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The Myth of India`s "Impeccable" Nuclear Non-Nroliferation Record
Tuesday February 28, 2006 (1656 PST)
By A. S. Muhammad The Indo-US Joint Statement of 18 July 2005 appreciated India`s strong commitment to prevent WMD proliferation and being a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states. To build India`s case on it`s presumably "impeccable record" on non-proliferation could be aimed at achieving multiple objectives, firstly, to keep nuclear cooperation country specific and deny the same advantages to other countries, such as Pakistan; second, to build a plausible case for the US legislature to adjust US laws; third, provide ostensible reason for the NSG member states to allow country - specific exception for India, and finally, to pacify nuclear non-proliferationist lobby, which has termed the proposed deal a threat to global non-proliferation efforts.
Acquisition of peaceful nuclear technology is an inalienable right of any country. However, if proliferation history is considered a criterion for peaceful and/ or safeguarded nuclear cooperation then none of the countries in the world, including the P- 5, have a clean record to prove the impeccability of their non- proliferation credentials. And India is no exception, it received peaceful nuclear technology in the past, which it misused and exploded a nuclear device in 1974. India`s breach of trust led to the formation of nuclear suppliers group (NSG), to regulate peaceful nuclear trade between countries and avoid any future misuse of nuclear technology. While there could be no illusion that the proposed nuclear cooperation agreement stems from the dynamics of realpolitik but projecting India as a responsible country with an ââ¬Åimpeccableââ¬Â record on nuclear proliferation is not only far from reality, but also rather thick!
India`s Illicit Nuclear imports. India`s nuclear weapons program was aided and abetted by many countries over a period of time. Some of them that consciously or otherwise enabled India to acquire nuclear weapons capability include Canada, United States, United Kingdom, former Soviet Union and some other European states, especially France, Germany, Norway etc.
India was an early beneficiary of the US sponsored "Atoms For Peace" program launched in 1953, The program was intended to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons by offering access to civil uses of nuclear technology in exchange for pledges not to apply technology to weapons purposes. Based on prevailing atmosphere of trust in the early Atoms for Peace years, in 1955 Canada supplied the CIRUS heavy water research reactor from which India later derived the plutonium for the 1974 nuclear explosive device. In lieu of IAEA safeguards, which did not exist until after the Agency was founded in 1957, Canada required only written "peaceful assurances" that the reactor would be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. However, India obviously betrayed the trust and built weapons grade fissile material stocks for its nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998. Based on India`s past record many Western analysts are genuinely skeptical about India`s commitment expressed in the Joint Statement of 18 July 2005. Therefore, when the Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran was questioned on India`s failed commitment on CIRUS research reactor at the Carnegie Endowment (CEIP) on 21st December 2005, he said, "I really would not like to get into an argument about the CIRUS reactor ... this is something which is really - something which is in progress, something which is under discussion."
The father of the Indian atomic bomb, Homi J. Bhabha understood the dual uses of many nuclear technologies, and lobbied hard to make India the first recipient of US nuclear material under Washington`s nuclear expert policy. US was so intent on concluding a nuclear supply contract with New Delhi that it offered heavy water four years before the completion of Canadian supplied CIRUS reactor. US Atomic Energy Commission in February 1955 sold 10 tons of heavy water to India. In 1955, US offered India standard research reactor but Bhabha declined and instead asked the US to transfer a nuclear power reactor to India ââ¬Åomitting essential safeguard features", which Bhabha called "onerous" and ââ¬Åmore or less of an insult to India`s peaceful intentions." Indian nuclear scientists and engineers were trained in the US and provided access to thousands of declassified papers and reports, enabling them to develop expertisee for India`s nuclear weapons program. US also agreed to provide four shipments of heavy water for CIRUS research reactor in March 1956. One of these shipments constituted 18.9 tons of heavy water and was provided without a safeguards mandate. In 1980, once India had already made its intentions clear by exploding a nuclear device in 1974, US provided India with 19 tons of enriched uranium, however a similar consignment was held back due to India`s refusal to accept full scope safeguards for its nuclear facilities. Even in the post 1 9998 environment, US firm Berkley Nucleonics Corporation sold India at least five nuclear pulse generators. Executives of the California based company were indicted by a San Francisco grand jury on 28 August 2001. In its ruling, the court said that the defendants "exploited imprecision in the regulatory regime for controlling exports," and, in the process, provided equipment to India, which, "may facilitate nuclear weaponry and thereby threaten stability in South Asia."
In 1954-55, in exchange for the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) consideration to purchase a British reactor in the future, India managed to acquire six kilograms of enriched uranium fuel rods and technical assistance from the UK. According to Sunday Times (London) report of 15 June 1992, British entity GEC-Marconi "secretly exported nuclear and missile technology to India". The firm supposedly tried to register equipment bound for the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) as medical research materials.
Following the 1974 nuclear explosion, India managed to acquire nuclear material from some other European sources including Germany, Spain, and Norway etc. In 1983 Norwegian heavy water intended for West Germany was reportedly diverted to Switzerland and then flown to India. A similar, consignment of heavy water was shipped same year from Soviet Union and combined with Norwegian heavy water was reportedly sent to Switzerland and than transported by air to Bombay, India. In 1986, yet another consignment was tracked from Norway to India through Romania.
India`s Illicit Nuclear Exports. India has been involved in proliferation of nuclear technology and material to other countries including Saddam`s Iraq, Iran, possibly North Korea and Libya.
India reportedly collaborated with Israel and there have been instances when nuclear knowledge was shared between the two countries. According to a former Mossad agent, one of his assignments was to escort Indian nuclear scientists in 1984, who had come "on a secret mission to Israel to meet with Israeli nuclear experts and exchange information." It is also believed that the second set of nuclear tests conducted by India in May 1998 were a joint Indo-Israeli venture.
In 1974, Saddam Hussein especially flew into India to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement with the Indira Gandhi government. This agreement included exchange of nuclear scientists, training and technology transfers. Iraqi scientists were working in India`s fuel reprocessing laboratories when India separated plutonium for its first nuclear explosive device, Later, these same Iraqi scientists were incharge of the nuclear fuel-processing unit supplied to Iraq by Italian company, CNEN. This was followed by Indian scientists spending a year at the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission`s computer center, training Iraqis in the use of computer codes. An Indian company, NEC Engineers Private Ltd, is believed to have helped Iraq acquire equipment and materials "capable of being used for the production of chemicals for mass destruction," According to CNN report of Jan 26, 2003, the company also sent technical personnel to Iraq, including to Fallujah 11 chemical plant. Between 1998 and 2001, NEC Engineers Private Ltd shipped 10 consignments of highly sensitive equipment, including titanium vessels and centrifugal pumps to Iraq.
According to a report, in 1975 Iran had advisers working an its nuclear program, from the United States, Britain and India. India also negotiated the sale of 10-megawatt nuclear reactor to Iran in 1991, In 1992 India supplied thiodyglycol and other chemicals to Iran and in 1993 United Phosphorus Company of India supplied 30 tonnes of trimethyl phosphite to Iran. Since 2000 a retired Indian nuclear scientist was working at Bushehr nuclear plant - and India and Iran signed an agreement to "cooperate in peaceful uses of nuclear technology". More recently in 2004, two Indian scientists were blacklisted for charges of nuclear proliferation to Iran. These two scientists C. Surrender and Y.S.R. Prasad had earlier served successive terms as Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Nuclear Corporation of India Ltd. According to US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, the sanctions were based on "credible information", and "the cases reflected poor Indian commitment to non-proliferation." In another violation of its non-proliferation commitments made to the international community, two Indian firms were found involved in selling prohibited items to Iran, these firms were sanctioned by the US in December, 2005.
Another pariah state that benefited from Indian nuclear technology is North Korea. In August 2003, Taiwan customs seized 1000 tons of Aluminum Oxide (which when mixed with other materials can be used for making shells) from a North Korean container ship, which was manufactured in India. An Indian American was arrested in early December 2003 in the US or, charges of supplying important nuclear components to North Korea.
The above-mentioned proliferation activities by India sufficiently question the veracity of lndia`s `impeccable` nuclear non-proliferation record. Ironically, while Saddam`s Iraq and Iran are targeted by the US for indulging in nuclear proliferation activities, India, being a source to these countries is not being even questioned for its role in providing nuclear technology to these countries. On India`s failure to honor its commitments to Canada on CIRUS reactor, some senior officials from both sides have attempted to question the very existence of any such obligations. According to US Under Secretary of State Robert Joseph, ââ¬Åa conclusive answer (on whether a violation occurred with respect to CIRUS reactor) has not been possibleââ¬Â. Gary Milhollin of the independent Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control said, Joseph`s statement was ",`flatly wrong", while Henry Sokolski of the Non-Proliferation Policy Education center called it ââ¬Åunbelievable and shameful.ââ¬Â Milhollin added, the Administration is afraid to press further because "they don`t want to know" and don`t want to have to hold India to account.
No matter what India claims, there is no doubt that like other NWS, India could not have acquired nuclear weapons capability without indulging into illicit nuclear trade. Contrary to what the US and Indian officials would like to propagate, India in fact has played a vanguard role in the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the entire region, especially in the developing world. It was India that conducted a nuclear test in May 1974, triggering Pakistan`s response. With two nuclear weapons countries in the neighborhood, it was but natural for the Shah of Iran to embark on a nuclear quest triggering Saddam Hussein to seek nuclear cooperation from India and develop nuclear weapons capability. The Indian ambition to compete with other NWS led to a domino effect in greater Asia, including South and West Asian regions with many potential aspirants waiting for the opportune moment to acquire nuclear weapons technology. Yet India claims to have an impeccable record and the US would like entire world to believe it.
Tuesday February 28, 2006 (1656 PST)
By A. S. Muhammad The Indo-US Joint Statement of 18 July 2005 appreciated India`s strong commitment to prevent WMD proliferation and being a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states. To build India`s case on it`s presumably "impeccable record" on non-proliferation could be aimed at achieving multiple objectives, firstly, to keep nuclear cooperation country specific and deny the same advantages to other countries, such as Pakistan; second, to build a plausible case for the US legislature to adjust US laws; third, provide ostensible reason for the NSG member states to allow country - specific exception for India, and finally, to pacify nuclear non-proliferationist lobby, which has termed the proposed deal a threat to global non-proliferation efforts.
Acquisition of peaceful nuclear technology is an inalienable right of any country. However, if proliferation history is considered a criterion for peaceful and/ or safeguarded nuclear cooperation then none of the countries in the world, including the P- 5, have a clean record to prove the impeccability of their non- proliferation credentials. And India is no exception, it received peaceful nuclear technology in the past, which it misused and exploded a nuclear device in 1974. India`s breach of trust led to the formation of nuclear suppliers group (NSG), to regulate peaceful nuclear trade between countries and avoid any future misuse of nuclear technology. While there could be no illusion that the proposed nuclear cooperation agreement stems from the dynamics of realpolitik but projecting India as a responsible country with an ââ¬Åimpeccableââ¬Â record on nuclear proliferation is not only far from reality, but also rather thick!
India`s Illicit Nuclear imports. India`s nuclear weapons program was aided and abetted by many countries over a period of time. Some of them that consciously or otherwise enabled India to acquire nuclear weapons capability include Canada, United States, United Kingdom, former Soviet Union and some other European states, especially France, Germany, Norway etc.
India was an early beneficiary of the US sponsored "Atoms For Peace" program launched in 1953, The program was intended to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons by offering access to civil uses of nuclear technology in exchange for pledges not to apply technology to weapons purposes. Based on prevailing atmosphere of trust in the early Atoms for Peace years, in 1955 Canada supplied the CIRUS heavy water research reactor from which India later derived the plutonium for the 1974 nuclear explosive device. In lieu of IAEA safeguards, which did not exist until after the Agency was founded in 1957, Canada required only written "peaceful assurances" that the reactor would be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. However, India obviously betrayed the trust and built weapons grade fissile material stocks for its nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998. Based on India`s past record many Western analysts are genuinely skeptical about India`s commitment expressed in the Joint Statement of 18 July 2005. Therefore, when the Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran was questioned on India`s failed commitment on CIRUS research reactor at the Carnegie Endowment (CEIP) on 21st December 2005, he said, "I really would not like to get into an argument about the CIRUS reactor ... this is something which is really - something which is in progress, something which is under discussion."
The father of the Indian atomic bomb, Homi J. Bhabha understood the dual uses of many nuclear technologies, and lobbied hard to make India the first recipient of US nuclear material under Washington`s nuclear expert policy. US was so intent on concluding a nuclear supply contract with New Delhi that it offered heavy water four years before the completion of Canadian supplied CIRUS reactor. US Atomic Energy Commission in February 1955 sold 10 tons of heavy water to India. In 1955, US offered India standard research reactor but Bhabha declined and instead asked the US to transfer a nuclear power reactor to India ââ¬Åomitting essential safeguard features", which Bhabha called "onerous" and ââ¬Åmore or less of an insult to India`s peaceful intentions." Indian nuclear scientists and engineers were trained in the US and provided access to thousands of declassified papers and reports, enabling them to develop expertisee for India`s nuclear weapons program. US also agreed to provide four shipments of heavy water for CIRUS research reactor in March 1956. One of these shipments constituted 18.9 tons of heavy water and was provided without a safeguards mandate. In 1980, once India had already made its intentions clear by exploding a nuclear device in 1974, US provided India with 19 tons of enriched uranium, however a similar consignment was held back due to India`s refusal to accept full scope safeguards for its nuclear facilities. Even in the post 1 9998 environment, US firm Berkley Nucleonics Corporation sold India at least five nuclear pulse generators. Executives of the California based company were indicted by a San Francisco grand jury on 28 August 2001. In its ruling, the court said that the defendants "exploited imprecision in the regulatory regime for controlling exports," and, in the process, provided equipment to India, which, "may facilitate nuclear weaponry and thereby threaten stability in South Asia."
In 1954-55, in exchange for the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) consideration to purchase a British reactor in the future, India managed to acquire six kilograms of enriched uranium fuel rods and technical assistance from the UK. According to Sunday Times (London) report of 15 June 1992, British entity GEC-Marconi "secretly exported nuclear and missile technology to India". The firm supposedly tried to register equipment bound for the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) as medical research materials.
Following the 1974 nuclear explosion, India managed to acquire nuclear material from some other European sources including Germany, Spain, and Norway etc. In 1983 Norwegian heavy water intended for West Germany was reportedly diverted to Switzerland and then flown to India. A similar, consignment of heavy water was shipped same year from Soviet Union and combined with Norwegian heavy water was reportedly sent to Switzerland and than transported by air to Bombay, India. In 1986, yet another consignment was tracked from Norway to India through Romania.
India`s Illicit Nuclear Exports. India has been involved in proliferation of nuclear technology and material to other countries including Saddam`s Iraq, Iran, possibly North Korea and Libya.
India reportedly collaborated with Israel and there have been instances when nuclear knowledge was shared between the two countries. According to a former Mossad agent, one of his assignments was to escort Indian nuclear scientists in 1984, who had come "on a secret mission to Israel to meet with Israeli nuclear experts and exchange information." It is also believed that the second set of nuclear tests conducted by India in May 1998 were a joint Indo-Israeli venture.
In 1974, Saddam Hussein especially flew into India to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement with the Indira Gandhi government. This agreement included exchange of nuclear scientists, training and technology transfers. Iraqi scientists were working in India`s fuel reprocessing laboratories when India separated plutonium for its first nuclear explosive device, Later, these same Iraqi scientists were incharge of the nuclear fuel-processing unit supplied to Iraq by Italian company, CNEN. This was followed by Indian scientists spending a year at the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission`s computer center, training Iraqis in the use of computer codes. An Indian company, NEC Engineers Private Ltd, is believed to have helped Iraq acquire equipment and materials "capable of being used for the production of chemicals for mass destruction," According to CNN report of Jan 26, 2003, the company also sent technical personnel to Iraq, including to Fallujah 11 chemical plant. Between 1998 and 2001, NEC Engineers Private Ltd shipped 10 consignments of highly sensitive equipment, including titanium vessels and centrifugal pumps to Iraq.
According to a report, in 1975 Iran had advisers working an its nuclear program, from the United States, Britain and India. India also negotiated the sale of 10-megawatt nuclear reactor to Iran in 1991, In 1992 India supplied thiodyglycol and other chemicals to Iran and in 1993 United Phosphorus Company of India supplied 30 tonnes of trimethyl phosphite to Iran. Since 2000 a retired Indian nuclear scientist was working at Bushehr nuclear plant - and India and Iran signed an agreement to "cooperate in peaceful uses of nuclear technology". More recently in 2004, two Indian scientists were blacklisted for charges of nuclear proliferation to Iran. These two scientists C. Surrender and Y.S.R. Prasad had earlier served successive terms as Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Nuclear Corporation of India Ltd. According to US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, the sanctions were based on "credible information", and "the cases reflected poor Indian commitment to non-proliferation." In another violation of its non-proliferation commitments made to the international community, two Indian firms were found involved in selling prohibited items to Iran, these firms were sanctioned by the US in December, 2005.
Another pariah state that benefited from Indian nuclear technology is North Korea. In August 2003, Taiwan customs seized 1000 tons of Aluminum Oxide (which when mixed with other materials can be used for making shells) from a North Korean container ship, which was manufactured in India. An Indian American was arrested in early December 2003 in the US or, charges of supplying important nuclear components to North Korea.
The above-mentioned proliferation activities by India sufficiently question the veracity of lndia`s `impeccable` nuclear non-proliferation record. Ironically, while Saddam`s Iraq and Iran are targeted by the US for indulging in nuclear proliferation activities, India, being a source to these countries is not being even questioned for its role in providing nuclear technology to these countries. On India`s failure to honor its commitments to Canada on CIRUS reactor, some senior officials from both sides have attempted to question the very existence of any such obligations. According to US Under Secretary of State Robert Joseph, ââ¬Åa conclusive answer (on whether a violation occurred with respect to CIRUS reactor) has not been possibleââ¬Â. Gary Milhollin of the independent Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control said, Joseph`s statement was ",`flatly wrong", while Henry Sokolski of the Non-Proliferation Policy Education center called it ââ¬Åunbelievable and shameful.ââ¬Â Milhollin added, the Administration is afraid to press further because "they don`t want to know" and don`t want to have to hold India to account.
No matter what India claims, there is no doubt that like other NWS, India could not have acquired nuclear weapons capability without indulging into illicit nuclear trade. Contrary to what the US and Indian officials would like to propagate, India in fact has played a vanguard role in the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the entire region, especially in the developing world. It was India that conducted a nuclear test in May 1974, triggering Pakistan`s response. With two nuclear weapons countries in the neighborhood, it was but natural for the Shah of Iran to embark on a nuclear quest triggering Saddam Hussein to seek nuclear cooperation from India and develop nuclear weapons capability. The Indian ambition to compete with other NWS led to a domino effect in greater Asia, including South and West Asian regions with many potential aspirants waiting for the opportune moment to acquire nuclear weapons technology. Yet India claims to have an impeccable record and the US would like entire world to believe it.
Carter slams US-India nuclear deal
WASHINGTON (updated on: March 29, 2006, 20:29 PST): Former US president Jimmy Carter criticised on Wednesday Washington's civilian nuclear deal with India, saying it was 'just one more step in opening a Pandora's box of nuclear proliferation'.
"Knowing for more than three decades of Indian leaders' nuclear ambitions, I and all other presidents included them in a consistent policy: no sales of civilian nuclear technology or uncontrolled fuel to any country that refused to sign the NPT," Carter said in an opinion piece in The Washington Post.
India has refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and developed nuclear weapons on its own.
US President George W. Bush clinched the landmark nuclear deal with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during a visit to New Delhi on March 2 and is pushing Congress to amend the US Atomic Energy Act, which currently prohibits nuclear sales to non NPT signatories, to make the agreement effective.
It would give energy-starved India access to long-denied civilian nuclear technology in return for placing a majority of its civilian nuclear reactors under international inspection.
Carter, a Democrat, slammed the Bush administration for abandoning many of the nuclear arms control agreements negotiated since the administration of Dwight Eisenhower. "This change in policies has sent uncertain signals to other countries, including North Korea and Iran, and may encourage technologically capable nations to choose the nuclear option," he said.
Carter said although US companies reportedly might win two contracts arising from Indian plans to import eight nuclear reactors by 2012, "this is a minuscule benefit compared with the potential costs.
"India may be a special case, but reasonable restraints are necessary," he said.
The Bush administration had often cited what it called India's unblemished nuclear non-proliferation record to go ahead with deal.
Carter said as the five original nuclear powers had all stopped producing fissile material for weapons, "India should make the same pledge to cap its stockpile of nuclear bomb ingredients.
"Instead, the proposal for India would allow enough fissile material for as many as 50 weapons a year, far exceeding what is believed to be its current capacity," he said.
So far, Carter said, India had only rudimentary technology for uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, and he urged Congress to "preclude the sale of such technology to India."
India should also join other nuclear powers in signing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, he said.
WASHINGTON (updated on: March 29, 2006, 20:29 PST): Former US president Jimmy Carter criticised on Wednesday Washington's civilian nuclear deal with India, saying it was 'just one more step in opening a Pandora's box of nuclear proliferation'.
"Knowing for more than three decades of Indian leaders' nuclear ambitions, I and all other presidents included them in a consistent policy: no sales of civilian nuclear technology or uncontrolled fuel to any country that refused to sign the NPT," Carter said in an opinion piece in The Washington Post.
India has refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and developed nuclear weapons on its own.
US President George W. Bush clinched the landmark nuclear deal with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during a visit to New Delhi on March 2 and is pushing Congress to amend the US Atomic Energy Act, which currently prohibits nuclear sales to non NPT signatories, to make the agreement effective.
It would give energy-starved India access to long-denied civilian nuclear technology in return for placing a majority of its civilian nuclear reactors under international inspection.
Carter, a Democrat, slammed the Bush administration for abandoning many of the nuclear arms control agreements negotiated since the administration of Dwight Eisenhower. "This change in policies has sent uncertain signals to other countries, including North Korea and Iran, and may encourage technologically capable nations to choose the nuclear option," he said.
Carter said although US companies reportedly might win two contracts arising from Indian plans to import eight nuclear reactors by 2012, "this is a minuscule benefit compared with the potential costs.
"India may be a special case, but reasonable restraints are necessary," he said.
The Bush administration had often cited what it called India's unblemished nuclear non-proliferation record to go ahead with deal.
Carter said as the five original nuclear powers had all stopped producing fissile material for weapons, "India should make the same pledge to cap its stockpile of nuclear bomb ingredients.
"Instead, the proposal for India would allow enough fissile material for as many as 50 weapons a year, far exceeding what is believed to be its current capacity," he said.
So far, Carter said, India had only rudimentary technology for uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, and he urged Congress to "preclude the sale of such technology to India."
India should also join other nuclear powers in signing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, he said.
German FM says US-Indian nuclear deal 'not helpful'
BERLIN (updated on: March 29, 2006, 20:27 PST): German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier criticised the landmark nuclear deal between the United States and India on Wednesday in light of the dispute with Iran over its nuclear program.
Steinmeier said in a speech before the Bundestag lower house of parliament the timing of the accord was "surely not helpful" against the backdrop of international efforts to convince Tehran to abandon sensitive nuclear research.
On a visit to New Delhi this month, US President George W. Bush agreed to give India access to nuclear technology in exchange for it separating its civil and military atomic programs and placing a majority of its reactors under international inspection.
Critics note that India has refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has developed nuclear weapons on its own. The argue that the US recognition smacked of a double-standard and could embolden nuclear renegades.
News magazine Der Spiegel reported this week that Merkel had expressed her displeasure in a recent telephone conversation with Bush.
The United States would like to present the pact for endorsement by the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group, which oversees trade in atomic fuel and technology, in June.
Despite his criticism, Steinmeier indicated that Germany, which is a member, would not veto the deal.
Germany is hosting a meeting of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council -- Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States -- Thursday with the aim of agreeing a UN statement urging Iran to abandon sensitive nuclear activities and allow international inspections.
BERLIN (updated on: March 29, 2006, 20:27 PST): German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier criticised the landmark nuclear deal between the United States and India on Wednesday in light of the dispute with Iran over its nuclear program.
Steinmeier said in a speech before the Bundestag lower house of parliament the timing of the accord was "surely not helpful" against the backdrop of international efforts to convince Tehran to abandon sensitive nuclear research.
On a visit to New Delhi this month, US President George W. Bush agreed to give India access to nuclear technology in exchange for it separating its civil and military atomic programs and placing a majority of its reactors under international inspection.
Critics note that India has refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has developed nuclear weapons on its own. The argue that the US recognition smacked of a double-standard and could embolden nuclear renegades.
News magazine Der Spiegel reported this week that Merkel had expressed her displeasure in a recent telephone conversation with Bush.
The United States would like to present the pact for endorsement by the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group, which oversees trade in atomic fuel and technology, in June.
Despite his criticism, Steinmeier indicated that Germany, which is a member, would not veto the deal.
Germany is hosting a meeting of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council -- Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States -- Thursday with the aim of agreeing a UN statement urging Iran to abandon sensitive nuclear activities and allow international inspections.
Obstacles to Indo-US N-deal
By Najmuddin A. Shaikh
ACTING with remarkable speed, the Bush administration has submitted to Congress its proposals for changes in American law that would be required to give effect to the agreement that President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reached in New Delhi on March 1. It has also brought the proposal to a meeting of the Nuclear Suppliersââ¬â¢ Group so that this group of countries with the potential to export nuclear technology can make similar amendments in the guidelines they currently use to govern the export of nuclear and dual-use equipment and technology.
A propaganda offensive has also been launched to highlight the benefits of the agreement and to rebut the charge that the agreement would cause the unravelling of the non-proliferation regime created under the leadership of the US over the past decades, and triggered, ironically, by the Indian testing of a nuclear device in 1974. As an opening gambit in the long negotiations with Congress, the administration has laid down the marker, to its great disadvantage ââ¬â though it would be pleasing to the Indians ââ¬â that the agreement must be accepted as it stands since a renegotiation would lead to its unravelling.
Currently, American law provides that the president can exempt any country from the prohibition on exports of nuclear technology and equipment and, if the country is a signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) the exemption will take effect if Congress does not pass a joint resolution denying the exemption within 90 days. For countries that are not signatories of the NPT however, Congress has to approve the exemption and can take as long as it wishes to do so.
The changes that the administration has now proposed would exempt India and treat it as though it was a NPT signatory so that the deal can only be blocked if Congress is able to muster the will to pass a joint resolution within 90 days.
In effect, this would mean that Congress would have virtually no oversight and no ability to influence the terms and conditions of the proposed transfer. Apart from the non-proliferation lobby in Congress ââ¬â there are many influential lawmakers in this group ââ¬â other legislators are going to be concerned about the infringement on congressional oversight rights and obligations that the vesting of such power in the president would represent.
The more serious issue will be the concerns of the non-proliferators. While the deal was being negotiated many in Congress believed that the bottom line of the American administration would be that the deal would minimize Indiaââ¬â¢s ability to accumulate the material required for manufacturing nuclear weapons. In other words, that most of Indiaââ¬â¢s nuclear reactors, particularly the fast breeder reactors, would be placed under perpetual safeguards, and those that were allowed to remain outside safeguards would not provide material for more than five or six nuclear weapons a year.
It was also assumed that as Indiaââ¬â¢s nuclear programme expanded, with foreign assistance or through indigenous efforts, all the new facilities would be placed under safeguards and would not be allowed to contribute to Indiaââ¬â¢s nuclear weapon building capability. The current agreement does no such thing.
A close perusal of the agreement shows that of the reactors India has under operation or under construction, currently four are already under safeguards ââ¬â Rajasthan I and II (Canadian origin) and Tarapur I and II (American origin) as will be the two Russian ââ¬â assisted reactors at Koodakulam.
India has agreed that the research reactor CIRUS (Canadian origin but fuelled in part by heavy water provided by the US and now internationally known as the source of the plutonium clandestinely diverted by India for constructing the nuclear device it exploded in 1974) will be shut down by 2010 while the other research reactor at the Bhaba Atomic Research Centre (BARC) will be moved out and placed under international safeguards at its new location thus ensuring that BARC itself is not open to international inspection. None of the other currently operating reactors are to be placed under safeguards.
Another facet of the agreement that is cause for concern is that even those reactors that are being placed under safeguards will remain only for as long as the Americans or other members of the NSG continue to supply fuel. In the event of an interruption in the fuel supply the Indians will be free to remove the inspectors and to use the material from the reactors in any fashion that they choose.
It has been calculated by American scientists that with eight nuclear reactors outside safeguards India will be able to accumulate enough spent fuel to produce the plutonium needed for 50 nuclear weapons annually. Other calculations place the figure even higher. Of course, everyone is aware that Indiaââ¬â¢s own limited natural uranium resources will now be available for Indiaââ¬â¢s strategic programme since it will receive fuel from abroad for its civilian safeguarded reactors.
Opponents of the deal have presented the following arguments:
ââ¬â It will open the door to other nuclear weapon countries cutting similar deals with their proteges ââ¬â Russia with Iran and China with Pakistan.
ââ¬â Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Japan, South Korea, etc, all forsook nuclear ambitions because they were told that there were penalties attached and that civilian nuclear cooperation would go forward only with such countries as had signed the NPT. For them there would be no legal or moral justification for not demonstrating nuclear weapon capability even if this meant opting out of the NPT. Similar considerations would apply even more forcefully in the Middle East where the presence of a nuclearised Israel provides an added incentive. In other words, once the breach has been created there will be many who will wish to drive through it, and there would be little the international community (the West) could do to stop it.
ââ¬â If India wished to be treated like a nuclear weapon country then it must accept the restrictions the nuclear weapon states have imposed on themselves. All of them, including China, have stopped the production of fissionable material for military purposes. Implicit in this is that even if India has a small stock of fissionable material at this time this stock should be enough to create the minimum nuclear deterrent that India says it wants. At the most, India should keep out of safeguards only a limited number of reactors that would give it the fissionable material for five to six nuclear weapons annually.
ââ¬â Whatever Pakistan may say now it is inevitable that there will be a nuclear arms race in South Asia. The Pentagon thinking on this was perhaps best reflected in the policy paper issued in January 2001 under the title ââ¬ÅProliferation: Threat and Responseââ¬Â. It said, ââ¬ÅIndian and Pakistani strategic programmes continue to be driven by the perception of the otherââ¬â¢s effort ..... India and Pakistan are expected to continue improving their nuclear and missile forces. In effect, a slow-speed Indo-Pak nuclear and missile arms race is underway, with consequences that are difficult to predict and potential for spillover beyond the subcontinent.ââ¬Â
It is perhaps instructive from our perspective even if American analysts have not raised it forcefully that during the long negotiations that the Americans conducted with India and Pakistan after the ââ¬Ë98 nuclear tests to persuade both countries to define and adhere to a minimum nuclear deterrent the American deputy secretary of state, Strobe Talbott, frequently said that during the Cold War the Americans and Russians had spent 5.5 trillion dollars to develop and maintain their nuclear arsenals.
He did not actually say so but it was clear that the ââ¬Åoverkillââ¬Â capacity that both countries developed flowed not from the security needs perceived by strategists but from the pressure that the highly articulate scientists and the industrial ââ¬â military complex exerted on policymakers. There is every reason to believe that something similar could happen in South Asia.
It is clear that even while touting the virtues of this agreement such as promoting non-proliferation or easing Indiaââ¬â¢s energy shortage ââ¬â arguments that no one in Congress will buy ââ¬â the Bush administration will be highlighting the role that this agreement will play in giving India the nuclear clout it needs to be Americaââ¬â¢s strategic partner in containing China. Will Congress buy this? A recent article in the prestigious Foreign Affairs argues that, ââ¬Åthe United States stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacyââ¬Â and that soon the US will be able to ââ¬Ådestroy the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia or China with a first strike.ââ¬Â
In detailing Chinaââ¬â¢s nuclear capabilities the article says that ââ¬ÅChinaââ¬â¢s entire intercontinental nuclear arsenal consists of 18 stationary single-warhead ICBMs. These are not ready to launch on warning: their warheads are kept in storage and the missiles themselves are unfuelled (Chinaââ¬â¢s ICBMs use liquid fuel, which corrodes the missiles after 24 hours. Fuelling them is estimated to take two hours.)ââ¬Â, and that ââ¬Ågiven the history of Chinaââ¬â¢s slow-motion nuclear modernization, it is doubtful that a Chinese second-strike force will materialize anytime soon. The United States has a first-strike capability against China today and should be able to maintain it for a decade or moreââ¬Â.
Congressmen and advisers such as former Senator Nunn will be aware that this is not just empty talk but a reflection of the reality that prevails. The United States has or will soon have ââ¬Ånuclear primacyââ¬Â In these circumstances would it be wise to put at risk this US supremacy by assisting another country ââ¬â no matter how friendly it is now ââ¬â that could in future become a counter-weight not to China but in combination with China to American supremacy?
For the moment, the tempo that the administration has sought to build for an early consideration of its proposal by Congress appears to have stalled. Partly this is due to Bushââ¬â¢s diminished political standing, partly to the perception that the Americans have been out-negotiated. What seems clear, however, is that there will be no early consideration and that the possibilities are that it will be on the congressional agenda only next year. It is also likely that as and when it comes up the Congress will subject it to conditions limiting Indian access to fissile material for weapon production.
It appears that the Americans are faced with a similar problem in the 45-nation NSG also. There is no doubt that many of the NSG members cannot afford to ignore American wishes but they will want nevertheless to try and minimise the damage to the non-proliferation regime.
The latest reports suggest that in the Vienna meeting of the NSG held a few days ago the Americans were not able to win support for putting the Indian deal on the agenda. A long battle lies ahead and no one should expect an early resolution. What should South Asia do in the meanwhile? Perhaps we need to ponder whether we want to step on the slippery slope which led the Soviet Union to ruin or to take a page out of the book of our northern neighbour which seems to be doing little to increase its nuclear might, and work out among ourselves a nuclear restraint regime that meets security needs without requiring an ever spiralling arms race.
The writer is a former foreign secretary.
By Najmuddin A. Shaikh
ACTING with remarkable speed, the Bush administration has submitted to Congress its proposals for changes in American law that would be required to give effect to the agreement that President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reached in New Delhi on March 1. It has also brought the proposal to a meeting of the Nuclear Suppliersââ¬â¢ Group so that this group of countries with the potential to export nuclear technology can make similar amendments in the guidelines they currently use to govern the export of nuclear and dual-use equipment and technology.
A propaganda offensive has also been launched to highlight the benefits of the agreement and to rebut the charge that the agreement would cause the unravelling of the non-proliferation regime created under the leadership of the US over the past decades, and triggered, ironically, by the Indian testing of a nuclear device in 1974. As an opening gambit in the long negotiations with Congress, the administration has laid down the marker, to its great disadvantage ââ¬â though it would be pleasing to the Indians ââ¬â that the agreement must be accepted as it stands since a renegotiation would lead to its unravelling.
Currently, American law provides that the president can exempt any country from the prohibition on exports of nuclear technology and equipment and, if the country is a signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) the exemption will take effect if Congress does not pass a joint resolution denying the exemption within 90 days. For countries that are not signatories of the NPT however, Congress has to approve the exemption and can take as long as it wishes to do so.
The changes that the administration has now proposed would exempt India and treat it as though it was a NPT signatory so that the deal can only be blocked if Congress is able to muster the will to pass a joint resolution within 90 days.
In effect, this would mean that Congress would have virtually no oversight and no ability to influence the terms and conditions of the proposed transfer. Apart from the non-proliferation lobby in Congress ââ¬â there are many influential lawmakers in this group ââ¬â other legislators are going to be concerned about the infringement on congressional oversight rights and obligations that the vesting of such power in the president would represent.
The more serious issue will be the concerns of the non-proliferators. While the deal was being negotiated many in Congress believed that the bottom line of the American administration would be that the deal would minimize Indiaââ¬â¢s ability to accumulate the material required for manufacturing nuclear weapons. In other words, that most of Indiaââ¬â¢s nuclear reactors, particularly the fast breeder reactors, would be placed under perpetual safeguards, and those that were allowed to remain outside safeguards would not provide material for more than five or six nuclear weapons a year.
It was also assumed that as Indiaââ¬â¢s nuclear programme expanded, with foreign assistance or through indigenous efforts, all the new facilities would be placed under safeguards and would not be allowed to contribute to Indiaââ¬â¢s nuclear weapon building capability. The current agreement does no such thing.
A close perusal of the agreement shows that of the reactors India has under operation or under construction, currently four are already under safeguards ââ¬â Rajasthan I and II (Canadian origin) and Tarapur I and II (American origin) as will be the two Russian ââ¬â assisted reactors at Koodakulam.
India has agreed that the research reactor CIRUS (Canadian origin but fuelled in part by heavy water provided by the US and now internationally known as the source of the plutonium clandestinely diverted by India for constructing the nuclear device it exploded in 1974) will be shut down by 2010 while the other research reactor at the Bhaba Atomic Research Centre (BARC) will be moved out and placed under international safeguards at its new location thus ensuring that BARC itself is not open to international inspection. None of the other currently operating reactors are to be placed under safeguards.
Another facet of the agreement that is cause for concern is that even those reactors that are being placed under safeguards will remain only for as long as the Americans or other members of the NSG continue to supply fuel. In the event of an interruption in the fuel supply the Indians will be free to remove the inspectors and to use the material from the reactors in any fashion that they choose.
It has been calculated by American scientists that with eight nuclear reactors outside safeguards India will be able to accumulate enough spent fuel to produce the plutonium needed for 50 nuclear weapons annually. Other calculations place the figure even higher. Of course, everyone is aware that Indiaââ¬â¢s own limited natural uranium resources will now be available for Indiaââ¬â¢s strategic programme since it will receive fuel from abroad for its civilian safeguarded reactors.
Opponents of the deal have presented the following arguments:
ââ¬â It will open the door to other nuclear weapon countries cutting similar deals with their proteges ââ¬â Russia with Iran and China with Pakistan.
ââ¬â Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Japan, South Korea, etc, all forsook nuclear ambitions because they were told that there were penalties attached and that civilian nuclear cooperation would go forward only with such countries as had signed the NPT. For them there would be no legal or moral justification for not demonstrating nuclear weapon capability even if this meant opting out of the NPT. Similar considerations would apply even more forcefully in the Middle East where the presence of a nuclearised Israel provides an added incentive. In other words, once the breach has been created there will be many who will wish to drive through it, and there would be little the international community (the West) could do to stop it.
ââ¬â If India wished to be treated like a nuclear weapon country then it must accept the restrictions the nuclear weapon states have imposed on themselves. All of them, including China, have stopped the production of fissionable material for military purposes. Implicit in this is that even if India has a small stock of fissionable material at this time this stock should be enough to create the minimum nuclear deterrent that India says it wants. At the most, India should keep out of safeguards only a limited number of reactors that would give it the fissionable material for five to six nuclear weapons annually.
ââ¬â Whatever Pakistan may say now it is inevitable that there will be a nuclear arms race in South Asia. The Pentagon thinking on this was perhaps best reflected in the policy paper issued in January 2001 under the title ââ¬ÅProliferation: Threat and Responseââ¬Â. It said, ââ¬ÅIndian and Pakistani strategic programmes continue to be driven by the perception of the otherââ¬â¢s effort ..... India and Pakistan are expected to continue improving their nuclear and missile forces. In effect, a slow-speed Indo-Pak nuclear and missile arms race is underway, with consequences that are difficult to predict and potential for spillover beyond the subcontinent.ââ¬Â
It is perhaps instructive from our perspective even if American analysts have not raised it forcefully that during the long negotiations that the Americans conducted with India and Pakistan after the ââ¬Ë98 nuclear tests to persuade both countries to define and adhere to a minimum nuclear deterrent the American deputy secretary of state, Strobe Talbott, frequently said that during the Cold War the Americans and Russians had spent 5.5 trillion dollars to develop and maintain their nuclear arsenals.
He did not actually say so but it was clear that the ââ¬Åoverkillââ¬Â capacity that both countries developed flowed not from the security needs perceived by strategists but from the pressure that the highly articulate scientists and the industrial ââ¬â military complex exerted on policymakers. There is every reason to believe that something similar could happen in South Asia.
It is clear that even while touting the virtues of this agreement such as promoting non-proliferation or easing Indiaââ¬â¢s energy shortage ââ¬â arguments that no one in Congress will buy ââ¬â the Bush administration will be highlighting the role that this agreement will play in giving India the nuclear clout it needs to be Americaââ¬â¢s strategic partner in containing China. Will Congress buy this? A recent article in the prestigious Foreign Affairs argues that, ââ¬Åthe United States stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacyââ¬Â and that soon the US will be able to ââ¬Ådestroy the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia or China with a first strike.ââ¬Â
In detailing Chinaââ¬â¢s nuclear capabilities the article says that ââ¬ÅChinaââ¬â¢s entire intercontinental nuclear arsenal consists of 18 stationary single-warhead ICBMs. These are not ready to launch on warning: their warheads are kept in storage and the missiles themselves are unfuelled (Chinaââ¬â¢s ICBMs use liquid fuel, which corrodes the missiles after 24 hours. Fuelling them is estimated to take two hours.)ââ¬Â, and that ââ¬Ågiven the history of Chinaââ¬â¢s slow-motion nuclear modernization, it is doubtful that a Chinese second-strike force will materialize anytime soon. The United States has a first-strike capability against China today and should be able to maintain it for a decade or moreââ¬Â.
Congressmen and advisers such as former Senator Nunn will be aware that this is not just empty talk but a reflection of the reality that prevails. The United States has or will soon have ââ¬Ånuclear primacyââ¬Â In these circumstances would it be wise to put at risk this US supremacy by assisting another country ââ¬â no matter how friendly it is now ââ¬â that could in future become a counter-weight not to China but in combination with China to American supremacy?
For the moment, the tempo that the administration has sought to build for an early consideration of its proposal by Congress appears to have stalled. Partly this is due to Bushââ¬â¢s diminished political standing, partly to the perception that the Americans have been out-negotiated. What seems clear, however, is that there will be no early consideration and that the possibilities are that it will be on the congressional agenda only next year. It is also likely that as and when it comes up the Congress will subject it to conditions limiting Indian access to fissile material for weapon production.
It appears that the Americans are faced with a similar problem in the 45-nation NSG also. There is no doubt that many of the NSG members cannot afford to ignore American wishes but they will want nevertheless to try and minimise the damage to the non-proliferation regime.
The latest reports suggest that in the Vienna meeting of the NSG held a few days ago the Americans were not able to win support for putting the Indian deal on the agenda. A long battle lies ahead and no one should expect an early resolution. What should South Asia do in the meanwhile? Perhaps we need to ponder whether we want to step on the slippery slope which led the Soviet Union to ruin or to take a page out of the book of our northern neighbour which seems to be doing little to increase its nuclear might, and work out among ourselves a nuclear restraint regime that meets security needs without requiring an ever spiralling arms race.
The writer is a former foreign secretary.
Samudra
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The author must understand that a arms race in South Asia will in the long run benefit India and effectively cripple what is left of the Pakistani economy.He can quit making threats about arms race.Our economy can afford one.
The author is also blind to the fact that India has agreed to perpetual safeguards in return for perpetual supplies.
The author is also blind to the fact that India has agreed to perpetual safeguards in return for perpetual supplies.
You're probabaly right, India can afford much more than Pakistan.
But I'm not sure if it will cripple our economy.
Chinese weapons and systems are much cheaper than the western designs and as per our need we'll keep minimum deterrance, i.e. smaller numbers of modern systems.
The strategy is to go for systems with full ToT and build them cheaper under license, further develop the indigenious capabilities and become less dependant on foreign designs.
Pak GDP is expected to reach $700-800 billion in 2030.
But I'm not sure if it will cripple our economy.
Chinese weapons and systems are much cheaper than the western designs and as per our need we'll keep minimum deterrance, i.e. smaller numbers of modern systems.
The strategy is to go for systems with full ToT and build them cheaper under license, further develop the indigenious capabilities and become less dependant on foreign designs.
Pak GDP is expected to reach $700-800 billion in 2030.
Samudra
SENIOR MEMBER
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Boss, there are lot of factors other than capital expenditure that help cripple ones economy when the country indulges in a arms race.
To match a Indian build-up the Pakistani defence budget will have to be beefed up to such an extent that other vital needs of the country will be starved of much needed funds.No international aid agency is going to provide aid to a country that prefers to spend so much on defence and spend what is left for development.
There are a lot of factors that effect the stability of Pakistani economy.I'm sure you're already aware of them.Lack of political stability,things like the recent earthquake come to mind.Therefore Pakistan might not be able to sustain very high expenditure for defence.
TBH Pakistani economy is still very fragile.Miles to go.
To match a Indian build-up the Pakistani defence budget will have to be beefed up to such an extent that other vital needs of the country will be starved of much needed funds.No international aid agency is going to provide aid to a country that prefers to spend so much on defence and spend what is left for development.
There are a lot of factors that effect the stability of Pakistani economy.I'm sure you're already aware of them.Lack of political stability,things like the recent earthquake come to mind.Therefore Pakistan might not be able to sustain very high expenditure for defence.
TBH Pakistani economy is still very fragile.Miles to go.
Correct!
To maintain current status quo, the balance ratio should not exceed from 4:1.
Both economies are growing at equal pace with India being on the top, but Pakistan can keep it up.
What ever India buys or develops, we only need a quarter of it to keep the balance.
Correct again!
Well it might or it may not, only future will tell.
Pakistan can afford to spend as high as 5% of GDP on defence, we've done that befor. Unfortunately this rise will affect other sectors like health, education etc.
The strength of Pakistani economy is the dynamic private sector which is to attract much more FDI in near future. The returns are second hightest in Asia after Vietnam as per a recent Meryl Lynch report.
Political stability is the only factor of serious concern I must admit.
Indeed it has!
But remember, even the longest journey starts with a single step. Pakistan has taken a leap forward.
Here is the grilling of RICE and the exposing of the deep indian/iranian defense link.
SEN. BARBARA BOXER (D), California: Did you say, "Before we go forward with this, we want this ended"? I mean, this is the defense news of the United States of America: "Indian Navy Trains Iranian Soldiers." Two of their ships were in the headquarters of Indian navy's southern command.
So you've got Iranian -- you're saying, on the one hand, we're going to allow fuel, nuclear fuel, to go from this country to their country, and they've got Iranian ships in port?
CONDOLEEZZA RICE: Senator, there are Iranian(CROSSTALK)
SEN. BARBARA BOXER: So have you made this part of the deal?
CONDOLEEZZA RICE: There have been and probably will be Iranian port calls in a number of countries in the world.
SEN. BARBARA BOXER: No, no, this isn't port calls. This is training of their military. Did you make this part of the deal, yes or no?
CONDOLEEZZA RICE: Well, Senator...
SEN. BARBARA BOXER: Because the reason I'm asking is, I think some of us would like to make it a condition.
Here is the entire script , enjoy:thumbsup:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june06/india_4-5.html
SEN. BARBARA BOXER (D), California: Did you say, "Before we go forward with this, we want this ended"? I mean, this is the defense news of the United States of America: "Indian Navy Trains Iranian Soldiers." Two of their ships were in the headquarters of Indian navy's southern command.
So you've got Iranian -- you're saying, on the one hand, we're going to allow fuel, nuclear fuel, to go from this country to their country, and they've got Iranian ships in port?
CONDOLEEZZA RICE: Senator, there are Iranian(CROSSTALK)
SEN. BARBARA BOXER: So have you made this part of the deal?
CONDOLEEZZA RICE: There have been and probably will be Iranian port calls in a number of countries in the world.
SEN. BARBARA BOXER: No, no, this isn't port calls. This is training of their military. Did you make this part of the deal, yes or no?
CONDOLEEZZA RICE: Well, Senator...
SEN. BARBARA BOXER: Because the reason I'm asking is, I think some of us would like to make it a condition.
Here is the entire script , enjoy:thumbsup:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june06/india_4-5.html
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