Heinz89
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The problem with Iran's strategic SAM deployment is the evident over-reliance on the S-200 system to provide air defense over most of the nation. The S-200 is certainly a threat to aircraft such as the U-2R or E-3, but the primary threat which Iran must consider is that of standoff cruise missiles and strike aircraft featuring comprehensive EW suites. Against these types of low-RCS or maneuverable targets, the S-200 cannot be counted upon to be effective. Libyan S-200 systems proved completely ineffective against USN and USAFE strike aircraft in 1986, and the Iranian S-200s would logically be expected to fare no better in a much more challenging contemporary air combat environment.
The remainder of the Iranian SAM assets are primarily situated to provide point or local area defense and as such do not represent a serious threat to a dedicated and sophisticated enemy. Even lesser-equipped nations would be able to explot the various gaps and vulnerabilities in the coverage zones, provided the S-200s could be neutralized in some fashion, be it through ECM, technical capability, or direct attack. Given the current deployment strategy, the small number of sites, and the capability of the systems themselves, it is likely that Iran places more importance on the fighter force as an air defense element. This would explain the continued efforts to retain an operational fleet of F-14A Tomcat interceptors. The short range of the HQ-2 and HAWK systems, coupled with the inability of the S-200 to effectively deal with low-RCS targets, also explains well documented Iranian attempts to purchase advanced SAM systems from Russia and China. It is possible that Iran simply does not feel that a robust SAM network is necessary. Relying on the S-200 for long-range defense and the other systems as point defense weapons to defend Iran's critical military and political infrastructure.
Superficially, Iran's ground-based air defense picture appears to be relatively robust thanks to the presence and reach of the seven S-200 batteries. However, a closer analysis reveals an overall coverage which is currently full of holes and vulnerabilities that a potential aggressor could exploit. The Iranian strategic SAM force is clearly in need of a serious upgrade, one which is more substantial than simply producing modified HQ-2 missiles. The presence of air interceptors and numerous terrain constraints do explain away some of the negative aspects of Iran's SAM network, but taken as a whole it represents a relatively ineffective form of defense against a modern aggressor.
Reassessing Iran's Air Defences
The remainder of the Iranian SAM assets are primarily situated to provide point or local area defense and as such do not represent a serious threat to a dedicated and sophisticated enemy. Even lesser-equipped nations would be able to explot the various gaps and vulnerabilities in the coverage zones, provided the S-200s could be neutralized in some fashion, be it through ECM, technical capability, or direct attack. Given the current deployment strategy, the small number of sites, and the capability of the systems themselves, it is likely that Iran places more importance on the fighter force as an air defense element. This would explain the continued efforts to retain an operational fleet of F-14A Tomcat interceptors. The short range of the HQ-2 and HAWK systems, coupled with the inability of the S-200 to effectively deal with low-RCS targets, also explains well documented Iranian attempts to purchase advanced SAM systems from Russia and China. It is possible that Iran simply does not feel that a robust SAM network is necessary. Relying on the S-200 for long-range defense and the other systems as point defense weapons to defend Iran's critical military and political infrastructure.
Superficially, Iran's ground-based air defense picture appears to be relatively robust thanks to the presence and reach of the seven S-200 batteries. However, a closer analysis reveals an overall coverage which is currently full of holes and vulnerabilities that a potential aggressor could exploit. The Iranian strategic SAM force is clearly in need of a serious upgrade, one which is more substantial than simply producing modified HQ-2 missiles. The presence of air interceptors and numerous terrain constraints do explain away some of the negative aspects of Iran's SAM network, but taken as a whole it represents a relatively ineffective form of defense against a modern aggressor.
Reassessing Iran's Air Defences
