S-2
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"But shoulder mounted one has enough time to escape from seen. By the time tank crew analyze the direction of incoming ,attacking party has enough time to escape. You have brilliant living example of role of AT in Hizbo-Israel conflict."
POG (Party Of God) ATGM gunners had a mixed-bag of success. If infantry were working with armor, the liklihood that an ATGM's signature would be spotted on firing went way up.
Here are two U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute papers written by U.S. Army officers about the Israeli operational military experience in Lebanon and Gaza. I think they make worthy reading-
Back To Basics: A Study Of The Second Lebanese War And Operation CAST LEAD-LTC Scott C. Farquhar, General Editor May 2009
and
We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israel War-CSI 2007 Matt Matthews
Both are research documents available for purchase and NOT student papers. These links are free reading courtesy of the U.S. government.
Now who says we never give you guys anything?
"So, that's one of reason tanks or armored cars are only confined to urban warfare. "
This is an unusual comment that is neither commonly perceived nor accurate. Armor operates far better where there's open space to permit both manuever and long-range direct-fire engagements with their primary killer, the tank cannon. While there were certainly some close range engagements at Medina Ridge and 73 Easting, much of the killing occurred at range or via thermal night sights.
Most argue that the confined spaces of an urban battlefield dramatically increase the effectiveness of infantry with portable ATGM. In point of fact, the 2006 war shows an Israeli armor force vulnerable to the channelizing effects of rough terrain and built-up areas. Both conspired to create vulnerable targets in the same manner that urban terrain affects armor.
JMHO.
POG (Party Of God) ATGM gunners had a mixed-bag of success. If infantry were working with armor, the liklihood that an ATGM's signature would be spotted on firing went way up.
Here are two U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute papers written by U.S. Army officers about the Israeli operational military experience in Lebanon and Gaza. I think they make worthy reading-
Back To Basics: A Study Of The Second Lebanese War And Operation CAST LEAD-LTC Scott C. Farquhar, General Editor May 2009
and
We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israel War-CSI 2007 Matt Matthews
Both are research documents available for purchase and NOT student papers. These links are free reading courtesy of the U.S. government.
Now who says we never give you guys anything?
"So, that's one of reason tanks or armored cars are only confined to urban warfare. "
This is an unusual comment that is neither commonly perceived nor accurate. Armor operates far better where there's open space to permit both manuever and long-range direct-fire engagements with their primary killer, the tank cannon. While there were certainly some close range engagements at Medina Ridge and 73 Easting, much of the killing occurred at range or via thermal night sights.
Most argue that the confined spaces of an urban battlefield dramatically increase the effectiveness of infantry with portable ATGM. In point of fact, the 2006 war shows an Israeli armor force vulnerable to the channelizing effects of rough terrain and built-up areas. Both conspired to create vulnerable targets in the same manner that urban terrain affects armor.
JMHO.