons,
heavier by about 2 tons than Trident D-5, the proud SLBM of
the United States that has a solid three-stage design with a
shooting range of 12,000 kilometers. Nissan Motor has
already supplied eight of these rockets since 1985.
Eleven years ago, therefore, Japan had a home-made
solid fuel rocket that could be used to carry a warhead with
a strategic shooting range. It is believed that one of the
objectives of the MTCR, which was concluded two years later,
was believed to prohibit export of this M-3SII. The reason
was that K (Kappa)-6 and other three models totaling 19
rockets had been previously exported from Japan to
Yugoslavia and Indonesia in the early 1960's.
M-3SII is a highly perfected rocket. Since then, the
ISAS and the NASDA have not developed any rocket with a
completely solid design that is smaller in size than M-3SII
and is capable of launching a satellite weighing more than
500 kilograms. They do not even have plans to develop such
rockets in the future. In the following, I would like to
examine the possibility of developing an uniquely Japanese
nuclear deterrent system with M-3SII rockets.
How About Nuclear Warheads?
Acquiring nuclear weapons anew is the same as
developing atomic bombs. A so-called hydrogen bomb creates
nuclear fusion by using the energy from the nuclear fission
of an atomic bomb. Therefore, it can be considered another
form of an atomic bomb. Once an atomic bomb can be produced,
it is quite simple in fact to create a hydrogen bomb. What
is most difficult for any advanced industrial country to do
is to manufacture a practical atomic bomb for the first
time.
Then, how can Japan manufacture its first practical
atomic bomb to be loaded on to the M-3SII?
Practically speaking, the raw material to be used for
nuclear fission for an atomic bomb is either plutonium 239
or uranium 235.
Plutonium 239 can be easily extracted in large quantity
and quality good enough to be used for nuclear bombs by
chemically treating byproducts from the lightwater reactors
at commercial nuclear power plants throughout Japan. As
there is no need to build new facilities, this method has a
merit of convenience.
A demerit, if any, is that plutonium 239 is not
suitable for the so-called "gun-barrel method," the simplest
critical experiment. It, therefore, requires a complex and
precise critical experiment called the "implosion method."
On the other hand, uranium 235 has the merit of
absolute reliability: If a weapon is made according to the
gun-barrel method, its explosion is assured without any
experiment. (In fact, the uranium 235, gun-barrel bomb used
on Hiroshima was dropped without prior experiment.)
However, the facilities in Ningyotoge and Rokkashomura
to enrich uranium 235 are not built to military
specifications. So, a demerit is the time that it will take
to enrich the uranium to the purity for use in making
nuclear bombs.
With an utmost priority placed on saving time for
production and deployment, therefore, the first three bombs
will be made of plutonium 235 according to the implosion
method.
However, to secure the credibility here and abroad of
assured explosion without experiment, the fourth and
subsequent bombs will be made of uranium 235 according to
the gun-barrel method as well as the implosion method and
will be included in a mixed inventory of warheads.
The number of warheads required to be manufactured for
the time being is 12 in total. The reason is that, to
maintain six SLBM's with single warheads and six submarines
on 24-hour alert all year-round, it is necessary to have at
least 12 warheads, assuming that the rate of operation is 50
percent.
Conditions of "Safety, Low Cost, and Advantage"
These six missiles with single warheads cannot be
deployed underground, above the ground, in the air, or on
the ocean.
Even if they are stored in sturdy underground silos,
they can be detected by foreign reconnaissance satellites.
If so, they will be destroyed by the enemy's preemptive
strike. Once such a possibility is evident, a strategic
nuclear system's significance for deterrence becomes
dubious. Therefore, England, France, and China have become
concerned with the survivability of their land-based nuclear
deployment systems from enemies' preemptive strikes, and
they are compelled to rearrange their 300 to 500 warheads
each and to reconsider their ways of launching them.
How about the deployment method that employs the land-
based mobilization method using railroads? This may be
suitable in Siberia or Alaska, but it is not "safe, low
cost, or advantageous" for a country like Japan that has
little land. This is self-evident.
A unique deployment method was experimented in the past
to launch a large ballistic missile from a large tanker
airplane to be standing by in the air all the time. Again,
for a country like Japan that has a limited space in its
territorial sky and airports, such an airplane can be easily
spotted for a preemptive strike. Therefore, this method
cannot be "safe, low cost, or advantageous."
The same can be said about a method of carrying a
strategic missile on a floating fortress like a battleship.
Undoubtedly the ship will be tailed closely by an enemy's
naval warship, and, once it gets a surprise attack, its
ability to make a nuclear counterattack will be easily lost.
Therefore, it seems clear that the SLBM method, where a
long-range ballistic missile of the M-3SII type with an
atomic bomb shall be launched from a conventionally powered
submarine, is the only way for Japan to have a system of
nuclear deterrence that is "safe, low cost, and
advantageous." To spread the risk of damage, six submarines
will carry one missile each.
Then, what should be the size of such a strategic
missile submarine?
If Japan is to begin designing a nuclear-powered
submarine now, it will take too much time. So, we must think
of some practical, conventionally powered submarine that can
be deployed by the turn of the 21st century. (SS-N-4, the
Soviet Union's first SLBM, was loaded onto a conventionally
powered submarine and used until 1979.)
The submarines now owned by the Maritime Self-Defense
Force each have a submerged displacement of less than 3,000
tons. If a submarine is nuclear powered like a hunter
submarine (an offensive-type nuclear submarine), and even if
it is built in large size like the "Sea Wolf," the U.S.
Navy's latest model, weighing close to 10,000 tons, it will
be able to move underwater at the speed of 35 knots. On the
other hand, a practical size for a conventionally powered
hunter submarine cannot exceed 3,000 tons at the present
time. Having no nuclear power, such a submarine with a
diesel engine cannot navigate continuously around underwater
for many minutes. If it moves at the full speed of 20 knots,
the battery will run out in a few minutes. Therefore, a
conventionally powered submarine must have a compact body so
that it will not be easily detected by an enemy's sonar or
magnetic search device.
The same constraints apply to the production of a
conventionally powered strategic missile submarine. In
contrast to a hunter submarine, however, a strategic missile
submarine places a high priority on the ability to navigate
underwater for an extended period of time. The larger the
size of the submarine, the better this ability becomes. It
is difficult to achieve the right balance, but a practical
size for a conventionally powered strategic missile
submarine should be 4,000 tons at most. The reason is that,
even if it can be made larger than this, it will not be able
to extend its "reach," and the cost of production and
operation will be higher than that for a nuclear-powered
submarine.
Limiting the number of crew members to 90, a
conventionally powered submarine in the size of 4,000 tons
will be able to continuously navigate underwater for two
weeks. Combined with the snorkel navigation method, it will
be able to extend the submerged navigation to three weeks.
But, if the snorkel is not projected out above the surface
of the water at all, and if the submarine is operated with
the battery only at a slow speed, it can navigate underwater
for about four days at most.
Incidentally, it has been reported that a U.S.
strategic missile submarine returns to port after patrolling
in a completely submerged state for 70 days. Of course, it
does not have to use its snorkel at all during that period
of time, and it can navigate continuously at the maximum
speed of 20 some knots for many days. Because of this
outstanding navigational ability, naval officers in the
world wish to have nuclear-powered submarines.
How About Launching Platforms?
During the war, Japan even launched a huge submarine
named Igo 400, which had a submerged displacement of more
than 6,000 tons. Today, it is possible to build six 4,000-
ton conventionally powered submarines concurrently at the
existing docks for submarines owned by Kawasaki Heavy
Industries and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Kobe. It will
probably take two years at full operation to complete
construction of the first six submarines. As a rule,
however, as construction of the next six submarines can be
shortened to a year and a half, 12 submarines will be ready
in three years and a half.
At any rate, this 4,000-ton submarine measures less
than 20 meters from the bottom of its hull to the top of its
sail (or the bridge).
On the other hand, the first section of a M-3SII
measures 14.8 meters, the second section 8.2 meters, and the
third section 2.7 meters, and including the fairing portion
that stores a reentry body, the total length becomes 27.8
meters.
Compared in terms of the length, the M-3SII is close to
Titan I, a large-scale, early-generation ICBM of the United
States, that measures 29.9 meters. It is 6.6 meters longer
than the Peacekeeper, the leading ICBM at the present time.
Although one missile is carried in one submarine, it cannot
be loaded vertically. Even the Russian "Typhoon" (29,000
tons), the largest strategic missile submarine in the world,
cannot load a 27.8-meter missile on a vertical position.
Furthermore, although the M-S3SII has a diameter of 1.4
meters, which is slender compared to the SLBM's used
currently by the United States and Russia, 1.9 meters (for
the U.S. Poseidon and Trident) and 2.4 meters (for the
Russian SS-N-20), respectively, it has a tail wing, which
has a diameter of 4-5 meters at the longest subsection.
Therefore, to use it as an SLBM, the entire rocket must be
placed in an enormous canister with an inside diameter of 5
meters, and this canister must be installed diagonally,
stretching from the lower deck at the center of the
submarine's hull to the foredeck.
A two-step launching method using a canister is
employed for cruise missiles in U.S. submarines, and it does
not involve much technical difficulty. Of course, the bow of
the submarine should be raised upward for vertical launching
of a missile. As the depth of water for launching is 20
meters, the canister will come out of the surface of the
water immediately, leaving no adverse effect on the accuracy
of the SLBM's trajectory. Needless to say, also, that a hot-
launch system (internal ignition and self-takeoff) should be
incorporated into the design so that a missile can be
launched without a canister by thrusting the bow of the
submarine up above the surface of the water.
The Maritime Self-Defense Force does not have the U.S.
Navy's advanced measurement methods for submarine
positioning. However, as our strategic submarine will change
its position only within our territorial water, which has
become like an underwater inland sea because of torpedo
netting, it will be able to obtain accurate enough
information on positioning for an attack against a city from
its internal gyrocompass adjusted at the time of sailing out
from a port.
When a nuclear attack is made by a foreign country,
Japan's prime minister immediately transmits his order for a
strategic nuclear counterattack through high-powered,
medium-wave broadcasting to the captain of a submarine
submerged in nearby waters. So ordered, the captain enters
the data on the target for retaliation into the missile's
automatic guidance control circuit and raises the bow of the
submarine to make a rapid ascension. Then, he opens the door
of the launching tube, and, as soon as the submarine reaches
a water depth of 20 meters, he lets carbon dioxide expand at
the bottom of the launching tube. The canister thrusts its
fang-like tip vertically above the surface of the water. At
the same time, he ignites the first motor of the M-3SII. The
missile bursts through the front of the canister and thrusts
up toward the great circle route. As the M-3SII has a
completely automatic guidance system (a strap-down system),
it does not have to be guided any more from the submarine.
The canister is immediately discarded, and the submarine
evacuates underwater.
1,044 Billion Yen in Total
For the time being, therefore, Japan needs to secure 12
warheads, about 30 missiles, including those for experiment
and for reserve, and 12 submarines. Now, let me estimate the
required cost.
Assuming that a unit cost of a warhead--reportedly it
was $40 million to about $300 million in the United States
in the 1980's--is 2 billion yen, accounting for the initial
cost, the cost of 12 warheads will be 24 billion yen. As one
M-3SII costs 6 billion yen, the cost of 30 missiles will be
180 billion yen. As a 4,000-ton submarine costs 70 billion
yen at the most, the cost of 12 submarines will be 840
billion yen.
Adding 24 billion yen, 180 billion yen, and 840 billion
yen will equal 1,044 billion yen in total.
Of Japan's fiscal 1995 budget for various subsidies,
that for the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries alone
amounts to more than 1,700 billion yen. The Japanese
citizens should stop worrying too much, and, just by taking
away the tax money for retiring bureaucrats and investing it
over a four-year period, we will be able to have nuclear
missiles. These nuclear missiles will enable us to regain
"silent neutrality" that we have always wanted since the
feudal government was installed 390 years ago.
Herewith, I have finished explaining my four-year plan
toward Japan's nuclear armament. Yet, as you may be still
worrying about reactions from our neighboring countries and
divisive public opinions, I would like to explain my reasons
why these worries are unnecessary in the next issue of this
magazine.
by Nisohachi Hyodo, critic and author
Tokyo SHOKUN , Oct 96 pp 202-213
.......
"The 1985 Crisis"
Does anybody remember the "1985 crisis"? As the
shooting range of an SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic
missile) for the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear missile
submarine was extended to over 8,000 kilometers in the late
1970's, it became possible for the Soviet Union to attack
the heart of the United States from its inland sea or
harbor. To protect its nuclear missile submarines from the
U.S. Navy, the Soviet Union reinforced its "Back Fire" and
antisubmarine aircraft carriers. Knowing this, the United
States felt the need to push its "front yard" further
forward and began to publicize the threat of the Soviet
Union in Japan. The publicity department of the Soviet Union
countered this in earnest. Some people in Japan interpreted
all this as an opportune time to increase the defense
budget, saying, "Around 1985 the Soviet military forces will
land in Hokkaido to secure the Soya Strait."
All this happened just about the time when I was
studying acting and music in Tokyo after having graduated
from a high school in Nagano.
Thinking that "I may be able to get some interesting
experience," I quit the professional school and enlisted in
the Ground Self-Defense Force in Hokkaido.
However, when I was assigned to the Second Division (a
division in charge of defending the territory in northern
Hokkaido to the extent of total annihilation), which was
supposed to be a unit on the foremost frontline equivalent
to the Kanto Army that had guarded the former Manchurian-
Soviet border, I did not observe any sense of emergency that
is expected to prevail in a battlefield.
In particular, mobilization and communications training
exercises all ignored the hypothetical case of the
counterpart (the Soviet force) using super weapons (nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons). For example, when a
nuclear attack is expected, tanks should be quickly
dispersed to safety, and machineguns outside vehicles should
be stored for a while in anticipation of a bomb blast. Such
training exercises were never conducted.
As I was also a communications operator, I received in-
house training on telegram (the Morse code) and cryptogram
(secret code). However, although I was instructed to process
telegrams on super weapons as special emergency items, I
could not find any sample telegrams concerning super
weapons.
Everything else was just like the example cited above.
Being dumbfounded by the lack of a sense of emergency on the
frontline, I tried to think up some reasons for this. Then,
I came to a conclusion: "The government and the Self-Defense
Agency have a firm belief that there will be no war
involving Japan in the future. Therefore, they consider it
enough as long as they provide some formal appearance to
unit formation, personnel, and training exercises."
After completing one term (two years), I left the Self-
Defense Forces.
What Is the Biggest Threat to Japan?
For Japan, the threat from the Soviet Union is not
relating to Soya Point or sealanes. It has been a long time
since all of the seven seas became the front yard of the
United States. The U.S. Navy can detect all seafaring
submarines of the Soviet Union and follow them around very
closely. Also, as the U.S. military forces maintain a large
number of smart mines in their bases in Japan, without any
help from the Self-Defense Forces, they will be able to
blockade the three straits easily by spreading these mines
from their tanker planes. For them, blocking was not an
issue; instead, the issue was whether or not their military
forces could pass through these straits to attack the Soviet
Union.
Then, what is the threat from the Soviet Union to
Japan?
Quite obviously, it is none other than the vast number
of nuclear weapons in storage that can be dropped anytime on
Japanese cities. Likewise, the nuclear weapons owned by the
United States and China always remain as the biggest threat
to Japan.
As a former self-defense official, I became a college
student five years behind my classmates. Then, I began to be
utterly offended by Japan's military academism, which
considers my way of arguing odd, as well as by the poor
level of journalism. So, I tried more than once to publish
my articles in newspapers and magazines. When I was a
freshman or sophomore, I had already formed my idea on the
strategic principle of "direct approach against power,"
which will be mentioned later. Yet, all of my articles
submitted were rejected.
This reality made me obstinate. I spent two years at a
graduate school to prove that no other strategic theories in
the past and present could surpass my viewpoint. Then, with
some intended purpose, I joined the editorial department of
a monthly magazine called "SENSHA MAGAJIN [Tank Magazine]."
When I was writing articles with my byline (I used my
real name then), the Gulf war erupted. "SENSHA MAGAJIN" was
the only one that was able to point out the following before
the operation Desert Storm: "The U.S. Marine Corps' plan to
land in Kuwait is a diversionary tactic to mobilize the mass
media. The main strike force of the multinational troops
will take a long way around from the left to aim at Basrah."
My prediction came true a day after the publication of the
issue of the magazine that carried my article. Except for a
"commentator on military affairs" who quoted my view on TV
without permission, there was no other public response.
In Japan, no matter how insightful or meaningful an
article or an opinion is with regard to military affairs, it
will never make the Defense Agency reconsider its position
or change the public opinion. As soon as the Gulf war ended,
all the "commentators on military affairs" disappeared from
TV programs. I realized then that, with no realistic vision
of militarism or war in Japan, a career in military
journalism is a futile one.
As a script writer of original stories, I am now
writing scripts for an action comic featuring weathermen,
brain surgeons, and employees at the legal department of a
chemical manufacturer. In the meantime, I completed and
published four research-based books through Ginga Shuppan:
Infantry Weapons of the Japanese Army, The Army's
Mechanized Weapons, Reevaluation of Japan's Naval
Preparedness, and Reevaluation of Japan's Defense
Capability.
In the last book entitled Reevaluation of Japan's
Defense Capability, I attempted to construct a reasonable
foundation of military preparedness for nuclear deterrence
by eliminating all self-binding restrictions, including the
Constitution. The objective of this article is to expand
further the contents of this book.
"A Direct Approach Against Power"
I believe that, as long as we have six SLBM's with
nuclear warheads on alert on a 24-hour basis, we will be
able to deter nuclear attacks by superpowers on Japan. Why
do we need only six SLBM's?
In considering a nation's strategy for nuclear
deterrence, there is one thing that needs to be remembered.
That is a "difference in national character."
On this globe, there are countries where any citizen in
the middle class can influence national policies and
countries where only a limited number of privileged citizens
can influence national policies. This, I call a "difference
in national characters."
The Vietnam war was a war between two completely
opposite national characters--the United States and North
Vietnam.
Each one of the U.S. soldiers who were sent to
Indochina was able, through injury or death, to change the
national policy at the White House.
In North Vietnam, on the other hand, a very limited
number of people in leadership in the city of Hanoi were
able to influence the national policy. Average citizens on
the home front and soldiers in frontlines did not have such
power of influence to change their country's national policy
through injuries or deaths.
The people in the leadership class in the United States
had never considered this difference in national characters
before 1986 when they decided to bomb Libya to attack
Qadhdhafi. Therefore, they avoided bombing the center of
Hanoi during the Vietnam war; instead, they killed or
injured only common soldiers and farmers. Despite the series
of bombings on North Vietnam, as the people in power were
never physically threatened, the North Vietnamese policy
remained intact.
On the other hand, the communist side understood that
each one of the U.S. soldiers had the power to influence
Washington. Therefore, by killing or injuring these soldiers
little by little everyday, the communist forces were able to
effect a policy change in Washington.
It has been said that the United States has two
targeting-policy choices for its nuclear strategy--a
"counterforce" and a "countervalue" strategy. Simply stated,
the former is to use its own nuclear weapons to destroy the
enemy's nuclear weapons; and the latter is to use its own
nuclear weapons to kill or injure the enemy's people in
cities. And, if the countervalue strategy, or the ability to
destroy cities, could be assured of being operative after
the enemy's first attack, a "nuclear deterrence" was
considered to exist.
However, even without considering the fact that the
failure to kill Colonel Qaddafi in 1986 gave rise to a
reckless attempt by Sadam Hussein in 1990, if we review how
the Korean war and the Vietnam war proceeded, we can realize
that a "deterrence" cannot be achieved so easily.
When we are dealing with such nations as North Korea,
China, Libya, Iraq, and the former Soviet Union, we cannot
achieve a deterrence by killing or injuring soldiers. Even
by killing a large number of average citizens, we cannot
force changes in national policies of these countries.
In other words, to change national policies of these
countries, it is necessary to impose physical threats upon
the limited number of powerful individuals. This is a case
similar to the following: Although the former Japanese
Empire had no intention of surrendering even after receiving
carpet bombings from the U.S. forces, including one atomic
bomb, as soon as the Soviet Union made an advance toward
Manchuria, endangering members of the Imperial Household and
some leaders of the army so as to become hostages of the
Soviet forces, it convened an Imperial conference and
accepted the Potsdam Declaration.
I call this a "direct approach against power." If we
apply this iron rule, we will be able to establish a nuclear
deterrence with a surprisingly limited number of nuclear
weapons against any opponent, even if it is the United
States, Russia, or China.
On the other hand, nuclear armaments that go against
this iron rule will never become a "safe, inexpensive, or
effective" nuclear deterrence. For example, Mr. Hachiyo
Nakagawa and former high-ranking officials of the Self-
Defense Forces are emphatic about maintaining short-range
nuclear weapons that can reach only up to Beijing or
Siberia. But, with no matter how many of these weapons we
have, how will we be able to deter strategic nuclear attacks
from the two major nuclear powers, the United States and
Russia? If a deterrence could be possible with such weapons,
China would never have attempted to develop an ICBM
(intercontinental ballistic missile) with a shooting range
of 13,000 kilometers.
Nuclear Power With "12 Warheads and 12 Submarines"
To deter nuclear attacks from the two nuclear
superpowers, the United States and Russia, that maintain
large numbers of warheads and currently have the
capabilities of directing 20,000 warheads toward Japan at
any time, it is necessary to have ballistic missiles with a
shooting range of at least 12,000 kilometers each to
threaten New York and Moscow.
To deter a country like the United States from
resorting to a nuclear attack, it is not necessary to target
the White House or the Pentagon. It is sufficient to
establish a credibility (certainty and reliability) that we
are capable of blasting nuclear bombs in one or two cities
to be randomly selected from about 10 large cities. In other
words, when dealing with the United States, we can use the
elementary "countervalue" nuclear strategy as our "direct
approach against power."
The credibility can be established by having two SLBM's
that can be launched anytime from two conventionally powered
submarines roaming in separate sea zones. To maintain these
"two warheads and two submarines" always on alert, it is
necessary to build "four warheads and four submarines,"
assuming that the rate of operation is maintained at 50
percent as in the case of the U.S. military.
When dealing with Russia, as its leaders and
intellectuals are extremely concentrated in Moscow and St.
Petersburg, "four warheads and four submarines" will produce
enough credibility as a "direct approach against power."
Like Russia, China is also a country with a limited
number of people who have the power to change national
policies. However, it has no one "central" city like Moscow
in Russia where everything of national importance is
concentrated. In dealing with China, therefore, it is
necessary to keep constant track of the whereabouts of the
specified number of powerful leaders so that SLBM's can be
ready to be launched accurately at any time toward these
locations. As long as this vigilance can be accomplished,
"two warheads and two submarines" seem to be sufficient.
In addition to these country-by-country measures, if we
are to take into consideration the need to deter all of
these three countries--the United States, Russia, and China-
-at the same time, at least "six warheads and six
submarines" must always be on alert. Therefore, it is
necessary to build "12 warheads and 12 submarines."
How About the Hardware and Launching Methods?
Then, how are we going to quickly procure 12 SLBM's and
warheads as well as submarines for launching these warheads?
As Mr. Ikutaro Shimizu and other advocates for nuclear
armament in the postwar Japan were all unable to explain
their plans in concrete terms, they lacked the power of
persuasion enough to awaken the public with a deep sense of
defeatism toward the former Allied Powers. Now, I am going
to work out such a plan.
On 4 February 1994, the National Space Development
Agency (NASDA) launched an H-II rocket with all of its parts
made in Japan. At that time, some mass media, here and
abroad, reported their opinions that this would eventually
become Japan's ICBM.
Such speculation showed the lack of knowledge on the
part of the reporters on the "vertical air nuclear launch
system."
Russia's SS-18, the largest ICBM in the world at
present, is 36.5 meters long, and its launch weight is 211
tons. On the other hand, the H-II is 50 meters long, far
larger than the SS-18, and its launch weight is 260 tons. It
is too big to be an ICBM.
Also, the H-II's main engine fuel--liquid hydrogen and
oxygen--cannot be kept in the tank for many hours. Before
launching, about four hours are needed to go through the
procedure of gas replacement, preliminary cooling, and early
fueling to fill up 98 percent of the fuel. Then, the
remaining 2 percent of the fuel is filled automatically to a
countdown from 40 minutes before launching. As soon as 100
percent of the fuel is filled up, the launching begins.
Considering that an enemy's first ICBM attack, which is
launched from the other side of the globe, is capable of
hitting the impact point in 45 minutes, a system that
requires five hours to prepare for launching can never
become a deterrent.
The former Soviet Union had to supplement the low
credibility of its liquid-fueled SLBM's with quantity. As
Japan needs to avoid the stupidity of competing against
superpowers by the quantity of nuclear arms, it must procure
rockets that can be launched immediately and reliably with
solid propellant.
In 1971, the Education Ministry's Institute of Space
and Astronautical Science (ISAS, Tokyo University's former
Aerospace Institute) launched an M (mu)-4S rocket with four-
step solid motors that was 23.6 meters long with a diameter
of 1.4 meters and a total weight of 43.6 tons. Using a
drawing in his book, "Japan's Nuclear Armament" (1975), Mr.
Uchihiro Koyama pointed out that the rocket was medium in
size, somewhere between an ICBM and a strategic nuclear
missile.
With a single 450-kiloton warhead, SS-N-18--an SLBM
that was made by the former Soviet Union in the late 1970's-
-had a range of 8,000 kilometers. Russia has now converted
the fuselage into a space rocket for the private sector.
Reportedly, the rocket can launch a satellite weighing 130
kilograms into a low orbit at an altitude of 250 kilometers.
Once you determine the weight of a satellite (payload)
that can be launched into a low orbit, you can estimate the
weight of a projectile warhead (slow weight). The latter is
a little heavier than the satellite.
The M-4S had the power to launch a satellite weighing
180 kilograms into a low orbit at an altitude of 250
kilometers. In other words, it had a power larger than the
SS-N-18. Instead of launching into an orbit, if it is used
for a trajectory flight of about 12,000 kilometers (the
distance between Tokyo and New York), it can carry a slow
weight of more than 180 kilograms. (Incidentally, the
distance between Tokyo and Moscow is 7,500 kilometers.)
The question is whether Japan at that time was capable
of manufacturing an atomic warhead with less than 100
kilotons necessary for an elementary level of nuclear
deterrence for the M-4S with a fuselage having a 1.4-meter
diameter and a slow weight of about 180 kilograms.
Stating my conclusion first, I believe Japan was not
capable of doing so in the 1970's.
Warheads Becoming Lightweight
In 1960, the United States mass-produced "W47," a 600-
kiloton-level single warhead weighing 408 kilograms
(excluding the weight of a reentry body), for its Polaris,
the world's first SLBM. As an SLBM is launched underwater
from a submarine, requirements for missile design are
extremely restrictive. Therefore, warheads always
incorporate the most advanced technology to make them
lightweight.
On the other hand, an "A-11" aerial bomb (an implosive
using plutonium 239), which was deployed by France as its
first practical atomic bomb in 1963, weighed 1.5 tons,
although its explosive power was only 60 kilotons. Still,
this clearly showed the advantage of later development
because the 23-kiloton "Fatman," which the United States
dropped on Nagasaki in 1945, was a plutonium-based implosive
bomb and weighed 4.5 tons.
Three years later, France experimented with an "AN52,"
a 25-kiloton strategic nuclear bomb using plutonium 239.
This bomb had a diameter of 60 centimeters and weighed 455
kilogram.
Another experiment was conducted in 1967 with an "A22"
warhead, which became the first missile warhead to be
launched from a submarine by France in 1971. This "enriched
bomb," which was made of uranium 235, deuterium oxide, and
tritium, weighed 1.5 tons initially. But, the weight was
successfully reduced in half to 750 kilograms in 1973.
Probably, Japan in the 1970's was still incapable of
producing such an atomic warhead weighing 750 kilograms.
Therefore, the M-4S with a payload of 180 kilograms could
never be converted to a nuclear missile.
Then, how light can we make a warhead for a strategic
ballistic missile that needs to be thrust back to the
atmosphere? The United States developed a 100-kiloton
warhead called "W76" to be used with an MIRV (multiple
independently targeted reentry vehicle) for the SLBM
Poseidon C-3. This warhead weighs 164.5 kilograms, and this
seems to be the technological limit. (Trident D-5, the
latest SLBM, is a more powerful missile but uses a heavier
warhead.) The technological limit in weight reduction that
was achieved for the "W76" by the United States in 1970 was
attained by the Soviet Union in the late 1970's when it
produced its SS-N-18. I believe this is beyond the reach of
today's Japan because of the lack of experience.
It could be possible for Japan in the late 1990's to
produce a warhead with less than 100 kilotons, including a
reentry body, that weighs about 750 kilograms, which is
equivalent to the weight of "A22" developed by France in
1973.
The reason is that specific information on how to
design a nuclear warhead is now quite well disseminated. In
Japan, there is no difficulty in obtaining such specialized
items as heavy metals (uranium 238) to make an atomic bomb
shell, explosives (triamino, trinitro, benzene, etc.) for
implosion, and precise triggering devices. Furthermore,
using a supercomputer and computational software programs,
we can easily simulate implosions with different
combinations of specialized explosives. Therefore, it seems
possible to carry out critical experiments economically with
an amount of plutonium 239 far less than that used by the
United States, the Soviet Union, England, and France when
they manually computed and developed their plutonium-based
atomic bombs, and thereby to design a powerful atomic bomb
that is relatively small in size. Design techniques
pertaining to reentry bodies have also been obtained through
more than 10 recovered experimental rockets, including TT-
500A's since 1980, TR-1A's since 1991, and the "Ryusei," the
first H-II rocket in 1994.
M-3SII Rocket
Jerico-I, a medium-range ballistic missile that was
deployed by Israel in 1973 had a diameter of only 1 meter
and a slow weight of about 500 kilograms. However, it was
believed to be equipped with a 20-kiloton warhead.
Also, when seven Western nations called for a Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987, they targeted
"missiles with carrying warheads weighing more than 1,000
pounds (454 kilograms)." This is merely an official
acknowledgment in 1987 that, if a missile has a slow weight
of 500 kilograms, it can launch a warhead. As North Korea's
Nodon 1, which is currently attracting attention, has a slow
weight of 500 kilograms, it is reportedly capable of
carrying a 50-kiloton atomic bomb in its fuselage with a
diameter of 1.3 meters.
Considering all this, Japan today can quite certainly
produce its first operational atomic warhead, including a
reentry body weighing less than 750 kilograms.
The M-4S rocket in 1971 was not capable for long-range
launching of a slow weight of 500-750 kilograms. Therefore,
it could not be made into Japan's strategic ballistic
missile.
The first time Japan achieved a slow-weight ballistic
missile weighing more than 750 kilograms was when the
Institute of Space and Astronautical Science developed the M
(mu)-3SII in 1985.
The M-3SII is several generations newer than the M-4S
rocket. With a fewer number of stages than the M-4S, it had
a far stronger payload and was capable of launching a
satellite weighing 770 kilograms at a low altitude of 250
kilometer. When a satellite to observe Halley's comet was
launched, this rocket became the first one in the world to
thrust through the earth's gravitational boundary, using
only solid rocket propellant. Its total weight is 61 tons,
heavier by about 2 tons than Trident D-5, the proud SLBM of
the United States that has a solid three-stage design with a
shooting range of 12,000 kilometers. Nissan Motor has
already supplied eight of these rockets since 1985.
Eleven years ago, therefore, Japan had a home-made
solid fuel rocket that could be used to carry a warhead with
a strategic shooting range. It is believed that one of the
objectives of the MTCR, which was concluded two years later,
was believed to prohibit export of this M-3SII. The reason
was that K (Kappa)-6 and other three models totaling 19
rockets had been previously exported from Japan to
Yugoslavia and Indonesia in the early 1960's.
M-3SII is a highly perfected rocket. Since then, the
ISAS and the NASDA have not developed any rocket with a
completely solid design that is smaller in size than M-3SII
and is capable of launching a satellite weighing more than
500 kilograms. They do not even have plans to develop such
rockets in the future. In the following, I would like to
examine the possibility of developing an uniquely Japanese
nuclear deterrent system with M-3SII rockets.
How About Nuclear Warheads?
Acquiring nuclear weapons anew is the same as
developing atomic bombs. A so-called hydrogen bomb creates
nuclear fusion by using the energy from the nuclear fission
of an atomic bomb. Therefore, it can be considered another
form of an atomic bomb. Once an atomic bomb can be produced,
it is quite simple in fact to create a hydrogen bomb. What
is most difficult for any advanced industrial country to do
is to manufacture a practical atomic bomb for the first
time.
Then, how can Japan manufacture its first practical
atomic bomb to be loaded on to the M-3SII?
Practically speaking, the raw material to be used for
nuclear fission for an atomic bomb is either plutonium 239
or uranium 235.
Plutonium 239 can be easily extracted in large quantity
and quality good enough to be used for nuclear bombs by
chemically treating byproducts from the lightwater reactors
at commercial nuclear power plants throughout Japan. As
there is no need to build new facilities, this method has a
merit of convenience.
A demerit, if any, is that plutonium 239 is not
suitable for the so-called "gun-barrel method," the simplest
critical experiment. It, therefore, requires a complex and
precise critical experiment called the "implosion method."
On the other hand, uranium 235 has the merit of
absolute reliability: If a weapon is made according to the
gun-barrel method, its explosion is assured without any
experiment. (In fact, the uranium 235, gun-barrel bomb used
on Hiroshima was dropped without prior experiment.)
However, the facilities in Ningyotoge and Rokkashomura
to enrich uranium 235 are not built to military
specifications. So, a demerit is the time that it will take
to enrich the uranium to the purity for use in making
nuclear bombs.
With an utmost priority placed on saving time for
production and deployment, therefore, the first three bombs
will be made of plutonium 235 according to the implosion
method.
However, to secure the credibility here and abroad of
assured explosion without experiment, the fourth and
subsequent bombs will be made of uranium 235 according to
the gun-barrel method as well as the implosion method and
will be included in a mixed inventory of warheads.
The number of warheads required to be manufactured for
the time being is 12 in total. The reason is that, to
maintain six SLBM's with single warheads and six submarines
on 24-hour alert all year-round, it is necessary to have at
least 12 warheads, assuming that the rate of operation is 50
percent.
Conditions of "Safety, Low Cost, and Advantage"
These six missiles with single warheads cannot be
deployed underground, above the ground, in the air, or on
the ocean.
Even if they are stored in sturdy underground silos,
they can be detected by foreign reconnaissance satellites.
If so, they will be destroyed by the enemy's preemptive
strike. Once such a possibility is evident, a strategic
nuclear system's significance for deterrence becomes
dubious. Therefore, England, France, and China have become
concerned with the survivability of their land-based nuclear
deployment systems from enemies' preemptive strikes, and
they are compelled to rearrange their 300 to 500 warheads
each and to reconsider their ways of launching them.
How about the deployment method that employs the land-
based mobilization method using railroads? This may be
suitable in Siberia or Alaska, but it is not "safe, low
cost, or advantageous" for a country like Japan that has
little land. This is self-evident.
A unique deployment method was experimented in the past
to launch a large ballistic missile from a large tanker
airplane to be standing by in the air all the time. Again,
for a country like Japan that has a limited space in its
territorial sky and airports, such an airplane can be easily
spotted for a preemptive strike. Therefore, this method
cannot be "safe, low cost, or advantageous."
The same can be said about a method of carrying a
strategic missile on a floating fortress like a battleship.
Undoubtedly the ship will be tailed closely by an enemy's
naval warship, and, once it gets a surprise attack, its
ability to make a nuclear counterattack will be easily lost.
Therefore, it seems clear that the SLBM method, where a
long-range ballistic missile of the M-3SII type with an
atomic bomb shall be launched from a conventionally powered
submarine, is the only way for Japan to have a system of
nuclear deterrence that is "safe, low cost, and
advantageous." To spread the risk of damage, six submarines
will carry one missile each.
Then, what should be the size of such a strategic
missile submarine?
If Japan is to begin designing a nuclear-powered
submarine now, it will take too much time. So, we must think
of some practical, conventionally powered submarine that can
be deployed by the turn of the 21st century. (SS-N-4, the
Soviet Union's first SLBM, was loaded onto a conventionally
powered submarine and used until 1979.)
The submarines now owned by the Maritime Self-Defense
Force each have a submerged displacement of less than 3,000
tons. If a submarine is nuclear powered like a hunter
submarine (an offensive-type nuclear submarine), and even if
it is built in large size like the "Sea Wolf," the U.S.
Navy's latest model, weighing close to 10,000 tons, it will
be able to move underwater at the speed of 35 knots. On the
other hand, a practical size for a conventionally powered
hunter submarine cannot exceed 3,000 tons at the present
time. Having no nuclear power, such a submarine with a
diesel engine cannot navigate continuously around underwater
for many minutes. If it moves at the full speed of 20 knots,
the battery will run out in a few minutes. Therefore, a
conventionally powered submarine must have a compact body so
that it will not be easily detected by an enemy's sonar or
magnetic search device.
The same constraints apply to the production of a
conventionally powered strategic missile submarine. In
contrast to a hunter submarine, however, a strategic missile
submarine places a high priority on the ability to navigate
underwater for an extended period of time. The larger the
size of the submarine, the better this ability becomes. It
is difficult to achieve the right balance, but a practical
size for a conventionally powered strategic missile
submarine should be 4,000 tons at most. The reason is that,
even if it can be made larger than this, it will not be able
to extend its "reach," and the cost of production and
operation will be higher than that for a nuclear-powered
submarine.
Limiting the number of crew members to 90, a
conventionally powered submarine in the size of 4,000 tons
will be able to continuously navigate underwater for two
weeks. Combined with the snorkel navigation method, it will
be able to extend the submerged navigation to three weeks.
But, if the snorkel is not projected out above the surface
of the water at all, and if the submarine is operated with
the battery only at a slow speed, it can navigate underwater
for about four days at most.
Incidentally, it has been reported that a U.S.
strategic missile submarine returns to port after patrolling
in a completely submerged state for 70 days. Of course, it
does not have to use its snorkel at all during that period
of time, and it can navigate continuously at the maximum
speed of 20 some knots for many days. Because of this
outstanding navigational ability, naval officers in the
world wish to have nuclear-powered submarines.
How About Launching Platforms?
During the war, Japan even launched a huge submarine
named Igo 400, which had a submerged displacement of more
than 6,000 tons. Today, it is possible to build six 4,000-
ton conventionally powered submarines concurrently at the
existing docks for submarines owned by Kawasaki Heavy
Industries and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Kobe. It will
probably take two years at full operation to complete
construction of the first six submarines. As a rule,
however, as construction of the next six submarines can be
shortened to a year and a half, 12 submarines will be ready
in three years and a half.
At any rate, this 4,000-ton submarine measures less
than 20 meters from the bottom of its hull to the top of its
sail (or the bridge).
On the other hand, the first section of a M-3SII
measures 14.8 meters, the second section 8.2 meters, and the
third section 2.7 meters, and including the fairing portion
that stores a reentry body, the total length becomes 27.8
meters.
Compared in terms of the length, the M-3SII is close to
Titan I, a large-scale, early-generation ICBM of the United
States, that measures 29.9 meters. It is 6.6 meters longer
than the Peacekeeper, the leading ICBM at the present time.
Although one missile is carried in one submarine, it cannot
be loaded vertically. Even the Russian "Typhoon" (29,000
tons), the largest strategic missile submarine in the world,
cannot load a 27.8-meter missile on a vertical position.
Furthermore, although the M-S3SII has a diameter of 1.4
meters, which is slender compared to the SLBM's used
currently by the United States and Russia, 1.9 meters (for
the U.S. Poseidon and Trident) and 2.4 meters (for the
Russian SS-N-20), respectively, it has a tail wing, which
has a diameter of 4-5 meters at the longest subsection.
Therefore, to use it as an SLBM, the entire rocket must be
placed in an enormous canister with an inside diameter of 5
meters, and this canister must be installed diagonally,
stretching from the lower deck at the center of the
submarine's hull to the foredeck.
A two-step launching method using a canister is
employed for cruise missiles in U.S. submarines, and it does
not involve much technical difficulty. Of course, the bow of
the submarine should be raised upward for vertical launching
of a missile. As the depth of water for launching is 20
meters, the canister will come out of the surface of the
water immediately, leaving no adverse effect on the accuracy
of the SLBM's trajectory. Needless to say, also, that a hot-
launch system (internal ignition and self-takeoff) should be
incorporated into the design so that a missile can be
launched without a canister by thrusting the bow of the
submarine up above the surface of the water.
The Maritime Self-Defense Force does not have the U.S.
Navy's advanced measurement methods for submarine
positioning. However, as our strategic submarine will change
its position only within our territorial water, which has
become like an underwater inland sea because of torpedo
netting, it will be able to obtain accurate enough
information on positioning for an attack against a city from
its internal gyrocompass adjusted at the time of sailing out
from a port.
When a nuclear attack is made by a foreign country,
Japan's prime minister immediately transmits his order for a
strategic nuclear counterattack through high-powered,
medium-wave broadcasting to the captain of a submarine
submerged in nearby waters. So ordered, the captain enters
the data on the target for retaliation into the missile's
automatic guidance control circuit and raises the bow of the
submarine to make a rapid ascension. Then, he opens the door
of the launching tube, and, as soon as the submarine reaches
a water depth of 20 meters, he lets carbon dioxide expand at
the bottom of the launching tube. The canister thrusts its
fang-like tip vertically above the surface of the water. At
the same time, he ignites the first motor of the M-3SII. The
missile bursts through the front of the canister and thrusts
up toward the great circle route. As the M-3SII has a
completely automatic guidance system (a strap-down system),
it does not have to be guided any more from the submarine.
The canister is immediately discarded, and the submarine
evacuates underwater.
1,044 Billion Yen in Total
For the time being, therefore, Japan needs to secure 12
warheads, about 30 missiles, including those for experiment
and for reserve, and 12 submarines. Now, let me estimate the
required cost.
Assuming that a unit cost of a warhead--reportedly it
was $40 million to about $300 million in the United States
in the 1980's--is 2 billion yen, accounting for the initial
cost, the cost of 12 warheads will be 24 billion yen. As one
M-3SII costs 6 billion yen, the cost of 30 missiles will be
180 billion yen. As a 4,000-ton submarine costs 70 billion
yen at the most, the cost of 12 submarines will be 840
billion yen.
Adding 24 billion yen, 180 billion yen, and 840 billion
yen will equal 1,044 billion yen in total.
Of Japan's fiscal 1995 budget for various subsidies,
that for the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries alone
amounts to more than 1,700 billion yen. The Japanese
citizens should stop worrying too much, and, just by taking
away the tax money for retiring bureaucrats and investing it
over a four-year period, we will be able to have nuclear
missiles. These nuclear missiles will enable us to regain
"silent neutrality" that we have always wanted since the
feudal government was installed 390 years ago.
Herewith, I have finished explaining my four-year plan
toward Japan's nuclear armament. Yet, as you may be still
worrying about reactions from our neighboring countries and
divisive public opinions, I would like to explain my reasons
why these worries are unnecessary in the next issue of this
magazine.
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cnleio
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I didn't read whole article, but ... 'A PLAN' LOL, Japan nuclear warheads vs U.S/Russia/China ... LOL
Quite obviously, it is none other than the vast number
of nuclear weapons in storage that can be dropped anytime on
Japanese cities. Likewise, the nuclear weapons owned by the
United States and China always remain as the biggest threat
to Japan.
To deter nuclear attacks from the two nuclear
superpowers, the United States and Russia, that maintain
large numbers of warheads and currently have the
capabilities of directing 20,000 warheads toward Japan at
any time, it is necessary to have ballistic missiles with a
shooting range of at least 12,000 kilometers each to
threaten New York and Moscow.
To deter a country like the United States from
resorting to a nuclear attack, it is not necessary to target
the White House or the Pentagon. It is sufficient to
establish a credibility (certainty and reliability) that we
are capable of blasting nuclear bombs in one or two cities
to be randomly selected from about 10 large cities. In other
words, when dealing with the United States, we can use the
elementary "countervalue" nuclear strategy as our "direct
approach against power."
BoQ77
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Targeting Halley's comet which had been predicted to reappear in 1985 after 76 years, ISAS started to develop the fourth generation Mu launch system, M-3SII, in 1981. It used the first stage of M-3S, and the rest of the stages were replaced by new ones to enhance its payload capability. The M-3SII-1 and -2, with an optional fourth kick stage, sent the first and second Japanese interplanetary probes, SAKIGAKE and SUISEI, into orbit in 1985 to encounter Halley's comet. Seven M-3SII launches out of eight were successful. It could send a 770 kg satellite into low earth orbit.
The Epsilon Launch Vehicle is a solid propellant rocket suitable for a new age, delivering both high performance and low cost.Based on the M-V Launch Vehicle, a multistage solid propellant rocket with the best performance in the world (discontinued in 2006), we try to achieve improved performance with the Epsilon Launch Vehicle, and build a system which will allow the frequent launch of launch vehicles by largely-reducing operational costs through enhancing aspects of operational efficiency, such as assembly and inspection. Through increased launch opportunities, we anticipate that space development activity will increase. The biggest goal of the Epsilon Launch Vehicle is to make space more accessible as rocket launches are made easier.
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