India selects EF, Rafale for MMRCA shortlist

[monitor]

Why India chose to disappoint the US
By Trefor Moss

India's procurement of 126 multi-role combat aircraft has been one of the most eagerly anticipated defense deals in years, and not just because of its US$11 billion value.

The selection was always going to be interpreted as an expression of New Delhi's evolving strategic outlook, and to some in Washington, which has built an increasingly close alliance with India driven by a mutual wariness of China, a win for either Boeing or Lockheed Martin, the two US contractors competing for the contract, seemed assured.

But the Americans were wrong to think that friendship alone would unlock the door to India's defense dollars. At the end of April, the Indian government announced that neither US firm had even made


it onto the final short list, with Dassault of France and the European EADS consortium winning through at their expense.

Having made plain that the US was "deeply disappointed" by the outcome, the US ambassador to India promptly resigned, citing personal reasons that seemed barely to mask his frustration that American lobbying had failed in spite of President Barack Obama's personal appearance in New Delhi last November.

Lockheed Martin's F-16 was perhaps always an outsider to fulfill India's requirement: Pakistan already operates the aircraft, and this counted against it right from the start. But the Americans thought, not unreasonably, that Boeing's versatile F/A-18 Super Hornet, backed up by industrial offsets from General Electric as well as Boeing itself, was a strong claimant.

Unfortunately, the Indian Air Force's technical evaluators didn't see it that way. They felt that the newer French and European fighters performed better in India's often challenging operating environments. The Europeans also went further on technology transfer, while the US's end user agreements struck India as needlessly prohibitive.

"The Air Force was focusing on getting an aircraft that would be superior, and the American aircraft on offer just didn't cut it," says Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, the senior fellow for South Asia at the International Institute of Strategic Studies. "There was surprise in India at the extent of the US disappointment ... The Indian mindset was that this deal wasn't about cementing relationships, it was about getting the best deal. The Indian view is that the Americans should have offered better aircraft."

Both sides are left with the sense that the other might have attached more value to their alliance in order to make the fighter deal happen. For the US, that the Indians were unduly blase in ejecting both US aircraft from the competition; from the Indian perspective, the Americans should have dug deeper and demonstrated their commitment to the Indian relationship by putting together a much stronger package.

"I hope [the Americans] learn from this," says aviation analyst Richard Aboulafia, vice president at the Teal Group. While maintaining that the Super Hornet was as strong technically as the other competitors, Aboulafia suggests that the Americans' complacency lost them the deal. "If the US had really reformed its processes and said to the Indians, 'You're our partners, you're our equals,' then the F-18 would have had a very strong chance. That's the approach the Europeans took - they came and said, 'We need you'. I hope this is a rude awakening for them."

Aboulafia points out that the US also failed to overcome the "unfortunate legacy" of its refusal to export critical aircraft components to India during the 1999 Kargil conflict with Pakistan. India needed cast-iron guarantees that nothing like this would ever happen again, and these were not forthcoming.

Much has been read into India's refusal to do the US any special favors in this case, with some commentators applauding what they see as a return to India's traditional non-aligned roots and a rejection of a US-India strategic bloc. But by opting for a European aircraft, India is not seeking to avoid aligning itself with the US. India clearly is aligning itself with the US, but as a partner rather than a client; it also sees the US as one of several key strategic partners, rather than the only ally that counts.

India's strategy, above all, is to spread the risk. It has already signed significant contracts with the US for military surveillance and transport aircraft, as well as civil nuclear development. Russia, once India's principal arms supplier, also missed out of the multi-role fighter deal, but is jointly developing a fifth-generation fighter with India.

France recently secured a $20 billion contract to build civil nuclear reactors in India - an agreement which may count against Dassault in the final round of the fighter contest if New Delhi truly is determined to spread its largesse. Partnership with France is already secured, whereas the selection of EADS' Eurofighter would give four more countries - Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom - a vested interest in the modernization of India's military-industrial base.

Political considerations will now dictate which of the two finalists secures the contract, and also when a deal is announced. The government's corruption woes are such that it would be far too sensitive to announce a major contact award in the next few months, perhaps pushing back a final decision until 2012.

The stakes for EADS and Dassault could hardly be greater. A Eurofighter win could potentially propel the aircraft to further success in other Asian markets which have shown an interest in acquiring it - such as Japan, Indonesia and Malaysia - while the fortunes of Dassault's Rafale, which has only Brazil as a significant export customer so far, would be similarly transformed.
For the US, there is everything reason to be optimistic about the defense relationship with India, despite this setback. The Indian Air Force has already ordered six C-130J transport aircraft from Lockheed Martin, and eight P-8 multi-mission aircraft and 10 C-17 transport planes from Boeing; it will probably come back for more of all three types within the next few years.

But the biggest opportunity could be in encouraging India to buy Lockheed Martin's F-35 Lightning II, a fifth-generation fighter that would be a capability leap beyond any of the aircraft under consideration this time around. Such a deal would be fraught with difficulties - not least how to involve Indian industry (as offset rules demand) in the construction of an aircraft that is far beyond its current technical capability - but the US has perhaps a decade to figure out how to get around them. India will certainly require a fifth-generation fighter as China makes progress towards acquiring one, and its prospects of successfully developing a fifth-generation fighter with Russia are mixed at best. The US certainly has a big incentive to learn the lessons of its recent setback.

After absorbing the initial disappointment, the US will put India's rebuff behind it and refocus on making the strategic relationship with India a cornerstone of its foreign policy in the Asian region. In this, it will find a willing partner, though India's assertiveness in rejecting the US aircraft will do it no harm as it strives to make that partnership an equal one.

Trefor Moss is a freelance journalist who covers Asian politics, in particular defense, security and economic issues. He is a former Asia-Pacific editor for Defense Weekly.

 

[jha]

 

[sancho]

Some more basic infos between the differences of Rafale and EF, from a post I made on ID


To understand the difference between both fighters, we have to understand the difference in design and more importantly the development goals!

Here are some excerpts of an flight global interview with Dassault Aviation's executive vice-president, Bruno Revellin-Falcoz:

In 1980/1 France joined the UK and Germany, and later Italy and Spain, in the European Combat Aircraft (ECA)initiative. An integrated international team was formed, but there was little common ground, although in 1983 the five nations' air forces managed to agree on an outline European Staff Target for a future fighter.

Dassault Aviation's executive vice-president for engineering, research and cooperation, Bruno Revellin-Falcoz, remembers how it became clear that France's requirement was not the same as that of the other four partners. "There were major differences in the aims and targets," he says. The problem centred on the partners' preference for an aircraft having long-range interception as its primary mission to replace their Panavia Tornado ADVs, McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantoms, and Lockheed F-104 Starfighters. This drove the weight up to around 10t, heavier than the smaller, 9t machine proposed by Dassault Aviation, which was to have multirole air-to-air and air-to-ground capability. "We were also the only country that planned a naval version as well," adds Revellin-Falcoz...

...The respective designs eventually chosen for the Rafale and Eurofighter reveal clearly their fundamental differences, even though both are based around delta wing/canards.

Dassault, with its long experience in delta wing/canard design, had already demonstrated close-coupling of the canard and wing - a solution rejected by the Eurofighter team. "We believed very strongly that the all-moving canard should be close-coupled aerodynamically to the wing," says Revellin-Falcoz. "First, it meant the canard could be located further rearwards, which, particularly in the two-seat version, would give the rear pilot better visibility for the air-to-ground mission. Second, we wanted to take advantage of the flow induction effect to the delta wing. This gave us more efficiency and better control at low speeds and high angle of attack, which was particularly important for carrier operations."

The design of the intakes was another area where the two sides disagreed. "In our book, a twin-engined configuration means it must be a true twin. In other words, we never want a single engine failure affecting the other engine," says Revellin-Falcoz.

This meant that separate intakes were needed, to preserve entry conditions for each powerplant under all conditions. "We think it is risky to have a chin intake, even though today's engines are so reliable," he adds. The Rafale intakes are 'semi-submerged', which are also "better for reducing the frontal signature."

The landing gear, because of the Rafale's carrier role, would also be different. Catapult-assisted take-offs required a particularly strong mounting, which meant the nosegear had to be attached directly to the fuselage to transmit the loads directly through to the main aircraft structure. "That would not have worked well on a chin intake - the resulting structure would have been extremely complicated," says Revellin-Falcoz...

Wings ofchange-09/06/1999-Flight International


As you can see, Dassault had more than good reasons to choose different solutions, especially for the location of the canards and the air intakes. This will also be evident when you keep in mind that the EF is generally used as a single seat fighter only, while the twin seat is basically for training. The Rafale on the other hand was planed from the start with a twin seat service version for example in the nuclear strike role!

The following pic shows a single seat EF and a twin seat Rafale and now compare the advantage of visibility for the WSO, because the canards are placed differently:

Also keep in mind the advantage at carrier landings, without canards in the field of view of the pilot and Dassault is not the only company that thought placing the canards so far in the front would not be a good idea:


Su 30 MKI

Gripen

J10

Both fighters has not only a comparable delta canard design, but also a focus on using a high ammount of composite materials like you can see here:

In fact, 75% of Rafales surface structure and 30% of its mass are made of composites, for EF it is 70% and 40%:

Eurofighter Typhoon

http://www.uimm3340.com/iso_album/metal_composite_1.pdf



Besides, the high ammount of composites and RAM materials, ducted air intakes that both has, Rafale also has a sawtooth design feature all over the airframe and even in the air intakes. These sawtooth are made of RAM materials and meant to scatter and absorb radar waves:

http://i32.servimg.com/u/f32/11/28/97/15/drk_9612.jpg

http://i32.servimg.com/u/f32/11/28/97/15/drk_9611.jpg



All stealth fighters begining with the F117 used similar sawtooth design features with the same aim of scattering the radar waves and to reduce the RCS as well:

Rafale and EF have comparable delta canard designs, while the location of the canard only tells us something about the design aim. The one for more visibility for twin seater, or during A2G roles and better low speed handling, the other possibly for better high speed maneuverability and clearly aimed on single seat A2A fighters.
Both uses high ammounts of composite and RAM materials, also use similar RCS reduction features. Which makes clear that both should have very low RCS, but I don't want to speculate which one is lower.

 

[Bagee]

Some more basic infos between the differences of Rafale and EF, from a post I made on ID


To understand the difference between both fighters, we have to understand the difference in design and more importantly the development goals!

Here are some excerpts of an flight global interview with Dassault Aviation's executive vice-president, Bruno Revellin-Falcoz:




Wings ofchange-09/06/1999-Flight International


As you can see, Dassault had more than good reasons to choose different solutions, especially for the location of the canards and the air intakes. This will also be evident when you keep in mind that the EF is generally used as a single seat fighter only, while the twin seat is basically for training. The Rafale on the other hand was planed from the start with a twin seat service version for example in the nuclear strike role!

The following pic shows a single seat EF and a twin seat Rafale and now compare the advantage of visibility for the WSO, because the canards are placed differently:

Also keep in mind the advantage at carrier landings, without canards in the field of view of the pilot and Dassault is not the only company that thought placing the canards so far in the front would not be a good idea:


Su 30 MKI

Gripen

J10

Both fighters has not only a comparable delta canard design, but also a focus on using a high ammount of composite materials like you can see here:

In fact, 75% of Rafales surface structure and 30% of its mass are made of composites, for EF it is 70% and 40%:

Eurofighter Typhoon

http://www.uimm3340.com/iso_album/metal_composite_1.pdf



Besides, the high ammount of composites and RAM materials, ducted air intakes that both has, Rafale also has a sawtooth design feature all over the airframe and even in the air intakes. These sawtooth are made of RAM materials and meant to scatter and absorb radar waves:

http://i32.servimg.com/u/f32/11/28/97/15/drk_9612.jpg

http://i32.servimg.com/u/f32/11/28/97/15/drk_9611.jpg



All stealth fighters begining with the F117 used similar sawtooth design features with the same aim of scattering the radar waves and to reduce the RCS as well:

Rafale and EF have comparable delta canard designs, while the location of the canard only tells us something about the design aim. The one for more visibility for twin seater, or during A2G roles and better low speed handling, the other possibly for better high speed maneuverability and clearly aimed on single seat A2A fighters.
Both uses high ammounts of composite and RAM materials, also use similar RCS reduction features. Which makes clear that both should have very low RCS, but I don't want to speculate which one is lower.

Aircraft Estimated radar cross section (RCS)
Sukhoi Su-30MKI 20 square metres[165]
Dassault Rafale 2 square metres[166]
Eurofighter Typhoon 1 square metre[155]
Sukhoi Su-35BM 1 square metre[167]
Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk 0.025 square metres[166]
Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor 0.0001 square metres[168]

 

[sancho]

Aircraft Estimated radar cross section (RCS)
Sukhoi Su-30MKI 20 square metres[165]
Dassault Rafale 2 square metres[166]
Eurofighter Typhoon 1 square metre[155]
Sukhoi Su-35BM 1 square metre[167]
Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk 0.025 square metres[166]
Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor 0.0001 square metres[168]

That's why i don't wanted to speculate.

 

[Bagee]

The Eurofighter project has been subject to several operational evaluations. These have been carried out, independently from the Eurofighter consortium, primarily by Britain's DERA, the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (now split into QinetiQ and DSTL). Unlike many previous theoretical operational capability studies, the Eurofighter analysis utilised a true simulation approach. This was achieved through a number of networked battle simulation computers, termed JOUST, each of which can be flown by human pilots.

BVR Combat Rating
91%
82%
50%
43%
25%
21%
21%
This system was used to comprehensively evaluate the BVR (Beyond Visual Range) performance of the Eurofighter and other aircraft against an upgraded Su-27 Flanker (comparable to an Su-35 Super Flanker and its equivalents). The studies investigated all aspect best performances from the major systems on each aircraft; avionics, structure (including RCS data), engine performance (including fuel usage), defences and man-machine interfaces. In these tests the French Rafale utilised the Matra-BAe MICA air to air missile (which is the primary AA weapon of the French airforce) while the other aircraft used the Raytheon-Hughes AMRAAM.

These simulations concluded that Eurofighter has a win rating of 82% (100% equals always win, 0% equals always lose, 50% equals parity) against the target aircraft. A more typical way to present this data is as a combat exchange ratio, for the Typhoon this equals 4.5:1. In other words statistically one Eurofighter would be lost for every 4.5 Su-35 fighters shot down. This compares extremely favourably to the other aircraft (see also the BVR Combat Rating table); F-16C Falcon (0.3:1), F-15C Eagle (0.8:1), F-18C Hornet (0.3:1), F-18+ (0.4:1, NB this is not the current F-18E/F which is apparently a downgraded version of the F-18+ used in the studies) and Dassault Rafale (1:1). Only the LM/Boeing F-22 Raptor bettered the Eurofighter's performance with a combat exchange ratio of 10.1:1.

In addition to these overall combat performance results a number of individual comparisons have been made available. Of enormous importance for BVR combat is acceleration at medium altitudes and here the Eurofighter's acceleration at Mach 0.9 and 22,000ft equals that of the F-22. At supersonic velocities (Mach 1.6 and 36,000ft) the sustained turn rate of the Eurofighter betters all but the F-22, while its instantaneous turn rate is superior to the F-22. At low altitudes, Eurofighter can accelerate from 200kts to Mach 1.0 in under 30 seconds. In a similar vain to its supersonic performance, the sustained and instantaneous subsonic turn rates of the Eurofighter are bettered only by the F-22. Only the Rafale comes close to the matching the Eurofighter's capabilities in these comparisons.

An important point to keep in mind when examining this data is that full details on the simulations have not been released. Without this information it is not possible to determine whether Eurofighter optimal profiles were examined at the expense of more varied combat missions. However these studies do give some indication as to the potential of the Typhoon.

 

[Bagee]

The Eurofighter project has been subject to several operational evaluations. These have been carried out, independently from the Eurofighter consortium, primarily by Britain's DERA, the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (now split into QinetiQ and DSTL). Unlike many previous theoretical operational capability studies, the Eurofighter analysis utilised a true simulation approach. This was achieved through a number of networked battle simulation computers, termed JOUST, each of which can be flown by human pilots.

BVR Combat Rating
91%
82%
50%
43%
25%
21%
21%
This system was used to comprehensively evaluate the BVR (Beyond Visual Range) performance of the Eurofighter and other aircraft against an upgraded Su-27 Flanker (comparable to an Su-35 Super Flanker and its equivalents). The studies investigated all aspect best performances from the major systems on each aircraft; avionics, structure (including RCS data), engine performance (including fuel usage), defences and man-machine interfaces. In these tests the French Rafale utilised the Matra-BAe MICA air to air missile (which is the primary AA weapon of the French airforce) while the other aircraft used the Raytheon-Hughes AMRAAM.

These simulations concluded that Eurofighter has a win rating of 82% (100% equals always win, 0% equals always lose, 50% equals parity) against the target aircraft. A more typical way to present this data is as a combat exchange ratio, for the Typhoon this equals 4.5:1. In other words statistically one Eurofighter would be lost for every 4.5 Su-35 fighters shot down. This compares extremely favourably to the other aircraft (see also the BVR Combat Rating table); F-16C Falcon (0.3:1), F-15C Eagle (0.8:1), F-18C Hornet (0.3:1), F-18+ (0.4:1, NB this is not the current F-18E/F which is apparently a downgraded version of the F-18+ used in the studies) and Dassault Rafale (1:1). Only the LM/Boeing F-22 Raptor bettered the Eurofighter's performance with a combat exchange ratio of 10.1:1.

In addition to these overall combat performance results a number of individual comparisons have been made available. Of enormous importance for BVR combat is acceleration at medium altitudes and here the Eurofighter's acceleration at Mach 0.9 and 22,000ft equals that of the F-22. At supersonic velocities (Mach 1.6 and 36,000ft) the sustained turn rate of the Eurofighter betters all but the F-22, while its instantaneous turn rate is superior to the F-22. At low altitudes, Eurofighter can accelerate from 200kts to Mach 1.0 in under 30 seconds. In a similar vain to its supersonic performance, the sustained and instantaneous subsonic turn rates of the Eurofighter are bettered only by the F-22. Only the Rafale comes close to the matching the Eurofighter's capabilities in these comparisons.

An important point to keep in mind when examining this data is that full details on the simulations have not been released. Without this information it is not possible to determine whether Eurofighter optimal profiles were examined at the expense of more varied combat missions. However these studies do give some indication as to the potential of the Typhoon.

just imagine this bvr range if there is a j 10 or j11b in the vicinity
first percentage is for f22 2)eurofighter 3) rafale 4) f 18
why not typhoon for ground operation first u need to be good in air and typhoon is best after f22 in that

 

[localoca]

That's why i don't wanted to speculate.

Because you know Sh!t about LO aircrafts, you dare to compare F-117 with Rafale? two words: Vertical Stabilizer

 

[lepziboy]

Aircraft Estimated radar cross section (RCS)
Sukhoi Su-30MKI 20 square metres[165]
Dassault Rafale 2 square metres[166]
Eurofighter Typhoon 1 square metre[155]
Sukhoi Su-35BM 1 square metre[167]
Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk 0.025 square metres[166]
Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor 0.0001 square metres[168]

Sukhoi Su-mki rcs is really big I really hate that

 

[axisofevil]

Aircraft Estimated radar cross section (RCS)
Sukhoi Su-30MKI 20 square metres[165]
Dassault Rafale 2 square metres[166]
Eurofighter Typhoon 1 square metre[155]
Sukhoi Su-35BM 1 square metre[167]
Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk 0.025 square metres[166]
Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor 0.0001 square metres[168]

Great point....That's what I was going to bring up and you clearly answered it for us. Thanks. We also need to remember offensive and defensive weapons capabilities have increased and changed tremendously since the Rafaele's induction.

 

[tanlixiang28776]

Aircraft Estimated radar cross section (RCS)
Sukhoi Su-30MKI 20 square metres[165]
Dassault Rafale 2 square metres[166]
Eurofighter Typhoon 1 square metre[155]
Sukhoi Su-35BM 1 square metre[167]
Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk 0.025 square metres[166]
Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor 0.0001 square metres[168]

For the first 4 fighters in this list it refers to a frontal RCS without any weapons, pods, or drop tanks.

In other words you would have to fly unarmed to achieve that kind of RCS. With weapons the RCS dramatically increases.

 

[lepziboy]

For the first 4 fighters in this list it refers to a frontal RCS without any weapons, pods, or drop tanks.

In other words you would have to fly unarmed to achieve that kind of RCS. With weapons the RCS dramatically increases.

I thought this was with weapons

 

[Just Yash]

Nup...... It's without Weapons.
Any by the way all this figures are wrong. No country will give away their main Fighter's RCS figures.

 

[sudhir007]

Russia Experts Says Russia Could Sell Mig-35 Fighter Jets To Pakistan ~ ASIAN DEFENCE NEWS

According to the Russian International Information Telegraph Agency refuses regarding India to purchase the Mig - 35 fighter plane incidents, Russia strategy and technical analysis center assistant director Constantine□Markey extended the branch saying.

Russia should let the Indian Air force undertake the consequence for own decision. In the Moscow tradition to maintains the restraint to the Pakistani sell weapon, but refuses in India to purchase under the Mig - 35 new situations, should carefully examine this policy.

He believed that the Pakistani Air force possibly while purchases Chinese and American fighter plane's also purchases Mig - 35.

 

[Abingdonboy]

Russia Experts Says Russia Could Sell Mig-35 Fighter Jets To Pakistan ~ ASIAN DEFENCE NEWS

According to the Russian International Information Telegraph Agency refuses regarding India to purchase the Mig - 35 fighter plane incidents, Russia strategy and technical analysis center assistant director Constantine□Markey extended the branch saying.

Russia should let the Indian Air force undertake the consequence for own decision. In the Moscow tradition to maintains the restraint to the Pakistani sell weapon, but refuses in India to purchase under the Mig - 35 new situations, should carefully examine this policy.

He believed that the Pakistani Air force possibly while purchases Chinese and American fighter plane's also purchases Mig - 35.

There's sooo much wring with this article/news.

Let me start at the top- PAF has expressed NOOOO interest in the Mig-35 let alone their dire finical issues they already are planning to induct a number of platforms from China that, whilst not as capable as the Mig-35, fit into the same class so I doubt PAF would want the hassle of the logistics let alone their F-16s that are in the same category.

Secondly, the most important factor is the Russians aren't foolish enough to do such a thing over ONE project (given it is a pretty large one) as India already has committed $30 BILLION for PAK FA/FGFA let alone the BILLIONS for MiG 29Ks for IN, UPG of IAF MiG 29, JV for MTA and likely order for 5+ A-50 for IAF Phalcon etc etc. I truly don't believe the Russians are that stupid, immature or emotional.

I haven't seen this news ANYWHERE else and even if I had it could just be ONE upset Russian (or not even Russian).

Russia won't bite the hand that feeds it.