Indian strategic thinking and Pakistan.

[indushek]

https://lh4.ggpht.com/iCDZfyGXc11DQHolYAyfGn97c71ewps53F4luOG6dSDgpOk5aO7m9ZtNzYFYXGc4ABz_tX8=s5

Hi a beginner's question, if the map above is to go by at how many places should we Indians be defending ourselves as we seem to have lot of areas where the Chinese could attack from??

http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/11/indiamap.jpg/

 

[notorious_eagle]

This is the most vital part of the strategy, to me.

It may seem strange to be advocating peace as a geo-political strategy, but on clearer reflection, THIS IS THE ONLY WAY FORWARD FOR BOTH COUNTRIES. Even a successful war against Pakistan will only breed another, even more rigidly obstinate opponents of India, bent upon taking revenge. Look at what happened after 1971. We will be trapped, like France and Germany were, in an eternal cycle of revenge. As history tells us, this dates back to the break-up of the Carolingian Empire in the 9th and 10th centuries.

It is also risky to consider a peace which is a matter of mutual deferment of trial by battle, as the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany entered into in 1939. If it is not a genuine peace, complete with border forces manned by personnel carefully balanced between both nations, officered by responsible people, it will be a worse mess than today's cold war conditions.

There are huge barriers, of course. Neither the right wing fascist imitation party in India nor their religious bigot counterparts will give up the idea of harrassing Pakistan and Pakistanis as an acceptable substitute for harassing Muslims at home. As a wise young friend of mine put it, he had seen examples of religion being put to the service of nationalism, but India was the first case where some were putting nationalism to the service of religion.

Nor are things better on the Hafiz Sayeed/Zaid Hamid/PakistanKaKhudaHafeez side of the boundary. We need not dwell on those; to paraphrase a young fauji friend of mine, that is a lazy man's target!

It is just that a good, solid anchored peace, based on mutual acceptance and self-respect is such a huge strategic win for India that it is quite obvious that in spite of over-smart TV presenters, mischief-making journalists, toad-eating diplomats and bumbling politicians who can't work out what to do with their hands when they are not in other people's pockets, we need to persevere; through gritted teeth, sometimes, but persevere nonetheless.

Very well put Sir

I wholeheartedly agree with you that relations between Pakistan and India need to improve. The status quo at present is not helping anyone and is stifling the development that can take place if relations between both India and Pakistan were good. If Frano-German relations can improve to this level, why not Indo-Pak relations. Millions of young men lost their lives due to their perceived rivalry. They were smart enough to put their rivalry behind them and instead focus on social development after World War 2.

I have been assigned a task by the boss, and she wants it executed this minute, no if or but. When I return, I hope to respond to the two sections remaining, then with my outline of what might be strategy for the IA in the west.


It is called Fatigue Duty in some quarters.

Sir work comes first. I am sure we can carry on our discussion at another time.

 

[deltacamelately]

.....Why not launch a strike from Pakistan where PLA can fight out on the open field which is clearly their strength. They have been training to fight an Armoured War for the past 40 years. The fluid environment allows them to fight battles of annihilation instead of punitive strikes which is clearly their favourite method looking at the last few manoeuvres performed by PLA. The logistics is something where the Chinese might have trouble but i am damn sure the Chinese would be expecting Pakistani help if they decide to go to war against India. Anyways, this is purely speculative but certainly looks a good option for the Chinese.

I wouldn't think so. The only ones the PLA can commit inside Pakistan currently, are the Guangzhou MR's 15th Airborne Corps. They are a light force though. The kind of campaign you envision requires a single-lift capability of min 50,000 men. However, currently, the PLAAF can only lift one division of roughly 10-11,000 men with light tanks and SP arty due to crippling airlift capability.

 

[rockstarIN]

This is a recent development, one that came into being after the formation of the strategic command for North and North East. It involves reducing the tail to teeth ratio and thinning down some administrative structures and static formations and beefing up with more operational troops.

It is indeed planned, that the strategic command will have 3 strike corps namely 1 corps, 2 Corps and 3 Corps. In addition the strike corps will have a single armored division. But the stress will be to have more Mechanized infantry units. The stress on armor is low, as in the alpine regions the use of tanks is limited. Even in the 1962 war the IA and PLA didn't eemploy tanks except at Chusul in Ladakh where the Chinese brought in some light tanks.

The role of the strike corps will be to go on the offensive and enter deep enough into Tibet, so as to destroy the enemy’s reserves and capture as much area as possible. This is a radical change from the earlier defensive posture and part of the credit for this must go to General J.J. Singh the erstwhile Army Chief and the governor of Assam. The strike corps would enter battle at any opportune time or land behind enemy lines to reduce the enemy’s operational capability. The idea would be to strike in the enemy’s rear.

Good post, nice to know that the Strike corps really meant to strike deep inside, rather people doubted here about their actual role. It is indeed a welcoming change rather putting too much importance to mountain war fare and believe that Himalaya is the biggest defender at northern side.

 

[notorious_eagle]

I wouldn't think so. The only ones the PLA can commit inside Pakistan currently, are the Guangzhou MR's 15th Airborne Corps. They are a light force though. The kind of campaign you envision requires a single-lift capability of min 50,000 men. However, currently, the PLAAF can only lift one division of roughly 10-11,000 men with light tanks and SP arty due to crippling airlift capability.

Sir

This raises the question that what exactly are the options of PLA to deal with IA? Looking at the balance of forces in the North, at best i see a stalemate. Due to the terrain and habitation, the war at best will be hand to hand. Only light tanks can be utilized for a very limited role, with the advancement of ATGM the light tanks will face serious opposition which they did not face in 1962. So we are back to the good old days when both sides would slug out hand to hand. Air support will be a factor for the ground troops but it will play a very limited role due to the terrain. Low flying aircraft or choppers would be easy pick for the MANPADS.

 

[Jinx1]

This is a recent development, one that came into being after the formation of the strategic command for North and North East. It involves reducing the tail to teeth ratio and thinning down some administrative structures and static formations and beefing up with more operational troops.

It is indeed planned, that the strategic command will have 3 strike corps namely 1 corps, 2 Corps and 3 Corps. In addition the strike corps will have a single armored division. But the stress will be to have more Mechanized infantry units. The stress on armor is low, as in the alpine regions the use of tanks is limited. Even in the 1962 war the IA and PLA didn't eemploy tanks except at Chusul in Ladakh where the Chinese brought in some light tanks.

The role of the strike corps will be to go on the offensive and enter deep enough into Tibet, so as to destroy the enemy’s reserves and capture as much area as possible. This is a radical change from the earlier defensive posture and part of the credit for this must go to General J.J. Singh the erstwhile Army Chief and the governor of Assam. The strike corps would enter battle at any opportune time or land behind enemy lines to reduce the enemy’s operational capability. The idea would be to strike in the enemy’s rear.

What you have mentioned has been largely covered in this report.

Offensive Plan of the Indian Army against China

Raising of Strategic Command was muted much earlier than being called a new development. As per one of the news items, it was to be raised in place of South Western Command which was to be phased out. However, South Western Command is still in place. The proposals for raising of new strike corps for the NE Command is being re-analysed to fit in the overall response by the three services, outcome being awaited.

Please also comment on another aspect related to the strike corps’. !, 2 and 21 Corps’ were the strike corps’ that I knew about. Where did 3 Corps’ come from. The information which is openly available indicates that 3 Corps is located at Rangapahar and is not a strike corps. If 3 is been converted into a strike corps, what happens to 21.

You say that the strike corps would enter battle at any opportune time or would land behind enemy lines. How would the land behind enemy lines – helicopter lift or air drop. Does the Indian Army possess such a capability of helicopter lift of two infantry or mechanized divisions, or their air drop. These would be mechanized troops as you said, and are these troops being trained for such large scale helicopter or air drop operations. Arnhem during the second world war is an example, even though the troops were trained for such an operation.

Also, the application of strike corps’ through a certain number of IIBGs require a certain number of armour formations. And if there would only be one armoured division, how would the IIBGs function without the armour support in their traditional area of operation. Unless offcourse, this armoured division is to be launched against the Chinese. And if so, where would it be launched against the Chinese in NE India.

These are some of the questions that come to the mind immediately. More later.

 

[OrionHunter]

What an amazing thread! This one should be made sticky. How I wish all threads on PDF were of the same high quality displaying maturity of thought and professionalism.

That said, I would like to throw in my two bits.

For decades, India's posture against China in the North-East has been defensive. This is the first time it will have offensive capabilities in the mountains if they are needed.

The new mountain strike corps will consist of two mountain divisions that are specially trained and equipped for an attack into Tibet. If the PLA captures any Indian territory, the strike corps will quickly concentrate an attacking force over Tibet’s impressive road network, and would not be forced into bloody, Kargil-style counterattacks to recapture that territory. Instead, the new strike corps would launch its own riposte, advancing into Tibet and capturing a vulnerable chunk of Chinese territory. Several objectives would be identified in advance and detailed preparations made for the offensives.

The new strike corps will have its own mountain artillery, missile batteries, combat engineers, anti-aircraft guns and armoured vehicles. It would also be supported by Indian Air Force fighters, operating from newly renovated bases in northeastern India.

Jorhat, Guwahati, Mohanbari, Bagdogra and Hashimara are being developed as air bases. The IAF is also modernising eight ALGs (Advanced Landing Grounds), essential for quickly building up and re-supplying the strike corps. These bases would also be crucial for airborne operations, especially heli-lifting forces to key objectives behind the enemy frontlines.




One member on this thread had mentioned the PLA’s legacy of excellent logistics in the many wars they have fought. However, unknown to many is the fact that the Chinese offensive into Arunachal in 1962 petered out due to a major tactical blunder. And that is, failure of a foolproof logistics plan that seemed to go awry after day 20 of the conflict.

According to Lt Gen Henderson Brooks who authored the as yet secret Henderson Brooks Report, a few extracts of which were obtained by Neville Maxwell and included in his book, India's China War, one of the main reasons why the Chinese withdrew was due to the breakdown of logistics. The battles on many fronts stalled as the PLA soldiers were down to 'eating grass and weeds', as also "hundreds falling sick drinking water from unclean, grimy streams and rivulets as well as dirty snow"..

As if this wasn't enough, the supply of replacement weapons/spares and ammo were fast drying up as the lines of communications were getting disrupted due to inhospitable terrain where PLA troops had overstretched themselves. Looking over your shoulder for administrative backup is the worst that can happen in combat and leads to disaster.

It is unfortunate that the logistics aspect in battle is usually given short shrift during the planning stages. If adequate importance is not given to this principle of war, a strike corps operating in mountainous terrain could flounder with disastrous consequences. As such, forward logistic nodes in the mountains will also need to be set up, where the requirement of space would be enormous. Considering the restricted lines of communications which would be vulnerable to enemy action as well as weather, establishing such mobile and static logistic nodes for a strike corps would be a nightmare of hellish proportions.

So, all said and done, having a strike corps looks dandy on paper, but in practical terms, operationalising it is going to be an uphill task! (pun unintended!)

 

[Jinx1]

Quite right, Sir, we have to distinguish between the two.

Sadly, today, it appears that the Indian armed forces must acknowledge and address at least nine theaters, from the DBO area to the Burmese frontier.



There is indeed a fallacy in defending one point by attacking another widely separated point. However, the recommendation was with regard to eliminating a weaker enemy before tackling the stronger one.

A military policeman was known for selecting the smallest partner he could before plunging in to pacify bar-room brawls. He was asked why he didn't select the biggest man instead. His answer was simplicity itself. "if you see a big and a small guy coming at you, whom will you hit first?"

From Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) to Burma is certainly a long way. And the type of border also differs from being disputed to being international to again being disputed. This also may indicate the type of threat expected on each of these disparaging mountain stretches.

Nassr aptly identifies that whereas, the war with Pakistan may be short and intense, against China it has to be comparatively long and arduous despite it being intense. Movement of troops who have fought a short and intense battle from one theater to another wide apart theater, is time consuming, is susceptible to air interception and not to mention the Siliguri Corridor through which these troops may have to pass through is certainly a tough ask, indeed not impossible.

However, these troops having fought a war may also need time to regroup, refit, beefed up with replacements lost or consumed during one type of war would also add to the time and woes. Not impossible.

During all this there is a dichotomy that emerges in the thinking of Indian thought process. One of the famous reasons cited for a short and intense war with Pakistan is that before the international community steps in, India should be able to inflict defeat. Is the Indian thinking with regard to fighting a rather prolonged battle against China in this case also revolves around a similar thought process. That after inflicting defeat on Pakistan, the same international community would come in support of India and the stretch in duration of war with China can be cut short.

This would tend to indicate that the movement to Chinese front, planned for restoration to pre-war situation, may only be undertaken if needed and not as a measure of necessity.

 

[REHAN NIAZI FALCON]

india is having day dreams , PAKISTAN is out of india,s reach , indaian are big fool if they planning for such kind of adventure ,
it will be their dooms day , cos PAKISTAN wouldn't allow itself to die alone , india will die along with us ....
indain policies makers need to realize facts look for peaceful solution rather than such fanatic theories ............

 

[Nassr]

What an amazing thread! This one should be made sticky. How I wish all threads on PDF were of the same high quality displaying maturity of thought and professionalism.

That said, I would like to throw in my two bits.

For decades, India's posture against China in the North-East has been defensive. This is the first time it will have offensive capabilities in the mountains if they are needed.

The new mountain strike corps will consist of two mountain divisions that are specially trained and equipped for an attack into Tibet. If the PLA captures any Indian territory, the strike corps will quickly concentrate an attacking force over Tibet’s impressive road network, and would not be forced into bloody, Kargil-style counterattacks to recapture that territory. Instead, the new strike corps would launch its own riposte, advancing into Tibet and capturing a vulnerable chunk of Chinese territory. Several objectives would be identified in advance and detailed preparations made for the offensives.

The new strike corps will have its own mountain artillery, missile batteries, combat engineers, anti-aircraft guns and armoured vehicles. It would also be supported by Indian Air Force fighters, operating from newly renovated bases in northeastern India.

Jorhat, Guwahati, Mohanbari, Bagdogra and Hashimara are being developed as air bases. The IAF is also modernising eight ALGs (Advanced Landing Grounds), essential for quickly building up and re-supplying the strike corps. These bases would also be crucial for airborne operations, especially heli-lifting forces to key objectives behind the enemy frontlines.




One member on this thread had mentioned the PLA’s legacy of excellent logistics in the many wars they have fought. However, unknown to many is the fact that the Chinese offensive into Arunachal in 1962 petered out due to a major tactical blunder. And that is, failure of a foolproof logistics plan that seemed to go awry after day 20 of the conflict.

According to Lt Gen Henderson Brooks who authored the as yet secret Henderson Brooks Report, a few extracts of which were obtained by Neville Maxwell and included in his book, India's China War, one of the main reasons why the Chinese withdrew was due to the breakdown of logistics. The battles on many fronts stalled as the PLA soldiers were down to 'eating grass and weeds', as also "hundreds falling sick drinking water from unclean, grimy streams and rivulets as well as dirty snow"..

As if this wasn't enough, the supply of replacement weapons/spares and ammo were fast drying up as the lines of communications were getting disrupted due to inhospitable terrain where PLA troops had overstretched themselves. Looking over your shoulder for administrative backup is the worst that can happen in combat and leads to disaster.

It is unfortunate that the logistics aspect in battle is usually given short shrift during the planning stages. If adequate importance is not given to this principle of war, a strike corps operating in mountainous terrain could flounder with disastrous consequences. As such, forward logistic nodes in the mountains will also need to be set up, where the requirement of space would be enormous. Considering the restricted lines of communications which would be vulnerable to enemy action as well as weather, establishing such mobile and static logistic nodes for a strike corps would be a nightmare of hellish proportions.

So, all said and done, having a strike corps looks dandy on paper, but in practical terms, operationalising it is going to be an uphill task! (pun unintended!)

Very interesting indeed Sir.

A riposte is launched when the enemy offensive is underway and has not reached its concluding objective. And if it is not launched in specified time, the strike corps would have to go in a counter offensive mode. This may happen because the enemy offensive may deny the jump-off space needed for riposte or may be close to reaching its concluding objective and may necessitate a counter offensive instead. If the riposte peters out, disengaging the committed forces becomes problematic and only limited force could be disengaged for countering the enemy offensive, if indeed.

This also brings out an interesting thought with regard to the riposte launch-pad sites and final objectives. It brings into focus the second country which may be forcefully involved in such a conflict - Bhutan. As I believe, Jinx1 may confirm, that there are some Indian forces already present inside Bhutan. some probably in the garb of providing training to the Bhutanese Security Forces - I wonder if they have some. Eastern Bhutan in this case may become sensitive to both India and China, and Siliguri Corridor in this case would be the contentious piece of territory.

Certainly would provide impetus to international community and a raisin-d'etre to step in. It would also demand haste from the Chinese thrust lines to link up with each other in order to obviate the chances of being permanently separated.

india is having day dreams , PAKISTAN is out of india,s reach , indaian are big fool if they planning for such kind of adventure ,
it will be their dooms day , cos PAKISTAN wouldn't allow itself to die alone , india will die along with us ....
indain policies makers need to realize facts look for peaceful solution rather than such fanatic theories ............

Niazi saab, aap mianwali ja kar so jaein. aapko roza laga hai

 

[Nassr]

Very well put Sir

I wholeheartedly agree with you that relations between Pakistan and India need to improve. The status quo at present is not helping anyone and is stifling the development that can take place if relations between both India and Pakistan were good. If Frano-German relations can improve to this level, why not Indo-Pak relations. Millions of young men lost their lives due to their perceived rivalry. They were smart enough to put their rivalry behind them and instead focus on social development after World War 2.



Sir work comes first. I am sure we can carry on our discussion at another time.

Sir,
The visionary seeks his vision of peace and harmony. The realist seeks to respond to the ground realities. Both should continue vigorously seeking their objectives, as the loss of one would result in the loss of the other.

 

[Nassr]

This is the most vital part of the strategy, to me.

It may seem strange to be advocating peace as a geo-political strategy, but on clearer reflection, THIS IS THE ONLY WAY FORWARD FOR BOTH COUNTRIES. Even a successful war against Pakistan will only breed another, even more rigidly obstinate opponents of India, bent upon taking revenge. Look at what happened after 1971. We will be trapped, like France and Germany were, in an eternal cycle of revenge. As history tells us, this dates back to the break-up of the Carolingian Empire in the 9th and 10th centuries.

It is also risky to consider a peace which is a matter of mutual deferment of trial by battle, as the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany entered into in 1939. If it is not a genuine peace, complete with border forces manned by personnel carefully balanced between both nations, officered by responsible people, it will be a worse mess than today's cold war conditions.

There are huge barriers, of course. Neither the right wing fascist imitation party in India nor their religious bigot counterparts will give up the idea of harrassing Pakistan and Pakistanis as an acceptable substitute for harassing Muslims at home. As a wise young friend of mine put it, he had seen examples of religion being put to the service of nationalism, but India was the first case where some were putting nationalism to the service of religion.

Nor are things better on the Hafiz Sayeed/Zaid Hamid/PakistanKaKhudaHafeez side of the boundary. We need not dwell on those; to paraphrase a young fauji friend of mine, that is a lazy man's target!

It is just that a good, solid anchored peace, based on mutual acceptance and self-respect is such a huge strategic win for India that it is quite obvious that in spite of over-smart TV presenters, mischief-making journalists, toad-eating diplomats and bumbling politicians who can't work out what to do with their hands when they are not in other people's pockets, we need to persevere; through gritted teeth, sometimes, but persevere nonetheless.

Peace between nation states is a relative term. As no two nations would have colluding interests in all spheres of interest, there would always be colliding interests. So how do we define peace between two, nation states.

A peace which is based on, no war. A cold start based on no peace – no war.

A peace without attaining solutions to contentious issues. Maintaining the status quo.

A peace which entails controlling a set of war mongering bigots. Starting an intra-societal conflict.

A peace based on compromise. Who sacrifices more, a weaker nation or the stronger one or a balanced set of sacrificial adjustments and who decides this balance.

A peace based on strength of military response. Uneasy and may be unsustainable peace.

A peace based on defeat of one. Wait for a rejuvenated response. Not sustainable.

A forced peace on two comparative weak nations. Lift the force and there you go again.

May be my skewed thinking, but one can highlight many more options for peace and it would always end up in one more difficult option. It may all depend on the resolve of a visionary set of leadership, rather than one which seeks peace in other’s weaknesses.

Lets wait for this visionary set of leadership while attempting to remain civil.

 

[deltacamelately]

Raising of Strategic Command was muted much earlier than being called a new development. As per one of the news items, it was to be raised in place of South Western Command which was to be phased out. However, South Western Command is still in place. The proposals for raising of new strike corps for the NE Command is being re-analysed to fit in the overall response by the three services, outcome being awaited.

Not the Strategic Command. The decision of raising of the China centric Corps is a comparatively recent development. Though the proposal to raise two additional Divisions for the defence of AP as well as the Strike Corps dates back to 2007, the actual decision to raise the additional divisions was taken by the Cabinet Committee on Security in 2009. This was the last major decision taken by the UPA government before the elections of 2009.

Please also comment on another aspect related to the strike corps’. !, 2 and 21 Corps’ were the strike corps’ that I knew about. Where did 3 Corps’ come from. The information which is openly available indicates that 3 Corps is located at Rangapahar and is not a strike corps. If 3 is been converted into a strike corps, what happens to 21.

All the three Strike Corps that you mentioned above, namely the I, II and XXI are PA specific. And yes, the III Corps based at Rangapahar(Nagaland) is not a Strike Corps, it just contains elements both from the Ranchi based 23rd Inf Div and 57th Mnt Div based at Leimakhong.

The newly raised Strike Corps is a mountain Strike Corps, consisting of 40,000 or more troops, which will be permanently located in bases in NE India. The new Corps will still be addressed as III Corps untill rechristened and will be tasked with OPOBJs, not limited to, retaliate against any major Chinese ingress into India by launching an offensive into Tibet.

You say that the strike corps would enter battle at any opportune time or would land behind enemy lines. How would the land behind enemy lines – helicopter lift or air drop. Does the Indian Army possess such a capability of helicopter lift of two infantry or mechanized divisions, or their air drop. These would be mechanized troops as you said, and are these troops being trained for such large scale helicopter or air drop operations. Arnhem during the second world war is an example, even though the troops were trained for such an operation.

The new mountain Strike Corps will control two Divisions that are specially trained and equipped for an attack into Tibet. In future if the PLA captures any key Indian territory, by quickly concentrating an attacking force over Tibet’s new rail/road network, the IA would not be forced into any bloody, Kargil-style counterattacks to recapture that territory. Instead, the new Strike Corps would launch its own riposte, advancing into Tibet and capturing vulnerable chunk of Chinese territory.The Chumbi Valley being one of the several identified. Several such objectives would be identified in advance and detailed preparations made for the offensives.

Just for your overall understanding, the Strike Corps will have its own mountain artillery, combat engineers, AA guns and radio equipment. It would also be supported by the IAF, operating from newly renovated bases in northeastern India. Apart from Chhabua and Tezpur, which have been allocated with the IAF's fighters, Jorhat, Guwahati, Mohanbari, Bagdogra and Hashimara are comming up as full fledged air bases. Additioanally 8 ALGs have also comeup for quickly resupplying the Strike Corps. These air bases are to cater to airborne operations, especially heli-lifting forces to key objectives behind the enemy frontlines.

Also, the application of strike corps’ through a certain number of IIBGs require a certain number of armour formations. And if there would only be one armoured division, how would the IIBGs function without the armour support in their traditional area of operation. Unless offcourse, this armoured division is to be launched against the Chinese. And if so, where would it be launched against the Chinese in NE India.

IBGs consist of heavy Armour columns or MBTs, envisioned in Cold Start and Cold Start is a Pakistan specific Doctrine. Nothing to do with China. The China specific Strike Corps won't have heavy MBTs, rather considerably Lighter Tanks.

These are some of the questions that come to the mind immediately. More later.

I'll be around, with whatever open source data I can find for you.

 

[Nassr]

Not the Strategic Command. The decision of raising of the China centric Corps is a comparatively recent development. Though the proposal to raise two additional Divisions for the defence of AP as well as the Strike Corps dates back to 2007, the actual decision to raise the additional divisions was taken by the Cabinet Committee on Security in 2009. This was the last major decision taken by the UPA government before the elections of 2009.

Raising of China specific Strike Corps for NE India is a pretty old decision. If my memory holds, it is more than a decade old plan being implemented now. Regarding raising the additional divisions, part of it is old, particularly with regard to 3 Corps, as 3 Corps earlier consisted of just one division, probably 57. Remaining new raisings may be new.

All the three Strike Corps that you mentioned above, namely the I, II and XXI are PA specific. And yes, the III Corps based at Rangapahar(Nagaland) is not a Strike Corps, it just contains elements both from the Ranchi based 23rd Inf Div and 57th Mnt Div based at Leimakhong.

You mentioned, "It is indeed planned, that the strategic command will have 3 strike corps namely 1 corps, 2 Corps and 3 Corps. In addition the strike corps will have a single armored division." You didn't mention 21 Corps, which is also a strike corps. The single armoured division with the strike corps, that you talked about; is it that each strike corps will have an armoured division, which they already do, or the new one being raised for NE India will also have an armoured division, consisting of light tanks. This aspect needs a bit of clarity please.

The newly raised Strike Corps is a mountain Strike Corps, consisting of 40,000 or more troops, which will be permanently located in bases in NE India. The new Corps will still be addressed as III Corps untill rechristened and will be tasked with OPOBJs, not limited to, retaliate against any major Chinese ingress into India by launching an offensive into Tibet.


The new mountain Strike Corps will control two Divisions that are specially trained and equipped for an attack into Tibet. In future if the PLA captures any key Indian territory, by quickly concentrating an attacking force over Tibet’s new rail/road network, the IA would not be forced into any bloody, Kargil-style counterattacks to recapture that territory. Instead, the new Strike Corps would launch its own riposte, advancing into Tibet and capturing vulnerable chunk of Chinese territory.The Chumbi Valley being one of the several identified. Several such objectives would be identified in advance and detailed preparations made for the offensives.

Just for your overall understanding, the Strike Corps will have its own mountain artillery, combat engineers, AA guns and radio equipment. It would also be supported by the IAF, operating from newly renovated bases in northeastern India. Apart from Chhabua and Tezpur, which have been allocated with the IAF's fighters, Jorhat, Guwahati, Mohanbari, Bagdogra and Hashimara are comming up as full fledged air bases. Additioanally 8 ALGs have also comeup for quickly resupplying the Strike Corps. These air bases are to cater to airborne operations, especially heli-lifting forces to key objectives behind the enemy frontlines.


IBGs consist of heavy Armour columns or MBTs, envisioned in Cold Start and Cold Start is a Pakistan specific Doctrine. Nothing to do with China. The China specific Strike Corps won't have heavy MBTs, rather considerably Lighter Tanks.


I'll be around, with whatever open source data I can find for you.

For the riposte task that you mention, please see the response at:

Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/strate...ategic-thinking-pakistan-5.html#ixzz21vZo41Rd

Will the heli-lift operations behind enemy lines be undertaken by troops from the two infantry divisions from the new strike corps or the SF. You didn't include SF as part of the new raising.

 

[deltacamelately]

A riposte is launched when the enemy offensive is underway and has not reached its concluding objective. And if it is not launched in specified time, the strike corps would have to go in a counter offensive mode. This may happen because the enemy offensive may deny the jump-off space needed for riposte or may be close to reaching its concluding objective and may necessitate a counter offensive instead. If the riposte peters out, disengaging the committed forces becomes problematic and only limited force could be disengaged for countering the enemy offensive, if indeed.

True as long as the riposte is launched along the main axis of intrusion. Your offensive forces can chose not to offer battle and leave the job to the defending forces. Regroup, realign and launch your own offensives en-masse, in the enemy territory of your chosing.

...It brings into focus the second country which may be forcefully involved in such a conflict - Bhutan. As I believe, Jinx1 may confirm, that there are some Indian forces already present inside Bhutan. some probably in the garb of providing training to the Bhutanese Security Forces - I wonder if they have some. Eastern Bhutan in this case may become sensitive to both India and China, and Siliguri Corridor in this case would be the contentious piece of territory.

Bhutan is but obviously critical and watched. As about the Silliguri Corridor, the XXXIII Corps are the guardians there. Tawang, Namka Chu and specifically the Thagla ridge are more contentious in comparison.