Indian strategic thinking and Pakistan.

[Joe Shearer]

Is it threat from north or the threat from east ?

As the response may be different for both.

Quite right, Sir, we have to distinguish between the two.

Sadly, today, it appears that the Indian armed forces must acknowledge and address at least nine theaters, from the DBO area to the Burmese frontier.

In good old days, strategists in Pakistan used to say that the defence of East Pakistan lie in West Pakistan. We ultimately lost East Pakistan. Yes off-course the environment were altogether different then and can not be compared with today.

However, the strategy of obviating the vulnerability in the East through neutralizing the threat from West has down-turns. One major down-turn for India is that by default, it makes China and Pakistan natural allies. Therefore, the threats would never go away and India would remain boxed in between two nuclear powers joined together against a common threat.

The perpetuity of the threat, despite other enhanced cooperative measure, may never allow formation of the trust which
is so much necessary for a good neighbourly co-existence.

How can the threat from the nuclear armed West be neutralized by India, besides the application of military arm. It may also generate interesting discussion.

There is indeed a fallacy in defending one point by attacking another widely separated point. However, the recommendation was with regard to eliminating a weaker enemy before tackling the stronger one.

A military policeman was known for selecting the smallest partner he could before plunging in to pacify bar-room brawls. He was asked why he didn't select the biggest man instead. His answer was simplicity itself. "if you see a big and a small guy coming at you, whom will you hit first?"

 

[Nassr]

Quite right, Sir, we have to distinguish between the two.

Sadly, today, it appears that the Indian armed forces must acknowledge and address at least nine theaters, from the DBO area to the Burmese frontier.



There is indeed a fallacy in defending one point by attacking another widely separated point. However, the recommendation was with regard to eliminating a weaker enemy before tackling the stronger one.

A military policeman was known for selecting the smallest partner he could before plunging in to pacify bar-room brawls. He was asked why he didn't select the biggest man instead. His answer was simplicity itself. "if you see a big and a small guy coming at you, whom will you hit first?"

Sir,

You express yourself so eloquently, that on many occasions I tend to lose my thoughts to ambivalence.

I understand your thoughts more and more as I read more of what you post. North now stands understood.

Regarding the elimination of a weaker enemy before tackling the stronger one, is indicative of an interesting thought process of one of the pugilists - so to say. This, not with regard to the voracity or otherwise of the statement, Patton also said something similar, "hit them where they aren't", and he went on to regain most of what he lost, by hitting them where they weren't.

Interesting thing here is that the other guy doesn't think he is weak to the extent of being taken advantage-off in the manner. Such big mutually perceptual differences are indeed surprising, considering the available wherewithal to ascertain the realities. Misunderstanding of signals meant for each other also partly emanate from such perceptual differences. But then probably, this is how mistakes lead to more mistakes and results in disaster for one or the other.

Coming back to point of going after the weaker one first and stronger later. Is the weaker one tackled first to create an impression on the stronger onlookers, as in case of the military policeman, or, is it that the stronger one's ability to respond is perceived to be curtailed due to the nature of terrain he fights on and therefor becomes even weaker than the weaker one - or - is it both.

I wish wars could be won or lost on perceptions alone without shedding blood, as probably was the case in the 15th Century warfare where one of the pugilists would accept defeat when the other would manoeuvre to an advantageous position. Unfortunately, it can't and won't happen here in this case.

 

[RazPaK]

Sir,

You express yourself so eloquently, that on many occasions I tend to lose my thoughts to ambivalence.

I understand your thoughts more and more as I read more of what you post. North now stands understood.

Regarding the elimination of a weaker enemy before tackling the stronger one, is indicative of an interesting thought process of one of the pugilists - so to say. This, not with regard to the voracity or otherwise of the statement, Patton also said something similar, "hit them where they aren't", and he went on to regain most of what he lost, by hitting them where they weren't.

Interesting thing here is that the other guy doesn't think he is weak to the extent of being taken advantage-off in the manner. Such big mutually perceptual differences are indeed surprising, considering the available wherewithal to ascertain the realities. Misunderstanding of signals meant for each other also partly emanate from such perceptual differences. But then probably, this is how mistakes lead to more mistakes and results in disaster for one or the other.

Coming back to point of going after the weaker one first and stronger later. Is the weaker one tackled first to create an impression on the stronger onlookers, as in case of the military policeman, or, is it that the stronger one's ability to respond is perceived to be curtailed due to the nature of terrain he fights on and therefor becomes even weaker than the weaker one - or - is it both.

I wish wars could be won or lost on perceptions alone without shedding blood, as probably was the case in the 15th Century warfare where one of the pugilists would accept defeat when the other would manoeuvre to an advantageous position. Unfortunately, it can't and won't happen here in this case.

Do you play chess?

 

[Joe Shearer]

Do you play chess?

Oh, hell, here's one of the flaming four. There goes the thread.

 

[Rig Vedic]

All conflicts begin and end in the mind.

It takes generations for a new identity to crystallize, and it takes generations for an identity to dissolve.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Sir,

You express yourself so eloquently, that on many occasions I tend to lose my thoughts to ambivalence.

I understand your thoughts more and more as I read more of what you post. North now stands understood.

Bear with me. Some of these thoughts have evolved over months, years even, and it is only now that I have two of you helping me to articulate and refine them. Some of your responses were so shockingly close to unexpressed ideas that it was like entertaining a guest within the very brain.

There is so much to say that last night, the effort had to be abandoned merely for not knowing how to begin. There will be moments of cloudy, confused expression; your critical help alone can clarify them.

Regarding the elimination of a weaker enemy before tackling the stronger one, is indicative of an interesting thought process of one of the pugilists - so to say. This, not with regard to the voracity or otherwise of the statement, Patton also said something similar, "hit them where they aren't", and he went on to regain most of what he lost, by hitting them where they weren't.

Interesting thing here is that the other guy doesn't think he is weak to the extent of being taken advantage-off in the manner. Such big mutually perceptual differences are indeed surprising, considering the available wherewithal to ascertain the realities. Misunderstanding of signals meant for each other also partly emanate from such perceptual differences. But then probably, this is how mistakes lead to more mistakes and results in disaster for one or the other.

What you have outlined is considered by historians of both the World Wars to have been behind these wars. Perceptions among the leaders - Baldwin, Hitler, Stalin, Masaryk and Benes, the curious bunch led by Daladier who governed France, Mussolini, and on the Pacific side, Hirohito's Kwantung Army and his military administration facing Roosevelt - were so deceived by the wishful thinking of the leaders themselves that peace never had a chance!

Coming back to point of going after the weaker one first and stronger later. Is the weaker one tackled first to create an impression on the stronger onlookers, as in case of the military policeman, or, is it that the stronger one's ability to respond is perceived to be curtailed due to the nature of terrain he fights on and therefor becomes even weaker than the weaker one - or - is it both.

This may be due to the desperate effort by a single antagonist to reduce the odds by knocking out one of his two opponents, quickly and cheaply, and then straining every sinew to take down the bigger opponent. As did Germany at the outset of WWII: first Poland, then, after re-grouping, France and Britain.

I wish wars could be won or lost on perceptions alone without shedding blood, as probably was the case in the 15th Century warfare where one of the pugilists would accept defeat when the other would manoeuvre to an advantageous position. Unfortunately, it can't and won't happen here in this case.

At one stage in mediaeval Europe, they could; you might be familiar with the office of a Champion. The condottiere, to whom you have referred, were of course very civilised about waging war. To them, bloodshed was not a necessary accompaniment of war.

 

[Joe Shearer]

It would appear that to defend our northern boundaries will be extremely risky with an active enemy to the west. That source of tension and hostility must be neutralized before an effective defence of the north can be set up.

Perhaps the best way to consider this neutralization is as a sequence of processes.

One process stands by itself, and must be a precursor to all other activity. If it fails, then, and only then should the other branch, consisting of three phases, be executed, each phase in succession or the first two in slight overlap.

The first process, and the most important one, is the attempt to reduce the engrained hostility that has built up over the years, one paper-thin layer at a time, until all normal relations are frustrated by this armour of mutual antipathy that citizens of both nations have to lug around.

While it is possible to criticize the implementation, there is no doubt that Manmohan Singh's doctrine of peaceful relations with neighbouring countries is the correct doctrine. It is impossible to maintain armed forces at the level that we have currently, or at the even higher levels that are about to be proposed in this strategic outline, without serious erosion of development and even maintenance of critical systems at current levels.

Process One, the Left Hook, is the campaign of waging all-out peace efforts. This must Be waged as all-out war, with the complete participation of all citizens. Perhaps as a sole exception, the lunatic fringe may be left out.

 

[notorious_eagle]

It would appear that to defend our northern boundaries will be extremely risky with an active enemy to the west. That source of tension and hostility must be neutralized before an effective defence of the north can be set up.

Very true. Fighting a simultaneous war can be exhausting. The strategy what you seem to be advocating reminds me of the Schliffen Plan that was implemented by Imperial Germany during World War 1. Neutralize France before the Russians mobilize in 6 weeks. The question is, can India subdue the threat from the West in quick succession so she can concentrate her numbers on the North. How confident is India that she can hold her defences in North before the reinforcements from the West arrive? How quickly can India transport her troops from the West to the North? How well versed are those officers with mountain warfare considering they have spent their entire lives training for a mechanized warfare?

Perhaps the best way to consider this neutralization is as a sequence of processes.

One process stands by itself, and must be a precursor to all other activity. If it fails, then, and only then should the other branch, consisting of three phases, be executed, each phase in succession or the first two in slight overlap.

The first process, and the most important one, is the attempt to reduce the engrained hostility that has built up over the years, one paper-thin layer at a time, until all normal relations are frustrated by this armour of mutual antipathy that citizens of both nations have to lug around.

While it is possible to criticize the implementation, there is no doubt that Manmohan Singh's doctrine of peaceful relations with neighbouring countries is the correct doctrine. It is impossible to maintain armed forces at the level that we have currently, or at the even higher levels that are about to be proposed in this strategic outline, without serious erosion of development and even maintenance of critical systems at current levels.

Process One, the Left Hook, is the campaign of waging all-out peace efforts. This must Be waged as all-out war, with the complete participation of all citizens. Perhaps as a sole exception, the lunatic fringe may be left out.

I agree. Peace is the only way forward for the entire region. Regional economic integration will bring huge dividends for both India and especially Pakistan. This will enable Pakistan to exploit her geo-strategical location, improve her economy and live in a peaceful neighbourhood.

It has been correctly stated that the logistics capability of the PLA is its greatest military asset against India, much more so than against any other adversary. The asymmetry is so great that one has to go back 140 years to find a similar situation, and then the similarities are hair-raising. What were the mistakes the French made in 1871? Are those mistakes replicable in today's situation on India's northern frontiers? Does the Indian Army find itself compelled by political pressure (and by pressure from Internet patriots) to defend every last rock, every last ravine? Does it have the equivalent of Belgium, a supposedly neutral country vulnerable to the slightest pressure that is capable of compromising the core of the Indian defensive structure? Is it inclined to give battle entirely within India, thus releasing the PLA to select its point of attack?

In one word, can India guard against China as things stand today?

The answer regretfully must be No, both for the reasons that might be collated from answers to the questions put above, and from the point of view of India's vulnerability to a simultaneous attack on the west. The answers to India's strategic vulnerability in the north lie entirely on its success in neutralizing the threat in existence to the west.

Thus the question that needs to be answered is, how is the General Staff planning to proceed with the worst case scenario?

I have been following Indian military developments quite closely. From what i have gathered is, India is still planning to fight a war on Corps Level strength and not on Division Strength. Suer there have been a few exercises here and there where IA has performed manoeuvres on Division Level strength, but it appears that Indian Strategic planning is still based on Corps Level attacks. The Cold Start Doctrine contrary to what the fanboys are saying is yet to be perfected and implemented on the field. It appears that General Sundarji's doctrine is still prevalent in IA's thinking progress.

The question that needs to be answered is how exactly does IA intend to neutralize her threat on the West in quick succession. What exactly are her objectives? From what i have read about the Cold Start Doctrine, the objectives envisioned in it are simply unsustainable. Holding territory before a compromise can be reached after the international community intervenes. That in my opinion is simply flawed. What if the PA does not to compromise and decides to fight it out with the exhausted IA Armour? What than.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Welcome back, dear Sir. I was waiting for you and Nassr, but have to admit that the discussion is at a superior level at all points. I hope Cold Hearted Aviator and Paan Singh will join in soon, and was it Jinx1?

At any rate, may I respond to you, separately for the three sections? While we wait for the others? Assuming that I have your permission,then.....

Very true. Fighting a simultaneous war can be exhausting. The strategy what you seem to be advocating reminds me of the Schliffen Plan that was implemented by Imperial Germany during World War 1. Neutralize France before the Russians mobilize in 6 weeks. The question is, can India subdue the threat from the West in quick succession so she can concentrate her numbers on the North. How confident is India that she can hold her defences in North before the reinforcements from the West arrive? How quickly can India transport her troops from the West to the North? How well versed are those officers with mountain warfare considering they have spent their entire lives training for a mechanized warfare?



I agree. Peace is the only way forward for the entire region. Regional economic integration will bring huge dividends for both India and especially Pakistan. This will enable Pakistan to exploit her geo-strategical location, improve her economy and live in a peaceful neighbourhood.



Thus the question that needs to be answered is, how is the General Staff planning to proceed with the worst case scenario?

I have been following Indian military developments quite closely. From what i have gathered is, India is still planning to fight a war on Corps Level strength and not on Division Strength. Suer there have been a few exercises here and there where IA has performed manoeuvres on Division Level strength, but it appears that Indian Strategic planning is still based on Corps Level attacks. The Cold Start Doctrine contrary to what the fanboys are saying is yet to be perfected and implemented on the field. It appears that General Sundarji's doctrine is still prevalent in IA's thinking progress.

The question that needs to be answered is how exactly does IA intend to neutralize her threat on the West in quick succession. What exactly are her objectives? From what i have read about the Cold Start Doctrine, the objectives envisioned in it are simply unsustainable. Holding territory before a compromise can be reached after the international community intervenes. That in my opinion is simply flawed. What if the PA does not to compromise and decides to fight it out with the exhausted IA Armour? What than.

 

[notorious_eagle]

At any rate, may I respond to you, separately for the three sections? While we wait for the others? Assuming that I have your permission,then.....

Honourable Sir

Off course. Its always a pleasure having a discussion with you.

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

I have been following Indian military developments quite closely. From what i have gathered is, India is still planning to fight a war on Corps Level strength and not on Division Strength. Suer there have been a few exercises here and there where IA has performed manoeuvres on Division Level strength, but it appears that Indian Strategic planning is still based on Corps Level attacks. The Cold Start Doctrine contrary to what the fanboys are saying is yet to be perfected and implemented on the field. It appears that General Sundarji's doctrine is still prevalent in IA's thinking progress.

The question that needs to be answered is how exactly does IA intend to neutralize her threat on the West in quick succession. What exactly are her objectives? From what i have read about the Cold Start Doctrine, the objectives envisioned in it are simply unsustainable. Holding territory before a compromise can be reached after the international community intervenes. That in my opinion is simply flawed. What if the PA does not to compromise and decides to fight it out with the exhausted IA Armour? What than.

It seems to me that there are fanboys in the Pakistan military establisment too who believe that Cold Start exist otherwise why would they develop NASR and go on in the press saying "we have developed it to counter Cold Start".

 

[Joe Shearer]

I agree. Peace is the only way forward for the entire region. Regional economic integration will bring huge dividends for both India and especially Pakistan. This will enable Pakistan to exploit her geo-strategical location, improve her economy and live in a peaceful neighbourhood.

This is the most vital part of the strategy, to me.

It may seem strange to be advocating peace as a geo-political strategy, but on clearer reflection, THIS IS THE ONLY WAY FORWARD FOR BOTH COUNTRIES. Even a successful war against Pakistan will only breed another, even more rigidly obstinate opponents of India, bent upon taking revenge. Look at what happened after 1971. We will be trapped, like France and Germany were, in an eternal cycle of revenge. As history tells us, this dates back to the break-up of the Carolingian Empire in the 9th and 10th centuries.

It is also risky to consider a peace which is a matter of mutual deferment of trial by battle, as the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany entered into in 1939. If it is not a genuine peace, complete with border forces manned by personnel carefully balanced between both nations, officered by responsible people, it will be a worse mess than today's cold war conditions.

There are huge barriers, of course. Neither the right wing fascist imitation party in India nor their religious bigot counterparts will give up the idea of harrassing Pakistan and Pakistanis as an acceptable substitute for harassing Muslims at home. As a wise young friend of mine put it, he had seen examples of religion being put to the service of nationalism, but India was the first case where some were putting nationalism to the service of religion.

Nor are things better on the Hafiz Sayeed/Zaid Hamid/PakistanKaKhudaHafeez side of the boundary. We need not dwell on those; to paraphrase a young fauji friend of mine, that is a lazy man's target!

It is just that a good, solid anchored peace, based on mutual acceptance and self-respect is such a huge strategic win for India that it is quite obvious that in spite of over-smart TV presenters, mischief-making journalists, toad-eating diplomats and bumbling politicians who can't work out what to do with their hands when they are not in other people's pockets, we need to persevere; through gritted teeth, sometimes, but persevere nonetheless.

 

[deltacamelately]

I haven't read anything about raising 2-3 Strike Corps' for the North East. Indian Army Chief, highlighting the plan to counter China in May 2011, did not mention raising 2-3 Strike Corps'. He just mentioned raising one dedicated Mountain Strike Corps.

This is a recent development, one that came into being after the formation of the strategic command for North and North East. It involves reducing the tail to teeth ratio and thinning down some administrative structures and static formations and beefing up with more operational troops.

It is indeed planned, that the strategic command will have 3 strike corps namely 1 corps, 2 Corps and 3 Corps. In addition the strike corps will have a single armored division. But the stress will be to have more Mechanized infantry units. The stress on armor is low, as in the alpine regions the use of tanks is limited. Even in the 1962 war the IA and PLA didn't eemploy tanks except at Chusul in Ladakh where the Chinese brought in some light tanks.

The role of the strike corps will be to go on the offensive and enter deep enough into Tibet, so as to destroy the enemy’s reserves and capture as much area as possible. This is a radical change from the earlier defensive posture and part of the credit for this must go to General J.J. Singh the erstwhile Army Chief and the governor of Assam. The strike corps would enter battle at any opportune time or land behind enemy lines to reduce the enemy’s operational capability. The idea would be to strike in the enemy’s rear.

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

What Gen Kapoor was basically planning for with the new doctrine is that in a IND-PAK war if China decides to open the N-E fronth then IA should be prepared for it.This is what most people in Pakistan fail to understand and think that India is going to start a 2 front war like what the Germans did.

Now what Gen Kapoor wanted was to concentrate on 5 points for his new doctrine.

1.The Armed forces should be prepared for a 2 front war incase China steps in to help Pakistan.

2.The Army needs to optimise' its capability to effectively counter both military and non-military facets of asymmetric and sub-conventional threats like WMD terrorism, cyber warfare, electronic warfare and information warfare.

3.The armed forces have to enhance their reach to operate anywhere from Persian Gulf to Malacca straight.

4.Operational synergy among the Army,Navy and AF must be achieved.

5.To achieve technological edge over its adversaries.


I think its a reality and we must be prepared for the worst situation otherwise we might be caught with our pants down.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Honourable Sir

Off course. Its always a pleasure having a discussion with you.

I have been assigned a task by the boss, and she wants it executed this minute, no if or but. When I return, I hope to respond to the two sections remaining, then with my outline of what might be strategy for the IA in the west.


It is called Fatigue Duty in some quarters.