History of Russia's Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) System (2002) | Union of Concerned Scientists
Despite the improvements, US military and intelligence reports say the Moscow system would still be relatively easy to defeat. The Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces told the House Armed Services Committee in 1987 that although the Soviets had spent over 10 years and billions of dollars developing an ABM system, the United States could penetrate it with a small number of Minuteman ICBMs equipped with "highly effective chaff and decoys," he went on to say that, "if the Soviets should deploy more advanced or proliferated defenses we have new penetration aids as counters."2 The Department of Defense has said that the Soviet system is no more advanced than was the US Safeguard system, which was developed in the early 1970's, but deactivated as soon as it was deployed in 1975 because of its military ineffectiveness and high cost.3 A 1989 report on Soviet Military Power also concluded that "with only 100 interceptor missiles, the system can be saturated, and with only the single Pillbox radar at Pushkino providing support to these missiles, the system is highly vulnerable to suppression."
How Effective Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense is Against Countermeasures? - Defense Update - Military Technology & Defense News
While the US administration openly stated confidence in its Ground Based Interceptors (
GBI), research analysts from the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) warn that such weapons may not be sufficient to protect from a deliberate attack launched by North Korea, since the current level of
missile defensetechnology has not matured yet to the level enabling the defense systems to engage realistic-complex targets, or discriminate between real
decoys and real warheads.
David Wright, co-director and senior scientist at UCS say it is likely that the US will face a ‘reactive enemy’ that will be able to develop and deploy
decoys and other
countermeasures to make it more difficult for U.S. defenses to defeat such missiles.“None of the intercept tests conducted so far of the U.S. ground-based or ship-based systems has included realistic countermeasures that you should expect in a real-world attack from North Korea.” Wright stressed, “The Pentagon still doesn’t know how to solve this problem… That’s why the large difference in technical sophistication between the U.S. and North Korea does not automatically tip the balance in favor of the U.S. in this challenge.”
“People frequently downplay the countermeasures issue, in part because it makes the problem so difficult. But unfortunately it is real.” Wright concludes, “The bottom line is that it makes no sense to add interceptors and/or an east-coast deployment site until the system has been shown to be effective against a real-world threat.”
Understanding the Extraordinary Cost of Missile Defense | RAND
Missile defense is a tough challenge, both technically and operationally. It was difficult enough when interceptors carried nuclear weapons and had a kill radius measured in hundreds of meters or even kilometers. But hit-to-kill requires precision that is measured in tens of centimeters and microseconds. It is especially challenging for national missile defense because there is very low tolerance for leakers, warheads that slip through the defense. Nearly everyone underestimates the breadth of the effort that will be required to field effective missile defenses. This does not necessarily mean that the job cannot be done, just that a program must fully account for all the challenges for it to be successful (assuming, of course, that the program is technically feasible to begin with). The technical challenges of missile defense amplify the effects of politically driven proposals and compressed schedules.
The British Government has been happy to allow US Radar installations to be based on British soil to feed into the US ABM system. The MOD seems to see ABM defences as too expensive and of too little ability to make any difference other than giving false assurance to the public. Given that the USA has spent $120 billion on ABM systems since the 1980's and achieved very little in terms of capability it is not hard to see why the MOD has this view.
Report Critiques U.S. Missile Defense | Arms Control Association
Arguing that the U.S.-based ballistic missile interceptor system is “very expensive” but has “limited effectiveness” against potential attacks from Iran, a September report by the independent National Research Council recommends replacing the current system with a revamped but largely similar system and expanding it by adding a new site in an East Coast state.
The panel of experts said, however, that its proposed system might not be effective against likely threats, saying “it depends” on how the United States and potential attackers design their systems and how much they know about each other’s technology.
The expert panel considered alternatives to midcourse interception, such as striking enemy missiles while still in their early “boost” phase, but found these options impractical. A missile’s boost phase is simply too short—just a few minutes—for an interceptor to reach it in time, the report said. Moreover, airborne lasers would have to fly near enemy airspace and would be vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire, while space-based interceptors would require hundreds of satellites and cost as much as $500 billion over 20 years, the experts estimated.
The midcourse approach provides significantly more time for the intercept, but has its own drawbacks, according to the report. Most notably, it must confront the “discrimination problem” of telling the difference between real warheads and decoys, also known as countermeasures.
One of the main conclusions of the report is that no practical missile defense system “can avoid the need for midcourse discrimination,” which “must be addressed far more seriously if reasonable confidence is to be achieved.” Until that reality is accepted, they say, “there will be no end to the poorly thought[-]out schemes proposing to avoid the need for midcourse discrimination.”
The report finds that, “at some point, countermeasures of various kinds should be expected.” Initial decoys may be unintentional, such as debris from the booster rocket that would be traveling along with warheads through space. Yet, “as threat sophistication increases, the defense is likely to have to deal with purposeful countermeasures,” that adversaries may use to “frustrate U.S. defenses.”
At the same time, the report says that it is not clear if its own proposed system would be effective against decoys. On this central question, the panel says that its plan “offers the greatest potential for effective discrimination” but “it is by no means a certain solution” and “there is no unequivocal answer” to the question of whether missile defense can work against countermeasures.
Many experts say that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) never has conducted tests against realistic countermeasures, in part because the systems have had enough trouble against targets without decoys and in part because planners assume that countries such as Iran and North Korea would not initially deploy countermeasures on their missiles. The report said the MDA has canceled research programs that would try to deal with countermeasures and that the committee “could not find anyone at MDA” who could explain much of the past research in this area.
The report, called “Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives,” is sharply critical of the current 30-interceptor system deployed on the West Coast, which it describes as “fragile” and ineffective against “any but the most primitive attacks.”
The system was first deployed in 2004 by President George W. Bush “before its development was complete in order to meet what was considered an urgent need to get a system deployed quickly,” according to the report.
Main US anti-ballistic missile defence system appears to have less than a 50:50 chance of an interception - Hyperbola
The US Missile Defence Agency has admitted that its latest test of its anti-ballistic missile interceptor missile failed to strike its target. The test of the Ground-based Midcourse Defence System missile occured on 5 July. It involved launching a target “ballistic” missile from the Kwajelein Atoll launch site in the Pacific followed by the launch intereptor missile carrying an upgraded (Capability Enhancement 1) Exoatrmospheric Kill Vehicle from the Vandenberg Air Force base in California. Unfortunately the planned interception and destruction of the target missile failed to take place.
This was the third failure in a row of the system which is designed to protect the continental United States of America from a limited hostile missile attack using the interceptors based at Fort Greely, Alaska. The previous two failures were in 2010.
Atlantic Community:Open Think Tank Article "Failure to Launch?"
Despite the congratulatory announcement, the US-NATO plan has many critics. At the forefront of the criticism are the questions of whether the extremely expensive (around $12-15 billion per year) missile defense shield will be effective enough to warrant the high price tag. Others question if the allied countries are currently under the threat of a missile attack, and if not, whether the vast network of anti-ballistic missile defense systems will unnecessarily strain relations between Russia and the West and potentially create a strategically unstable climate.
Given the potential risks of missile defense development, BMD appears to be an extremely expensive and unproven form of security. Conversely, if a true ballistic missile threat presented itself in the absence of NATO’s current missile defense initiatives, the time required to develop a capable anti-missile system would put the West at a significant strategic disadvantage. These factors beg the questions: how close to perfect is useful? How much treasure are NATO allies willing to exhaust for relative success?
Special Commentary: Indias Missile Defence by Amit Gupta
While Indian scientists have expressed confidence in the system and claimed it has a 90% accuracy level, impartial observers tend to be more sceptical. The best anti-missile systems tend to have an accuracy rate of 70% and that statistic can also be challenged (Broad and Sanger, 2013). The most common complaint against anti-missile defences is that they cannot distinguish between real missiles and decoys thus, invariably, letting some actual warheads in and causing damage. Moreover, as Brigadier Arun Sahgal has pointed out, the missile shield would require round the clock online connectivity, uninterrupted power supply, and associated systems that even at the best of times, are unreliable in India (Bedi, 2012).
Read it and then discuss , how practical and effective is the thing you are talking about , currently in development phase when the world power's have this to say about their own developed advanced systems , in which billions of dollars and tremendous sources were poured and yet nothing substantial was obtained , they have reservations about North Korea and Iran's capabilities even .
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