Indian Agni BM Technology origin

[desiman]

The so called Pakistani indigenous missiles - have a look

Missile Chronology

1992-1993

This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1992
US intelligence discovers the transfer of an M-11 training ballistic missile along with its accompanying transporter-erector-launcher to Pakistan. The transfer of a training missile suggests that operational missiles are likely to follow.
—Bill Gertz, "Missile Deception," Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security, (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1999), p. 159.

1992
Pakistani officials are seen in North Korea examining a prototype model of the Nodong-1. [Note: This report is unsubstantiated.]
—Bill Gertz, "Iran-Bound Mystery Freighter Carried Parts for Missiles," Washington Times, 16 July 1992, p. A3.

1992
Pakistan's Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) is building its second 50kg research satellite, Badr-B, to be launched in 1994. Chairman of the agency Sikandar Zaman says that an engineering test model of the indigenously built satellite is under construction. SUPARCO plans to launch this satellite as a "piggyback load" and is looking for potential launchers. Pakistan's first satellite, the 50kg Badr-A or Badr-1, was launched in July 1990 with the help of China's Long March 2E booster. The space agency also has a sounding rocket program and launches three to four rockets each year. The agency's two-stage, solid-fueled Shahpar rocket is capable of carrying a 55kg payload to altitudes in excess of 450km. The Shahpar measures 7m in length; it's first stage has a diameter of 0.5m. SUPARCO's test range is located about 50km northwest of Karachi and has a total area of 200 hectares. The test range is equipped with mobile and fixed radars, a rocket and payload integration facility, and a launch control center. Plans are afoot to upgrade the test range to accommodate larger sounding rockets. SUPARCO employs 2,500 workers, of which approximately 10 percent are scientists and engineers. SUPARCO's Chairman Sikandar Zaman says that the agency has not produced any military versions of its sounding rockets.

—Paul Proctor, "Pakistan's Space Agency Building Second Experimental Satellite," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 10 August 1992, Vol. 137, No. 6 p. 46, Competition in Pakistan Skies; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 2 September 1992, web.lexis-nexis.com.

January 1992
Retired Pakistani General Inam Ul-Haq is arrested in Germany on charges of attempting to obtain and export nuclear weapons-grade metal to Pakistan and extradited to the United States.
—Legal Intelligencer (Philadelphia), 9 July 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 2 September 1992, web.lexis-nexis.com.

31 January 1992

China allegedly delivers guidance systems for M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan.
—"China said to sell Missile Technology," Los Angeles Times, 31 January 1992, Part A, p. 11, Column I, Foreign Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 31 January 1992, web.lexis-nexis.com.

5 February 1992

Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen refutes a foreign press report alleging China's sale of missile technology to Pakistan and Syria. Qichen terms the report as "false" and says that US Secretary of State James Baker did not know about this.
—"FM refutes reports on China selling missile technology," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 5 February 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6 February 1992, web.lexis-nexis.com.

16 June 1992

US Department of Commerce amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and places tighter restrictions on a list of missile technology projects, countries, and regions. Pakistan's Hatf series missiles are included in the list. The new regulations stipulate that exports to the listed entities require a validated license.
—'Expansion of Foreign Policy Controls; Missile Technology Destinations 57 FR 26773," Federal Register, 16 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 December 1991, web.lexis-nexis.com.

July-August 1992

North Korean Deputy Premier Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam visits Syria (27-30 July), Iran (30 July-3 August), and Pakistan (4-7 August). Missile cooperation and North Korean sales of the Hwasŏng-6 and possibly Nodong missiles are on the agenda.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 23.

7 July 1992

A US federal court convicts the retired Pakistani General Inam Ul-Haq of conspiring to obtain nuclear weapons-grade metal in violation of US export laws.
—Legal Intelligencer (Philadelphia), 9 July 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 2 September 1992, web.lexis-nexis.com.

8 July 1992

Assistant US Attorney Amy Kurland says there was good evidence that Inam Ul-Haq directed a scheme to get 50,000 pounds of beryllium and a special type of steel called "maraging 350 steel" for export to Pakistan. Kurland further says that Ul-Haq was the driving force behind the scheme, even though no direct evidence was attributable against him.
—Legal Intelligencer (Philadelphia), 9 July 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 2 September 1992, web.lexis-nexis.com.

August 1992

North Korean Deputy Premier Foreign Minister Kim Yŏng Nam travels to Pakistan, where missile cooperation and the Nodong missile sales are on the agenda.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 21.

October 1992

A "senior Pentagon Asian specialist" says there are "indications" that China is violating the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) by discussing possible M-9 and M-11 missile exports with Pakistan Syria, and that the Pentagon is "also concerned" that China may be discussing further "nuclear missile" exports with Iran. With regards to possible Syrian and Pakistani exports, the official says, "we are watching very closely."
—"We are watching very closely," Jane's Defence Weekly (Coulsdon, Surrey), 10 October 1992, p. 18.

2 November 1992
An US company, CMI International Inc of Gaffney, Southern Carolina, pleads guilty in federal court for making false statements to a freight company in an attempt to ship missile fuse components to Pakistan.
—Compiled from News Dispatches, "Plea on Export Charge," Newsday (Long Island, New York), 2 November 1992, p. 18; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 2 November 1992, web.lexis-nexis.com.

December 1992
Pakistan makes an $83 million payment to China Precision Import/Export Corporation for unspecified "goods." US intelligence agencies believe that the "goods" are M-11 ballistic missile shipments.
—Bill Gertz, Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security, (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing Inc., 1999), p. 268.

4 December 1992
US intelligence analysts determine that China may have recently transferred approximately two dozen M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan; the missiles were photographed as they passed through the Pakistani port of Karachi. Other US intelligence analysts caution, however, that China may have transferred shorter-range solid-fueled ballistic missiles instead of the M-11. Furthermore, the missiles transferred may have been modified so as to make them incapable of delivering nuclear warheads. If China did indeed transfer M-11s to Pakistan, it would amount to a violation of its earlier pledge to US Secretary of State James A. Baker III to not transfer such systems. An M-11 sales brochure published in the mid-1980s by the China Precision Machinery Import and Export Company states that the M-11 is a 31-foot long missile and is capable of delivering an 800kg payload over a distance of 180 miles.
—R. Jeffrey Smith, "China said to sell arms to Pakistan; M-11 Missile Shipment may break vow to U.S.," Washington Post, 4 December 1992, First Section, Page A10; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 4 December 1992, web.lexis-nexis.com; Jim Mann, "China said to sell Pakistan dangerous new missiles," Los Angeles Times, 4 December 1992, Part A, Page 1, Column 5, Foreign Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 4 December 1992, web.lexis-nexis.com.

4 December 1992
US intelligence analysts believe that Pakistan has been interested in acquiring the M-11 ballistic missile for a long time, to target India. Pakistan admits its potential to assemble at least one nuclear device and US intelligence analysts believe that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consists of less than a dozen unassembled weapons. However, analysts express doubts if Pakistan has the capability to mount nuclear weapons on the M-11 missile.
— R. Jeffrey Smith, "China said to sell arms to Pakistan; M-11 Missile Shipment may break vow to U.S.," Washington Post, 4 December 1992, First Section, Page A10; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 4 December 1992, web.lexis-nexis.com; Jim Mann, "China said to sell Pakistan dangerous new missiles," Los Angeles Times, 4 December 1992, Part A, p. 1, Column 5, Foreign Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 4 December 1992, web.lexis-nexis.com.

5 December 1992
Pakistan's former Chief of Army Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg comments that "as regards the M-11 missile system that Pakistan is acquiring from China, it is covered within the six-nation agreement on Missile Technology Control to which China is a signatory. The missile has a range of less than 300km and is not capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. It is neither designed for nor has the required degree of accuracy."
—The News (Karachi), 6 December 1992, p. 4; in Proliferation Issues, 18 December 1992, p. 17; UPI, 5 December 1992; in Executive News Service, 7 December 1992; Pakistan Times (Rawalpindi), 10 December 1992, pp. 1, 8; in Proliferation Issues, 23 December 1992, p. 10.

6 December 1992
The US government halts the sale of a crucial supercomputer to China and also threatens to impose additional sanctions if the intelligence reports of its clandestine missile deals with Pakistan are confirmed. A US State Department spokesman issues a strongly worded statement, indicating that the United States will treat this as a "serious matter," and will "pursue any evidence" regarding the missile deal. However, officials from the White House and the State Department indicate that the United States has not reached a conclusion on whether China has indeed violated its pledge to not sell M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan.
—Michael Chugani, "U.S. acts over China arms sales," South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 6 December 1992, Sunday Edition, p. 1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6 December 1992, web.lexis-nexis.com.

6 December 1992
US intelligence officials claim they have proof of China's sale of missiles and transfers of weapons technology to Russia, Iran, Syria, and Pakistan.
—Michael Chugani, "U.S. acts over China arms sales," South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 6 December 1992, Sunday Edition, p. 1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6 December 1992, web.lexis-nexis.com.

6 December 1992
Responding to media reports about Pakistan's alleged acquisition of M-11 ballistic missiles from China, Pakistani Defense Minister Glaus Ali Shah comments that he is in no position to challenge the veracity of such reports. Shah adds that Pakistan is well within its rights to defend its borders and points to India's efforts to acquire sophisticated nuclear missiles during the past few years.
—Nation (Lahore, Islamabad), 7 December 1992; in Proliferation Issues, 18 December 1992, p. 16.

6 December 1992
A five-member Chinese military delegation led by Major General Yang Guo Ping visits Pakistan to discuss matters of mutual military interest with senior Pakistani officials. The Chinese delegation visits Pakistani military and related-training institutions in Rawalpindi, Abbotabad, Peshawar, and Lahore.
—AFP, 6 December 1992; in Proliferation Issues, 18 December 1992, p. 16.

7 December 1992
China denies news reports of its missile sales to Pakistan; a Chinese foreign ministry official describes the reports as "groundless."
—Reuter, "China denies selling missiles to Pakistan," Toronto Star (Toronto), 7 December 1992, News, Pg. A12, www.thestar.com; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 7 December 1992, web.lexis-nexis.com.

May 1993
Iran begins producing a new man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS) called the Misagh-1, which looks similar to the China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation's QE-1 Vanguard and is also similar to Pakistan's Anza MK II missile system developed by Abdul Qadeer Khan Research Laboratories.
—Christopher F. Foss, "Iran fields manportable SAM System," Jane's Defence Weekly (Coulsdon, Surrey), 3 May 2000, p. 16.

6 May 1993
US intelligence officials say photographic and other evidence has provided proof that China indeed shipped M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan in violation of its pledge to the United States; and this evidence has grown more persuasive since reports first surfaced of the alleged Chinese transfers. Although earlier reports suggested that China had shipped complete missile systems, US officials say that more recent reports suggest that China most likely shipped missile components that could be assembled in Pakistan later. It is still unclear whether any of the missiles are functional at this point.
—Douglas Jehl, "China breaking missiles pledge, U.S. aides say," New York Times, 6 May 1993, Section A, p. 1, Column 5, Foreign Desk, www.nytimes.com; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6 May 1993, web.lexis-nexis.com.

6 May 1993
US State Department spokesperson Joseph Snyder announces that the United States has "not determined that China transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan." But the official adds the United States would regard "very seriously" any signs of China's breach of its commitment to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines.
—Douglas Jehl, "China breaking missiles pledge, U.S. aides say," New York Times, 6 May 1993, Section A, p. 1, Column 5, Foreign Desk, www.nytimes.com; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6 May 1993, web.lexis-nexis.com.

8 May 1993
The Chinese foreign ministry denies news reports of China's alleged transfer of missile components to Pakistan. The ministry's spokesperson says, "A news report on China shipping M-11 missiles is groundless," he adds, "The position of China that it will act in accordance with the guidelines of MTCR remains unchanged."
—Leon Hadar, "Report of missile export deals blow to China's trade status extension," Business Times (Singapore), 8 May 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 8 May 1993, web.lexis-nexis.com.

21 May 1993
Secretary-General of Pakistan's Foreign Ministry, Akram Zaki, denies that Pakistan has received M-11 missiles from China. He reiterates that friendly relations between Pakistan and China have a long history and that both the countries have had defense ties since 1963, but adds that China is strictly adhering to MTCR stipulations once it promised to do so. Mr. Zaki terms foreign news reports on M-11 missiles in Pakistan as "speculative stories and motivated allegations."
—"Pakistan denies receiving Chinese M-11 missiles," Agence France Presse, 21 May 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 July 1993, web.lexis-nexis.com.

29-30 May 1993
North Korea successfully launches four missiles from the Musudan-ri test facility in Hwadae-kun, North Hamgyŏng Province, two of which are thought to be Nodong-1 missiles. Later reports confirm that only one of the missiles was a Nodong. One missile traveled 500km; another traveled 100km; the remaining two fell short of 100km. Israel's Mossad reportedly warned the United States and Japan of the test weeks in advance. Iranian and Pakistani observers are present for the tests.
—Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), 14 June 1993, in "DA: DPRK 'Appears' to Have Tested Missile," FBIS-EAS-93-112, 14 June 1993, p. 5; David E. Sanger, "Missile Is Tested by North Koreans," New York Times, 13 June 1993, p. 7; Kim Yong Kol, Hankook Ilbo, 16 June 1993, p. 4, in "Israel Makes Gesture to North Korea for Improvement of Relations," FBIS-EAS-93-114, "Possible Israeli Aid to DPRK Viewed," 16 June 1993, p. 20; "Defense Ministry: May Nodong-1 Test Successful," Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 24 June 1993, in FBIS-EAS-93-120, 24 June 1993, p. 19; "North Korea Seen Successful in Test of Nodong-1 Missile," Aerospace Daily, 29 June 1993, pp. 538-539; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 203; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 17, 21; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing," Jane's Intelligence Review (Coulsdon, Surrey), April 1995, pp. 186-189; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 283-286, 291; Yu Yong Wŏn, "'Puk Changgŏrip'o Chŏnbang Chŭnggang'/Kukpangbu, Rodong 1 Ho Palsasŏnggong Ch'ŏt Kongshikhwag'in," Chosun Ilbo, 25 June 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, ????????.

26 July 1993
During an informal meeting with the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen denies that China has violated any international agreement on missile exports. However, Christopher warns Qichen that the United States may impose punitive sanctions on China in the face of mounting evidence that it has transferred missile technology to Pakistan in violation of its pledges to the United States.
—Steven A. Holmes, "China Denies Violating Pact By Selling Arms to Pakistan," New York Times, 26 July 1993, Section A, p. 2, Column 3, Foreign Desk, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 July 1993, web.lexis-nexis.com; Art Pine, "U.S. Warns Beijing on Arms Exports; Weapons: Sanctions may be imposed because of evidence of missile parts being shipped to Pakistan," Los Angeles Times, 26 July 1993, Part A, Page 4, Column 1, Foreign Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 July 1993, web.lexis-nexis.com.

25 August 1993
The Clinton administration concludes that China has violated international arms control guidelines by selling missile components to Pakistan. The administration reached this conclusion after the US intelligence community arrived at a consensus view that China had indeed made the sale.
—Daniel Williams, "U.S. finds that China broke arms control rules," Houston Chronicle, 25 August 1993, Section A, p. 13; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 25 August 1993, web.lexis-nexis.com.

25 August 1993
The United States announces sanctions against China for a period of two years, citing a Category II breach of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines. A Category II breach involves the transfer of missile components, whereas a Category I breach involves the transfer of complete missile systems. US State Department spokesperson Mike McCurry says the evidence regarding the M-11 missile sale has been reviewed by various US government agencies including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Pentagon, and the National Security Agency (NSA). After extensive review, the agencies concluded that the evidence of the missile sale was "unambiguous." However, China and Pakistan deny the veracity of the US findings.
—Martin Walker, "U.S. imposes curbs on China for missile know-how sale," Guardian (London), 26 August 1993, p. 7; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 August 1993, web.lexis-nexis.com; Mary Curtius, "China, Pakistan get U.S. sanctions over missile trade," Boston Globe, 26 August 1993, National/Foreign, Pg. 21; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 August 1993, web.lexis-nexis.com.

26 August 1993
In response to the allegations of missile transfer and the subsequent imposition of sanctions by the United States, China contends the missile range to be 190 miles and, hence, does not fall under the MTCR guidelines. Both China and Pakistan deny the US finding of the missile transfer.
— Martin Walker, "U.S. imposes curbs on China for missile know-how sale," Guardian (London), 26 August 1993, p. 7; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 August 1993, web.lexis-nexis.com.

26 August 1993
Pakistan denies its missile deals with China have broken any US rules. A senior Pakistani diplomat says, "China has supplied us with short-range tactical missiles that do not violate the Missile Technology Control regime (MTCR) guidelines, but we have no M-11s." Pakistan's Foreign Ministry indicates that the acquisition was necessitated by the Soviet-made scud attacks from Afghanistan in the late 1980s.
—Nancy Dunne, "China, Pakistan hit by U.S. sanctions," Financial Times (London), 26 August 1993, p. 16; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 August 1993, web.lexis-nexis.com; Ahmed Rashid, "Islamabad rejects CIA claims of missile deal," Daily Telegraph (London), 26 August 1993, International, p. 9; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 August 1993, web.lexis-nexis.com.

27 August 1993
Pakistan's caretaker prime minister, Moeen Qureshi, faults the United States for imposing sanctions against China and Pakistan. In a statement, Qureshi states that the missiles do not fall under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines and emphasizes the role of the missiles as a defensive response to the scud attacks from Afghanistan and India's missile program.
—Farhan Bokhari, "Qureshi criticises U.S. for applying 'unjust' sanctions against China and Pakistan," Financial Times (London), 27 August 1993, p. 4; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 27 August 1993, web.lexis-nexis.com.

28 August 1993
The Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu summons the US Ambassador J Stapleton Roy and warns that with the imposition of US sanctions, "...the Chinese government has been left with no alternatives but to reconsider its commitment to the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime]." Huaqiu labels the application of sanctions as a "naked hegemonic act."
—Raymond Whtaker, "U.S.-Chinese rift underlined by missile dispute; Anger over Pakistan connection fuels hostility between the two powers," Independent (London), 28 August 1993, International News Page, p. 10;
in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 28 August 1993, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 November 1993
The Clinton administration offers to lift the recently imposed trade sanctions on China, subject to China's assurance of halting future missile-related exports. According to the suggested pact, China need not admit to the export of the M-11 missile components to Pakistan; but China must agree to a more detailed pledge having more legal force, promising not to transfer missiles and their components to Pakistan or to any other country.
—R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. offers to waive China Trade Sanctions," Washington Post, 11 November 1993, First Section, p. A39; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 11 November 1993, web.lexis-nexis.com.

December 1993
Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto travels to China and North Korea two months after being elected. There is evidence she is seeking cooperation in missile development. Soon after her visit, Pakistan begins a project to purchase and produce the Nodong, known in Pakistan as the "Ghauri."
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 23.

26 December 1993
Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto denies international media reports that she will be discussing missile procurement or development during her two-day visit to North Korea, which is to begin on 29 December 1993. The Pyongyang visit, which immediately follows a meeting in Beijing, is at the invitation of the North Korean President Kim Il Sung.
—Radio Pakistan Network, 26 December 1993, in "Denies Possible Talks on Missiles," FBIS-NES-93-246, 27 December 1993, p. 57; Radio Pakistan Network, 27 December 1993, in "Departs for China," FBIS-NES-93-246, 27 December 1993, p. 57.

29 December 1993
Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto states in Beijing that Pakistan has purchased Chinese M-11 ballistic missiles because of the threat posed by Afghani Scuds and the Indian missile buildup.
—Jeffrey Parker, Reuters, 29 December 1993.

29 December 1993
Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto arrives in Pyongyang for a two-day state visit. Bhutto says she welcomes the ongoing talks between the United States and North Korea to diffuse the current nuclear crisis in North Korea.
—'DPRK, Pakistani Leaders call for Closer Asian Cooperation," Xinhua News Agency, 30 December 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 31 December 1993, web.lexis-nexis.com.

30 December 1993
Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto urges the United States to lift the sanctions imposed on China and Pakistan for the transfer of the Chinese M-11 missiles. Bhutto states that "China and Pakistan have not violated the parameters of the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] agreement and we regret the imposition of the sanctions." Ms. Bhutto calls on the United States to review its stand on the sanctions as they are based on "erroneous information." Wu Jianmin, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, also comments that the sanctions "were entirely unjustified and should be lifted."
—Sheila Tefft, "China, Pakistan Band Together in Opposition to U.S. Sanctions," Christian Science Monitor, 30 December 1993, The World, International, p. 1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 30 December 1993, web.lexis-nexis.com.

30 December 1993
Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto leaves Pyongyang after having talks with North Korean President Kim Il Sung. Bhutto is accompanied in her talk by Foreign Minister Sardar Aseff Ahmad Ali and Minister of Defence Aftab Shaban Mirani. According to Pakistani officials, the Pakistani delegation left with plans for North Korea's Nodong missile.
—"Bhutto Ends Visit to North Korea," Agence France Presse, 30 December 1993, International News; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 30 December 1993, web.lexis-nexis.com


Now what do you think about this growler ?

 

[desiman]

Babur/Hatf-VII

In August 2005, Pakistan conducted the first test of its Babur/Hatf-VIII cruise missile. Babur is a subsonic missile with a range of 700 km and can carry both nuclear and conventional payloads. When it was first tested, its range was 500 km, which was subsequently extended. It is a terrain-hugging missile, making detection by ground-based radars difficult. As of 2008, the missile has not yet been deployed with the Pakistani armed services.Apart from the ground-launched version, Islamabad also plans to develop the Babur for deployment on aircraft (such as F-16, Mirage, A-5) and submarines (Agosta 90B).

The missile has been tested on numerous occasions since 2005 – March 2006, March 2007, July 2007, and December 2007.

The origins of the Babur are shrouded in controversy. Although the official position of the Pakistan government is that the missile was developed indigenously, it is widely suspected that the Babur is based on the Chinese DH-10 missile which, in turn, was derived from U.S. cruise missile technology through Tomahawk missiles that had landed unexploded in Afghanistan in 1998 and were passed on by Pakistan to China.

---------- Post added at 06:09 AM ---------- Previous post was at 06:08 AM ----------

Ra’ad/Hatf-VIII

Two years after first testing the Babur, Pakistan test-fired a new air-launched cruise missile, the Ra’ad (‘Thunder’ in Arabic), in August 2007, from a Mirage III EA aircraft of the Pakistan Air Force.[75] This nuclear capable missile reportedly has a 350 km range along with stealth capabilities. The missile was subsequently tested in May 2008 as part of the process of “validating the design parameters of the system.”

Although the first test of the Ra’ad took place from a Mirage aircraft, according to one analyst, it is probable that the Ra’ad would be deployed on the F-16A and F-16C fighter aircraft.[76] It is also likely that the relatively limited range of the Ra’ad indicates that it is a new design dependent on technology transfers from a foreign actor preferring to desist from violating the MTCR’s payload and range restrictions.

 

[desiman]

Hatf-III/Ghaznavi/M-11

The Chinese DF-11/M-11 (NATO designation CSS-7), which goes by the dual nomenclatures Hatf-III and Ghaznavi in Pakistan, is a short-range, solid-propellant, road mobile, single-warhead ballistic missile. China began development work on the M-11 in the mid-1980s; the first flight-test of the missile is believed to have occurred in 1990, and it probably entered operational service in 1992.

Analysts believe that the M-11 has a throw-weight of 800kg over a maximum range of 280km. By trading payload weight for increased range, the M-11 could deliver a 500kg payload over a range of 300km, meaning that the missile is held as a Category I system under the MTCR Control during the boost phase is probably exercised through "vanes in the exhaust" or "small vernier motors with an inertial platform for guidance." It is also believed that "the warhead assembly separates during flight" and that "there are four small fins mounted at the rear of the warhead section." However, "it is not known if these four fins move, or are simply stabilizers." Some reports suggest that the missile has a terminal guidance system; the "separating warhead section has a miniature propulsion system to correct the attitude before re-entry, as well as adjusting the terminal trajectory."

Pakistan apparently concluded an agreement with China to procure an undisclosed number of M-11 ballistic missile systems in the late 1980s. Sometime during 1990-1991, U.S. intelligence discovered the presence of an M-11 training missile in Pakistan with an accompanying TEL vehicle, which indicated that operational missile systems were likely to follow.Beginning in 1992, U.S. intelligence agencies tracked shipments of at least 30 M-11 ballistic missiles from China through the Pakistani port city of Karachi. Subsequently, China resorted to transferring components and subsystems so that the missiles could be assembled in Pakistan.Chinese missile technicians are also believed to have trained Pakistani Army personnel in the assembly and simulated launch of the missiles, which entered operational service in 1995 or 1996. Around the mid-1990s, China also built a turnkey missile facility for the NDC at Fatehjung in Punjab. The Fatehjung missile facility is believed to be capable of building either complete missiles or most components and sub-systems of the M-11. Such transfers constitute a violation of Category I of the MTCR that refers to rocket systems that can carry a payload of 500 kg over a range of at least 300 km. [84]

Open source estimates of Pakistan's M-11 inventory range from approximately 30 to84 missiles. At least 30 of the missiles are believed to be stored at the Pakistan Air Force base at Sargodha in Central Punjab. Satellite imagery of the base has revealed the existence of shelters for missile crates and their mobile launchers, missile maintenance areas, and missile crew quarters.[20] More missiles may be deployed at other currently undisclosed bases in Pakistan. Although China developed the export versions of the M-11 with high-explosive conventional warheads, the missiles in Pakistan's inventory are believed to be nuclear-capable.

The Pakistan Army conducted a launch of the Hatf-III/Ghaznavi in October 2003 to validate the missile's various design parameters.Subsequent to this test, in February 2004, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf formally inducted the missiles into the Army's Strategic Forces Command.[23] The missile was also tested in December 2006 and another batch was inducted into the Second Missile Group of the Strategic Forces Command in April 2007. As part of the army’s annual training exercises, the Ghaznavi was also tested by the Army Strategic Forces Command (ASFC) in February 2008.

 

[desiman]

Pakistan not only copies but basically renames foreign made missile and then calls it "Indigenous" effort hypocritical isnt it ? Blaming India when your own record is far from straight. Lets not even go into the nuclear side of things.

 

[Myth_buster_1]

The so called Pakistani indigenous missiles - have a look
Now what do you think about this growler ?

I never claim pakistani missiles to be "indigenous" as indians claim theirs to be.
but if you have spend your last 3-4 hours searching on the site then you must have also came across this..

India Missile Milestones: 1947-2005

The Risk Report
Volume 11 Number 6 (November-December 2005)

1947: Dr. Vikram Sarabhai establishes the Physical Research Laboratory (PRL), which will later become a national center for space research, supported primarily by India's Department of Space.

1962: The Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL), established one year earlier as an extension of the Special Weapon Development Team (SWDT), is moved to Hyderabad to work on missile design and development.

1962: The Indian Committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR) is established under the auspices of the Department of Atomic Energy.

1963: INCOSPAR establishes the Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station (TERLS).

November 1963: A U.S.-produced, solid-propellant Nike-Apache rocket is launched from Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station. The launch is part of an international effort under the United Nations. It is later followed by 350 U.S. French, Soviet and British rockets launched between 1963 and 1975.

1964: The Centre National d' Etudes Spatiales (CNES) and India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) conclude a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for CNES to supply four Centaure rockets with payloads for vapor cloud experiments. For its part, DAE will manufacture in India, under license, the Belier and Centaure types of sounding rockets.

1965: India establishes the Space and Technology Center (SSTC) in Thumba.

1967: The Satellite Telecommunication Earth Center is established in Ahmedabad.

1967: India launches its first sounding rocket, Rohini-75.

1969: The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) is formed under the Department of Atomic Energy.

1970: India and the Soviet Union sign a MoU on Collaboration in the Organization of Rocket Sounding of the Atmosphere by Soviet Meteorological Rockets at Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station.

1972-1982: DRDL establishes missile-related infrastructure, including aerodynamic, structural and environmental test facilities, liquid and solid propulsion facilities, fabrication engineering facilities, control, guidance, FRP, and computer facilities.June 1972: The Space Commission and Department of Space is established and ISRO is brought under the Department of Space.

1975: India launches its first satellite, Aryabhata.

1977: India and France sign a Cooperation Agreement in the Field of Space Affairs.

1978: India and the United States conclude a MoU and an Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Relating to Launching and Associated Services for Indian Satellites.

1979: Bharat Dynamics Ltd. becomes India's guided missile headquarters.

March 1979: A Centaure-2 type rocket is launched from Thumba, as part of an agreement and program begun in 1974. The rocket carries Bulgarian and Indian equipment for exploration and measurement of in space of proton and electron fluxes.

1980: India conducts the second experimental launch of its SLV-3 after its failed initial launch in 1979, and succeeds in placing the Rohini satellite into orbit.

1982: The Vikram Sarabhai Space Center (VSSC) successfully launches a Centaure rocket under the joint cooperation of India, West Germany, and Austria.

1983: India's Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) begins, with more than 60 public and private organizations involved.

April 1984: India and the Soviet Union conduct a joint manned space mission.

September-October 1984: A senior Indian delegation led by the Deputy Minister for Electronics, Dr. Sanjeevi Rao, visits the Soviet Union to purchase high-powered computers for India's defense and nuclear industry. The Soviet Union agrees to supply its latest-generation "Elbrus" computer system to India after 1986.

1986: India's Scientific Advisor to the Defense Minister Dr. V.S. Arunachalam announces that scientists at DRDL have successfully developed and tested a high-thrust, liquid-fueled rocket engine that generates a thrust of 30 tons and is capable of lifting a payload to a height of 600 km into space.

1987: After debate since 1985, an interagency group of U.S. officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce issue a communiqué that India is permitted to purchase from the United States "the Cyber 205, a Cray of approximately the same vintage, a single-processor Cray X-MP or some 'other machine of equivalent capability.'"

February 1988: India conducts the first test flight of its surface-to-surface Prithvi ballistic missile, under a program headed by the DRDL.

March 1988: India launches its first operational remote sensing satellite, IRS-1A.

April 1988: ISRO signs a cooperation agreement with the European Space Agency.

1989: India conducts a test launch of its first medium-range ballistic missile, called the Agni. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi states "The Agni is an R&D vehicle, not a weapons system. However, the technologies proved in Agni are deeply significant for evolving national security options."

1991: ISRO and Russia's Glavkosmos reach an agreement for the supply of engines and cryogenic technologies to India. Under U.S. pressure and sanctions imposed on ISRO in 1992, the agreement will be limited to the sale of seven KhimMach KVD-1 engines, each of which produces 7.5 metric tons of thrust.

1992: India acquires the ability to manufacture liquid hydrogen.

May 1992: India conducts a successful test of the third-stage motor for its PSLV, ignited under simulated high-altitude conditions.

May 1992: India stages its first successful launch of the four-stage ASLV, carrying its SROSS-C satellite into orbit, following two failed attempts in 1987 and 1988.

1993: ISRO signs a cooperation agreement with the European Space Agency.

1994: The periodical Flight International reports that India's Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE) has for the past two years been engaged in designing a ramjet-powered, submarine-launched missile dubbed the Sagarika.

1995-1996: India suspends development of the Agni missile project.

January 1996: India conducts the first test flight of the Prithvi-II surface-to-surface ballistic missile with a range of 250 kilometers, far enough to reach Islamabad.

March 1996: India successfully conducts its third and final developmental launch of the four-stage PSLV, deploying a 1-ton Indian satellite into 500-mile polar orbit.

May 1997: India completes development of two variants of the Prithvi ballistic missile. A 150-kilometer range version with a heavier warhead is ready for introduction into the Army, while the 250-kilometer version with a lighter warhead destined for the air force is ready for user trials.

June 1997: A fewer than a dozen Prithvi missiles are moved close to the Pakistani border. Prime Minister I. K. Gural denies the deployment, but Western officials affirm in November that the missiles were moved from storage to sites near the Pakistan border.

August 1997: The Agni missile program is revived in response to Pakistan's test of the Hatf-III missile in July.

September 1997: India conducts the first operational launch of its PSLV-C1, deploying a 1200-kilogram Indian Remote Sensing Satellite (IRS-1D) into orbit. In reaching 817 km circular polar sun-synchronous orbit, the PSLV was powered by four stages of alternating solid and liquid propellant.

1998: India conducts five underground nuclear tests at Pokhran, ranging in yield from less than 1 kiloton to about 45 kilotons. Defense Minister George Fernandes reportedly says that India will "inevitably" arm itself with nuclear warheads. The United States proceeds to implement sanctions, in place by November 1998, on a large number of research, development, and production entities relating to space and missile technology.

February 1999: Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif meet in Lahore, Pakistan. They agree to exchange strategic information about their nuclear arsenals, to give each other advance notice of ballistic missile tests, and to increase efforts to resolve the Kashmir issue.

April 1999: India conducts its first test of the nuclear-capable Agni-II missile. The two-stage solid fuel missile, which can carry a 1,000 kg payload, was successfully fired to a range of 2,000 kilometers.

May 1999: India launches a PSLV and successfully deploys an Indian remote sensing satellite and two other payloads.

July 1999: India successfully tests the Nishant, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed to conduct aerial reconnaissance of battlefields.

October 1999: Scientists from the DRDO announce they are developing the Surya, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range exceeding 5,000 kilometers.

April 2000: India tests the medium-range Dhanush missile, a naval version of the Prithvi.

August 2000: India's Agni-II missile reportedly reaches the operational stage. India's Defense Minister, George Fernandes, states that re-entry, guidance, and maneuverability have been tested.

February 2001: Dr. Vasudev Aatre, head of India's DRDO and scientific adviser to the Indian Minister of Defense, announces that India is developing the Agni-III ballistic missile. The Agni-III is anticipated to have a range of 3,500 km, improving upon the "range and capability" of the 2,100 km-range Agni-II.

March 2001: India's Defense Minister, George Fernandes, announces that the Agni-II ballistic missile is operational and is ready for mass production after its second successful test launch in January. The 2,500 km range missile may be launched from a static launch pad or mobile launcher and offers India a nuclear second-strike capability.

March 2001: The periodical Defense News reports that India and Russia's Central Scientific and Research Institute of Automatics and Hydraulics (TsNIIAG) are negotiating the sale of a variant of an electro-optical guided missile warhead originally developed for Scud-B ballistic missiles, which could drastically improve the accuracy of India's ballistic missiles.

March 2001: India aborts the first attempt to launch its GSLV, when computers detect that one of its four liquid-fueled strap-on booster engines is not generating the required 90 percent thrust.

April 2001: After tracing the March 2001 malfunction to a defective oxidizer line, India's GSLV successfully launches, setting the 3,000 lb experimental GSAT-1 communication satellite into orbit.

June 2001: According to the periodical Defense News, India successfully launches the PJ-10, also known as the BrahMos cruise missile, developed by DRDO and Russia's NPO Mashinostryenia (NPOM) under a secret 1998 Indo-Russian accord. The missile has a range of 280 kilometers and may be fired from Indian and Russian mobile launchers, ships, submarines and aircraft.

July 2001: India and France reportedly sign a MoU to co-develop and co-produce battlefield surveillance radars and ballistic missiles, and for India to domestically build Scorpene submarines.

August 2001: According to Jane's Defence Weekly, the Indian Army is to create a second missile regiment, the Strategic Rocket Regiment, to induct the Agni-II intermediate-range ballistic missile.

September 2001: U.S. President George Bush lifts sanctions against India and Pakistan imposed under the Arms Export Control Act.

December 2001: An unclassified summary of the U.S. National Intelligence Council's (NIC) National Intelligence Estimate claims most components required for an ICBM are found in India's indigenous space program. India could "convert its polar space launch vehicle into an ICBM within a year or two of a decision to do so." However, the report cautions that while India is striving for self-sufficiency, it still relies "heavily" on foreign assistance. The NIC also states that India will probably not deploy its Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missile until 2010 or later.

December 2001: India successfully test-fires a 250 km extended-range version of the Prithvi missile, developed for the Indian Air Force. The indigenously developed surface-to-surface missile is one of the five missiles being developed under the IGMDP. The earlier version of the Prithvi is already in service with India's Army.

March 2002: India's Ministry of Defense announces that the Agni-II ballistic missile has entered into production phase and will soon be inducted into the Army.

March 2002: Scientists at India's LPSC successfully fire an upper-stage cryogenic engine for 12 minutes, the duration it will fire during actual flight. On the same day, ISRO successfully tests an improved variant of the two-meter diameter solid-propellant motor that powers the third stage of the PSLV. Improvements include "optimization of the motor case and nozzle and increased propellant loading." ISRO plans to use the motor in its PSLV launch later in 2002, which would be the first time that a PLSV will be used to place a payload in geostationary orbit.

April 2002: Jane's Defence Weekly reports that, according to U.S. intelligence sources and contrary to the claims of Indian officials, the first test of a single-stage variant of the Agni was a failure. The missile flew its anticipated range of 700 km, but the warhead failed to separate.

June 2002: The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions states that India "still lacks engineering or production expertise in some key missile technologies." The report adds that during 2001 Russia and Western Europe remained the main sources of missile-related and dual-use technology to fill these gaps.

July 2002: According to Jane's Defense Weekly, Indian defense officials claim that India has acquired two Green Pine radar systems from Israel, but say they have had little success in developing a missile defense capability against a possible Pakistani attack.

December 2002: The CIA in its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions states that India was among the countries supplying assistance to Libya's ballistic missile program.

January 2003: India has allocated $1 billion to the DRDO for the development of hypersonic missile systems, powered by an indigenously developed cryogenic engine fueled by liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen.

January 2003: The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) approves the creation of a Strategic Forces Command (SFC) to manage and administer all nuclear and strategic forces. The Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), comprising of a Political Council and an Executive Council, will be responsible for India's nuclear arsenal.

January 2003: India reportedly places under its SFC two operational missile groups of the Indian Army, which possess the 150-250 km-range Prithvi and the 2,500 km-range Agni nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.

February 2003: According to a DRDO official, India has begun a 10-year development program of a two-stage space vehicle called Avatar that can take-off and land like an aircraft and place a 1,000 kg payload into a low-earth orbit. The vehicle would be capable of performing about 100 re-entries into the atmosphere. According to the DRDO official, the primary function of the vehicle is to act as a "reusable missile launcher, one which can launch missiles, land … and be loaded again for more missions."

February 2003: An unnamed official from India's Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that India has agreed to invest approximately $150 million in Israel's Arrow-2 anti-missile system. The proposed investment must still be approved by the United States. Aerospace Daily claims that Israel has emerged as the second-largest supplier of weapons and equipment to India.

March 2003: The Times of India reports that British Prime Minister Tony Blair's dossier on Iraq alleged that India's NEC Engineers Private Limited had "extensive links in Iraq," including to Iraq's Al-Mamoun missile production plant, and had illicitly supplied ammonium perchlorate to Iraq.

April 2003: According to Indian Defense Minister, George Fernandes, India is developing and making efforts to test the Agni-III, a long-range surface-to-surface missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead more than 2,000 kilometers.

May 2003: India conducts the second launch of its GSLV, lifting a 1,800 kg experimental communications satellite. Unlike the first flight, when the GSLV's Russian-made cryogenic upper stage burned out four seconds too soon, this launch occurred without incident. ISRO announces that once declared operational, the GSLV will "make the Indian space program a self reliant one."

May 2003: The Indian periodical Vayu announces that with the lifting of "restrictions imposed by collaborators," India's Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) has been cleared for missile exports. BDL manufactures a variety of missiles including the Prithvi-I and Prithvi-II surface-to-surface missiles.

July 2003: The Washington Post reports that a coalition of pro-India and pro-Israel lobbyists, including the U.S.-India Political Action Committee (USINPAC), America Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC), and American Jewish Committee (AJC), have joined forces to gain U.S. approval for the sale of Israel's Arrow ballistic missile defense system to India.

August 2003: R. N. Agarwal, the former Director of the Agni missile project and currently the Director of the Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL), states that the carbon composite content of the new Agni variants will be increased from 35 to 80 percent making them lighter and able travel longer distances. Agarwal says that the Agni's re-entry heat shield is entirely made up of carbon composite.

October 2003: India clears the short-range Agni-I and medium-range Agni-II surface-to-surface missiles for the Army.

October 2003: Defense News, citing defense officials in Washington and New Delhi, reports that in August India "formally asked" the United States for multiple Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) anti-missile systems. India's Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in September also requested inclusion in the U.S.-led global missile defense shield.

December 2003: Indian Defense sources indicate that the BrahMos cruise missile has been configured for launch from submarines. Submarine-to-surface launch is one of the four BrahMos designs, which are anticipated to include air-to-surface, ship-to-surface, and surface-to-surface. The missile was launched successfully from a surface ship and travelled 290 km to its target.

January 2004: India and the United States agree under the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with India (NSSP) to expand cooperation in civilian nuclear programs, civilian space programs, and high-technology trade, including expanded dialogue on missile defense. This agreement initiates three major steps: removal of ISRO from the Department of Commerce Entity List, removal of export license requirements for items subject to Export Administration Regulations EAR99, and establishment of a presumption of approval for all items not controlled for nuclear proliferation reasons.

February 2004: ISRO chairman, G. Madhavan Nair unveils plans for the Ammonium Perchlorate Experimental Plant to expand ammonium perchlorate (AP) production from 300 metric tons to 800 metric tons by 2005.

March 2004: At the Sixth Joint Technical Group between India and the United States, Indian defense scientists approach the United States about possible cooperation in developing optronics, electro-optics, encryption, and sensor and jamming technologies.

March 2004: India successfully test-fires an "improved" version of its Prithvi-II surface-to-surface ballistic missile with an extended-range of 250 km and "much higher accuracy," according to a defense ministry official.

September 2004: India conducts the first operational flight of its GSLV, lifting a 1,950 kg spacecraft.

October 2004: India conducts a launch of its single-stage, Prithvi-III missile.

November 2004: India successfully test-fires the 350 km-range Dhanush missile, marking the induction of the system into the Navy. Dhanush is the naval version of the Prithvi-II.

December 2004: The Russian Federal Space Agency says that it will continue cooperation with India in the development of an oxygen-hydrogen booster for space rockets.

December 2004: India and Russia sign 10 agreements on space, defense, and aviation, including an agreement to jointly cooperate on satellite manufacture and launch under the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS). Russia's Federal Space Agency head, Anatoly Perminov, states that India's military use of the GLONASS system, which could help improve the accuracy of Indian missiles, has not been ruled out.

February 2005: President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam states before Parliament that the BrahMos missile "has been successfully tested ... and is ready for induction" into India's military.

May 2005: ISRO's four-stage solid and liquid propellant PSLV-C6 successfully propelled two satellites into polar sun synchronous orbit. The Spacecraft Control Centre of ISTRAC at Bangalore will continuously monitor the CARTOSAT-1, which is a cartographic satellite mounted with two cameras with 2.5 meter spatial resolution and 30 km coverage, and the HAMSAT, which is a micro-satellite intended for radio transmission.

May 2005: India's Rajya Sabha, the upper house of Parliament, passes the Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Bill, which bans proliferation of mass destruction weapon and missile technology. Once signed by India's President Abdul Kalam, the bill will become law and will apply to Indians in India and abroad, as well as foreigners residing in India.

May 2005: India has reportedly added the short-range Agni-I and intermediate-range Agni-II to its Strategic Forces Command arsenal.

May 2005: Agni program director, Dr. R. N. Agarwal says that the Agni-III, India's long-range ballistic missile designed to be capable of hitting targets 3,000 to 3,500 km away, will be ready for flight testing by the end of 2005.

June 2005: As part of the "New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship," signed by U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee, the United States has offered India a briefing on the Patriot PAC-3 missile system, as well as increased opportunities for technology transfer, collaboration, co-production, and research and development with the understanding that U.S. technology-related sanctions on India will be lifted.

June 2005: India's VSSC has begun work on its first hypersonic wind tunnel (HWT).

July 2005: A joint venture between Russia's Mashinostroenie Scientific Industrial Association and India's DRDO has begun mass production of the BrahMos cruise missile. The Indian Navy has placed the first order for the missile, which is also anticipated to be fielded by the Russian Navy. The baseline version is an anti-ship missile, which also may be fired from air platforms.

July 2005: The United States and India release a joint statement during a visit by India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to the White House. Initiatives to be implemented include signature of a Science and Technology Framework Agreement, establishment of closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation and launch, and cooperation in the commercial space arena through such groups as the U.S.-India Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation.

August 2005: India's Defense Secretary Yogendera Narain states that India has acquired a Green Pine radar from Israel for "advanced research," after three to four years of discussions.

August 2005: The U.S. Department of Commerce removes from the Entity List ISRO subordinates: ISRO Telemetry, Tracking and Command Network (ISTRAC), ISRO Intertial Systems Unit (IISU), and Space Applications Center.

October 2005: India and Pakistan's Foreign Secretaries sign a formalized agreement on notification at least 72 hours ahead of ballistic missile tests. Contained within the agreement is a bilateral pledge not to set up any missile test launch site within 40 km of the Line of Control or the international border.

 

[desiman]

Hatf-IV/Shaheen-I/M-9

Analysts speculate that Pakistan likely acquired an undisclosed number of M-9 ballistic missiles from China in the mid-1990s, although open source reports alleging M-9 transfers from China to Pakistan stretch back to the early 1990s. However, some analysts now believe that China probably also transferred an entire production line for M-9s to the Fatehjung missile facility that it built for Pakistan in the mid-1990s.

China started developing the M-9 in the mid-1980s. The first M-9 flight-test is reported to have occurred in June 1988, and the missile probably entered service in 1990. However, Pakistan first announced the test of an 800km-range ballistic missile in July 1997. This missile was subsequently designated Hatf-IV or Shaheen-I and was publicly displayed for the first time during the National Day parade in March 1999. It was subsequently tested in April 1999, October 2002, and October 2003, respectively. The photographs of the missile displayed during the parade, and those of the tested version, along with its disclosed range and payload closely match the parameters of the Chinese M-9.

The DF-15/M-9 (NATO designation CSS-6) is a single-stage, solid-propellant, road mobile, short-range ballistic missile. It can reportedly deliver a 500kg warhead over a range of 600km; other reports suggest that with a smaller warhead, the missile could have a range of 800km. Pakistani government statements suggest that the missiles in Pakistan's possession have a maximum range of 700-800km, but the missile's payload capacity at that range remains unclear. Like the M-11 missiles, control during boost phase is exercised through "exhaust vanes or small scale vernier motors." The M-9 has a reported 300m circular error probability (CEP) and is believed to employ some form of terminal guidance. Analysts suggest that the missile has a "strapdown inertial guidance system with an onboard digital computer,"....which "enables rapid targeting and eliminates need for wind corrections prior to launch." Unconfirmed reports suggest that the "separating warhead section has a miniature propulsion system to correct the attitude before re-entry, as well as adjusting the terminal trajectory."

Although China originally designed the export versions of the M-9 with a high-explosive conventional warhead, Pakistan is believed to have modified its missiles to make them nuclear capable.The total number of M-9s in Pakistan's inventory remains unknown.

The Hatf-IV/Shaheen-I was formally inducted into the Pakistan Army in March 2003.However, the continuation of flight-tests as late as October 2003 raises doubts whether all development concerns have been resolved. The missile was subsequently tested successfully in November 2006.

Since then, the missile has been ‘operationalized’ and is in possession of the Army’s Strategic Forces Command (ASFC), even as routine tests of the missile have been conducted. In January 2008, a Strategic Missile Group (SMG) of the AFSC successfully tested the missile at the end of the army’s annual training exercises.

 

[desiman]

Hatf-VI/Shaheen-II/M-18?


Shaheen-II is a two-stage solid-fuel missile with a range of 2,000 km. Analysts have speculated in the past that the Shaheen-II is possibly a version of the M-9, or more likely a copy of the M-18. The M-18 was originally advertised as a two-stage system with a payload capacity of 400-500kg over a range of 1,000km. U.S. intelligence sources suggest that Pakistan remains heavily reliant on external assistance for the Shaheen-II program and that China is actively assisting Pakistan through the supply of missile components, specialty materials, dual-use items, and other miscellaneous forms of technical assistance.

Development flight tests of the Shaheen-II began in March 2004 when a 26-ton missile was launched from Pakistan's Somiani Flight Test Range on the Arabian Sea. According to the Chairman of Pakistan's National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, the missile covered a distance of 1,800km during the test.

The missile was tested in March 2005, April 2006, and February 2007. Subsequently, reports in summer 2007 stated that Pakistan had begun the process of deployment of the Shaheen-II.

In April 2008, Pakistan tested the Shaheen-II twice in three days. According to an official statement, the tests were an indicator of the operational readiness of the missile.The April tests were the first time that the missile was tested by the Army Strategic Forces Command (ASFC); all prior tests had been conducted by defense scientific organizations.

 

[desiman]

The infancy that the Pakistani Space program is in goes to prove that Pakistan still does not have a credible capability to make long range missiles. At most Long range missiles are just a run down versions of engines used on space flights. Like its or not Pakistani missiles are as Pakistani as Boston Pizza is from Boston. The number of test/missile ratio is also very fishy, missiles seem to be tested once and then "Successfully “inducted into the armed forces. The rapid pace of induction and a rate of success even higher than that of the United States only hints towards the fact that the Missiles are being either copied of existing platforms or are just being lifted straight up. So next time you accuse India, look into your own side first.

 

[desiman]

Hatf-V/Ghauri-I/Nodong


Pakistan's liquid-engine ballistic missile program is spearheaded by KRL and built on past collaboration with North Korea. Cooperation in the area of ballistic missiles between the two countries dates back to the early 1990s. The proposal to procure North Korean Nodong ballistic missiles was probably on Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's agenda during her visit to Pyongyang in December 1993. However, Pakistani missile scientists and engineers are believed to have inspected the Nodong as early as 1992 and were allegedly present during the missile's flight-test from Musudan-ri in May 1993. The Nodong deal was likely finalized during the visit of the former Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission Marshal Ch'oe Gwang to Islamabad in December 1995. Foreign intelligence agencies began monitoring increased frequency of cargo flights between North Korea and Pakistan in the fall of 1997. North Korean telemetry crews reportedly traveled on some of these flights.

Ultimately, Pakistan flight-tested a Nodong, which was rechristened the "Ghauri," in April 1998.[35] North Korean crews were present and apparently helped with the launch. Since then, Pakistan has conducted several flight-tests of the Ghauri-I/Nodong: in April 1999, May 2002, May 2004, June, 2004, October 2004, and November 2006.[59, 60, 61, 62] According to Pakistani news reports, the Hatf-V/Ghauri was inducted into the military in January 2003.[63]

The missile has a range of 1200-1300 km, and can carry a payload of 1,000 kg.

In February 2008, the Ghauri was tested as part of the army’s annual field training exercises. The test was conducted by a Strategic Missile Group (SMG) of the Army’s Strategic Forces Command (ASFC). It is important to note that the Ghauri, developed by the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), has competed with the Shaheen missile, which has been produced by the rival National Development Complex, under the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. Thus, the February 2008 Ghauri test, the first since November 2006, was important in context of the need for continued funding of the Ghauri missile program.

The Ghauri-I/Nodong is probably derived from a Soviet-era missile system. Some analysts believe that it is most likely an upscaled version of the Soviet R-17 missile, although there is insufficient data to reach this conclusion definitively. The missile's basic airframe is made from steel, although some sections may be crafted out of aluminum. The propulsion system is a liquid rocket engine that uses a storable combination of inhibited red fuming nitric acid and kerosene. During the boost phase, four jet vanes are used for thrust vector control. It is also believed that the missile uses three body-mounted gyros for attitude and lateral acceleration control. In addition, "a pendulum integration gyro assembly serves for speed control." The Nodong's range and throw weight have been variously estimated between 800-1,500km and 700-1,300kg, respectively.The Nodong is nuclear capable and can also deliver high-explosive conventional warheads. However, it is unclear whether KRL has mastered the capability to mount nuclear warheads on the missiles acquired from North Korea.

U.S. intelligence agencies have identified an assembly and storage facility for the Ghauri close to the KRL's Kahuta plant. Estimates of Pakistan's Ghauri inventory remain unknown, although information available in open sources suggests that Pakistan may have obtained between 12-25 missile systems from North Korea. Speculation also persists that North Korea may have transferred an entire production line for Nodong ballistic missiles to Pakistan.

KRL had previously disclosed plans for longer-range versions of the Ghauri: the Ghauri-II and possibly Ghauri-III. A more powerful engine for longer-range versions of the Ghauri is under development.Some statements attributed to Pakistani nuclear scientists and government leaders suggest that the Ghauri-II will have a range of 1,700km; other statements suggest that the Ghauri-III will have a strike-range of 2,000-3,500km.[38] However, details of the programs remain unknown. Nonetheless, analysts cite the presence of Pakistani missile scientists and engineers during North Korea's August 1998 Taepodong launch and speculate that the Ghauri-II and -III may either be a Taepodong or draw extensively on components and technologies from the latter program.

Former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto admitted in February 2004 that Pakistan obtained missile technology from North Korea in lieu of cash. However, Pakistan's current President Pervez Musharraf vehemently denies that Pakistan obtained ballistic missiles from North Korea. Musharraf insists that Pakistan purchased surface-to-air missiles instead. In March 2003, the United States imposed sanctions on KRL and North Korea's Changgwang Sinyong Corporation for engaging in proliferation activities. A U.S. State Department spokesperson explained that missile proliferation sanctions were imposed on North Korea for "its involvement in the transfer of Missile Technology Control Regime Category 1 items" to a "Category 1 missile program in a non-Missile Technology Control Regime country."

 

[DESERT FIGHTER]

Desi mans all crappy posts are based on theories ROFL while he defends and defies solid proof of the indegenous weapons myth of india.be it Brahmos or dhruv.......Man if i were u id just shut up and get lost....Fools paradise is a great haven for u buddy...enjoy ur life

 

[desiman]

Emerging Trends

Although Pakistan has a small force of nuclear-capable combat aircraft in its nuclear force inventory, land-based ballistic missiles and cruise missiles (on a variety of platforms) are likely to become the mainstay of its nuclear strike force in the near future. Apart from Pakistan's poor economic performance and its lack of financial resources to modernize its air force in a significant way, external suppliers such as the United States, Russia, and the European Union remain hesitant to supply Islamabad with sophisticated combat aircraft due to instability concerns in Pakistan. Furthermore, the continuing modernization of the Indian Air Force through the acquisition of high-performance combat aircraft as well as substantive improvements in the latter's long-range reconnaissance and air defense capabilities are likely to degrade the deterrence value of the air leg of any Pakistani nuclear force in the future. These factors are likely to encourage Pakistan's continued reliance on a land-based ballistic missile-based nuclear force, for which India has no defense at present.

Given its limited technological and economic resource base, Pakistan appears to have resorted to a strategy of importing complete ballistic missile systems of different range categories and types, standardizing and optimizing their production, and then attempting to manufacture them indigenously through backwards vertical integration with assistance from foreign entities. Analysts believe that the NDC can now probably produce solid-fueled Ghaznavi (M-11) and Shaheen-I (possibly M-9) ballistic missiles in small batches. Over time, Pakistani missile scientists and engineers could improve the performance characteristics of these missiles by making modifications in the solid-propellant motors, achieving weight reduction through the use of lighter materials, and increase their accuracy through the use of either improved inertial navigation or the use of global positioning systems.

However, Pakistan's current fleet of solid-fueled SRBMs suffers from range limitations. In order to strike targets in western India, the missiles need to be deployed close to the Indo-Pakistani border, a condition that leaves them vulnerable to early detection and destruction. More significantly, the SRBMs lack the range to strike targets in eastern, central, and southern India. These shortcomings are expected to be addressed by the medium-range Shaheen-II and Ghauri-II programs, which are under development at the NDC and KRL, respectively. Despite U.S. pressure, China is likely to stick to its commitment to help Pakistan in the development of the Shaheen-II medium-range ballistic missile program. But unlike the past, when China transferred compete missile systems and assembly and production lines to Pakistan, the current pattern of Chinese assistance is apparently restricted to design advice, specialty materials, missile components, guidance systems, and related dual-use machine tools and technologies.

It is also unclear whether KRL has the ability to produce the Ghauri-I/Nodong indigenously. Although North Korea is alleged to have transferred 12-20 operational missiles to Pakistan, it is uncertain whether cooperation extended to the transfer of a production line for the missiles as well. After KRL's alleged assistance to North Korea's centrifuge enrichment efforts came to light, Pakistan insisted that it had ended its defense cooperation program with North Korea. Although continued secret contacts between entities in both countries cannot be ruled out, Pyongyang might find itself less inclined to continue with its program of missile cooperation in the event of any future grand bargain with the United States that is backed by economic and security guarantees from China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia. Since the development of longer-range versions of the Ghauri would probably require the development of a new liquid-fuel engine entirely, or multi-staging involving liquid engines and solid motors, termination of North Korean assistance could result in a serious set back for Pakistan's Ghauri-II and -III ballistic missile development efforts.

Although Pakistan tested the Shaheen-II in 2004, the Ghauri-II does not appear to be ready for flight-tests. Independent analysts speculate that Pakistan might be able to flight-test both missiles in the near-term and possibly produce a small number of prototypes for test-demonstration purposes. However, Islamabad is unlikely to be able to build and deploy them in large numbers. This is largely because Pakistan does not have a large and vertically integrated research, development, and manufacturing infrastructure to build long-range rockets. Furthermore, there is poor coordination and integration between government-controlled research and development labs, public sector firms, and private sector companies. Although there is some evidence of private sector participation in the production of the Shaheen-I SRBM, on the whole, Pakistani private sector firms do not have much experience in manufacturing high-technology products. In addition, Pakistan does not as yet produce basic strategic materials, such as aerospace-grade specialty steels, alloys, and composites, for which it is entirely dependent on imports. This deficiency also extends to missile guidance, control and navigation systems, and components such as gyroscopes, missile computers, and accelerometers. Finally, Pakistan lacks the requisite human capital--a large and dedicated pool of aerospace scientists and engineers from which to draw on for a large-scale ballistic or cruise missile program. Thus, Pakistan will most likely remain dependent on external suppliers for its MRBM program in the short- and medium-term.[47]

Although Pakistani leaders have suggested that Islamabad might deploy nuclear-capable missiles at sea in the future, the Pakistan Navy (PN) does not appear to be pursuing either sea-launched cruise or ballistic missile programs. Neither has the PN made the case for the acquisition or development of nuclear submarines. At this point in time, the PN's status as a junior service in comparison to the Army and Air Force, together with resource constraints, both technological and economic, constitutes the principal stumbling blocks to any Pakistani sea-based nuclear capability. Furthermore, it is also unclear whether China, which is in the midst of a gradual course correction in its relations with India, and already under considerable U.S. pressure to terminate missile assistance to Pakistan, would aid Islamabad in any proposed efforts to acquire a sea-based nuclear missile capability.

However, India's efforts to invest in theater ballistic missile defense through the acquisition of either the Israeli Arrow-2 or the U.S. PAC-3 systems could spur significant changes in Pakistan's missile programs. Indeed, the advent of Pakistan’s land-attack cruise missile programs seems aimed in part to complicate Indian investments in ballistic missile defenses, as the latter systems are far less effective against cruise missiles than they are against ballistic missile threats. Although an Indian theater missile defense would not create a leak-proof defense umbrella, a limited missile defense coupled with improvements in Indian long-range air and satellite-based reconnaissance capabilities could severely undercut the deterrence value of a Pakistani SRBM force. This latter trend, coupled with Chinese concerns over U.S. attempts to provide Taiwan with a theater missile defense capability, could lead to deepening cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad. In the future, China could conceivably help Pakistan develop intermediate-range ballistic missile systems, land- and sea-launched cruise and ballistic missiles, and missiles with fast burning boosters using high-energy solid-propellants, multiple warheads, maneuverable re-entry vehicles, decoys, and other means to fool ballistic missile defenses.

Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely that Pakistan would seek to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability in the short- and medium-term. The technological difficulties of developing such a capability apart, Pakistan's security concerns are primarily Indo-centric. Since medium- and intermediate-range missiles would suffice to hold most targets in India hostage to the threat of a nuclear strike, Pakistani leaders currently regard an ICBM capability as a strategic irrelevance.

---------- Post added at 06:25 AM ---------- Previous post was at 06:24 AM ----------

Desi mans all crappy posts are based on theories ROFL while he defends and defies solid proof of the indegenous weapons myth of india.be it Brahmos or dhruv.......Man if i were u id just shut up and get lost....Fools paradise is a great haven for u buddy...enjoy ur life

so my post are theories but Growlers stupid post become fact, seriously brainwashing at its best.

 

[desiman]

Desi mans all crappy posts are based on theories ROFL while he defends and defies solid proof of the indegenous weapons myth of india.be it Brahmos or dhruv.......Man if i were u id just shut up and get lost....Fools paradise is a great haven for u buddy...enjoy ur life

why dont you prove to me that these so called theories are false and that Pakistani missiles are really "Pakistani", that would really help.

 

[desiman]

India - Import Dependency and Export Controls

After four decades of investments in its aerospace sector, India has succeeded in achieving a relatively high-degree of autonomy in the development, engineering, and manufacture of first-generation ballistic missiles. As a result, international "technology-denial" regimes can at best delay and add to the opportunity cost of India's ballistic missile programs. However, such regimes cannot disrupt them in the long term.

With the help of Western European and North American aerospace companies in the late 1960s and 1970s, the Indian government created an elaborate infrastructure for the development and manufacture of solid and liquid propellants, composites, structural materials, navigation, avionics, flight control, launch support equipment, computers, and software needed for civilian satellite launch vehicles. At about the same time, the Indian government also began creating an infrastructure for designing, developing, testing, and building guided missiles. This included "aerodynamic, structural, and environmental test facilities, liquid- and solid-propulsion test facilities, fabrication and engineering facilities, control, guidance, rubber, and computer facilities."

After the launch of the IGMDP in 1983, the DRDO further expanded and refurbished these facilities, and gained competence in the areas of solid propellants, composites, and advanced metallurgy. In 1987, India's Defense Research and Development Laboratory inaugurated a new state-of-the-art facility for designing and building modern missiles at Imarat Kancha near Hyderabad. The new facility was named Research Center Imarat (RCI). In addition, India has built a dedicated test range on its east coast in Orissa (Chandipur-On-Sea) to test "long-range missiles, air defense missiles, high 'G' maneuverable missiles, weapon systems delivered by aircraft, and multi-target weapon systems." Range tracking and acquisition radars and some of the support equipment for this test range were imported from the United States and Russia in the 1980s and 1990s.

Despite its emergence as a potential "second-tier" supplier state, India is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). New Delhi rejects participation in the MTCR on grounds that India is a victim of such technology-denial regimes, that such regimes are insensitive to India's national security needs, and they interfere with the peaceful uses of space technology. In the past, senior Indian defense officials such as Sivathanu Pillai and Dr. Abdul Kalam have expressed the view that Indian missile programs, both strategic and tactical, are not only aimed at providing the Indian military with weapon systems, but also to generate exports.[92] In 1994, the Indian defense ministry's Department of Defense Production and Supplies included the Prithvi in its catalogue of defense items available for export. Although no Prithvi exports have occurred to date, Indian defense officials have suggested that India may sell some of the missile's subsystems in the international market.[93] Indian and Russian officials have publicly expressed their intent to export the BrahMos/PJ-10 cruise missile to friendly "third countries" with mutual consent.

This report is from NTI, if you read the NTI missiles overview for India, it is clearly stated that apart from the K-15 or Sagrika missiles, all Indian Missiles are totally Indian efforts and the credit only goes to India. Are you going to call NTI false now also ?

 

[Myth_buster_1]

If desiman wishes to start a trolling war then so be it. lol

India's Missile Shopping List

The Risk Report
Volume 1 Number 1 (January-February 1995) Page 9

India is still weak in many vital rocket technologies, and needs help in composites, electronics, computers, sensors, navigation, guidance, control and propulsion, according to a Pentagon study which ranks countries' military capabilities. To bolster its efforts in these areas, India is looking for imports.

Composites from America dried up in 1992 when the United States sanctioned the Indian Space Research Organization. Lightweight and heat-resistant composite materials are ideal for making rocket motor cases and nozzles. They improve a rocket's range as well as its engine thrust. The U.S. sanctions also dried up ISRO's American sources of application-specific integrated circuits, which are needed for rocket and missile guidance.

India also needs high quality gyroscopes and accelerometers for mis-sile guidance. India has some gyroscopes of its own, but Indian engineers are seeking better equipment "to improve the accuracy and stabilization of their missile systems," says one State Department analyst. India recently obtained U.S. ring laser gyro-scopes for fighter planes, but the gyros are difficult to adapt for missiles. "I don't think India can get there without a lot of help from the outside," the analyst says.

India also hopes to get high quality accelerometers to measure missile speed more accurately. In addition, India is shopping for laser radars to improve guidance, although India has not approached U.S. companies to buy them recently.

Computers are also on India's shopping list, according to the Pentagon study, which says that India has "limited" capability in digital computing, "no capability" in hybrid computing, but "capabilities in some critical elements" of advanced computing.

According to the Pentagon, computers play "a pivotal role in the development and deployment of missiles and missile systems." Digital computers can predict the behavior of entire weapon systems and are required to process space-borne sensor data in real time, the study says. The recent decontrol of computers may have helped India fill some of its needs.

 

[Myth_buster_1]

India's Missiles - With a Little Help from Our Friends

By Gary Milhollin

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
November 1989, pp. 31-35

Last May 22, India became the first country to test a strategic missile derived from a civilian space program. The missile's first-stage rocket motor, heat shield, and guidance system all came from India's space effort -- generously launched and sustained by foreign help.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi claimed that the missile, called "Agni" (fire), is "an R&D vehicle, not a weapons system." Then he qualified the assertion. "Agni is not a nuclear weapons system," he said. "What Agni does is to afford us the option of developing the ability to deliver non-nuclear weapons with high precision at long ranges."

In the May test, the missile reportedly flew 625 miles. But it is designed to carry a one-ton payload 1,500 miles, far enough to hit cities in southern China. Carrying a half-ton atomic bomb, the Agni would be able to fly about 2,200 miles, far enough to hit Beijing.

Whether Agni eventually carries nuclear or conventional weapons, the missile should destroy any illusions about sharing technology in the interest of peaceful uses of outer space. The story of the Agni's development shows how difficult it is to separate civilian and military uses of technology, and just how futile may be the recent, belated attempts to control the proliferation of military missile technology. A control regime established by seven Western nations in 1987 seeks to prevent precisely this sort of development. [See the June 1988 Bulletin.] Yet the regime has no provisions for enforcement, and the Indian program continued full speed ahead, with some foreign - particularly West German - cooperation, after the regime was adopted.

Lessons in America

Agni's foreign ancestry dates from the 1960s. In November 1963, the United States began India's space program by launching a U.S. sounding rocket from Indian soil. (Sounding rockets fly straight up into the atmosphere to conduct scientific experiments. They are too small to launch satellites.) The United States was followed by others. Between 1963 and 1975, more than 350 U.S., French, Soviet, and British sounding rockets were launched from India's Thumba Range,[1] which the United States helped design. Thumba's first group of Indian engineers had learned rocket launching and range operation in the United States.

Among them was the Agni's chief designer, A. J. P. Abdul Kalam. In 1963-64, he spent four months in training in the United States. He visited NASA's Langley Research Center in Virginia, where the U.S. Scout rocket was conceived, and the Wallops Island Flight Center on the Virginia coast, where the Scout was being flown. The Scout was a low-cost, reliable satellite launcher that NASA had developed for orbiting small payloads.

Soon afterward, in 1965, the Indian government asked NASA how much it would cost and how long it would take to develop an Indian version of the Scout, and whether the United States would help. NASA replied that the Scout was "available . . . for purchase . . . in connection with scientific research," but warned that "transfer of this technology . . . would be a matter for determination by the Department of State under Munitions Control."[2] NASA nevertheless sent India technical reports on the Scout's design, which was unclassified. India's request should have raised some eyebrows: it came from Homi Bhabha, head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission.

But Kalam had the information he needed. He returned to India and built the SLV-3 (Space Launch Vehicle), India's first satellite launcher. Its design is virtually identical to the Scout's. Both rockets are 23 meters long, use four similar solid-fuel stages and "open loop" guidance, and lift a 40-kilogram payload into low earth orbit. The SLV's 30-foot first stage would later become the first stage of the Agni.

NASA officials say U.S. aid to India in rocketry was limited to the program in the 1960s. In 1988, however, the United States agreed to supply an advanced ring laser gyroscope to help guide a new Indian fighter plane.[3] It is not clear what will prevent India from using it to guide missiles. The highly accurate device is essentially solid state, making it easy to adapt to the demands of missile acceleration.

French lessons: liquid fuel

France also launched sounding rockets from India, and in the late 1960s allowed India to begin building "Centaure" sounding rockets under license from Sud Aviation. But France's main contribution has been in the field of liquid propulsion. Under a license from France's Societe Europeene de Propulsion (SEP), India is building its own version of the Viking high-thrust liquid rocket motor, used on the European Space Agency's Ariane satellite launcher.[4] Indian engineers helped develop the Viking in the mid-1970s, then began a program of their own. India has now built an experimental model of the Viking engine, called the Vikas.

The training in liquid propulsion seems to have paid off. Just over a year before testing the Agni, Kalam tested a smaller predecessor, the "Prithvi" (earth), which uses a liquid-propelled motor to carry a one-ton payload 150 miles. It resembles the widely sold Soviet Scud-B. Indian sources say that the Agni's second stage is a shortened version of the Prithvi.[5]

A German intensive tutorial

The aid of the United States and France, however, was quickly dwarfed by West German help in the 1970s and 1980s. Germany gave India help in three indispensable missile technologies: guidance, rocket testing, and the use of composite materials. All were supposed to be for the space program, but all were equally useful for military missiles.

The German government's aerospace agency DLR (Deutsche Forschungsanstalt fur Luftfahrt und Raumfahrt e.V.) began tutoring India in rocket guidance in 1976.[6] The first step was to put a German interferometer on an Indian sounding rocket. An interferometer works by using antennas placed at different locations on the rocket to measure the phase of a radio signal received from the ground. The phase difference among the antennas reveals their relative positions on the rocket and thus the rocket's attitude, which can be monitored and corrected from the ground. The first launch of an Indian rocket with a German interferometer was in 1978. By 1981 the project had been expanded to include an on-board DLR microprocessor. In April 1982, India tested its own version of the same interferometer.

The next step was to make a navigation system that did not depend on signals from the ground, one that could guide a payload through space by determining its position and speed at any moment. The "autonomous payload control system," which India proposed in July 1981, would provide "full autonomous navigation capability to spaceborne sensors," determining "position, velocity, attitude, and precision time in a real-time mode." India would supply the rockets and satellites; Germany would provide the brains of the guidance system. The key component would be an on-board computer, using a microprocessor based on the Motorola family M 68000, and the software to run it.

It must be noted that an inertial navigation system that can guide satellites can also guide warheads. The United States used NASA's experience in guiding the Titan II transtage, a "bus" designed for multiple satellite launchings, to develop a bus that would accurately deliver small nuclear warheads.[7]

The German-Indian plan was carried out. By January 1982, the two countries had agreed on a series of joint projects for the program. But at the same time, India announced that it was designing a new navigation system for its own space rockets: it would replace the "open loop" system used on its first launcher, the SLV-3, with a "closed loop" system for its Advanced Space Launch Vehicle and its Polar Space Launch Vehicle. An open loop system can only correct the rocket's attitude, not deviations from the planned flight path. A closed loop system can correct both, because it senses and determines the rocket's position in space. It amounts to an autonomous navigation system.

So while India's program with Germany, called APC-Rex for Autonomous Payload Control Rocket Experiment, was developing autonomous navigation for a satellite, India would develop autonomous navigation for its own rockets. India would need a brain for its space rockets' new closed loop system, which it would provide by developing the "Mark-II" onboard processor - "based on [the] Motorola 6800 microprocessor with 16-bit word length" - the same as that used in the German program. (Although Indian reports repeatedly refer to the Motorola "6800," according to Motorola the 16-bit chip is the M 68000.) The timing of subsequent events showed continued parallel developments in the two programs.

The German aid in guidance is apparently continuing, despite the Agni launch. In May 1989, a DLR official said that "the APC-Rex program has not yet been concluded, but it will come to an end in 1989."[8] West Germany was one of the seven countries that adopted the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1987, an agreement not to export items useful in making long-range missiles. That agreement barred the export of technology capable of real-time processing of navigation data, unless specific assurances could be given that the technology would not be used for, or transferred to, missile programs. If, as the evidence suggests, technology from APC-Rex has been used in India's rocket and missile programs, Germany may have violated the agreement.

India has not described the Agni guidance system. But when the missile was assembled in 1988, Indian rocket scientists had studied and developed only one brain for rocket guidance: the German system based on the Motorola microprocessor and its software. Over a decade, Germany's guidance tutorial helped India build and test a navigation package based on that system. Did that system go into the Agni, or did India invent from scratch some other system, not mentioned in any Indian space program report? If the latter, did the Indian rocket scientists block from their minds everything they had learned from the Germans? The evidence is strong that the Agni owes its brain to German engineering.

Interchangeable parts

The Indian space program first mentions the Agni in its 1982-83 annual report as a booster rocket for the Polar Space Launch Vehicle: six identical Agni boosters will lift the missile's first stage. The boosters, in turn, are adaptations of the first stage of the SLV-3.[9] Indeed, the SLV-3 is the only large booster motor that India has: it carries nine tons of solid propellant, as does the Agni first stage; no other Indian booster carries anything close to that amount. India has used the same booster to lift the Advanced Space Launch Vehicle.[10] After the Agni launch a number of sources, Indian as well as foreign, reported that the Agni first stage was identical to the SLV-3 first stage. Thus, the main rocket for India's missile program has come from India's space program.

This same rocket, in turn, owes much to German help. Wind tunnels are essential to the design of any rocket. In 1974-75, DLR tested a model of the first stage of the SLV-3 in its wind tunnel at Cologne-Portz. DLR also helped India build rocket test facilities, furnishing a complete facility design and training Indian engineers in high-altitude testing. India has said it will use this technology to test the liquid-fueled upper stage of the Polar Space Launch Vehicle, and it may already have done so. India may also have used it to test the Agni's liquid-fueled second stage, which must have been tested somewhere.

In June 1988, two Egyptian military officers were indicted for trying to smuggle carbon fiber composites out of the United States. Export of the composites was strictly controlled: the strong, lightweight, heat-resistant materials were being used for the nozzles and the nosecone of the MX, Trident, and Minuteman nuclear missiles.

But DAR began giving Indian scientists on-the-job training in composites at Stuttgart and Braunschweig in the mid-1970s. Subjects ranged from "glass fibre reinforced plastics via impregnated materials" to "carbon fibre reinforced composites." The Indians learned "composition, manufacturing processes, quality control, and error detection."

The German training allowed India to make rocket nozzles and nosecones of its own, which could be for either missiles or space launchers. To help the Indians use the composites, DAR supplied the documentation for a precision filament-winding machine, which India built and commissioned in 1985-86.

After the Agni test, Prime Minister Gandhi affirmed that one of the goals was to test "atmospheric reentry." Lower-ranking officials were more specific. They said that the goal was to test a "domestically developed heat shield."[11]

Target: China

No country, including India, has ever spent money on long-range rockets simply to explore space. The "satellites" launched by the SLV-3 were little more than flight monitors, used to transmit data on rocket performance, which was India's true interest. To launch real satellites, India could and did hire other providers of that service. The Soviets launched India's first two satellites; France's Ariane rocket and the U.S. space shuttle have launched others.

Nor has any country developed long-range missiles simply to deliver conventional bombs. The large cost of missile development is only justified by the ability to inflict strategic blows, which conventional warheads cannot do.

The Agni, therefore, can only be interpreted as a step toward a long-range nuclear strike force. As India progresses in guidance, the Agni's range should extend gradually to most targets in China.

India apparently has the material and skill to mass produce the Agni and arm it with nuclear warheads. The result will be a new nuclear equation in Asia. Across a common border, nuclear-armed rivals will confront each other, each with missiles, one or both vulnerable to a first strike from the other.

When India exploded an atomic bomb in 1974, the world was shocked. India had taken a Canadian reactor and U.S. heavy water both imported under guarantees of peaceful use and used them openly to make plutonium for a nuclear blast. That blast destroyed illusions about the "peaceful atom" and prompted changes in nuclear export policy. It is not surprising that India has again taken advantage of civilian imports and technology to further what appears to be a nuclear weapons program. What is surprising is that, given India's record, it was so easy.

How a Satellite Guidance System Gets into a Missile

(Excerpts from program reports)

1982-83

APC-Rex (German-Indian missile program satellite guidance program): received Motorola 68000 microprocessor

Indian space and missile program: "An engineering model of the Mark-ll based on the Motorola 6800 [sic] has been integrated and exhaustive tests are being carried out."

1983-84

APC-Rex (German-Indian missile program satellite guidance program): "Development of an on-board computer for autonomous payload control is in progress."

Indian space and missile program: "Design review was conducted on inertial navigation systems with the participation of international experts."

1984-85

APC-Rex (German-Indian missile program satellite guidance program): "Design of the on-board [guidance] packages was completed."

Indian space and missile program: "Design of on-board processors for SLV based on 16-bit microprocessors has been completed."

1986-87

APC-Rex (German-Indian missile program satellite guidance program): "Development and validation of hardware and software packages for APC-Rex are in their final stages."

Indian space and missile program: "Breadboard models of on-board computers based on microprocessors have been realized."



Sources:

1. P.D. Bhavsar et al., "Indian Sounding Rocket Program," Proceedings of the 4th Sounding Rocket Technology Conference (Boston: American Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics, June 23-26,1976), pp. 101-07.

2. Letter from Arnold W. Frutkin, assistant administrator for international affairs, NASA, to Homi J. Bhabha, chairman, Indian Atomic Energy Commission, March 10, 1965.

3. Steven R. Weisman, "U.S. Clears Vital Gyroscope for Indian Jet Fighter," New York Times, April 7, 1988, p. A12.

4. David Velupillai, "ISRO, India's Ambitious Space Agency," Flight International (June 28, 1980), p. 1466.

5. "India's Agni Success Poses New Problems," Jane's Defence Weekly (June 3,1989), p. 1052.

6. Many of the following details of the German-Indian space program are found in the proceedings of a January 27, 1982, colloquium of the DAR (then called DFVLR) and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) in Bangalore, India, "A Decade of Cooperation in the Field of Space Research and Technology," and in annual reports of the Indian government's Department of Space.

7. Ted Greenwood, Qualitative Improvements in Offensive Strategic Arms: The Case of the MARV(Cambridge: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Aug. 1973), p. 278.

8. Letter from Dietmar Wurzel, head of DAR's Washington, D.C., office, to Gary Milhollin, May 1, 1989.

9. "India The Way Forward," Spaceflight (Dec.1986), p. 434.

10. "India Aims for Self-Sufficiency in Space," Flight International (June 14,1986), p. 45.

11. Barbara Crossette, "India Reports Successful Test of Mid-Range Missile," New York Times, May 22, 1989, p. A9.