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INDIA: Building a Modern Arsenal in India

Baba Firangi,

Please take a look at the following figures published by Global Firepower and see the difference, now indian economy currently having 40% the size of chinese economy will surely take 15 years atleast to come upto the standard where china is today.




........................................China.......................................................India

Total Population ............1,330,044,544..................................................1,147,995,904
Military Manpower Available 729,323,673...................................................584,141,225
Fit for Military Service .........609,273,077...................................................467,795,073
Reaching Military Age Yearly ..20,470,412.....................................................22,229,373
Active Military Personnel ..........2,255,000......................................................1,325,000
Active Military Reserves ..............800,000......................................................1,155,000
Active Paramilitary ..................3,969,000......................................................1,293,300
Total Air-Based Weapons ...............1,900.............................................................1,007
Total Land-Based Weapons ..........31,300...........................................................10,340
Total Naval Units ...............................760................................................................143
Towed Artillery Systems ...............14,000.............................................................4,175
Merchant Marine Strength ...............1,822...............................................................501
Major Ports and Terminals ......................8................................................................. 9
Aircraft Carriers ......................................1..................................................................1
Destroyers ...........................................21..................................................................8
Frigates ................................................42................................................................16
Submarines ...........................................68 ............................................................. 18
Patrol Coastal Craft .............................368...............................................................43
Mine Warfare Craft ................................39 ...............................................................12
Amphibious Operations Craft ................121.................................................................7
Defense Budget / Expenditure $59,000,000,000..................................$32,350,000,000
Foreign Reserves $1,534,000,000,000................................. $275,000,000,000
Purchasing Power $7,099,000,000,000.............................. $2,966,000,000,000
Oil Production .......................3,725,000 bbl.................................................810,000 bbl
Oil Consumption ...............6,930,000 bbl .................................................2,438,000 bbl
Proven Oil Reserves 12,800,000,000 bbl ...........................................5,700,000,000 bbl
Total Labor Force .................800,700,000.................................................516,400,000
Roadway Coverage ..........1,930,544 km.................................................3,316,452 km
Railway Coverage .......................75,438 km.................................................63,221 km
Waterway Coverage .................124,000 km.................................................14,500 km
Coastline Coverage ......................14,500 km.................................................7,000 km
Major Serviceable Airports .....................467............................................................346
Square Land Area...................9,596,960 km ............................................3,287,590 km
 
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India’s Quest for Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence

Indian scientists recently launched an indigenously developed solid fuel rocket called the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) interceptor from Wheeler island to destroy a Prithvi target missile launched earlier from the Interim Test Range at Chandipur 72 Km to its North. The split second precision with which scores of systems and sub-systems were made to function flawlessly drew global attention to this spectacular achievement. The intercept was all the more challenging because it was designed to occur within the thermally sensitive layer of the atmosphere. In the event the target was destroyed at 15 km altitude.

Before that in Nov 06, DRDO scientists had done another successful experiment in which they had engaged and destroyed another Prithvi missile target. The interceptor missile in that trial was also another Prithvi, to whose original liquid motor, a solid fuel booster had been attached to give it an enhanced altitude capability up to 80 Km. It was christened ‘Prithivi Air Defence’ missile (or PAD). The experiment was intended to kill the incoming warhead before it entered the atmosphere. The interception occurred successfully at 50 Km above the ground level.

DRDO has announced that next April an AAD and a PAD would be fired together in an integrated mode against a single incoming target missile to increase the kill probability.

By any reckoning, DRDO scientists engaged in this programme deserve great credit for this very significant achievement. After all there are not many defence research and engineering organizations in the world which can claim credit for being able to hit a bullet with a bullet. However as seen so often before, DRDO community can not be faulted for suffering from any exgatterated sense of modesty. Based on two successes, they have claimed that in the next few years, India will have an indigenous ballistic missile defence system in place to intercept and destroy Intermediate-range (IRBM) and Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). This is hyperbole of the worst kind. Anyone even vaguely familiar with the enormous complexity involved in erecting Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) defences would immediately recognize the customary overstretch attempted by the DRDO scientists community each time they get a faint smell of success. The inevitable failures to meet the stated goals then cast a deep shadow on all the good work done.

Let us just very briefly look at the challenges involved in BMD. Ballistic Missile are essentially space weapons - in the sense that they traverse most of their distance to the target in space. They don’t really fly. They merely go up and down. Rocket motors attached to the missile give it a push ( in a single or multiple stages) to overcome earth’s gravity. After launch a Ballistic Missile arches up from one point and comes down on another. A typical Ballistic missile’s trajectory is a fourth as high as it is long. Therefore a missile even with a range of 100 miles reaches a height of 25 miles, i.e. outside the atmosphere. How high a ballistic missile reaches in its trajectory is a function of its range. The height attained also determines how fast it comes down on the target. An ICBM with a range of 6000 km and hence descending from a height of 1500 km could be reaching speeds up to 7 to 9 km/sec or 25 to 30,000 km/hr. A short range missile on the other hand would arrive on target at about 2 km/sec or 3000 km/hr.

A missile trajectory from the point of launch to impact can be divided in four segments i.e. Launch or Boost phase, Post boost, Mid-course and the Terminal Phase. For any aerospace defensive system to be credible, it must be multi-layered, i.e. engagement possibilities must be spread throughout the flight path or trajectory of the target-right from its origin to the end point. It must also be robust enough to nullify countermeasures and have sufficient margin at the edges to be able to cope with incremental improvement in tactics or technology. As in conventional air defence, terminal defences are expected to cope with only residual threat which survives the attrition imposed by multilayered area defences. They can not be simultaneously the first and last line of defence.

A full spectrum multi layered defence against Ballistic missiles entails both terrestrial as well as space based surveillance and kill systems with which engagement can begin as soon as the missile leaves the launcher. The process continues through the Post boost, mid course and finally the transatmospheric phase (both exo-atmospheric as well as endo-atmospheric) of terminal engagement. Technologically and financially, a stand alone, full spectrum Indian ABM system is and would remain well beyond India’s reach in the foreseeable future. In fact United States has spent hundreds of billions of dollars over the last six decades and is still experimenting with cutting edge technologies to make even a limited ABM system work. No such system is operational any where in the world - and none is likely any time soon.

Quite understandably, Indian effort is concentrated only on the terminal phase because it is relatively simpler in definition and less demanding in technology. Except the United States which both for political reasons as well as confidence in its science continues to pay homage to comprehensive defence against Ballistic missiles, all other nations seeking a defensive response (like Israel and Japan) are considering only terminal defences.

If terminal phase of the missile trajectory is loosely defined as when it begins to experience some significant air resistance (at about 40 km altitude) then its distance from impact point would vary with the distance it has traveled from the launch site. A longer distance missile would be approaching at a relatively shallower angle and hence would be farther away than its shorter range counterpart. Considering that a ballistic missile attack has to be assumed to be nuclear, and on impact with the interceptor threat of warhead activation is a distinct possibility, the intercept must occur well away from the target to avoid the devastating effects of air burst of a nuclear weapon. Interception in the exo-atmospheric regime i.e. before thermal effects due to atmospheric heating come into play are less daunting. However the flip side is that decoys become discernible only due to differential effect of atmospheric drag and heating on warheads and decoys.

Modern anti-missile radars (like the Green Pine) are capable of detecting and accurately determining spatial position of. warheads well beyond warhead’s entry into the terminal phase. However interceptor missile ranges are limited on account of other exacting demands on their performance. The American Patriot (PAC3) has a range of only 15 km. Israel’s Arrow, the leader in its class is limited to 40 km. Indian PAD and ADD measure well in comparison However PAD’s first stage continues to comprise a liquid fuelled motor which imposes several limitations in terms of its readiness duties.

Notwithstanding all the limitations of a defensive system, success achieved by our defence scientists community is still quite spectacular. However that should neither blind us to the remaining technological challenges nor to the political implications of Missile defence. Technologically what has been done this far is merely a ‘proof of concept’. From this juncture to fielding an operational system, there lies an enormous amount of development work which would consume much time, effort and financial resources.

However whatever the level of success that may be achieved, a few related aspects must be kept in view while embarking on a BMD programme.. The first amongst them is that while there is much technical sophistication and expense involved in erecting even a limited terminal defensive shield, in the end it is quite easily defeated. The simplest way would be simply to overwhelm the system with a large number of warheads. It is much easier and cheaper to send one more warhead to the target than what is required to defend against it. Defence against a massive attack is simply not possible. Besides numbers with which defences can be saturated, the very high speed of interception also imposes a severe limitation on the maneuverability of the interceptor. Therefore if warheads do not arrive precisely on the predicted trajectory, the interceptors may not be able to close the gap for an effective kill. Interception geometries even in the terminal phase are calculated based on the post boost trajectory of the warhead. An early method to defeat anti-missile defences was to pack more than one independently targeted warhead in a single carrier vehicle. The technique still remains valid and Chinese are known to have this capability.

Quite apart from actual number of offensive and defensive systems fielded, there is a real problem of perceptions too. Strong ABM defences sow a seed of doubt in the opponents’ mind regarding the deterrent value of his offensive forces, thus creating an impetus for force enhancement. It was deployment of ABM systems that created fears of an uncontrolled arms race which provided the impetus for the ABM treaty between US and the Soviet Union. US withdrawal from the treaty in 2002, has resulted in Russia testing new missiles and reworking systems to defeat the proposed American defensive shield. In the same vein it is unlikely that our ABM defences would go unnoticed by either the Chinese or the Pakistanis.

Finally, in the absence of means to conduct constant long range surveillance to detect a hostile launch instantaneously and ability to track trajectory of the warhead, terminal defences can not guarantee optimal effectiveness. All other countries deploying terminal defence systems are integrated into a formal or informal alliance led by the US-who has the necessary technical means to give the required surveillance and tracking support. We have signed with the United States a 10 year ‘US - India Defence Relationship - The Defence Framework’. Clause H of agreement seeks to ‘Expand collaboration relating to Missile Defence’. Is it our intention to integrate our fledgling capability with the larger US plan to erect ABM defences? Considering the choppy seas through which the Nuclear deal is having to negotiate its passage, it is unlikely that there would be a political consensus to back this nature of relationship with the US
 
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India's nuclear submarine plan surfaces

NEW DELHI - Expressing fears about cross-border terrorism in the wake of the November 26 Mumbai attack and keeping a close eye on China's military expansion, India announced plans this week to hike its defense budget by 34% to 1.4 trillion rupees (US$30 billion) and last week revealed that its project to build three nuclear-powered submarines is nearing completion.

"Things are in the final stage now in the Advanced Technology Vessel [nuclear-submarines] project. There were [mainly technical] bottlenecks earlier ... they are over now," Defense Minister A K Antony said on February 12.

The Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project is part of India's $3 billion plan to build five submarines and complete what it calls



a "triad" of nuclear weapon launch capability - from air, land and sea. India is concurrently developing the K-15 ballistic missile, which can be nuclear-tipped and launched from submarines.

Defense sources have told Asia Times Online that New Delhi has been actively seeking out assistance from France in the implementation of the ATV project, and that Russian engineers are already involved. The sources said that the sea trials of the nuclear-powered submarines should begin this month and that the submarines should be operational within the next three years.

The secretive ATV nuclear backed ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) project began in the late 1970's and is being implemented at a secret dry dock in Visakhapatnam, India's Eastern Naval command base. Observers have said that the submarines are a critical addition to India's weapons capabilities.

In a grim reminder of the possible dangers facing India from the sea, India's Naval chief Admiral Suresh Mehta warned this week that terrorists could smuggle "dirty" nuclear bombs via the nation's ports as they lack adequate security measures. Terrorists also used a sea route to infiltrate Mumbai.

Nuclear-powered submarines with their greater speed, power, range and the length of time they can stay submerged compared to conventional diesel-electric submarines are effective for sudden strikes as well as fast and stealthy protection from attacks.

New Delhi has been concerned about Beijing's strengthening of bilateral ties with Islamabad, particularly given recent tension on sea projects such as at the Gwadar port. China has also been developing ties with Sri Lanka and Myanmar to deepen its control over a complex energy-security conflict being aggressively played out in the region.

Given the ongoing tussle between India and China to control the waters of the Indian Ocean, the New Delhi government has been put under tremendous pressure from the navy to ramp up India's sea power. China has already spoken of creating three ocean-going fleets to patrol the areas of Japan and Korea, the western Pacific, the Malacca Strait and the Indian Ocean.

The ATV project has been in the spotlight as India's other attempt to procure a nuclear submarine this year received a setback when Russia "indefinitely" postponed delivery of the Akula-II class Nerpa nuclear submarine, citing incomplete sea trials and a lack of funds.

Further, the Amur shipyard in Russia's far east, where the sub is being built, is yet to finalize a new team following an accident in November in which 20 members were killed. The accident has led Indian media to describe the submarine as "cursed".

India has been looking at developing underseas capabilities to launch nuclear weapons, after gaining some competence in land-based nuclear delivery platforms for the domestically developed ballistic missiles Prithvi and Agni.

India has already developed a submarine-launched supersonic missile, a modification of the BrahMos cruise missiles, an achievement previously limited to only advanced nations such as the US, France and Russia. Ship and land launched versions of the BrahMos are being introduced in the navy and army.

The state-controlled Defense Research and Development Organization is also undertaking a joint development project with Israel Aerospace Industries to develop a surface-to-air missile which can be launched from land and ships.

Upgrade and renovation of India's navy will be an important aspect of India's US$50 billion defense modernization exercise. Under the plan, the projects code named 75 and 76 entail the production of 24 underwater vessels valued at US$20 billion to meet the challenges across the Indian Ocean.

In 2007, construction of the highly-advanced Scorpene submarine began at the upgraded Mazgon Dock in Mumbai as part of a US$3.5 billion deal for six such French submarines. As the Scorpene deal involves transfer of technology, it should be beneficial for both nations as India gains new technology and French firms gain a possible foothold in the big Indian market.

But significant delays are now expected in India's acquisition of the aircraft carriers Admiral Gorskov from Russia and two that are being developed at home. In early 2007, India purchased the 36-year-old US warship the USS Trenton (re-christened INS Jalashwa) with a gross tonnage of 16,900 tons for US$50 million.

The Trenton is the first ever US warship owned by the Indian Navy and the second largest that India possesses after the INS Viraat aircraft carrier. The Indian Navy plans to add 40 new warships to its fleet and the government plans to invest over 500 billion rupees (over US$12 billion) over the next 10 years on warships.

The government has encouraged the private sector to play a bigger role in the nation's defense, and India's largest engineering and construction firm Larsen & Toubro has announced plans to build defense warships and paramilitary vessels at a proposed facility in Tamil Nadu
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After the rude awakening of the Mumbai terror attacks, others branches of the military are also now pushing for more upgrades and additions.

The Indian Air Force, for example, is seeking 42 fighter squadrons up from the current 32 or 33 squadrons (each with 14 to 18 jets), to offset the phasing out of older Russian planes. The army, which has been allocated a large piece of the military outlay, is seeking more tanks and howitzer field guns.
 
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INS Arihant - Be scared, be very scared lol

The Indian Navy leased a Project 670A Skat (Charlie I Class) nuclear-powered submarine (INS Chakra in Indian Naval service) for three years - from 04 January 1988 to January 1991. The boat was was manned by a Russian crew who also had the task of training Indian submariners on how to operate the nuclear-powered vessel. In addition to becoming a training ground, INS Chakra also acted as a design laboratory for developing and testing indigenous nuclear submarine technologies. The lease was not extended after January 1991 and the submarine was returned back to Vladivostock, Russia where it was decommissioned from Russian naval service. The Russian crew that trained the Indian submariners have reportedly taken key posts, probably in the Indian Naval Design Organisation, to design India's first nuclear-powered submarine codenamed the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV). This top secret project has facilities in New Delhi, at Visakhapatnam and Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh and at Kalpakkam in Tamil Nadu. The plan is for a class of five submarines fitted with long-range, nuclear-tipped missiles. A nuclear-capable missile (Sagarika) is reportedly under development at the Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE) at Bangalore, Karnataka.

The naval wing of DRDO (Defence Research & Development Organisation) manages the organization and since 1985 has always had a retired Vice Admiral in charge. Vice Admiral Bharat Bhushan is the first known Director General of the program. In late 2000, the project was given a new lease of life with the appointment of Vice Admiral R.N. Ganesh (Retd) to take charge. An experienced submariner, he was the first commander of INS Chakra. In early 2004, Vice Admiral P.C. Bhasin (Retd) was appointed as the head of the ATV program, as he was the former Chief of Material. As per a news article in domain-B, dated 19 May 2007, Vice Admiral Arun Kumar Singh (Retd) is to be appointed as the new Director General (DG) of the highly-classified ATV program. He too had commanded INS Chakra during her service with the Indian Navy. He also commanded submarine shore establishments, INS Virbahu and INS Satvahana and served as the Director of Submarine Operations. As the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Submarines), he authored the Indian Navy's 30 year submarine construction program and was also responsible for the modernisation of the submarine force, primarily the Sindhugosh Class boats.

Rahul Bedi in a news article in IndiaPRWire, dated 17 May 2007, stated the following;

• The vessel will be based on the Charlie I Class boat and will be 124 meters long, have a displacement of 4000 tons and be fitted with a 100 MW nuclear reactor, developed jointly by DAE (Department of Atomic Energy) and DRDO (Defence Research & Development Organisation). Bharat Rakshak Note: Earlier reports indicated that the boat could likely resemble the Russian Navy's new Severodvinsk Class attack submarine and/or the Akula Class attack submarine, of which the Indian Navy reportedly plans to lease a pair.

• The 100 MW nuclear reactor went critical in October 2004 at Kalpakkam and is now fully operational. A miniaturised version of the reactor is under construction for integration into the ATV at Visakhapatnam. In July 2006, then-incumbent Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee inspected the ATV's reactor project while participating in the 20th anniversary celebrations of the commissioning of the Fast Breeder Test Reactor at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research in Kalpakkam. Earlier, in October 2004, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the ATV facility when he launched the construction of the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor. The Prototype Testing Centre at Kalpakkam will be used to test the boat's turbines & propellers while a similar facility at Visakhapatnam will run trials on the vessel's main turbines & gearbox.

• Officials familiar with the ATV project stated that the highly enriched uranium fuel for the reactor was supplied by the Rare Materials Project (RMP) in Ratnahalli near Mysore, Karnataka. The four to five years delay in the reactor reaching criticality, was due to the extended time taken by RMP to produce an adequate quantity of uranium, the officials added. While many components of the reactor like the steam-generator and the control rod mechanism have been indigenously developed within India itself, senior naval officers stated that Russia had helped Indian scientists overcome certain technical hurdles. This included assistance not only in designing the vessel's reactor, but also guidelines in eventually mating it with the boat's hull. The involvement of Larsen & Toubro, that began in 2001, helped kick-start the stalled ATV project. L&T was awarded the contract to build the hull (code named P 4102) at its Hazira dockyard facility in Gujarat and has already floated sections of it on a barge to Visakhapatnam.
 
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Update on Boeing Super Hornet Pitch - MRCA

Good news

Boeing and its F/A-18 industry partners Raytheon, GE and Northrop-Grumman held a press conference in Delhi on Wednesday.

As far as the transfer of source codes for AESA is concerned, Boeing is still at the "can't discuss in an open forum, lets see how this plays out" mode. At the same time, the fact that India has agreed to the US end user agreement during Hillary Clinton's visit here means that the full-up Super Hornet IN, inclusive of the upgraded GE F414 engine, the APG-79 AESA and other key systems are cleared for transfer. So it's quite possible that the version of the AESA offered will be full-spec. In fact, I am sure, India would not accept anything less than that.

Secondly, February 2010 is the big date for the IAF and the next phase of the Hornet There will be an evaluation of the following: 1. Mission systems flight evaluation 2. AESA 3. FLIR 4. EW 5. Weapon delivery 6. Maintenance evaluation 7. Technical evaluation.

All this will be done at the Naval Air Station Lemoore in California, the same base from where I flew the second of my Super Hornet sorties. Boeing reps repeatedly state that the AESA will be evaluated in conjunction with other systems, ie, the data link, FLIR etc to showcase the full package.

As far as AESA is concerned, the Boeing-Raytheon team seemed to take on their European rivals who are still developing/integrating their product. They explained how it took eight years for the APG-79 to move from low rate initial production to first operational deployment. The dates are as follows: June 2003 Low rate initial production / December 2006 Operational evaluation completed / December 2007 Initial Operational clearance & Full scale production approval and May 2008 First operational deployment.

The APG-79 has 1,000-hours mean time between failures (MTBF), more than 75,000 operational flight hours, it's been approved for sale to India and will be sustained in US service beyond 2035. The proposed GE F414 EPE (Enhanced Performance Engine) for India offers a 20 per cent increase in thrust and a 1 per cent reduction in fuel burn. The F414 is itself in the 22,000-lb thrust class, 170 lb/second airflow. Engine change is done in under 30 minutes, interchangeable left and right engine installation. No need for a functional check flight after engine change. No throttle restrictions while in operation (I have personally witnessed this, it's amazing -- you can pretty much do what you want with the throttle, slam it to burner and take it back as much as you want ... nothing happens).

Boeing says it WILL offer the Indian Air Force an out and out 9G fighter -- this has been a promise made by the Boeing team. I was led to believe this involves changes in the flight control system, though the airframe itself is OK for 9G.

The pitch -- this is a rugged, proven, operational platform, which is now available to India at a cost NOT too much over its single engine competitors in the MMRCA race. As far as their performance in the trials in Bangalore are concerned, they say that they are satisfied with what they were able to demonstrate to the Indian Air Force but reiterate that its the IAF which has to be satisfied. Thats it for the moment folks.
 
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Details on the PAF's Saab 2000-based Erieye airborne early warning and control aircraft

I have friends that work for Saab if you guys have any question on this deal feel free to ask.

Saab 2000

http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_o_no4M2xEPY/Si2DWjRr4qI/AAAAAAAAG78/_lvqQBaMFkk/s1600-h/3-730722.jpg

System Layout

http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_o_no4M2xEPY/Si2DW1aKK1I/AAAAAAAAG8E/GW_WOSEagdE/s1600-h/2-731208.jpg

Key Performance Data
http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_o_no4M2xEPY/Si2DW0520DI/AAAAAAAAG8M/e0RqnADMrpw/s1600-h/1-731922.jpg

Sorry I can post the pics here, for some reason its not allowing me to post pics.
I will post details about the Indian Phalcon system next


:cheers:
 
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This is for people who wanted more info on the India-British Aircraft Carrier Deal

Sixty-five thousand tonnes of ambition

Recent reports of Indian intentions to purchase an aircraft carrier from Britain would not substantially add to India's ambitions to be a global power. However, the rumours are symbolic of India's delicate strategic balancing act as it shifts its focus to China.

Britain's imperial control over India was secured by its mastery of the seas, what strategists today call 'command of the commons'. The very idea that the United Kingdom could sell one of the Royal Navy's - and indeed the nation's - most potent political and military assets to its erstwhile colony is therefore of considerable symbolic importance - both because of the geopolitical inversion that it represents, and also the implications for India's ascent from a regional to global power.

In November 2009, The Guardian reported that one of Britain's two forthcoming Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers, each costing £2bn, could be sold to India as part of next year's strategic defence review. India is reported to have lodged 'a firm expression of interest'.

Each ship will displace 65,000 tonnes (three times the size of the preceding Invincible class carriers), will be specially configured for power projection, and will be the most capable carriers outside of the United States Navy. There is minimal official evidence to support the story, and any Indian Navy interest is more likely to be in understanding the ships' design and technology than in the purchase of a hull. India's defence establishment has severe and sometimes crippling difficulties with efficient and timely procurement, and has budgetary constraints of its own. In 2008, sources raised the possible sale of the USN aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk, but nothing transpired. The report could be an attempt by the Indians to shake Russia out of its lethargic refurbishment of the Admiral Gorshkov. Lastly, Britain's Ministry of Defence (MoD) labeled the report 'unfounded speculation', although the denial was awkwardly worded and there are strong political incentives to issue such a statement. Nonetheless, if a deal were to pass, there could be far-reaching military and political consequences for both sides and outside powers.


Indian Seapower
Naval expansion

The Indian Navy (IN), the world's fifth largest, has wide-ranging maritime aspirations. As early as 2000, Defence Minister George Fernandes defined India's sphere of interest as extending 'from the North of the Arabian Sea to the South China sea'. A year later, India patrolled the Malacca Straits in the aftermath of 9/11, on America's request. In 2004, its ships played a prominent role in humanitarian operations after the Indian Ocean earthquake. India's first naval doctrine was released in the same year. Two years later, four Indian warships in the Mediterranean evacuated thousands from Lebanon during the war between Israel and Hezbollah. In 2008, Admiral Navy Chief Sureesh Mehta announced that 'by 2022, we plan to have a 160-plus ship navy, including three aircraft carriers, 60 major combatants, including submarines and close to 400 aircraft of different types', constituting 'a formidable three dimensional force with satellite surveillance and networking'.

India's naval expansion accords with rapidly growing perception of a threat from China, whose surface fleet is three times as large and is supported by five times the personnel. The notion of a 'string of pearls', referring to Chinese political and military ties with states on India's periphery, is ubiquitous in strategic circles. This fear is compounded by the pace and scale of Chinese military, and especially naval, modernisation. China has also intensified its claim on India's north-eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, blocked a $3bn loan from the Asian Development Bank directed at the province, issued a demarche after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh campaigned there, and reportedly increased the frequency of incursions. As India's strategic attention shifts from Pakistan to China, its orientation is becoming increasingly maritime in nature; India's Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC), along which its energy supplies travel, are perceived to be vulnerable to coercive disruption during a crisis or war. This shift to naval concerns was reinforced by the amphibious nature of the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008.
India's carrier fleet

Presently, the Indian Navy possesses the INS Viraat, an ageing platform that served the UK as HMS Hermes in the Falklands, but cannot launch heavy combat aircraft from its short runway. It was expected to serve until 2011-2, but after recent refurbishments may endure until 2019. The Admiral Gorshkov, purchased from Russia and bedevilled by delays and spiralling costs, is anticipated to enter the fleet in 2012-3 as the INS Vikramaditya. Finally, the first of India's Vikrant class or Indigenous Aircraft Carrier, the INS Vikrant, is expected to enter into service in 2014, with a second to follow three years later.

If, as is likely, the Vikramaditya replaces the Viraat, then India could possess three carriers by 2017 (delays are probably inevitable). This would guarantee that at least one carrier would be deployed whatever the state of maintenance operations, and that carriers could potentially be simultaneously deployed in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, and Bay of Bengal. These carrier groups would be equipped with highly capable BrahMos cruise missiles, advanced MiG-29Ks, and limited submarine escorts. Depending on China's naval modernisation, this would constitute Asia's largest, most advanced and most offensively capable naval force.



65,000 tonnes of ambition: Indias Navy and its rivals, 2010-2025


The Queen Elizabeth class carriers
Drawbacks

It is unclear why the Indian Navy would seek to procure a Queen Elizabeth class carrier: whether they would replace or augment the prospective Vikramaditya. Financial constraints and force planning imply the former, since India would be unlikely to pay an extra $3bn to Russia for an additional carrier whose function has not been articulated in naval doctrine or strategic planning. At the same time, a few factors speak against India purchasing a replacement British carrier.

First, the sheer size of the vessels - capable of carrying forty aircraft - would render them expensive to man and equip with airpower. An extra carrier group would be costly to support in terms of protective screens of surface ships, anti-submarine platforms, and submarine escorts. The naval budget has risen rapidly in recent years, but could not support this scale of expansion. Some naval thinkers contend that inadequately protected aircraft carriers are deeply vulnerable, and consequently of limited military use in a conflict if put at risk by an adversary. This is borne out by the British experience during the Falklands War, and current US concerns over China's growing submarine force. For India, a hugely costly platform that could be 'asymmetrically' neutralised would represent a poor investment.

Second, issues that were invoked during the prospective purchase of the USS Kitty Hawk emerge here: although the flight deck of the Queen Elizabeth class carriers is not much larger than that of the Vikramaditya, the aircraft capacity is twice as large. Indian sailors may not possess the experience to manage a correspondingly more complicated flight deck.

Third, the British carriers are not likely to be as adapted to Indian needs as the Vikramaditya will be. The latter will employ a STOBAR configuration (ski-jump on the bow and three arrestor wires on the stern) with an eye to the Indian purchase of MiG29Ks. The British carrier will use STOVL, as is appropriate to the British fleet of Harriers and the anticipated F-35s. However, this is not a major concern because the British design is anticipated to be modifiable, and arrestor wires could be installed at reasonable cost.

Fourth, India may be concerned about too rapid an expansion in naval capabilities during a period of heightened regional tension. India's previous use of an aircraft carrier, during the 1971 Bangladesh War, was to launch attacks on Pakistani territory. Pakistan may use procurement of an additional carrier, or an accelerated procurement of a replacement for Viraat, as a pretext for a more offensive posture on Kashmir or advancement of its ballistic missile and nuclear programmes. China may also gain wider acceptance of its own modernisation. Regional powers who have undertaken joint naval exercises with India may become warier of its ambitions.

Fifth, and potentially most important, India may jeopardise its deeply rooted defence relationship with Russia. Bharat Karnad, a former member of India's National Security Advisory Board, has cautioned that if India chose an American aircraft in its $11bn tender for multirole combat aircraft, 'the tourniquet of spares and servicing support could be applied across the board, resulting in a rapid degrading of the readiness aspects of the Indian military [and] a cutback in the Russian involvement in many high value military technology collaboration projects'.

He goes on to speculate that 'there is the possibility of Russia making common cause with China in denying India a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, a seat India craves'. Although the Gorshkov deal is not as lucrative, Russia would likely take issue with Indian rejection at this late stage. It should be noted that although 70 per cent of India's present military equipment is of Soviet or Russian origin, Russia also depends on India as a major customer and might be self-deterred from taking excessively punitive measures.
Opportunities

On the other hand, the acquisition of a Queen Elizabeth class carrier (or a carrier with a similar design) could also bring several benefits. The expanded aircraft capacity over the Vikramaditya would allow for the long-term expansion of naval airpower. The editor of Jane's Navy International suggests that 'It's all about power projection. The Indian Navy is in the process of expanding its reach as a naval force capable of operating far from its own shores'. The actual difference in power projection depends on the Navy's ability to acquire a suitable aerial contingent and ancillary ships, but the Vikramaditya would likely be a faster ship. The service life of the British carrier, though, would be up to three decades longer.

It is also significant that the British carrier was adapted to be interoperable with the US Navy. In February 2009, executives of Lockheed Martin claimed that 'the Indian Navy has expressed an interest in the [fifth-generation] F-35B', for which the Queen Elizabeth class carriers are optimised, adding that the F-16, entered in India's tender for 126 multi-role combat aircraft, is 'the bridge to the F-35 for India'. These comments could be nothing more than a tactic to encourage Indian consideration of the F-16. But in the context of the 'New framework for the US-India Defense relationship' of 2005, the possibility of configuring a major platform for US assets would be of potential strategic value.

Wider implications

Dr. Lee Willett, Head of the Maritime Studies Programme at RUSI, argues that 'there is no public indication as yet that this story has any substance. In the context of the current visceral debates in the UK regarding the defence budget and the Future Defence Review, there are many different rumours emanating from different sources for different reasons often due to vested interests. If there is any substance to the story, it is likely that the potential sale of one carrier will be just one of many options being considered within the defence review thinking.'

'The Government has stated clearly and regularly that the UK's own requirement for two carriers remains,' he adds. 'This raises the question of whether - if there is any truth in this story - the UK should actually consider adding a third carrier to the programme, with that third carrier being the ship sold to the Indian Navy. This would potentially reduce the cost of all three ships, would enable the UK to sell the third ship at market value, and would extend the carrier programme's investment in British industry and jobs'. The IN's interest may be in the design and technology principles which are underpinning the UK's delivery of two state-of-the-art carriers for £5 billion for the pair. One Indian naval source suggested that 'If we were to be interested at all in the Queen Elizabeth class, it would be because of their claimed air defenses [and] what they claim their radar systems could do'.

If Indian intentions transcend design and technology, the strategic consequences of a sale could be severe for the UK. HMS Invincible was decommissioned in July 2005, Ark Royal is planned to be decommissioned in 2015, and Illustrious in 2012. After 2015, therefore, Britain would be left with just one aircraft carrier. Along with its two major twentieth-century withdrawals from bases in Singapore and East of Suez, this would mark a milestone in the Royal Navy's ongoing retrenchment. It would also constrain Britain's ability to simultaneously defend local waters and engage in power projection without local bases. In the summer, former chief of defence staff Lord Guthrie had questioned Britain's need for two carriers at all, asking 'Are there other, better ways of delivering sea power, maybe with more frigates? How good are aircraft carriers at chasing Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden'? The sale of a carrier could dovetail with an intellectual shift in the strategic defence review to manpower-centric conceptions of war, increasingly salient after the British experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Alternatively, mounting casualties in the latter theatre could instill a wariness to commit troops, strengthening the case for carrier-based air power, as applied against Serbia during the 1999 Kosovo war.

What could be equally important in the medium to long-term would be the shift in the naval balance. At present, Britain has a 3:1 superiority in carriers over India. If a sale occurs, India could reverse that figure in under a decade, giving it the world's second largest number of carriers. Britain at present supports India's bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The UK's own position is perceived to depend on its nuclear status and formidable military capacity. With the future of Britain's nuclear deterrent under considerable debate and the possibility of a precipitous decline in its expeditionary capabilities, the UK might judge that India's accession to the UN Security Council could come at cost to itself. Britain may therefore soften its enthusiasm for India's bid, as might France. Russia also supports India's bid, and a weakening in the Indo-Russia defence relationship could similarly imperil its backing. These are merely possible rather than probable scenarios, but their magnitude renders them worthy of attention.

India's ambitions to be a global power would not be substantially more fulfilled by acquisition of a British rather than Russian carrier. The potential for integration with the F-35 is less consequential than seems, for India is jointly producing a fifth-generation fighter with Russia. The projection of power in defensive, coercive, or humanitarian operations would depend more on the number of carriers than their precise capabilities, although India would prefer a more advanced carrier built to British specifications. This is particularly imperative if India considers China its major peer competitor; any Chinese carrier would not emerge until 2014, and could therefore be a half-generation ahead in terms of technology. None of these considerations has been publicly aired, but they will weigh on the minds of strategists in Britain and India over the coming months.

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not a chance.

May be in the metropolitan areas or major cites may see change. GIFT city will give Indian economy a face. And you will see Sky scrappers In all major cites. The biometric Indentity if it work may work to curb Grass root corruption and show real rural development.

2030 we will have china's current Economic size if not greater. and be the 3rd largest Economy. after 30 years of Growth we will be in the same status as China, A nation nearing the end of its quest for development.

China of course by then would have over taken the US, in terms of economic size.

well all that is assuming We meet the challenges of Climate change.
And not get nuked by Pakistan.(not joking Pak has almost pushed the Button twice, in the Last decade.)

I think if India want to make progress. Most Indians, not just Indian leadership, must think like you do. You make educated analysis of the situation. If current trend holds, India would surpass the US economy in absolute term in 40 years. I also like how you raise the climate change issue and the issue with Pakistan.
 
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Umm???.. Naaah... Make it 2140-2150.. Or beyond..

Right now, we in India are in medieval age.. And our army still uses bows and arrows to wage and fight wars.. While China today is already as advanced as Western Europe.. We will need all that much time to catch up to what China is today..

Happy now??.. Go eat some more noodles..

Cheers:cheers:

If you are willing to accept the facts, I can't make you. I was showing the projection base on recent facts.
 
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hey dude... first match up to our MKI...(u guys are pretty hard working so i expect u will be able to do something by 2035-40 surely...).. than start ur day dreaming.....U r extremely behind India in military technology as of now....so work hard instead of making arrogant claims..

China is defintely behind the Russian and Europeans in term of technology. China is generations behind that of the US. In terms of technology, I think China can catch up to Russia in about 10-15 years and Europe in about 20-25 years base on current trend.

Because India's high tech are totally imported, in the next 25 years, the technology in India's arm force would be depends on what India imports from the Russia, Europe and the US. After 25 years, US would be the only country that can provide India with arms that can match that of China.
 
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between usa and russia what happened to communist russia same thing will happen to communist china,, history will repeat it self

Communist Russia fell because its government focus on military spending and ignore civilian need. China, on the other hand, focus more on civilian technology first. This is the same direction taken by the US. Who knows what the future holds, but I doubt China will fell apart like USSR.
 
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If you are willing to accept the facts, I can't make you. I was showing the projection base on recent facts.

leave projection...
come to the moment called now....

When can u make something like MKI...????
not before 2030-35.... now thats present reality...

So that is when u will have smthng India has now...What India will have by then u can project...
 
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China is defintely behind the Russian and Europeans in term of technology. China is generations behind that of the US. In terms of technology, I think China can catch up to Russia in about 10-15 years and Europe in about 20-25 years base on current trend.

Because India's high tech are totally imported, in the next 25 years, the technology in India's arm force would be depends on what India imports from the Russia, Europe and the US. After 25 years, US would be the only country that can provide India with arms that can match that of China.

what u think doesnt matter....u can even think China will equal Russia and US in 2 years and surpass aliens in 3 years..
 
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