Indian strategic thinking and Pakistan.

[Nassr]

I do not think you are aware of the fact that a PLA infantry division is much smaller than an Indian or Pakistani Infantry division. Most PLA mountain divisions have been downsized to consist of only two regiments. Thus the pre-reduction number of 12000 to 13000 troops have been reduced to 8000 to 10,000 in most divisions. An IA mountain division in contrast has 15,000 combat troops.

For offensive ops in mountainous terrain an attacker needs a combat ration of 9:1 ie, nine times the defensive force it is attacking. So four IA mountain divisions are sufficient to thwart any offensive by the PLA considering that it can bring to bear a total of only 30 mountain divisions including reserves in the theater of ops we are talking about, leaving the Indian strike corps free to launch an offensive.

However, the PLA would need to deploy at least six to seven divisions for defense to thwart an Indian offensive. That leaves it just about 20 divisions with which it can attack, which needless to say, is way below the needed combat ratio required for a protracted offensive in mountainous terrain, over tenuous lines of communication.

Good explanation. However, you have not answered the portion you quoted from my post, "China has around 30 divisions deployed against India and the Strike Corps being raised against China may barely be able to support the defensive operation as against launching operations inside China."

Lets say, hypothetically, that the 20 or so Chinese divisions available for launching of offensive are divided in three thrust lines in the North East (I am not talking about actual perception). This means 4-5 divisions in each thrust and some reserves. The Indian response would first come from the holding division and its reserves. Later the Crops reserves would respond. If the offensive is stopped, well enough - if not, the only reserves available then would be the Strike Corps. If this strike corps has already been launched for an offensive inside China, a recoil may come into play.

Therefore, the primary role of the strike corps is likely to remain countering Chinese offensive and not an offensive inside China.

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

I haven't read anything about raising 2-3 Strike Corps' for the North East. Indian Army Chief, highlighting the plan to counter China in May 2011, did not mention raising 2-3 Strike Corps'. He just mentioned raising one dedicated Mountain Strike Corps.

Army presents three-point plan to counter China : North, News - India Today

This Mountain Strike Corps is being raised in North East. I have also read about another Strike Corps which may be raised in Indian Occupied Kashmir against China, not in North East.

Raising three Strike Corps' in North East against China alone may not be militarily logical due to space and terrain restrictions and probably the type of threat expected.

Regarding the concept of Holding and Strike Corps being outdated; I have read about re-designation of some Holding Corps' into Pivot Corps', and employment of Strike Corps' in Integrated Independent Battle Groups' (IIBG) concept. It has also been written that the Strike Corps' will remain as administrative and training formations. Both these concepts, the Pivot Corps and IIBG are pretty old in Indian Army and not new ones. However, their application in the existing and future war time environment due to acquisition of hi-tech instruments of war, may have been improved and upgraded.

The strategy of deterring and dissuasion may have been changed to active deterrence against both Pakistan and China as have been mentioned in some news reports. However, since the advent of nuclear warfare, the conventional deterrence has been backed by nuclear deterrence as well. This has completely changed the environment altogether.

Sorry i am unable to find the link.

I had heard that IA will raise 2-3 Strike Corps in the future.1 will be in North East and second will be based in Leh and a part of it in Uttranchal.

The 3rd Strike corp could be raised in the next 5 years..I dont know where it will be deployed.


Regarding the Holding and Strike Corps...the IA thinks that it will be wasting time waiting for the Strike Corps to come for an offensive while the Holding corps would hold.Now the plan is for the Holding Corps to launch an offensive by the time Strike Corps come and then the Striek corps can carry on.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Good explanation. However, you have not answered the portion you quoted from my post, "China has around 30 divisions deployed against India and the Strike Corps being raised against China may barely be able to support the defensive operation as against launching operations inside China."

Lets say, hypothetically, that the 20 or so Chinese divisions available for launching of offensive are divided in three thrust lines in the North East (I am not talking about actual perception). This means 4-5 divisions in each thrust and some reserves. The Indian response would first come from the holding division and its reserves. Later the Crops reserves would respond. If the offensive is stopped, well enough - if not, the only reserves available then would be the Strike Corps. If this strike corps has already been launched for an offensive inside China, a recoil may come into play.

Therefore, the primary role of the strike corps is likely to remain countering Chinese offensive and not an offensive inside China.

The idea of a Strike Corps in the north east doesn't add up. How will it strike, against whom, for what purpose? It cannot be a motorised or mechanized Corps, let alone armoured, and the idea of an infantry corps being designated a strike corps is odd. The PLA is carefully deployed in depth, away from the front lines, which are manned by Border Defence Regiments, therefore any strike corps has to clamber up the steep gradient, achieve the plateau, and then mount an attack across at least dozens of miles, if not more. All the PLA has to do to foil this thrust is just stay out of contact, using its existing mobility, and allow the Indian Army to punch into the air. Tibetan habitation centres are expendable targets, and in any case, the worst thing an attacking force on foot can do is to get bottled up within cities and towns, vulnerable to isolation and siege by highly-mobile troops.

This does not apply quite so forcefully to the Ladakh sector. But where is our mobility over there?

Personally, to me, the battle for the north-east does not lie on the ground, but in the air. The ground forces have to take a secondary role, guarding certain geographical nerve centres and staying aloof for counter-attacks for the rest. And mining the damn' Baillie Trail.

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

Good explanation. However, you have not answered the portion you quoted from my post, "China has around 30 divisions deployed against India and the Strike Corps being raised against China may barely be able to support the defensive operation as against launching operations inside China."

Lets say, hypothetically, that the 20 or so Chinese divisions available for launching of offensive are divided in three thrust lines in the North East (I am not talking about actual perception). This means 4-5 divisions in each thrust and some reserves. The Indian response would first come from the holding division and its reserves. Later the Crops reserves would respond. If the offensive is stopped, well enough - if not, the only reserves available then would be the Strike Corps. If this strike corps has already been launched for an offensive inside China, a recoil may come into play.

Therefore, the primary role of the strike corps is likely to remain countering Chinese offensive and not an offensive inside China.

India is raising 100,000 troops in the Easter sector.Lets assume the current strength to be 300,000 which brings the total strength to 400,000 troops.

Now in mountaineous warfare a agressor has to have the ratio of 9:1.Which means that the Chinese should have a strength which they would not like to put in China-India border.

I dont think that the Strike corps would require to do the job of a holding corp.Plans have already been made as to what their roles are and where they need to operate and even a special SF unit is tasked with the job of finding suitable targets in china and carriers out practice throughout the year.Everything is planned incase of an attack by china.

 

[Nassr]

Sorry i am unable to find the link.

I had heard that IA will raise 2-3 Strike Corps in the future.1 will be in North East and second will be based in Leh and a part of it in Uttranchal.

The 3rd Strike corp could be raised in the next 5 years..I dont know where it will be deployed.


Regarding the Holding and Strike Corps...the IA thinks that it will be wasting time waiting for the Strike Corps to come for an offensive while the Holding corps would hold.Now the plan is for the Holding Corps to launch an offensive by the time Strike Corps come and then the Striek corps can carry on.

I do not know about the third Strike Corps. You had earlier talked about three Strike Corps' for the North East for which I responded.

Two are known to be raised. One for NE India and One for IOK against China. Agreed.

Regarding the holding and strike corps'. I agree with you - this is about right. It is the Pivot Corps' concept and has been practiced by the Indian Army in some exercises I read about.

 

[Joe Shearer]

India is raising 100,000 troops in the Easter sector.Lets assume the current strength to be 300,000 which brings the total strength to 400,000 troops.

Now in mountaineous warfare a agressor has to have the ratio of 9:1.Which means that the Chinese should have a strength which they would not like to put in China-India border.

I dont think that the Strike corps would require to do the job of a holding corp.Plans have already been made as to what their roles are and where they need to operate and even a special SF unit is tasked with the job of finding suitable targets in china and carriers out practice throughout the year.Everything is planned incase of an attack by china.

If the plan is to react to a PLA attack, that doesn't sound like a strike corps. But perhaps the point is that nomenclature is getting in the way. Assuming for a moment that the troop build-up takes place successfully, and it really should do so, what next? Guard and hold key points? Keep divisional and corps reserves? Keep sufficient resource for rapid air deployment of the reserves, and evacuation of outnumbered strong points? What then? Assume for a moment that the attacking forces find yet another geographical feature or combination of features supporting their attack, what do we do to stop the PLA?

Can the Army do the job alone? If the Air Force is to be a critical component of the plans, is something being done to integrate the respective structures at least at strategic, theatre level? Assuming that integration lower down might be a mammoth task and might even be unnecessary?

I believe our focus should be on this type of inter-services integration. Today, a ground unit cannot talk to an airborne element. The frequencies differ. Should we worry about this more than about nomenclature?

 

[Paan Singh]

I am surprised about jinx1 post and few of the points of the nassr.I respect ur opinion but there are few of the point about indian thinking wrt china n pakistan.

1)As per U.S vision till 2025-2030,U.S will call back most of their military from all over world back to U.S.They have enough resources whether its oil in atlantic and will emerge as super power again.They will keep their stooges but in different way.They used to make slaves but now they are going for partners which may be equal and india is one of them.They know that india is not going to be U.S brigade to fight anywhere like nato do.Those who thinks that china will do this n that are delusional,U.S will remain sole super power whether china leaves them economically behind or not.

2)Regarding to indian navy expansion,indian navy is expanded wrt to secure oil lines and to have a force which can independently fight with any force alone like U.S have.Future war is for securing oil lines and routes for economy and indian ocean is going to be most keyed region and it is similar to U.S goals here too..and most important wrt china czo we are clueless about china.

3)Relations with pakistan are not going to improve coz again point is china and its relations with china and china wants to secure gwadar point.Like it or not,india wants U.S to attack on pakistan and india have lobbied hard to do so coz U.S can do it without caring for U.N and other major powers like china or russia and dont holds card against them too...India cant afford to loose sources on pakistan if we go directly against pakistan but U.S can afford easily.So india have kept its army in control wrt pakistan and china and waiting for the U.S response wrt this.U.S used to have thinking that they will get india easily while making relations with pakistan too but opposite happened.India have worked silently to separate pakistan from U.S and waiting for U.s attack and this is known to pakistan too thats why their military buckle down when U.S talks about going against them..if u analyze,you will see that pakistan mostly buckles in front of U.S while holding cards of the nato supply etc and international pressure is different.Pak will remain the sole target for indians but india wants to concentrate on china and full wants to utilize U.S resources against china with attack on pakistan.This is the reason you will find that india is waiting n there is no solid breakthrough or talks wrt china and pakistan by india.But again U.s have own mess like syria and iran etc...
I have been saying that once this mess is resolved,with in month,US will attack pakistan or u may say that next target will be paksitan.U.S also wants to block china access to gwadar,once gwadar is gone,china will be neutralize without anywar since indian and USN navies will be sitting at indian ocean and even if U.S departs,india must be able to hold indian ocean..so those who are saying that indian navy is for piracy operations are delusional ...india have kept every option open but one thing is certain that india n israel wants U.S attack on paksitan.Both have lobbied hard and pakistan favor in senate or congress have been reduced to great extent..


so point is not of large indian army which is incapable to do anything ,point is global change or shift which is going to come in next decade.india is not in mood to waste a single resource and wants to utilize U.s desperateness in region coz U.S wants to leave region after 10-15 yrs and wants to stall as india as super power in asia.

More U.S will desperate,more india will remain in benefit.You can see how much weight U.S is throwing towards india and i can bet that india will be the first country other than israel who will get f-22 .

 

[Nassr]

The idea of a Strike Corps in the north east doesn't add up. How will it strike, against whom, for what purpose? It cannot be a motorised or mechanized Corps, let alone armoured, and the idea of an infantry corps being designated a strike corps is odd. The PLA is carefully deployed in depth, away from the front lines, which are manned by Border Defence Regiments, therefore any strike corps has to clamber up the steep gradient, achieve the plateau, and then mount an attack across at least dozens of miles, if not more. All the PLA has to do to foil this thrust is just stay out of contact, using its existing mobility, and allow the Indian Army to punch into the air. Tibetan habitation centres are expendable targets, and in any case, the worst thing an attacking force on foot can do is to get bottled up within cities and towns, vulnerable to isolation and siege by highly-mobile troops.

This does not apply quite so forcefully to the Ladakh sector. But where is our mobility over there?

Personally, to me, the battle for the north-east does not lie on the ground, but in the air. The ground forces have to take a secondary role, guarding certain geographical nerve centres and staying aloof for counter-attacks for the rest. And mining the damn' Baillie Trail.

Nicely outlined. My explanation also concluded that the primary role for the strike corps would be countering the Chinese offensive and launching an offensive across the Chinese border may be a secondary task.

However, the environment in NE India are pretty diverging with regard to the bordering countries. NE borders Burma and Bangladesh in addition to China. I have read some Indian defence analysts discussing one of the Chinese offensive thrusts through Burma as well. This makes defending NE all the more interesting. It means that the border along Burma will also have to be well guarded, though it may provide India sufficient warning of an impending Chinese offensive through Burma and may allow time for re-deployment, yet it would be prudent to defend the border along Burma from where such Chinese offensive can be launched. This means additional troops deployed along Burma, from where the Chinese may not come at all, or may just pose some threat through Burma to tie down Indian troops there.

I agree with you on the difficulties faced by aggressors in mountainous terrain and therefore mountain warfare. However, I may like to differ with your preference to air force being pre-dominant. It will have to be a joint effort and the ground forces will have to address the major share while closely supported by the air force. Air support in high altitude and may be jungle covered mountains has its limitations and it is the ground forces who take the brunt of the offensive.

In my opinion, the high altitude mountain defence does not have to rely on defending the key geographical features. It has to be a an all-encompassing effort in order to deny the communication infrastructure as well as the key geographical features. Because the key geographical features may be bypassed for tackling at later stage if the communications infrastructure is held strongly.

 

[notorious_eagle]

The idea of a Strike Corps in the north east doesn't add up. How will it strike, against whom, for what purpose? It cannot be a motorised or mechanized Corps, let alone armoured, and the idea of an infantry corps being designated a strike corps is odd. The PLA is carefully deployed in depth, away from the front lines, which are manned by Border Defence Regiments, therefore any strike corps has to clamber up the steep gradient, achieve the plateau, and then mount an attack across at least dozens of miles, if not more. All the PLA has to do to foil this thrust is just stay out of contact, using its existing mobility, and allow the Indian Army to punch into the air. Tibetan habitation centres are expendable targets, and in any case, the worst thing an attacking force on foot can do is to get bottled up within cities and towns, vulnerable to isolation and siege by highly-mobile troops.

This does not apply quite so forcefully to the Ladakh sector. But where is our mobility over there?

Personally, to me, the battle for the north-east does not lie on the ground, but in the air. The ground forces have to take a secondary role, guarding certain geographical nerve centres and staying aloof for counter-attacks for the rest. And mining the damn' Baillie Trail.

Well put Sir

Lets go into a bit more depth. India upgrading her defences near her Chinese border is a welcome sign, it was long overdue. The PLA has got one thing right and that is to focus on logistics. The logistical infrastructure they have built across the Indian border is magnificent. They can rush reinforcements at a much faster pace compared to their Indian counterparts. India is setting up her infrastructure fast and from what i have read, they will increase the number of troops. One aspect where i believe the Indian war planners are lacking is the acquisition of artillery. Due to India's mammoth bureaucratic machinery, i believe IA still lacks the amount of artillery she needs on both fronts. PLA has dominance in this area, they have the necessary numbers required to punish Indian forces whether they are advancing or on the defence.

Due to the nature of terrain, sustained offensive operations are highly unlikely from both sides. Contrary to all the propaganda in the 1962 war, PLA would have been clobbered if they would have held the ground due to Indian reinforcements which were due to arrive. PLA was smart enough to know this and they retreated before those reinforcements arrived which would have meant sure encirclement for PLA. You do raise a good point that Air will be a decisive factor. Looking at the balance of forces and the terrain, it appears to me that both sides will launch punitive actions instead of battle of annihilation.

 

[notorious_eagle]

Nicely outlined. My explanation also concluded that the primary role for the strike corps would be countering the Chinese offensive and launching an offensive across the Chinese border may be a secondary task.

However, the environment in NE India are pretty diverging with regard to the bordering countries. NE borders Burma and Bangladesh in addition to China. I have read some Indian defence analysts discussing one of the Chinese offensive thrusts through Burma as well. This makes defending NE all the more interesting. It means that the border along Burma will also have to be well guarded, though it may provide India sufficient warning of an impending Chinese offensive through Burma and may allow time for re-deployment, yet it would be prudent to defend the border along Burma from where such Chinese offensive can be launched. This means additional troops deployed along Burma, from where the Chinese may not come at all, or may just pose some threat through Burma to tie down Indian troops there.

I agree with you on the difficulties faced by aggressors in mountainous terrain and therefore mountain warfare. However, I may like to differ with your preference to air force being pre-dominant. It will have to be a joint effort and the ground forces will have to address the major share while closely supported by the air force. Air support in high altitude and may be jungle covered mountains has its limitations and it is the ground forces who take the brunt of the offensive.

In my opinion, the high altitude mountain defence does not have to rely on defending the key geographical features. It has to be a an all-encompassing effort in order to deny the communication infrastructure as well as the key geographical features. Because the key geographical features may be bypassed for tackling at later stage if the communications infrastructure is held strongly.

Sir

I have my doubts if Burma will allow the Chinese to enter their territory. Even if the Chinese do coerce them into opening their borders for Chinese troops, it still wont give the Chinese much advantage. They still will be fighting high pitched battles which is clearly not their strength.

Why not launch a strike from Pakistan where PLA can fight out on the open field which is clearly their strength. They have been training to fight an Armoured War for the past 40 years. The fluid environment allows them to fight battles of annihilation instead of punitive strikes which is clearly their favourite method looking at the last few manoeuvres performed by PLA. The logistics is something where the Chinese might have trouble but i am damn sure the Chinese would be expecting Pakistani help if they decide to go to war against India. Anyways, this is purely speculative but certainly looks a good option for the Chinese.

 

[Nassr]

India is raising 100,000 troops in the Easter sector.Lets assume the current strength to be 300,000 which brings the total strength to 400,000 troops.

Now in mountaineous warfare a agressor has to have the ratio of 9:1.Which means that the Chinese should have a strength which they would not like to put in China-India border.

I dont think that the Strike corps would require to do the job of a holding corp.Plans have already been made as to what their roles are and where they need to operate and even a special SF unit is tasked with the job of finding suitable targets in china and carriers out practice throughout the year.Everything is planned incase of an attack by china.

A strike corps will have a primary and a secondary role. If the primary role of the strike corps being raised for NE India is to capture targets inside China, it will have to identify particular sets of targets within a geographical limit and can only go as far inside china as it is capable of, while the holding corps' conduct defensive operations.

How much difference would it make to the Chinese with regard to the sensitivity of the lost territory is the core point. If they can afford to lose some territory and in the bargain cut-off NE India from the rest of India, they can deal with the intrusion later. In any case they would've surrounded all the Indian forces within NE India.

It therefore is rather interesting to war-game such environment.

I am surprised about jinx1 post and few of the points of the nassr.I respect ur opinion but there are few of the point about indian thinking wrt china n pakistan.

I have noted that as well and request him to provide a link to the original post. Thank you for pointing it out.

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

I do not know about the third Strike Corps. You had earlier talked about three Strike Corps' for the North East for which I responded.

Two are known to be raised. One for NE India and One for IOK against China. Agreed.

Regarding the holding and strike corps'. I agree with you - this is about right. It is the Pivot Corps' concept and has been practiced by the Indian Army in some exercises I read about.

I am sorry what i mean was against China..3 Strike corps would be for China not for North East with 1 dedicated for NE region and the 2nd divided into half with one based in Leh and other in Uttrakhand.I really have no idea where the 3 will be based and if at all it wll be formed or not but i guess sometime in the later part of this decade it can be formed.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Nicely outlined. My explanation also concluded that the primary role for the strike corps would be countering the Chinese offensive and launching an offensive across the Chinese border may be a secondary task.

Indeed, my thinking was quite congruent with yours, perhaps with different emphases.

However, the environment in NE India are pretty diverging with regard to the bordering countries. NE borders Burma and Bangladesh in addition to China. I have read some Indian defence analysts discussing one of the Chinese offensive thrusts through Burma as well. This makes defending NE all the more interesting. It means that the border along Burma will also have to be well guarded, though it may provide India sufficient warning of an impending Chinese offensive through Burma and may allow time for re-deployment, yet it would be prudent to defend the border along Burma from where such Chinese offensive can be launched. This means additional troops deployed along Burma, from where the Chinese may not come at all, or may just pose some threat through Burma to tie down Indian troops there.

This, and one other, has been a recurring nightmare. Nobody familiar with the history of the Second World War can fail to remember that this was precisely the terrain in which the Chinese fought side-by-side with other Allied troops, and fought well, at that. The Chinese 5th, 6th and 66th Armies (= British Division) and the Burma Corps could not coordinate their defences, and were broken in isolation. While the 6th and 66th Armies retreated into China, the 5th actually retreated into India and re-grouped there!

So the ground is very well known, in historical terms, and the Japanese made it brutally clear that it could be fought, successfully. It can therefore be fought again, presumably equally successfully, if the PLA dumps its gadget fascination and returns to basics.

The answer, equally, lies in returning to basics. Light infantry unsupported by other arms will be over-run, and a wholly different, lost-in-the-mists-of-time fighting doctrine will have to be dusted off and brought to the field in training programmes.

This is wholly subject to whether the Chinese will prove to be as ruthless as the Germans about neutrality, whether they respect the neutrality of Burma, or not.

I agree with you on the difficulties faced by aggressors in mountainous terrain and therefore mountain warfare. However, I may like to differ with your preference to air force being pre-dominant. It will have to be a joint effort and the ground forces will have to address the major share while closely supported by the air force. Air support in high altitude and may be jungle covered mountains has its limitations and it is the ground forces who take the brunt of the offensive.

In a foolish attempt to keep matters brief, I omitted any detailing of the possible role of air power in this sector.

My repeated hints at the role of air power were not intended to suggest close air support. This, to my mind, is impossible in the terrain we have for consideration in Arunachal. It puts valuable assets at the mercy of a random foot soldier with a MANPAD. Not a good idea. We saw in the Kargil campaign what an awful idea, in fact, this was.

Rather, my suggestion would be to try and put in a Herculean effort to achieve air superiority, not impossible, though very, very tough, and use that for medium- and long-range interdiction. As someone has already pointed out, notorious eagle, perhaps, the edge the PLA has is logistics, and that should be the primary target of Indian forces.

In my opinion, the high altitude mountain defence does not have to rely on defending the key geographical features. It has to be a an all-encompassing effort in order to deny the communication infrastructure as well as the key geographical features. Because the key geographical features may be bypassed for tackling at later stage if the communications infrastructure is held strongly.

Precisely so. Communications both physical and electronic.

 

[Nassr]

I am surprised about jinx1 post and few of the points of the nassr.I respect ur opinion but there are few of the point about indian thinking wrt china n pakistan.

1)As per U.S vision till 2025-2030,U.S will call back most of their military from all over world back to U.S.They have enough resources whether its oil in atlantic and will emerge as super power again.They will keep their stooges but in different way.They used to make slaves but now they are going for partners which may be equal and india is one of them.They know that india is not going to be U.S brigade to fight anywhere like nato do.Those who thinks that china will do this n that are delusional,U.S will remain sole super power whether china leaves them economically behind or not.

2)Regarding to indian navy expansion,indian navy is expanded wrt to secure oil lines and to have a force which can independently fight with any force alone like U.S have.Future war is for securing oil lines and routes for economy and indian ocean is going to be most keyed region and it is similar to U.S goals here too..and most important wrt china czo we are clueless about china.

3)Relations with pakistan are not going to improve coz again point is china and its relations with china and china wants to secure gwadar point.Like it or not,india wants U.S to attack on pakistan and india have lobbied hard to do so coz U.S can do it without caring for U.N and other major powers like china or russia and dont holds card against them too...India cant afford to loose sources on pakistan if we go directly against pakistan but U.S can afford easily.So india have kept its army in control wrt pakistan and china and waiting for the U.S response wrt this.U.S used to have thinking that they will get india easily while making relations with pakistan too but opposite happened.India have worked silently to separate pakistan from U.S and waiting for U.s attack and this is known to pakistan too thats why their military buckle down when U.S talks about going against them..if u analyze,you will see that pakistan mostly buckles in front of U.S while holding cards of the nato supply etc and international pressure is different.Pak will remain the sole target for indians but india wants to concentrate on china and full wants to utilize U.S resources against china with attack on pakistan.This is the reason you will find that india is waiting n there is no solid breakthrough or talks wrt china and pakistan by india.But again U.s have own mess like syria and iran etc...
I have been saying that once this mess is resolved,with in month,US will attack pakistan or u may say that next target will be paksitan.U.S also wants to block china access to gwadar,once gwadar is gone,china will be neutralize without anywar since indian and USN navies will be sitting at indian ocean and even if U.S departs,india must be able to hold indian ocean..so those who are saying that indian navy is for piracy operations are delusional ...india have kept every option open but one thing is certain that india n israel wants U.S attack on paksitan.Both have lobbied hard and pakistan favor in senate or congress have been reduced to great extent..


so point is not of large indian army which is incapable to do anything ,point is global change or shift which is going to come in next decade.india is not in mood to waste a single resource and wants to utilize U.s desperateness in region coz U.S wants to leave region after 10-15 yrs and wants to stall as india as super power in asia.

More U.S will desperate,more india will remain in benefit.You can see how much weight U.S is throwing towards india and i can bet that india will be the first country other than israel who will get f-22 .

Sir, you elucidate your thinking pretty well. I am not as well conversant with the geo-political environment as you are, however I will attempt to put across a bit of my response:

America's dealings with different countries is based on their interests. They seek a different kind of response from India and different from Pakistan. India is placed by them in Pacific Command (PACOM), whereas Pakistan is placed in CENTCOM. These two commands have different areas of operation. Though on insistence of India, they allowed India to place a liaison officer in CENTCOM yet, India remains in PACOM. That is why they repeatedly seek India's indulgence in South East Asia.

They also want to take advantage of India's cheap labour and seek an alternative of China in an effort to improve their economy.

They also want India to be a countervailing factor with regard to containing China.

Because India is boxed in between two strong nuclear countries, they want to take advantage of India's naval forces in keeping the "world commons". World commons are international air, sea and space thoroughfares.

At the same time, they also don't want India as a challenger to US hegemony in future.

They want different set of things from Pakistan according to their interests therefore need Pakistan's support as well.

For this, they want both these countries to improve their relations, so that any conflict between them, and I don't mean armed conflict only, which can adversely impact their interests, is avoided.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I request a little time, around four hours, to respond to posts 24, 25, 26 and 27.

This is one of the most meaningful discussions to emerge in recent months, and I will have to kill myself if the discussants drop the topic.