Now or never for Waziristan push?
By M Ilyas Khan
BBC News, Islamabad
The announcement that an army ground offensive had been ordered in South Waziristan tribal region was made by the Governor of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province on 15 June.
Four months later, the army is still waiting for the right time to move in.
"The government has taken [a decision in principle]
but it's now a matter of military judgment as to what will be the appropriate time," the chief army spokesman, Maj Gen Athar Abbas, said at a news briefing on Monday.
So what exactly has held back the army so far?
Doubts about the fate of the operation emerged just a week after Governor Owais Ahmad Ghani's announcement when a pro-government militant leader, apparently being groomed by the army to defeat and replace militant commander Baitullah Mehsud, was assassinated.
Baitullah Mehsud himself was killed in a suspected US drone strike in August.
Plagued by delays
His death led some security analysts to suggest that there was now no need for a full-blown operation, and that small-scale, localised action would take care of the menace.
Fighting the Baitullah Mehsud group could suck in other factions
But recent informal briefings held by the army's top brass for members of the media spell out a range of reasons why the Waziristan operation has suffered delays.
The impression being conveyed is that the country's civilian government has not been quick enough to rehabilitate the system of administration in areas cleared of militants.
As a result, the argument goes, the army has not been able to free up troops for operations in other areas.
For example, declare these officials, the army is still not properly prepared for an offensive in South Waziristan, which they say is far more dangerous than other regions.
In Swat and other parts of Malakand, where the army launched a successful operation in early June, these officials say the government has still not beefed up the local police force or filled the judicial vacuum in the area.
Easier terrain
As a result, the army continues to be involved in combating remnants of militant groups for fear that if it thins its presence, the gunmen may stage a comeback.
In addition, the army carries the "logistical burden" of about 8,000 arrested militants.
Many civilians have already fled South Waziristan
The army says it is holding these militants because police could not cope with such a number.
Furthermore, the courts and anti-terrorism laws are inadequate to carry out trials, or achieve convictions.
This loss of time has brought us to the verge of winter, which is not the right time to start a ground offensive in Waziristan, says the military.
But there are counter-arguments that call the army's declared reasons into question.
First, the terrain in the north-eastern parts of South Waziristan, which is envisaged to be the main theatre of war, is not as difficult as that in Malakand.
Thick forest cover and lots of water made nearly the entire Malakand region suitable for militants to create hideouts and to lie low there for longer periods.
But South Waziristan is an arid zone, with no forest and little water.
Second, the likely war zone in South Waziristan is sparsely populated, and most of the population has already left the area, effectively cutting the possibility of civilian casualties.
Third, the troops deployed in the South Waziristan region are more than twice the numbers that conducted the Malakand operation, even though the area of the combat zone is smaller.
Hornet's nest
Fourth, the army has had the experience of operating in Waziristan since 2002, whereas it was a complete stranger to the Malakand region.
Fifth, the winters in the Mehsud area of South Waziristan are not as harsh as in some other areas and have not prevented the army from conducting operations there in the recent past.
This analyst says America is not happy with the Pakistani army
Given these factors, security analysts believe there may be two main reasons why the army is yet to implement its decision to go after this destructive ground-zero of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan.
Any action against the Baitullah Mehsud group in South Waziristan could draw in to the conflict militant groups based in the Wazir tribal areas of South and North Waziristan.
These groups are part of the al-Qaeda affiliated Haqqani network, and have peace agreements with the army.
They have so far concentrated exclusively on fighting inside Afghanistan, and many analysts consider their activities central to the army's perceived security interests in Afghanistan.
Any hostilities with them may harm these interests, analysts say.
Another reason may well have been the so-called Kerry-Lugar bill which promises $1.5bn (£0.95bn) in annual aid to Pakistan for the next five years.
The bill, which has been in the works for well over a year, has become hugely controversial recently due to some clauses that the military look upon as detrimental to its interests.
Last week, the army publicly denounced the bill at a time when the government was defending it, thereby sparking a rift within the political establishment.
"The language of the bill is reflective of American disapproval of the Pakistani army, and may well cause the army to rethink its entire anti-militancy strategy," says Mehmood Shah, a defence analyst and retired Pakistani army brigadier.
But while the army considers its options for a re-think, attacks such as the one on its central headquarters in Rawalpindi on 10 October indicate that the options it has are indeed limited, and time is running out.
CoAS has said that SWA is an intel blackhole.
